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Preface
“To the desert, and the Bedouin, the coming of the British 
was a small whim of God. There is something enduring about 
the huge sand dunes, the endless empty horizons, the foul 
water and solitary wandering camels and the sublimely 
arrogant Bedouin soul. The Romans, the Abyssinians, the 
Turks, the British have all in their turn come, and in their 
turn have gone. Whoever comes next will leave as shallow 
an imprint.”1
Alfree, “The hAwks of hAdrAmAuT”, 1967
Of all the possible successors it was the politically dwarfish German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) following in the footsteps of the giant that was the British Empire. 
Even though officially without a mission to colonize, or the means to do so, the GDR 
and its leading party SED2 without doubt aimed to leave a substantial “imprint” 
in Yemen, or more precisely, its southern region. The GDR’s foreign policy in 
the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)3 was designed to reproduce 
its very own state- and nation-building process, the “planned development of 
Socialism.”4 Until its accession to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990,5 
the GDR had been expanding this strategy step by step and, with the Kremlin’s 
approval, maintained intensive contacts to the South Yemeni regime throughout 
the existence of the PDRY.
So why does the impact of a demised state’s foreign policy on another long-
gone state and nation even matter? First, as this analysis will show, the GDR’s 
engagement in South Yemen’s state-building process is highly underrepresented 
1 | Alfree, 1967, 192.
2 | Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands.
3 | The People’s Republic of South Yemen renamed itself in 1970.
4 | German: planmäßiger Aufbau des Sozialismus. Schroeder, 2013, 110ff. 
5 | For example, a visit by a South Yemeni delegation of the Ministry of Interior in the GDR 
in August 1989, in: Bericht über den Aufenthalt einer Delegation des MdI in der VDRJ, July 
25 to August 1 1989, in: BStU MfS HA VII7954, 43ff.
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in today’s foreign policy history narratives of the PDRY, the GDR and the USSR 
alike6 – mostly due to remaining gaps in archival research. As a consequence, 
this case study also aims to complement recent research on the role of the Arab 
states in the Cold War. Second, current analyses and assessments by the Western 
media on the Yemeni transition process after 2011 and the abrupt termination of 
the internationally mediated National Dialogue in the wake of large-scale armed 
conflict in Yemen in early 2015,7 tend to ignore the complexity of Yemen’s social 
and political structure and the resulting conflicts. Especially since the launch 
of Saudi Arabia’s “Decisive Storm” operation against the Houthi movement, 
Western media and self-declared experts appear to be in favor of more accessible 
but regularly oversimplified explanations for the current escalation of violence 
in Yemen. The popular focus on the Sunni-Shiite nature of the struggle, swiftly 
reinterpreted as a “proxy war”8 between Riad and Teheran, is only one example 
among many.
Almost invisible in Western media coverage of Yemen is the history of half the 
country: the deceased Marxist state in the south and its remnants in today’s Yemeni 
society.9 In Yemen, the new interpretation of a separate southern identity has been 
gestating for almost a decade now. Waving the PDRY flag and commemorating 
the anniversaries of British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 or secession from the 
north in 1994,10 the identity of the Southern Movement draws from integrative 
symbols and memories of the former PDRY. This case study claims that South 
Yemen’s state-building process and its actual manifestation as a state cannot be 
explained in a comprehensive way without taking into consideration Moscow’s and 
East Berlin’s intensive engagement and presence there. Whether the East German 
“imprint” has to be considered just as “shallow” as the preceding foreign powers’ 
is another question of this analysis. This book is not about today’s struggle for 
peace and stability in Yemen. First and foremost, it is an historic case study of the 
German Democratic Republic’s activities in South Yemen, the only Marxist state 
that ever existed in Arabia11 and at times the closest and most loyal ally to the Soviet 
Union in the region. However, this book also aims to raise awareness of the roots 
of one of today’s major internal divides in Yemen, the identity rift between north 
6 | Usually, the GDR’s activity is mentioned in relation to the presence of other states of 
the Eastern Bloc in South Yemen, such as the ČSSR. Halliday, 1990, 207. The same may be 
said for overviews on the GDR’s foreign policy. Wentker, 2007, 286.
7 | Steinvorth, 2015; Stenslie, 2015.
8 | Avenarius, 2015.
9 | “Yemeni” is an onomatopoeic approximation to the Arab adjective “yemenī”.
10 | Madabish, Divisions within Yemen’s Al-Hirak delay announcement of Southern 
independence, in: Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 1 2014; Augustin, 2015, 53.
11 | Historic Term; “Arabia […] is that great peninsula formed by the Arabic Gulph [sic!], 
the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulph[sic!],” in: Niebuhr, 1792, 5.
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and south. The main transition mechanism, the National Dialogue, was the first 
attempt to acknowledge the different interests of the major factions, but it failed 
to equally include and bind all parties, among them the Southern Movement. 
Hoping against hope that Yemen as a state will survive this crisis, Yemenis with 
the will and the ability to build a new Yemen will have to achieve the impossible: 
the integration of all social forces into the process of political transition, so that 
each and every one of them can claim this process as their own. We remember 
former President Ali Abdallah Saleh’s12 famous quote: ruling Yemen was “like 
dancing on the heads of snakes.”13 Today, Saleh wants the world to believe that 
he is the only leader able to get Yemen back on track.14 But by perpetuating his 
system of patronage and corruption, Saleh has turned out to be very much part 
of the problem. Thus, with the serpent charmer Saleh gone, the key for Yemen’s 
transformation is not only to leave the old basket and flute behind, but the decision 
of each and every snake to be part of this transformation, to shed its skin and 
become a very different kind of political animal for the sake of a common goal: a 
happy Yemen.
12 | Arabic: Al ī Abdallah Ṣāleḥ; The Party’s leading figure Saleh had already been head 
of state in the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) since 1978 and had kept his power 
position in unified Yemen as well.
13 | Clark, 2010.
14 | Schiavenza, Yemen's Wily Puppet Master. Ali Abdullah Saleh, ousted in the Arab 
Spring protests, has re-emerged as the country's most influential man, March 29 2014.
Preface

Section A. AnALYticAL FRAMeWoRK

CHAPTER 1. Then and Now:  
Why the Past of Yemen’s South and the GDR’s Role in it matter
„ “ – God, the nation, revolution, unity!”1
NATioNAl moT To of uNified YemeN since 1994
“[Ismail] knew not to unite with the north and he was right, 
look what happened since 1990. […] The truth is we really 
lost our leadership in 1986 after that we went downhill. 
how we united, i dont know? The fact is if [Ismail and the 
former leaders of the Left] were still alive; we‘d be better 
off! [sic!]”2
YemeNi blogger liviNg iN The u.s. commeNTiNg oN A souTh 
YemeNi proTesT iN wAshiNgToN iN 2009 
The case of South Yemen is exceptional in more ways than one. After ousting 
the British from their Crown Colony in 1967, the South Yemeni regime seized 
power to erect a new, socialist state from scratch. The radical South Yemeni 
leaders aimed at eradicating both the remnants of British occupation, but also the 
traditional socio-political structures of Yemeni society. At times in their state’s 
history, especially during the years of economic growth in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, it appeared as if they had succeeded. However, the Marxist experiment 
turned out to be rather short-lived. After the “1986 crisis”, an inner-party struggle 
of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) followed by a bloody civil war, the majority 
of the revolutionary leaders were dead, exiled, or imprisoned. The PDRY never 
recovered from this political and economic blow. Yemeni unification in 1990 was 
followed by another civil war, this time between the former north and south. In 
the end, “Marxist Arabia” disappeared from the map without a trace.3 During 
Yemeni unification, the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) of the north simply 
expanded its former political system with minor adjustments. The YAR’s major 
1 | World Heritage Encyclopedia, National Motto. 
2 | South Yemeni Protest in Washington, YouTube Photography and Comments, July 7 2009.
3 | On the role of ar tificial borders and the construction of social realty through their 
demarcation on maps: Willis, in: Al-Rasheed, 2004.
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party, the General People’s Congress (GPC) led by its President, Ali Abdallah 
Saleh,4 claimed power. Ever since, Yemeni school children have started their 
school day by shouting the motto of a supposedly unified nation: 
„ “ – God, the nation, revolution, unity!”5
This motto must be considered part of the GPC’s, or rather Saleh’s, wider policy 
to overcome the country’s fragmented and stratified nature to create a unified 
national Yemeni identity.6 Thus, the re-emergence of a distinct southern identity 
about a decade later in January 2007 came as a surprise to the majority of 
external and even some internal observers. Due to feelings of discrimination 
and marginalization, former South Yemeni military personnel had initiated 
protests on the occasion of the anniversary of the “1986 massacre”, as they would 
call the incident. The appeals of retired officers for equality and compensation 
drew especially the young, and the loose congregation of protestors mutated into 
what is called the Southern Movement today, or just “The Movement”: Al-Hirak.7 
Fragmentation at this point had not been overcome and after the Arab Upheavals 
of 2011 and Ali Abdallah Saleh’s downfall the year after, the “Southern Question” 
emerged as one of the main obstacles to Yemen’s current transformation process.8 
Waving the PDRY-flag today, a significant part of Al-Hirak has been advocating for 
secession from the Republic.9 Supported by a weakened YSP10 and former PDRY 
functionaries, the secessionists challenge and thus endanger not only Yemen’s 
national unity today, but also its possible post-crisis transformation. How and why 
did this separate and clearly artificially constructed identity survive? Where are its 
origins and who had an active part in its formation? The historic references to the 
PDRY used by Al-Hirak, glorification of day-to-day life in former South Yemen, 
4 | Arabic: Ali Abdallah Saleh; The Party’s leading figure Saleh had already been head 
of state in the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) since 1978 and had kept his seat in 
unified Yemen as well.
5 | World Heritage Encyclopedia, National Motto. 
6 | On the history of socio-political fragmentation in Yemen: Dresch, 1993 and 2000.
7 | Arabic: Al-Ḥirak, Augustin, 2015 and Day, 2012, Rise of the Southern Movement, 
227ff. Even though Day’s analytical approach to Yemen’s modern history has to be rejected 
as overly simple, his account on the events of the last two decades offers an elaborate 
summary of recent political developments in the country.
8 | Among others like the Houti conflict in the north. On the dynamics of the Houti Conlfict: 
Brandt, 2013.
9 | Thousands rally for Southern Independence in Yemen, October 12 2013 (AFP), in: ahram.
org; Clash between Yemen troops. Southern Separatists wound four, January 27 2014 
(AFP) Divisions within Yemen’s Al-Hirak delay announcement of Southern independence, 
in: Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 1 2014.
10 | The Yemeni Socialist Party replaced the National Front as the new “vanguard party” 
of the PDRY in 1978. 
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and still active insider relations and networks of former YSP functionaries11 give 
rise to demand a more diverse and intensive research on and analysis of the 
PDRY’s history and especially its development as a socialist state. 
South Yemen’s unique history as a Marxist state in the Arab world and its re-
emergence as an “imagined community”12 par excellence during Yemen’s ongoing 
transition alone render South Yemen an interesting object of International 
Relations study.13 However, to explore the early years of state- and nation-building 
in the separate south and the formation of a separate identity, a thorough account 
of external involvement in the process is needed: the emergence of a state led 
by a Soviet-style vanguard, including the process of “Socialist state- and nation-
building” would never have taken place without external influence of East Germany 
and the Soviet Union. After the British had left and taken their money with them, 
the conflict-ridden and impoverished fledgling state needed large-scale support 
to realize the regime’s ideological project, which was readily granted by the Soviet 
Union and its right hand in the international sphere, the GDR. As a consequence 
of the interdependence between Moscow’s, East-Berlin’s and Aden’s actions, this 
case study not only offers a foreign policy analysis of East German engagement, 
but at the same time includes the internal developments in South Yemen as an 
essential determinant. “The GDR in South Yemen” is a unique case study in 
many respects: South Yemen’s recent history provides an intriguing venue for 
foreign policy engagement by one of the most contested, ignored, and neglected 
international actors in 20th century history: The German Democratic Republic.14
11 | Like for example Ali Salem Al-Beidh (Arabic: ˁAl ī Sālem al-B īḍ), Augustin, 2013.
12 | Anderson, 1983, 35.
13 | In this analysis the discipline of “International Relations” (capitals) is dif ferentiated 
from the actual relationships between states, or “international relations”. 
14 | Gareis, 2006, 49; Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007, 30.
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1. AN ANALYSIS OF ThE GDR’S FOREIGN POLICY – A FRuITLESS 
ENDE AvOR?
“The effor ts of small states to reach their goals have to be 
considered foreign policy nonetheless.”15
hermANN weNTker
Due to profound controversies on the scope, quality, and content of East German 
foreign policy in academic discourse and political praxis, an extensive debate on 
the GDR’s foreign policy in general is inevitable for the analysis of any case study 
of East German foreign policy engagement. Furthermore, studies of the GDR’s 
foreign policy regularly fail to clarify the role and position of the GDR’s foreign 
activities in relation to its political system and ideology as part of the SED’s “Policy 
of survival”. To do justice to the interdependence between the system of Real 
Socialism and East German foreign policy, this analysis explicitly includes the 
interdependence between the domestic and international sphere while accounting 
for its two major determinants, the Soviet Union and the “other Germany”.
To this day, German and Cold War studies discourse cannot even agree on the 
question of whether the GDR was able to pursue an independent foreign policy in its 
own right.16 The German Federal Republic’s17 international activities, on the other 
hand, have been considered a comprehensive, full-fledged foreign policy ever since 
the Treaties of Bonn and Paris came into force in 1955 and diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union were established. According to Helga Haftendorn, “the Federal 
Republic of Germany claimed its place as an equal member among the community 
of peoples”18 at this point, even though it hadn’t achieved full sovereignty, yet. 
Further along the way, the West German intellectual Ralf Dahrendorf diagnosed a 
“sturdy state existence” with a “considerably big scope of action”19 in the mid-1970s. 
Contrastingly, Siegfried Bock, a high-ranking East German diplomat, in hindsight 
does not consider the GDR “a normal actor in international relations”, as it was “not 
able to claim the same scope of action and options as other states.”20 These opinions 
clearly demonstrate the huge gap between West and East German self-perceptions, 
with West Germany expressing far more confidence in their international actions 
than their Eastern counterparts.
However, the impact of the GDR’s foreign policy during its existence and 
after cannot simply be denied in one sweeping blow. At least in certain countries 
15 | Wentker, 2007, 3.
16 | Wippel, 1996, 27; Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007, 30; Wentker, 2007, 10. 
17 | Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); German: Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
18 | Haftendorn, 2001, 56.
19 | Dahrendorf, Ralf, in: Wentker, 2007, 1.
20 | Bock, Siegfried, 1999, in: Wentker, 2007, 3.
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and regions, East Germany’s international performance had and still has a 
considerable influence on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and its bilateral relations. In 1990, East Germany officially terminated foreign 
relations and dismissed its diplomatic personnel. In certain cases, however, 
reunified Germany drew from relations and connections established by the GDR, 
that is, in those countries where former West Germany for one reason or the 
other had not been involved. This long-term impact of East German international 
engagement so far has widely been neglected in academia, but clearly has to be 
regarded part of a wider discourse on how to handle the fact of German separation 
in history and political science in general. 
One of the major controversies here is whether the two separate German 
histories between 1945 and 1990 should be written as one and if so, how this 
could be done. Initially, this question was addressed by Kleßmann in the late 
1980s.21 He tried to include the history of both German states in his narrative 
of German postwar history. This concept was resumed about a decade and a 
half later, and from there, a new discourse beyond bipolar-system thinking has 
evolved, including a demand for an “integrated postwar history” in German 
studies.22 Obviously, the discipline is bound to at least partly revise its analytical 
approach to Germany’s divided past. And while the dictatorial character of the 
political system of the GDR calls for a conscious debate about the interrelation 
between the SED dictatorship and the GDR’s policy output, it is not an excuse or 
justification for ignoring the impact of the GDR’s existence and performance as 
a state in the international system in its entirety. Studies considering the GDR 
as a mere object of history exiled to the “footnotes”23 without doubt have proven 
inadequate in explaining the direct and indirect impact of the GDR on other 
actors within the international community of states.
This is especially true for the effects on the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The controversy over the exclusive focus on the German Federal Republic with 
regard to German postwar history has not yet come to a conclusion. But without 
doubt, the mutual reference of the two German states had its part in the formation 
of two separate German identities and thus on both states’ performance in the 
international sphere: Ever since their “zero hour” in 1945, both German states 
defined their new identity as states claiming to be the “better Germany”, while 
inevitably referring to their antipode. As a consequence, the long-term goal of 
research on German history should not only be to include East German history, 
but to even overcome the rather restrictive interpretation of the “parallel history of 
Germany” by Kleßmann. Current discourse suggests using an approach to German 
history that includes differences and similarities, as well as the interconnected 
21 | Kleßmann, 1988.
22 | Möller, in: APuZ 3/2007, 7.
23 | Heym, Stefan, 18 March 1990 and Wehler, 2008, 362.
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character of the two German states, to identify the long-term impact of separation 
on unified Germany and thus unified Germany’s foreign policy. This analysis 
explicitly positions itself within this debate and advocates for a more open and 
especially more public debate about Germany’s divided past and reunited future 
in not only academia, but also politics. In 2010 Klaus Schroeder asked: 
“Are the Germans off their heads? Even though they have been reunited for over 
twenty years, they keep emphasizing what separates them, not what they have 
achieved together.”24 
If Germany intends to achieve not only a structural unification, but a joint reunion, 
reconciliation, and merger of the two societies in the long run, “the Germans’ 
doubled history cannot be overcome separately,”25 as Weidenfeld noted in the 
early 1990s. This especially holds true for German foreign policy history, as the 
double existence of two German states in the international realm is not a matter 
of interpretation, but a fact witnessed by the international community of states for 
over forty years and thus cannot be ignored any longer.
Regarding the GDR’s foreign policy, the “other Germany” in the West emerged 
as one of the two major determinants shaping the East German international 
scope of action. The second determinant, the Soviet Union, for the most part 
claimed full control over East German international actions. But even though 
there did not exist an East German foreign policy independent from Moscow, 
this did not necessarily result in the non-existence of East German foreign policy 
making in general: regardless of its degree of autonomy, any policy directed by 
an internationally recognized state towards the international community of states 
to further its national interest has to be considered foreign policy. Undeniably, 
relations between the GDR and the Western allied forces exemplify the limits of 
the SED’s room for maneuver. But East Berlin nonetheless sought and found ways 
to realize its national interest in day-to-day politics in the international realm. 
Despite the boundaries of the GDR’s foreign policy being clearly marked, East 
Berlin discovered other, more modest ways to assert its political interests abroad. 
The GDR offered education and training for political cadres of Socialist-friendly 
states and became heavily engaged in the organizations of the United Nations 
even before its admission as a full member. Other venues for East German foreign 
policy were the CSCE Process in the early 1970s26 and East German engagement 
in the Middle East27 from the early 1960s. Furthermore, some of the so-called 
24 | Schroeder, 2010, 7.
25 | Weidenfeld, 1993, 15.
26 | Müller, in: DA 4/2010, 610.
27 | The author opts for a wide understanding of the term “Middle East” and follows 
Steinbach who defines it geographically as the “Arab world between Egypt and the Indian 
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developing countries28 provided an extraordinary scope of action for East Berlin. 
Firstly, Moscow explicitly opened the door for East German activities in the “Global 
South.”29 Secondly, Western Germany as the legal successor of the “Third Reich” 
had consented to political obligations to the state of Israel.30 This approach resulted 
in severe political pitfalls and restrictions for Bonn in the Near and Middle East. In 
conclusion, the “developing world,” and particularly the Arab states from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1970s, became the main venue of East Germany’s “patchwork 
policy.” Acknowledging the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany 
as the two major foreign policy determinants of the GDR, this case study aims 
to deliver a foreign policy analysis of East German engagement in South Yemen. 
It follows Hermann Wentker’s argument in which he differentiates between the 
phases of development of the relationship between the GDR and the Soviet Union, 
and between East and West Germany: Not only did Bonn and Moscow undergo 
significant changes during this time, as the GDR itself changed as well and thus 
these dependencies were not static either. 
Finally, this analysis explicitly includes the dictatorial character of the GDR’s 
political system as an integral part of any policy analysis of the GDR. Unfortunately, 
analytical tools designed to understand the functioning of democratically 
constituted states turn out to be rather inadequate when confronted with the 
organization of the GDR’s political system. In spite of its name, the German 
“Democratic” Republic, the GDR had never been designed as a democracy, as 
Walter Ulbricht emphasized during his exile in Moscow in 1945: “It only has to look 
democratic while we keep everything in our hands.”31 The SED’s unconditional 
claim to power was even formalized in the GDR’s constitution of 1968: “The 
German Democratic Republic is a Socialist state of workers and farmers […] led 
by the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party.”32 The party’s influence was 
explicitly designed to penetrate every aspect of society and its political structures 
with the SED’s version of Socialism. For example, educational policy was based 
Ocean, the Persian Gulf and Iran, including Afghanistan and Pakistan,” in: Steinbach, in: 
Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007, 494. 
28 | A critical account of the term “developing states”: Sindjoun, Luc, in: Badie/Berg-
Schlosser/Morlino, 2012, 640-645. On “modernization theory”: Badie/Berg-Schlosser/
Morlino, 2012, 1609-1613.
29 | “Global South” is part of the “Postcolonial Project” and is the critical and competing 
conceptualization of what has been called the “Third” or “Developing World” to avoid the 
First-World/Second-World Dichotomy and to emphasize the agency of these countries, in: 
Bullard/Anheier/Juergensmeyer, 2012, 725-728.
30 | Meuschel, in: Kleßmann/Misselwitz/Wichert, 1999, 117.
31 | Ulbricht, Walter, May 1945, in: Leonhard, Wolfgang, 1961, 365. Leonhard as a former 
member of the “Ulbricht Group” quotes Ulbricht from his memory.
32 | Constitution of the GDR of 1968, Ar ticle 1.
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on the concept of “collective education” to form “socialist personalities.”33 The 
long-range objective of this policy, also called “educational dictatorship,” was the 
creation of the “new socialist human”34 who would willingly concentrate all his 
efforts on the establishment of a communist utopia.
As a consequence, any analysis that aims to go beyond official statements of 
the leading party, the SED, and political and academic studies of the time has 
to guard against relativizing the system’s dictatorial character. This argument 
opposes those who insist on the existence of social and political spheres remaining 
untouched by the state’s penetration and who argue for an analysis decoupled 
from the traditional concept of dictatorial regimes.35 Furthermore, any study of 
the GDRs foreign policy today has to presuppose a self-image of the state and its 
functionaries colored in socialist ideology. Especially with regard to foreign policy 
and the Party’s monopoly on any cross-border relations, it is almost impossible to 
imagine any space within GDR’s society occupied with international questions 
untouched by state interference. Thus, it does not suffice to describe the GDR’s 
legal system, constitution, and official statements to assess the true motives behind 
the GDR’s foreign policy. Rather all of these have to be critically questioned and 
compared to constitutional reality and political day-to-day life, while relying on 
primary sources as much as possible, to allow a fruitful conclusion on the GDR’s 
performance in the international system.
2. Puz zLE, hYPOThESES, AND STRuCTuRE – hOW ThE RESE ARCh 
QuESTION GENER ATES ThE ANALY TICAL APPROACh
The case study first and foremost is a foreign policy analysis. However, it aims 
to include a critical perspective on the “limits of foreign policy” from both a (1) 
normative-ethical and a (2) descriptive-empirical perspective, while (3) expanding 
the analytical perspective. In doing so, the analysis is able to draw conclusions on 
(4) the exceptional case as a possible model or “ideal type” of the GDR’s foreign 
policy towards the “Global South”.
(1) In international law the principles of “equal sovereignty” and “non-intervention” 
have to be considered the basis for the international community of nation states and 
thus the international state system as it has been established after WWII.36 The two 
principles firstly define the reach and influence of a state’s foreign policy as ending at 
33 | “Bildung und Erziehung“, in: Kleines politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 116-118.
34 | Ulbricht, Walter, 10 Gebote für den neuen sozialistischen Menschen, July 10 1958, in: 
Protokoll der Verhandlungen des V. Parteitages der SED, 1959.
35 | E.g. Sabrow, 2007, 19-24.
36 | Charter of the United Nations, Ar ticle 2 (4) and (7); Giddens, 1983, 263; Welsh, 
Limiting Sovereignty, in: Welsh, 2004.
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the boundaries of another state’s sovereignty and secondly declare any infringement 
of these boundaries illegal. Apart from questions concerned with military interference 
of one state into the territory of another, which can be summarized under the label 
of “humanitarian intervention”,37 infringement of sovereignty can also be caused by 
other means of intervention and imposition. What is the relationship between one 
state’s foreign policy and the sovereignty of another? Where does foreign policy end 
and intervention begin? To what extent can the foreign policy agent influence internal 
developments of the recipient state? This is where the normative-ethical “limits of 
foreign policy” may be discovered and explored.
(2) This normative-ethical dimension is complemented by an extensive 
empirical analysis of East German foreign policy engagement in South Yemen 
to identify the “limits” of foreign engagement in concrete terms. How do the two 
determinants of foreign policy, the national and the international, limit a state’s 
foreign policy? What determines the success or failure of a foreign policy strategy? 
Thus, the analysis intends not only to describe GDR’s foreign policy in South 
Yemen, but to evaluate its success with regard to its goals and motives, assess the 
importance of the country for the GDR’s foreign policy and finally to comment on 
the impact of the GDR’s actions in South Yemen. 
(3) To fully understand a phenomenon’s limits, one has to include more than 
just a single perspective on this boundary: No analysis of foreign policy can 
ignore the recipient or host (state) of foreign policy. Thus, the approach expands 
the traditional analytical perspectives of foreign policy analysis that usually focus 
exclusively on the foreign policy agent. This perspective is inspired by the critical 
stance of the “postcolonial project” usually referred to as postcolonialism.38 This 
interdisciplinary field is occupied with the “forces of oppression and coercive 
domination that operate in the contemporary world.”39 Halliday emphasizes the 
benefits of postcolonial perspectives for studies concerned with the Middle East:
“This […] ‘anti-hegemonic’ approach stresses that we need not just look at the 
differences of social and political composition, or interest (e.g. in regard to trade 
or oil), but also to know how Middle Eastern states, and their peoples, regard 
international relations, not least to explain why they make the choices they do. 
Too often external analysis ignores not just history and context, but the roots of 
protest and the perspective of regional actors.”40
37 | Orford, 2003; Walzer, 1977; Shue and Wheeler, both in: Welsh, 2004, 11-28 and 29-51.
38 | Postcolonial research relies heavily on the post-structuralist perceptions of Michel 
Foucault and Jacques Derrida and thus is closely connected with other so-called “critical” 
fields of study in the social sciences in general and the discipline of International Relations 
(IR) in particular. On the boundaries of the discipline: Lockman, 2010, 207 and Young, 
2001, 63ff.
39 | Young, 2001, 11.
40 | Halliday, 2006, 32.
CHAPTER 1. Then and Now: Why the Past of Yemen’s South and the GDR’s Role in it matter
28
To remedy this shortcoming, studies committed to the “postcolonial project” not 
only aim to deconstruct these structures of domination, but also to recover agency 
of the “subaltern”41 (Latin: the subordinate). As a consequence, the ‘host state’ 
of foreign policy is not merely considered a dependent but also an independent 
variable, not a mere statistic of but an explanatory for East German policy design, 
implementation, policy change, and outcome. To grasp the motives, formulation, 
and implementation of East German activities in South Yemen, a thorough 
analysis of the socio-political conditions in South Yemen before and during the 
GDR’s presence is an inevitable precondition.
(4) In relation to the big picture of the GDR’s foreign policy, its activities 
in South Yemen were by no means the rule but the exception. How can this 
exceptional case be of any use beyond its own narrative? The research process on 
East German foreign policy engagement in South Yemen successively produced 
the major hypotheses of this study: The case of South Yemen may not only be 
considered the “exception to the rule”, but also a model suggesting a theoretical 
“ideal type”42 of the “general,”43 a “utopia” of East German foreign policy toward 
the Global South.
From the Big Picture to the Small Picture and Back Again – 
Structuring the Argument
The following section briefly summarizes the overall structure of the analysis 
and at the same time is intended to give the reader guidance to the overall 
approach. Divided into three Sections, the study follows the traditional structure 
of Introduction, Analysis, and Conclusion. Section A, “Analytical Framework”, 
introduces the topic and puzzle and provides the reader with an overview of the 
project’s theoretical presumptions. It includes subchapters on method, hypotheses, 
and theory. After an overview of the state of research on the interdisciplinary topic, 
as well as secondary and primary sources used, the major analytical categories 
are introduced: Foreign Policy, the Nation State, Sovereignty, and Identity. In the 
process, these categories will be connected by interrelated hypotheses to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical basis for the analysis.
Section B, “Analysis”, is the main section of the analysis and offers a full-scale 
analysis of the internal and external determinants of the GDR’s foreign policy 
in general and its activities in South Yemen in particular. It is divided into two 
parts, whereas Part I is occupied with “The GDR as a Foreign Policy Actor” and 
41 | Inspired by Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, Gayatri Spivak reframes the notion 
of the “Subaltern”, in: Spivak, 2009.
42 | Weber, 2002, 10.
43 | Following Søren Kierkegaard’s notion of the general, the exception defines the normal 
situation as well as itself. Comp. Kierkegaard, Søren, in: Schmitt, 2005 (1922), 15.
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Part II with “The GDR in Yemen”. Part I of Section B sketches the role of the 
two major determinants of East German foreign policy, the Soviet Union and the 
Federal Republic of Germany and points out the priorities directing East German 
foreign policy decisions. To be able to interpret East German foreign policy in 
South Yemen and reach conclusions about its generics and peculiarities, this is 
followed by an introduction to East German foreign policy history, its objectives 
and turning points, before and after its international diplomatic recognition in 
the early 1970s, the major turning point in East German foreign policy. Part I 
concludes with an analysis of the political system of the GDR based on the “three 
spheres approach”, which differentiates between the three spheres of the SED state 
and thus foreign policy making: Party, state and society. This final subchapter 
aims to firstly differentiate between constitutional ideal and political reality of the 
SED state, secondly to point out the most relevant foreign policy actors in general 
and for the GDR’s engagement in South Yemen in particular, and thirdly to serve 
as a point of reference for the concept of “socialist state- and nation-building” to 
interpret concrete East German foreign policy in South Yemen.
Taking into consideration the results of Part I, Part II of Section B firstly analyzes 
the role of the Middle East in the GDR’s international activities. It presents three 
major strategies of East German foreign policy in the region and how they tie in 
with East German foreign policy in general. Secondly, Part II provides the reader 
with a unique study of the political milieu in Aden during the years leading up to 
South Yemen’s independence to assess the impact of foreign powers in the country 
in the following decades, first and foremost the GDR. Lastly, the GDR’s activities 
in South Yemen are analyzed using a phase analysis, based on the assumption that 
the foreign policy of any state, regardless of its political system, is an “interactive 
process”44 that changes over time as a reaction to internal and external influences.
East German foreign policy in South Yemen is approached as a state- and 
nation-building policy of socialist connotation. Changes to and continuity of 
this policy are explored with reference to the major turning-points and catalyst 
events of East German-South Yemeni relations, of which four phases between 
1967 and 1990 can be identified. Each of the analyzed phases of East German 
foreign policy is based on the same analytical scheme. First of all, the phase is 
determined by initial and finishing turning-points and catalyst events, followed by 
a brief overview of political developments in South Yemen. Change and continuity 
of politics and society serve as a points of reference and independent variables, 
that is, they are explanatory for any foreign policy activities of foreign powers in 
the country. Then Soviet interests and policies during the phase are sketched 
briefly to allow for an assessment of Moscow’s major fields of engagement and, 
more importantly, Moscow’s level of engagement. The short summary of Soviet 
44 | Haftendorn, 1989, 33. See also: Weißbuch zur Sicherheit Deutschlands of 1994 and 
Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik.
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interest and activity on the Gulf of Aden is considered the framework of action for 
the GDR’s foreign policy. East-German engagement in the Yemeni policy fields 
varied in intensity over time and the motives and reasons for these changes in 
intensity are identified. The conclusions of each phase analysis draw extensively 
from the introductory summary of Moscow’s policy and South Yemen’s internal 
political developments, as both are considered the major determinants of the 
GDR’s activities on the ground.
The major goal of the phase analysis is to conclude with a comprehensive overview 
of East German engagement in South Yemen, including an assessment of its 
evolution over time, its relation to the GDR’s overall foreign policy, and the impact 
of Soviet interests. Based on these results, Section C, “Findings” reconsiders the 
study’s initial question and major hypotheses in three concluding chapters to 
provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of the study’s major findings 
and conclusions. The first concluding chapter summarizes the empirical, concrete 
internal and external limits of East German foreign policy in general. The second 
chapter is occupied with the limits of East German foreign policy in South Yemen 
in particular. The first two concluding chapters on East German foreign policy 
serve as the framework to answer whether the major hypothesis of the study can 
be upheld: Can the case of South Yemen be considered both an exceptional case 
and a model pointing towards a Weberian ideal type45 of East German foreign 
policy? Finally, the last “Findings” chapter reflects on the normative limits of 
foreign policy with regard to the autonomy of the host state.
45 | Weber, 2002, 10.
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CHAPTER 2. State of Research:  
The Selection of Sources for an Interdisciplinary Project
The lion’s share of the project’s scholarly achievement is the review and evaluation 
of comprehensive archival material, which has been uncharted territory so far. 
However, the interpretation of the findings of this research is only possible by 
including the research of several different fields. Consequently, and apart from the 
process of developing a fruitful approach to process the archival documents, one of 
the major challenges of this study was the selection of secondary literature on the 
various fields and topics relevant for this analysis. In the end, several monographs 
but also articles proved to be the most relevant for the theoretical approach and 
method of this study. In this chapter, a short account of the state of research on 
East German foreign policy, based on the most influential authors, is followed by 
brief statements on the non-theoretical monographs and articles most influential 
and relevant to this project. This includes the GDR’s foreign policy and divided 
Germany’s foreign policy history, Cold War Studies and the Middle East, and lastly 
the history of modern Yemen and its current transformation process.
1. hISTORY OF A DIvIDED GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY: 
ASYMME TRIC ENDE AvORS AND AvAIL ABILIT Y OF SOuRCES
With regard to the history of German foreign policy, the notion of “asymmetry of 
research” between East and West is more valid than in other policy fields, even 
more so for the two Germanys’ foreign policy in the Arab world, where countless 
studies on Bonn’s activities have been published over the last three decades.1 The 
question whether East Germany had the ability to pursue a foreign policy wasn’t 
even formulated in the West before the Berlin Wall was erected and the existence of 
East Germany could be denied no longer.2 Actual academic interest of West German 
1 | See for example: Abu Samra, 2004; Berggötz, 1998; Bippes, 1997; Braune-Steininger 
1988; Engler, 2007; Hünseler, 1990; Küntzel, 2009; Müllenmeister, 1998; Weingardt, 2002.
2 | Woitzik, 1967, in: Scholtyseck, 2003, 54.
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researchers in this foreign policy did not arise before the “Grundlagenvertrag” of 
1972,3 as the hostile relationship of neglect between the two Germanys had festered 
and engulfed academia as well. The two German signatures under one treaty meant 
the mutual de facto recognition towards the GDR of the “other Germany” and the 
attitude of West German research was about to change profoundly. While countless 
studies on the GDR’s political and social system were published, more and more 
researchers occupied themselves with East Berlin’s foreign policy as well. When the 
GDR joined the Federal Republic though, this newfound dedication disappeared 
over night. East Berlin’s diplomatic staff was dismissed with almost no exemptions, 
its foreign ministry, the ‘Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten’ (MfAA), 
was dissolved and with it the GDR’s foreign policy history.4
Research tentatively reclaimed the field for further exploration in the late 1990s. 
Benno Eide Siebs’ study of 19995 offers a first overview of the GDR’s international 
activities after 1976, which neatly complements Ingrid Muth’s study of 2001 
on East-Berlin’s Foreign Policy between 1949 and 1972.6 While Muth focuses 
on political structures and decision-making processes, Siebs presents a phase-
oriented foreign policy analysis focusing on the content of the GDR’s activities. 
Both studies rely on secondary literature published until the early 2000s, but 
distinguish themselves by including a wider range of newly researched archival 
material, mostly from the Political Archive of the Foreign Office7 and the German 
Federal Archive.8 Several studies focusing on singular aspects of the GDR’s 
international activities followed suit, like an anthology on the GDR’s relations to 
the Western states, edited by Ulrich Pfeil and published in 2001. Two years later, 
Joachim Scholtyseck published a concise overview on the state of research on the 
GDR’s foreign policy in reunified Germany and provided the first comprehensive 
summary of East German foreign policy development after reunification.9 Only a 
few years later Hermann Wentker published his “Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen” 
of 2007,10 the most comprehensive overview of the state of research on the GDR’s 
foreign policy so far. Caution is recommended for studies published in the GDR 
3 | Kriele, in: Hacker, 1989, 33.
4 | Von Bredow, 2006, 183.
5 | Siebs, Benno-Eide, Die Außenpolitik der DDR 1976-1989. Strategien und Grenzen, 
Paderborn, 1999.
6 | Muth, Ingrid, Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949-1972, Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen, 
Berlin, 2000.
7 | Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA), Berlin.
8 | Bundesarchiv (BA), branch Berlin.
9 | Scholtyseck, Joachim, Die Außenpolitik der DDR, Enzyklopädie Deutscher Geschichte, 
Band 69, Oldenburg, 2003, esp. 51-60.
10 | Wentker, Hermann, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen 
System, 1949-1989, München, 2007.
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by East German social scientists and historians, which usually “put the foreign 
relations in the right light”11 in accordance with the SED’s political preferences. 
Similar sensitivities are needed when dealing with West German publications 
during German separation, as they were highly politicized as well. Before the 
de facto recognition of the GDR, interest in the “other” Germany in general and 
its foreign policy in particular was considerably low. East Berlin’s actions were 
considered a mere expression of Soviet interests. Due to rapprochement between 
the two Germanys in the 1970s, this attitude changed profoundly and academia 
enthusiastically turned towards this “new field”. Nonetheless, these works 
remained part of the world they described. Political opinion oftentimes was mixed 
with “objective” analysis and East German publications naturally served as either a 
negative or positive blueprint. In addition to that, no sources without East German 
and Soviet approval could be used at the time. Nonetheless, contemporary studies 
remain an indispensable reference for the perceived interests and scope of action 
and thus are explicitly included in this analysis.
2. SECONDARY SOuRCES IN FOCuS I:  
GERMANY’S DIvIDED hISTORY AND FOREIGN POLICY
The topic of this study is located at the intersection not only of several disciplines 
but also fields of research. Apart from current debates on German separation, 
reunification, and history of German foreign policy, a good grasp of the 
determinants, players and ideologies of the Cold War is needed. Before beginning 
with the research for this study, the author had been working on the topic of 
German divided history in general and German foreign policy in particular for 
several years. 
With regard to the Federal Republic of Germany’s foreign policy, Helga 
Haftendorn’s work provides an extraordinarily comprehensive interdisciplinary 
analysis before and after reunification. Apart from her contributions to this study’s 
approach to foreign policy, her most recent study, “Coming of Age: German Foreign 
Policy Since 1945,”12 published in German in 2001 and in 2006 in English, serves 
as an introduction to the history of German foreign policy and as an indispensable 
guide to Germany’s role during the Cold War. Even though this analysis contends 
with the GDR’s international activities, Haftendorn’s monograph initiated countless 
new trails of thought and led to much greater understanding of East German foreign 
policy.
11 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 53; Siebs, 1999, 19ff.
12 | Haftendorn, Helga, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy Since 1945, Oxford, 
2006; Haftendorn, Helga, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und 
Selbstbehauptung. 1945-2000, Stuttgart/München, 2001.
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Among the monographs and encyclopedias on this topic, “The Handbook of 
Communism,”13 published by Stéphane Courtois, offered a combination of in-
depth analysis and distinguished interpretation in a very condensed format. 
In concise articles, Courtois and his research team introduce the communist 
ideology from its beginnings to its Real Socialist excesses. One of the contributors 
to the “Handbook,” Klaus Schroder, also published the most comprehensive study 
on the political system and reality of the GDR, “The SED State” in 1998. With 
the second edition of 2013, the monograph has established itself as a classic of 
German studies.14 It established the major determinants of the GDR’s political 
system to interpret the relationship between party and state in the GDR. This 
was complemented by Matthias Judt‘s annotated and edited collection of selected 
document, published in 1998, which presents pivotal original documents in the 
context of short but well-researched articles.15 
Ingrid Muth‘s monograph on the GDR’s foreign policy before 1972 is not only 
the first comprehensive study of the GDR’s foreign policy apparatus, but without 
doubt also one of the most thorough and knowledgeable analyses of the structures 
and “praxis” of the GDR’s foreign policy of its first two decades of existence. Due 
to Muth’s two decades of active service for the GDR’s MfAA, however, the reader is 
advised to keep a certain critical distance when reviewing her findings. While her 
work is not purposefully biased, she still explicitly remains within the logic of the 
political system of the GDR.16 On the one hand, there are good arguments to do so, 
the most important among them to be able to understand the nature of decision-
making as well as to assess success and failure. On the other hand, this “inside” 
perspective does not generate conclusions beyond the ideological justifications or 
political bloc restraints of the GDR’s foreign policy: Muth’s institutional analytical 
view still treats East Berlin’s foreign policy as separate from its dictatorial reality. 
Hermann Wentker‘s monograph of 2007 remains the most extensive 
overview on East German foreign policy research. Strockmann rightly criticizes 
the book as a mere recycling of the various studies published before.17 However, 
this is also Wentker’s most important achievement. Even though he does not 
include a significant amount of new archival material beyond edited document 
collections,18 his monograph provides research on the GDR’s foreign policy with 
a thorough and well-researched summary, interpretation, and assessment of 
secondary literature on the subject. In addition to that, Wentker introduces an 
13 | Courtois, Stéphane (Ed.). Das Handbuch des Kommunismus. Geschichte. Ideen. 
Köpfe, München, 2010.
14 | Schroeder, Klaus, Der SED-Staat, Der SED-Staat. Geschichte und Strukturen der 
DDR, München, 2013.
15 | Judt, Matthias (Ed.), DDR-Geschichte in Dokumenten, Bonn, 1998.
16 | Muth, 2001, 9.
17 | Storckmann, 2012, 28, FN 107.
18 | E.g. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
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efficient approach to grasp the material and further understanding of the GDR’s 
position in the international system at the same time: Wentker focuses on the 
dichotomy of heteronomy and autonomy of the GDR’s foreign policy, depending 
on three determinants: the Soviet Union, West Germany, and internal political 
developments.19 In this study on the GDR in Yemen, Wentker’s fruitful approach 
is reconsidered and adapted according to the findings of the analysis. 
With his 2013 monograph on the GDR’s military relations to the third world,20 
Klaus Storckmann finally is able to step out of the cycle of seemingly endless 
academic repetition and recycling in the field of the GDR’s international military 
engagement. Based on extensive archival research and three elaborate case studies 
of Egypt, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, Storckmann presents the meticulous work 
of an historian. He explicitly focuses on the “coordination process between the 
GDR and Soviet leadership”21 and successfully embeds his findings in the micro-
level of his case studies on the one hand and, on the macro-level of the Warsaw 
Pact and GDR’s policy towards the “Third World” on the other. Unfortunately, 
Storkmann’s analysis merely oscillates between the two levels described, and as 
a consequence often misses opportunities to draw further conclusions from his 
findings with regard to the general Cold War setting and regional implications. But 
even though Storckmann’s study may not be considered comprehensive with regard 
to the role of the GDR’s military relations within the wider framework of foreign 
policy, Storckmann clearly departs from the well-trodden paths of academic and 
semi-academic research which had generally relied on exaggerations of the Western 
media and personal memories than archival findings. 22 Storckmann sketches a 
clear and thorough framework of the GDR’s policies in the Global South and 
provides significant insights on the decision-making processes of the GDR’s foreign 
policy.23 As a consequence, and despite the apparent lack of involvement by the 
GDR’s military in South Yemen, Storckmann’s book adds considerable substance to 
this analysis. 
Finally, the rising number of case studies on the GDR’s activities in the Global 
South all in all does not substantially contribute to the discourse and state of 
research, as these are mostly limited to indexing archival material and sometimes 
interpreting it with regard to the respective country. A prominent example for this 
phenomenon is Haile Gabriel Dagne’s slim volume on “The Commitment of the 
19 | Introduction, Wentker, 2007.
20 | Storckmann, Klaus, Geheime Solidarität. Militärbeziehungen und Militärhilfen der 
DDR in die “Dritte Welt”, Berlin, 2012.
21 | Ibid. 15.
22 | Ibid. 23; 27.
23 | Ibid. 55-179.
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German Democratic Republic in Ethiopia. A study based on Ethiopian Sources”24 
of 2006. While the subtitle clearly is the primary strength of Dagne’s analysis, it is 
also its biggest weakness, as the Ethiopian sources leave the reader with more gaps, 
that is, more questions than answers about the East German presence in Addis 
Abeba. Also, Dagne fully ignores the complex interaction between East German 
activities abroad and its two major determinants – Moscow and Bonn – and falls 
short of interpreting the GDR’s engagement in Ethiopia in the wider framework 
of the Cold War in general and East German foreign policy in particular. As a 
consequence, case studies like Dagne’s are considered merely episodically in this 
analysis. 
3. SECONDARY SOuRCES IN FOCuS II:  
COLD WAR STuDIES, ThE MIDDLE E AST AND MODERN YEMEN
While the Cold War has been depicted as half a century of both conflict as 
well as strained peace,25 current research tends to locate its assessments of the 
global competition between the Soviet Union and the United States of America 
somewhere in the middle. Despite significant progress over the past two decades, 
Greiner in 2008 rightly emphasizes vast uncharted territory in Cold War research 
and the academic discourse – especially with regard to the Soviet Union and its 
closest allies.26 With respect to this analysis, the profound change of perspective 
after Odd Arne Westad’s publication of the “The Global Cold War”27 in 2005 is 
most relevant for the evolution of the Cold War discourse: According to Westad, 
the conflict created the idea of the “Third World”28 by globalizing the narrative 
of the Cold War. Part of this development is the newly emerging perspective that 
comprehensive interpretations of the Cold War as a political phenomenon are 
only possible when the rigid surface of findings based on the bipolar perspective 
is scarified. This may be achieved by shifting the analytical focus to ‘smaller 
actors’ in the conflict as Greiner suggests29 and is exactly what Anne Applebaum 
achieved with her well-researched and even better-written narrative “Iron Curtain: 
The Crushing of Eastern Europe. 1944-1956” of 2013. Celebrated by the media 
and academia alike,30 Appelbaum’s book presents an intriguing account of Soviet 
24 | Dagne, Haile Gabriel, The Commitment of the German Democratic Republic in 
Ethiopia. A study based on Ethiopian sources, Berlin, 2006.
25 | Gaddis, 1987; Soutou, 2011 (2011).
26 | Greiner, in: Greiner/Müller, Walter, 2008, 16.
27 | Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War. Third World interventions and the making of 
our times, Cambridge, 2005.
28 | Westad, 2005, 275ff.
29 | Greiner, in: Greiner/Müller, Walter, 2008, 7 and 16.
30 | Levgold, 2013; Lieven, 2013.
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domination of Eastern Europe by focusing on the “recipient countries” of Soviet 
neo-colonial aspirations. Just like her, Fred Halliday focuses on the “small” actors 
within the Cold War context in one of the subchapters of his regional study “The 
Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology”, in which he 
sketches the role of the Middle East during the Cold War and beyond. The impact 
of his writings on this analysis are elaborated upon further below. In addition to 
that, two other monographs turned out to be indispensable in interpreting the 
role of the Middle East in the Cold War: Youssef Choueiri’s “Arab Nationalism: A 
History” published in 2000 and Tareq Ismael’s monograph on “The Communist 
Movement in the Arab World” published in 2005.31 Based on the two major 
ideological concepts of the Arab world in the 20th century, both studies provide 
an excellent overview of the region’s position and role in a bipolar world.
To merely access the highly complex history of modern Yemen is a task of several years 
of study. At that point, the researcher usually is able to realize that he or she has not 
progressed much toward understanding the multilayered and oftentimes contradictory 
social and political identities and loyalties of Yemen’s actors, as a colleague put it during 
a conference. Nonetheless, the researcher has to begin somewhere. Paul Dresch’s “A 
History of Modern Yemen” spans the full 20th Century history of Yemen and has 
already become a “classic” for researchers of modern Yemen since its publication in 
2000. Dresch’s work distinguishes itself by its thorough historical analysis, dense 
writing style and inclusion of a wide range of Arab literature on the topic. He recounts 
the story of Yemen as more of a separated than divided history which inevitably to 
Yemeni unification in the early 1990s. His approach clearly has a focus on the state-
founding and -building period until the early 1970s. As a consequence, Dresch’s 
depiction of South Yemeni society and the political power constellation of the 1950s , 
in addition to his assessment of the revolutionary years of the 1960s, are indispensable 
for the foundations of the argument of this study.
Robert Burrowes’ “Historical Dictionary of Yemen”32 closes the huge gap in 
encyclopedias of the modern Middle East in the English language. Though the 
“Dictionary of Yemen” still has to live through several reviews and expansions 
– especially after the final downfall of Ali Abdallah Saleh in 2012 – it offers the 
most comprehensive and easiest access to a wide range of topics, events, and 
especially political actors in Yemen’s modern history. The brief overview of the 
most important references used by Burrowes offers a solid starting point for any 
researcher new to the topic33 and the majority of monographs introduced by him 
have been used in the research for this study. Apart from its informative character, 
the “Dictionary” has to be considered a comprehensive comment on most of 
31 | Choueiri, Youssef M., Arab Nationalism. A History, Oxford, 2000; Ismael, Tareq Y., The 
Communist Movement in the Arab World, New York, 2005.
32 | Burrowes, Robert D., Historical Dictionary of Yemen, Plymouth, 2010.
33 | Burrowes, 2010, 461-465.
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political developments in Yemen. Bearing this very personal approach in mind, 
Burrowes’ interpretation of events and development is an invaluable companion 
to any analysis of modern Yemen history.
The current state of research on South Yemen has to be considered rather 
underwhelming, as current research is concentrated among a very small circle of 
researchers34 and the most recent piece of work on the PDRY is rather a popular 
than an academic book. The majority of thorough, well-informed studies so far 
have been published by Marxist scholars. As a consequence, the danger of simply 
transferring ideologically inspired opinions to this analysis remains. Keeping this 
in mind, this study, however, will not and cannot dispense with this research – 
the PDRY simply remains a niche topic, in which today mostly socialist-oriented 
researchers take interest. Of the older of these studies, especially Robert Stookey’s 
“South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia”35 of 1982, Joseph Kostiner’s “The 
Struggle for South Yemen”36 of 1984, Helen Lackner’s “P.D.R.Yemen: Outpost of 
Socialist Development in Arabia”37 of 1985, and Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael’s 
“The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen: Politics, Economics and Society”38 
published the year after, contributed to this study.
Without doubt, it is mostly authors who embrace some version of socialism 
and/or who lived through Real Socialism’s failure that provide us with the most 
thorough and balanced analyses of the role of the Soviet Union in the Cold War 
and the socialist movements in the Middle East. The most prominent – but also 
moderate – example among authors writing on South Yemen is Fred Halliday with 
his “own particular version of historical materialism.”39 Halliday’s works have to 
be reviewed with a critical eye, especially in regard to the role of the Soviet Union 
in the region, as he usually tends to explain negative events and changes in the 
region and South Yemen by the overpowering policies of the “West” and its allies.40 
However, two books by Halliday provided invaluable insights for this study: “The 
Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology” of 2005 and 
“Revolution and Foreign Policy: The case of South Yemen 1967-1987” of 1990. The 
34 | This obviously has not changed since the early 2000s when Dahlgren decried the fact 
even for the most active discipline in Yemen, anthropology, that “anthropological Yemeni 
studies have in the last decades concentrated on the Northern Yemeni tribal society,” 
Dahlgren, 2000, 1.
35 | Stookey, Robert W., South Yemen. A Marxist Republic in Arabia, Boulder, 1982.
36 | Kostiner, Joseph, The Struggle for South Yemen, New York, 1984.
37 | Lackner, Helen. P.D.R. Yemen. Outpost of Socialist Development in Arabia, London, 1985.
38 | Ismael, Tareq Y./Ismael, Jacqueline S., The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. 
Politics, Economics and Society, Marxist Regimes Series, London, 1986.
39 | Cox, 2011, 1110.
40 | Halliday on the ongoing conflicts in Middle East: “the increasing pressure put upon 
[South Yemen] by Saudi Arabia, and indirectly, the USA. It was therefore a case of U.S.-
inspired ‘destabilization’ that in the end backfired,” in: Halliday, 1979, 380.
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latter already anticipates Halliday’s position as presented in “The Middle East in 
IR.” His foreign policy analysis aims to include South Yemen’s agency as a self-
directed actor on the one hand while upholding an “outside” view rather distanced 
from South Yemen’s socio-political condition on the other.41
Noel Brehony’s well-written story of the PDRY,42 initially published in 2011, 
made a decisive step to fill the gap in English literature on the formation of 
the NLF. It clearly is not an academic analysis in the strict sense and one may 
criticize Brehony’s journalistic approach. However, the book benefits from 
Brehony’s references to personal discussions and interviews with a significant 
share of the relevant actors. The narrative is based on the big names of English 
Yemen research, among them Dresch, Halliday, and well-known Marxist Robert 
Stookey,43 but also includes a high number of Arab original press releases, official 
party documents, and minutes. Brehony, former Chairman of the British-Yemeni 
society, successfully weaves together his interviewees’ perspectives with the 
junctions of events, while clearly labelling the personal statements and attitudes as 
such. Some of his conclusions though should be handled with care. For example, 
Brehony comments on political and social reforms of the NLF/NF regime: 
“Though there were obvious flaws in the regime’s economic policies, its social 
goals were both progressive and well-intentioned.”44 The tendency to relativize 
the autocratic Marxist regime in Aden is probably explained by personal contacts 
and friendships, a circumstance to keep in mind when discussing Brehony's 
perspective. 
The strength of the current research on Yemen clearly lies with the ongoing 
workshops and conferences and its tightly-woven academic community. Thus, there 
does not exist “one” monograph representing the most relevant findings, and even a 
long list of articles and papers wouldn’t do justice to the thriving research of today. 
The following selection merely reflects the references of this analysis and does 
not aim to represent current research on Yemen. In 2009 Brian Whitaker, former 
Middle East editor of the Guardian, published “The birth of modern Yemen,” 
which further closes the gap between Yemeni unification and current events. To 
connect the developments of the last decade with Yemen’s divided history, such as 
the emergence of the “Southern Movement”, the protests of the “Arab Upheavals” 
and the following transition process, and finally the reinvigoration of the Houthi 
movement, this analysis heavily relied on many of the contributors to the recently 
41 | Halliday, 1990, 178-218.
42 | Brehony, Noel, Yemen Divided. The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia, London/
New York, 2013 (2011).
43 | Stookey, 1982.
44 | Brehony, 2013, 69.
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published anthology “Why Yemen matters: A Society in Transition”45 which offers 
up-to-date research and expertise on a wide range of topics. Among them are well-
established authors like Marieke Brandt, Noel Brehony, Laurent Bonnefoy, Susanne 
Dahlgreen, Gerhard Lichenthäler and Lackner herself.
4. PRIMARY SOuRCES: BET WEEN ARChIvAL AND PERSONAL DEPThS
“If one looked for the concrete impact of the [MfS’ work 
abroad on the secret services in the Global South], a look 
into the [relevant] countries would be most promising.”46
ilko-sAschA kowAlczuck, reseArcher AT The sTAsi-Archive
The archival research for this project was guided by the analytical method of turning 
points and catalyst events determining phases of political development.47 The four 
phases suggested in this study bring together internal turning points of South 
Yemeni politics and turning points in Aden’s bilateral relations with both Moscow 
and East Berlin. The reasons for the partial congruency of East German and Soviet 
engagement between 1970 and 1986 and for the discrepancy between East-Berlin’s 
and Moscow’s policy before and after are explained in the respective phase chapters. 
The most relevant dividing line with regard to the availability of sources can now be 
detected between the “Phase of Expansion”, from 1970 to 1978 (Phase II), and the 
“Phase of Consolidation and Continuity”, from 1978 to 1986 (Phase III): only one of 
the three included archives provides material on the topic for the time after 1980 
that is comparable to the periods before: the Stasi Archive, or the BStU.48
The initial research was conducted at the Political Archive of the German Foreign 
Office49 (PA AA). Here, Germany’s 30-year blocking period for archival material 
applies in a very restrictive way. In addition to that, there is only limited access 
to certain files issued even before this period, due to security reasons and the 
protection of individual rights. As a consequence, the material of the PA AA 
mostly supported the analysis of the first two phases of East German foreign 
policy in South Yemen until about 1980. For the argument of these two phases, 
45 | Lackner, Helen, (ed.) Why Yemen Matters. A Society in Transition, SOAS Middle East 
Issues, 2014.
46 | Kowalczuck, 2011, 260.
47 | On guidelines for archival research and the interpretation of historic sources: Budde/
Freist/Günther-Arndt, 2008, 159; Baumgart, 1977; Burkhardt, 2006.
48 | BStU – Bundesbeauftragte(r) für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der 
ehemaligen DDR.
49 | German: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes.
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the material of the Aden representation and embassy as well as the MfAA of the 
GDR have proven indispensable to the overall findings of the study.
The second major source of documents was a section of the German Federal 
Archive (SAPMO-BArch).50 Unfortunately, the working process of the Central 
Committee (CC)51 did not file submissions in accordance with the actual decision-
makers at the top of the hierarchy, but with the inquiring office or section52 which 
clearly hampers focused research in the files of the SAPMO. As a consequence, 
and in combination with the sheer volume of documents available, research there 
requires significantly more time in the future to fully evaluate all sources relevant for 
the GDR’s activities in South Yemen. The material of the BArch is included in this 
study mostly to close gaps in the findings obtained from the other archives included. 
The research focus for this project was on the SED party material, especially the 
work of the Central Committee and Politbüro of the SED, as well as documents of 
the ministries involved. 
The GDR’s activities in South Yemen were part of Moscow’s wider strategy in 
the Middle East. A significant part of East German engagement was occupied 
with the security apparatus. The East German State Security (MfS),53 also known 
as the “Stasi”, was highly active in Aden. As advisors to several South Yemeni 
ministers and policy-makers in various fields, the officers were highly involved 
in the installation of state institutions, policy generation, and even day-to-day 
politics. As a consequence, the focus of archival research of this study was on the 
files of the BStU. Since January 1992, these files have been open to the public, 
academia, and the media. They have proven to be quite a treasure trove on a wide 
range of topics.54 Unfortunately, the files produced by the Main Administration 
A (HV A),55 the MfS section occupied with international affairs, for the most part 
have been destroyed by the HV A itself. Between November 1989 and January of 
1990, when the GDR’s citizens occupied the MfS building, about 100 trucks are 
said to have left for a paper mill close by.56 The meagre remnants of the HV A files 
contending with the two Yemens do not offer much valuable information.57 On the 
50 | German: Stif tung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR at the 
Bundesarchiv.
51 | German: Zentral Komitee (ZK).
52 | Storckmann, 2012, 45.
53 | German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit.
54 | Stasi-Records Act, first issued on December 29 1991, also see Version of 2012 of 
the Stasi-Records Act.
55 | German: Hauptverwaltung A. 
56 | Müller-Enbergs, 1998, 17; Möller, 2004, 48.
57 | HV A files on the PDYR almost with no exemption (BStU MfS HV A Nr. 778) merely 
contain the annual report on political conditions in the country: e.g. BStU MfS HV A Nr. 40, 
75, 109, 125, 151, 162, 167, 172, 383, 385, 388, 391 and 394. 
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other hand, the files of other sections involved in relations with South Yemen have 
been saved and oftentimes provided copies of HV A case files.
Studies and analyses on the Stasi in general and the HV A in particular 
mention their advisory activities in the Global South. In this context, the PDRY 
usually is either only mentioned in enumeration or not mentioned at all.58 Gieseke, 
for example, states that “at all times good relations”59 had existed between the 
MfS and South Yemen. Documentation on the GDR’s and especially the MfS’s 
involvement in the establishment of South Yemen’s state security apparatus is 
incomplete and the mostof the available files appear to have been destroyed with 
the files of the HV A. Fortunately, other Sections were involved in the process as 
well and the databases of HA II, III and especially HA X offer a broad overview of 
the cooperation between the MfS and the Yemeni “Committee for State Security” 
(KfS), which mostly allows us to corroborate the findings with a second source. 
These agreements and protocols describe the measures of cooperation and 
planned implementation in great detail. Other documentation is available, for 
example the files of the MfS’s Section of Finances, and coded information can 
also be decoded by researching other files: The coding used for the “young nation 
states” by the HV A and its subunit HV A/III reappears in other Sections of the 
MfS as well. Financial, material, and personnel support for these “young nation 
states” were grouped under “Planteil III.”60 All activities of delegations, advisory 
groups, finances or payments of solidarity in or for South Yemen were coded 
with a “C”61 or “030.”62 Also, one of the few comprehensive files on the PDRY of 
Section X not only provides a history of the development of the KfS, but also the 
full structure of the PDRY’s Secret Service.63
The former Stasi documents have a downside which cannot be ignored in the 
process of research. Firstly, the Stasi Files are the result of the work of a former 
secret service and thus their content regularly concerns security interests of not 
only other states but also the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as individuals 
still active in public life. Secondly, the MfS was not a “secret service like any other”, 
but also a political secret police without a clear separation of the two. Many of 
the results now conveniently accessible to the researcher have been acquired by 
betrayal, blackmailing, and sheer brute force. Consequently, for the sake of state 
58 | For example Howell, 1994.
59 | Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 231.
60 | Zusammenstellung des MfS für Hilfeleistungen an junge Nationalstaaten 1978, 
December 15 1978, in: BStU MfS Abt. Finanzen Nr.1393, 149.
61 | “MR C“, in: Bericht über die finanzökonomische Anleitung in der Ministerratsgruppe 
der VDRJ in der Zeit vom 3.7. bis 5.7.1987, BStU MfS Abt. Finanzen Nr.85, 66.
62 | Vorschlag zur Verschlüsselung [suggestion for coding; handwritten note], 1980, in: 
BStU MfS BCD Nr.20802, 59.
63 | Strukturen des MfS der VDR Jemen; Zur Lage des MfS der VDR Jemen; Kadersituation 
des MfS der VDR Jemen, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 93-107.
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secrecy, but even more so for the individual dignity of the persons observed, the 
researcher not only has to be aware of these circumstances of the files’ creation, 
but also has to consistently reconsider their genesis during the writing process.
Inter views with Contemporar y Witnesses
A central methodological topic of this study is the proper inclusion of contemporary 
perspectives without overemphasizing these interpretations and losing touch with 
the fact of contemporary perceptions. Firstly, this analysis clearly has to overcome 
“outdated” policy papers and strategic analyses of the analyzed time period. 
Naturally, these do not necessarily provide reliable information on a country’s 
policies or the international events this study is looking at. On the other hand, 
these analysis are invaluable to understanding the international perception of 
policies and events – what is assumed by political decision-makers may prove 
more powerful with regard to impact than actual facts. This study aims to strike 
the right balance between finding an appropriate analytical distance from these 
statements while providing them with sufficient room to speak for themselves. 
This is intended to be achieved by treating writings of the analyzed time period 
first and foremost as a primary sources on the respective topic.
The same approach applies for the However, in addition to the limitations of 
the personal perspective of contemporary writing, memories of course change 
over time. On top of that, the topic of the GDR’s foreign policy turned out to be a 
highly sensitive topic for the political actors involved. The interviewer necessarily 
had to distance herself from the oftentimes very personal accounts of memory 
on the one hand, while showing the empathy necessary to interpret the given 
information on the other. What all interview partners had in common was a 
certain resentment toward the complete eradication of their profession as GDR 
diplomats.64 This attitude is understandable and inevitably has to be taken into 
consideration when using the results of the interviews for this analysis, as the 
procedure of the voluntary dissolution of the GDR and its inclusion into the Federal 
Republic seemed to have different effects on the potential and actual interview 
subjects. One of the interviewees, for example, summarized the attitude of the 
former political functionaries of the GDR toward their past:
“It’s the same with our own people. The reflection of the circumstances is 
changing. Some fully block off cer tain topics, others opt for a ‘soft line’, trying 
to justify their political decisions afterwards. […] The focus is on defense not 
reproduction [of policies and events].”65
This observation already has to be considered relevant for the selection of partners, 
as not all contemporary witnesses able to offer information were also willing to do 
64 | Pfeif fer, 1997.
65 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.
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so. Furthermore it turned proved difficult to avoid the “mechanism of justification” 
described above. This was to be achieved by creating a positive and open interview 
atmosphere between interviewer and interviewed. To support this intention, the 
transcripts and notes which resulted from these meetings had been reviewed in 
a reciprocal exchange to assure the proper use of the perspective provided by the 
contemporary witnesses. These interviews are considered biographic primary 
sources, offering a very personal perspective. As part of the research for this study 
they serve two major purposes: Firstly, and most importantly, they illustrate or 
comment on certain policy decisions, developments, and events and thus help to 
interpret archival material. Secondly, and only in a few selected cases, they are 
used to support a line of argument in case archival material was contradictory. The 
latter of the two ways of processing the interviews is used carefully, taking into 
consideration the unsteady ground of personal accounts of history.
In the following, all interview partners who supported this research project with 
their personal account of East Germany’s foreign policy activities are introduced 
in alphabetical order, while pointing out the relevance of their experiences for this 
study and summarizing the most important topics of the interviews. Due to the 
East German policy in the diplomatic sphere to train and assign their personnel 
with a regional focus, all of my interview partners from the MfAA had worked 
together at one point or the other in their careers,66 which significantly added to 
the worth of the interviews: by offering different perspectives on the same topic, 
they can be considered more than just the sum of their parts.
First of all, a written and published account on personal experiences in South 
Yemen can be introduced here, as the slim volume is approached in the same way 
as an interview – as a personal memory of events. Günther Scharfenberg, East 
German ambassador to the PDRY in the 1970s, published his memoirs and notes 
in 2012. Scharfenberg served as ambassador to Aden from September 1972 to May 
1978. Before the posting, Scharfenberg had proven his abilities in foreign policy 
by substituting for the Head of Section Arab States of the MfAA, Karl-Heinz 
Lugenheim, from August 1970 to February 1971, and then for Wolfgang Bator in 
the Section International Relations of the CC in fall 1971. Thus, Scharfenberg’s 
interpretations of foreign policy making in Aden regularly offer a perspective 
beyond South Yemen and tend to include the GDR’s approach to the region, as 
well as details about the East German foreign policy apparatus.
Fritz Balke, considerably younger than the other interview partners, is the only 
interviewee who remained involved with actual German foreign policy making 
after reunification. Through contacts to West German foreign policy personnel, 
he was recruited as election observer 1996 in Palestine and 1997 in Yemen. In 
66 | For example, Günther Scharfenberg (ambassador in Aden from 1972 to 1978) had 
shared an office with Freimut Seidel (ambassador to Aden from 1986 to 1989) in East 
Berlin, in: Scharfenberg, 2012, 14.
A Spectre is Haunting Arabia – How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen
45
the GDR, Balke had been Vice-Consul in North Yemen from early 1969 to the 
end of 1972. The Sana’a consulate, and later on the embassy, had depended on the 
communications and trade infrastructure of the comparably large embassy in Aden. 
Thus Balke visited the South on a frequent basis. After several other placements, 
Balke was assigned to East Germany’s relations with both Yemens in the Section 
Near and Middle East of the MfAA in East Berlin. In the late 1980s he returned 
to Aden twice, on the occasion of the YSP Conference in 1987 and accompanying 
the Head of the CC Section IV to renegotiate party relations between the SED and 
the YSP. Furthermore, he witnessed two meetings of Honecker with the PDRY’s 
new President Al-Beidh after the “1986 crisis” in Moscow on the occasion of the 
CPSU Party Congress and the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1987. 
Balke’s comments on the GDR’s engagement in both Yemens are characterized 
by a very frank and open attitude, granting a glimpse of day-to-day friction in the 
political process and the existing variety of opinions among diplomatic personnel 
about East Germany’s foreign policy making. 
Due to regular publications and presentations, Wolfgang Bator is one of the 
most well-known former GDR foreign policy personnel today. In the GDR he 
pursed both a diplomatic and an academic career as a major expert on the Near 
and Middle East. He has been occupied with the region since he first left for Syria 
in 1958. He served as ambassador in Libya and Iran and was a member of the 
Section International Relations of the CC.67 In the early 1970s he was nominated as 
the new ambassador to South Yemen, but withdrew himself for personal reasons. 
His interview focuses on the GDR’s activities in the Near and Middle East and 
gives a personal account of the diplomatic service and day-to-day work in the East 
German embassies. As Bator explicitly takes a Marxist-Leninist stance and argues 
along its ideological lines, his comments on the relation between foreign policy 
and ideology support the interpretation of the discrepancy between ideological 
theory and political reality of this study. 
According to the leftist newspaper “junge Welt”, Hans Bauer is still working as an 
attorney in Berlin to “defend former citizens of the GDR against political prosecution 
and criminalization, […] advocating for rehabilitation, justice and historic truth.”68 
Bauer had been a public prosecutor of the GDR and was recruited by the Stasi in 
1982. Together with Volkbert Keßler,69 both of them high-level party functionaries 
(nomenclature) of the CC of the SED, he served for the HV A in the PDRY from 1982 
to 1985.70 Due to his new position as an official Party-Secretary of the Department of 
67 | German: Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen (IV).
68 | Rupp, Rainer, Interview with Hans Bauer, “Strafvollzug in der DDR zielte auf vollwertige 
Wiedereingliederung”, in: junge Welt, June 21 2012, 3.
69 | Brief HA XX Kienberg an HV A Stellver treter, January 28 1982, in: BStU MfS AP 
Nr.68777-92, 27f.
70 | Vermerk über die Einstellung der inoffiziellen Zusammenarbeit mit dem GMS 
„Leonhardt“ Reg. Nr. XV 3481/1982, October 11 1988, HA XX, in: BStU MfS AP Nr.36630-92.
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the Attorney General in South Yemen, Bauer was able to “entertain official contacts 
in political-operative cooperation [as well as] unofficial cooperation [with the MfS] 
which had been terminated” in fall 1988.71 During his years in Aden he emerged as a 
trusted advisor of the Attorney General of the PDRY.72 Even though Bauer’s account 
on his actual work in the PDRY remains vague, his interview offers an interesting 
account on some details of his political and juridical work in Aden and the intensity 
of East German engagement in this field and thus helps to assess the impact of East 
German presence on South Yemeni internal development.
Werner Sittig had been the last serving ambassador in the PDYR. He and his 
family arrived in Aden in August 1989. Sittig witnessed the beginnings of Yemeni 
unification and was supposed to become the East German ambassador for unified 
Yemen in Sana’a. German reunification prevented that from happening. After his 
early return to East Berlin, he became Head of the Section Near and Middle East. 
He supported this study with a lengthy phone call about his experiences.
Heinz-Dieter Winter had joined the MfAA in 1960 in the Section Southeast 
Asia. He had started his diplomatic career in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, and 
advanced first to Head Deputy and then Head of the Section Near and Middle East 
until the late 1980s. From 1986 until his resignation in 1990, he served as Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs and visited South Yemen on several occasions, the last 
time in 1990. From 1988 he had been assigned to the Section Near and Middle 
East. His interview is especially valuable regarding the assessment of structures 
and procedures of foreign policy making, the role of the Near and Middle East for 
East German foreign policy, and the final years of East German foreign policy. 
Last but not least, Winter provided the author with an inside view on the internal 
discussion on the ‘1986 crisis’ in Aden and the GDR’s resulting policy turn.
71 |  Ibid. 48. 
72 | Operative Einschätzung des GMS „Leonhardt“ – Vorg.-Nr.XV 3481/82, August 28 
1986, HV A/III/AG/018, in: BStU MfS AGMS Nr.10208-88, 67.
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CHAPTER 3. Analytical Approach:  
An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreign Policy
“What’s past is prologue.”1
williAm shAkespeAre, The TempesT, 1611
To understand the present without knowing the past may be compared to the 
attempt of crossing an ocean without seeing the sun: “[W]e need [history] to live 
and act, not to turn lazily away from life and action or even the whitewashing 
of a selfish life and times of cowardice and malice.”2 This especially is the case 
when occupied with current history, which regularly encroaches upon current 
political developments as a major determinant and explanatory. About a century 
after Nietzsche, Halliday also advocates for the “need for history”, though in less 
normative terms than Nietzsche, and emphasizes the benefit history brings to the 
analysis of international relations and foreign policy: 
“[H]istory is necessary to explain why countries act as they do, and, equally, to 
provide the basis for analyzing how states, and their opponents, claim to use, 
select and falsify history to justify what they do.”3 
As a consequence, this analysis does not shy away from including “history” in the 
form of primary sources on East Germany’s foreign policy or secondary sources of 
contemporaries to interpret this foreign policy in the context of its present, which 
itself has now become “history”. While the analysis is based on a comprehensive 
political science approach, the important role of primary sources for this study led 
to continuous elaboration of this theoretical approach in the sense of deducing 
theory from the case study at hand. As a result, this study integrates methods 
and approaches of political science and history to prevent a mere presentation of 
1 | Antonio, The Tempest, Shakespeare, William, 1894 (1611), 31. Engraved on the 
National Archives Building, Washington. Görtemaker, 1999, 13.
2 | Nietzsche, 1937, 5.
3 | Halliday, 2006, 40.
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a theoretical account without any relevant connection to the actual analysis. Apart 
from historical methods, like the three-step process of “heurism, critique, and 
interpretation” for interpreting historic sources,4 the interdisciplinary openness 
resulted first and foremost in the identification of turning points and catalyst events 
of East German foreign policy engagement in South Yemen from which four phases 
of development were derived.5 These secondary methods substantively support the 
overall theoretical approach to foreign policy of this study as a “process”.
The following chapter introduces the central analytical categories to connect 
them in a comprehensive theoretical approach. First of all, the term “foreign 
policy” is defined and operationalized as an analytical category with a focus on 
how foreign policy relates to its two major determinants, the national and the 
international. The analytical category “foreign policy” is connected with the 
macro-hypothesis of this study which considers East German engagement in 
South Yemen a “policy of socialist state- and nation-building” with a possible 
“neo-colonial”6 connotation. Finally, the relation of “foreign policy” to “state 
sovereignty” is explored to illuminate the normative-ethical dimension of the 
“limits of foreign policy”. Here, the concept of “identity”, and more specifically 
“national identity”, plays a major role in explaining the impact or inefficacy of 
foreign policy on the “recipient of foreign policy” or host state.
1. FOREIGN POLICY: WhERE ThE NATION STATE ENDS 
“The meaning of a complex expression can be derived unambiguously from the  
lexical meaning of its components, their grammatical meaning, and syntactical  
structure.” 7
Compositional semantics8 suggests that, at least on the descriptive level of 
interpretation, any complex expression can be approached as lexically self-
explanatory based on its respective elements. According to this approach, the term 
“foreign policy” by itself may refer to either a “policy” that is considered “foreign” 
by the speaker, or a “policy” occupied with questions considered “foreign” by the 
speaker. With regard to the context in which the term “foreign policy” regularly is 
used, the latter relation between the two words is what determines its meaning: An 
expression to describe the “policy”, the sum of a state’s or other international actors’ 
actions and non-actions, directed towards the “foreign” of this state or international 
4 | Budde/Freist/Günther-Arndt, 2008, 159; Baumgart, 1977; Burkhardt, 2006.
5 | On Giddens‘ approach to history and change as “episodic”, in: Joas, 2011, 427.
6 | Definition “Neo-Colonialism”, in: Stanton/Ramsamy/Seybolt/Elliott, 2012, 332-334 
and Young, 2001.
7 | Löbner, 2002, 20.
8 | A sub-discipline of semantics: “Research of Meaning”, in: Lyons, 1995, 409.
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actor. Nonetheless, “foreign” is rather a vague term: “Foreign” as the opposite of 
“common”, “native” or, “domestic”? “Foreign” for whom and in comparison to 
what? No more clarity can be found with regard to the French expression “politique 
étrangère”, either, as its qualifying adjective only offers the same meaning. The 
German term “Außenpolitik” and the Arabic expression “al-siyasa al-harijiya”9 on 
the other hand offer easier access to the core meaning of the English term “foreign 
policy”. Originally, the German and Arabic terms had been used for more or less 
defined territorial political entities which later on developed toward the nation state 
of the international state system as we know it today. Both “außen” and “al-harijiya” 
refer to the “external” as opposed to the “internal” of the respective actor. 
Wilfried von Bredow clearly sticks to this basic meaning of the German term 
“Außenpolitik”, when he defines foreign policy as 
“the sum of all interactions of a state with other states or non-state actors 
outside its territorial borders. The state is represented by its government and 
claims […and takes] ultimate responsibility for all external relevant actions of 
its citizens.”10 
 
With his definition, von Bredow also points out the relevant actor in the international 
realm: the state. In doing so, he follows the realist approach to foreign policy. 
“Contemporary scholarship has been for the most part content to see foreign 
policy explained as a state-centric phenomenon in which there is an internally 
mediated  response to an externally induced situation of ideological, military, 
and economic threats.”11 
As this quote by David Campbell suggests, both major streams of IR thought, 
realism and liberalism, derive their reflections on the international realm first and 
foremost from the actions and decisions of the state and its respective government. 
However, a significant change has evolved within the discipline, mostly due to 
substantial shifts in the international state system, but also within academia itself. 
First of all, one of the most important characteristics of the realist point of view, 
has been challenged. According to realists such as Kenneth Waltz, foreign policy is 
formulated in the name of the state and presented as though it were the general will 
of the state.12 Hence, states always act as a unified actor, a “black box” to other states. 
Internal developments are of no relevance for Realists. This perspective has been 
9 | Arabic: al-sīāsa ‘al-ḥāriğīya.
10 | Von Bredow, 2006, 38.
11 | Campbell, 1997, 36.
12 | Waltz, 1959, 178f.
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challenged repeatedly, from within the discipline but also by related disciplines. 
Anthony Giddens, for example, criticizes IR theory’s tendency to obscure 
“the fact that governments cannot be equated with states […] and that policy 
decisions within governments usually emanate from highly contested arenas of 
social life.”13 
As a consequence, the “black box” approach has been revised in recent decades in 
mainstream IR theory. However, the most significant change to the Westphalian 
state system had already started during the time of the “founding fathers” of IR due 
to two phenomena: Domestic and international democratization. According to von 
Bredow, it is the state, represented by its government, which “claims […] ultimate 
responsibility for all external relevant actions of its citizens”.14 However, von Bredow 
argues, while the state remains responsible for its citizens’ actions, in democracies 
any citizen or group of citizens can also become an external actor. Thus, the “inside” 
of the state becomes an immediate determinant of foreign policy.15
Furthermore, international institutions and organizations emerged while more 
treaties and trade agreements clustered around state interests, at least with regard 
to certain issues. The relation between “inside” and “outside” the state, the basis of 
the definition of foreign policy, is considered to have changed due to the growing 
importance of international and especially supra-national organizations. These 
entities form a new level between the national and international sphere. State 
actors have begun to hand over competencies16 and some of these organizations 
even have formulated foreign policy frameworks for their members.17 However, 
this development may not only be interpreted as the end of the nation state. Both 
Krasner and Giddens suggest that international organizations and state sovereignty 
rather have to be considered to mutually enhance one another.18 
Nonetheless, the permeability, perhaps even dissolution of the boundary between 
“inside” and “outside” as described above may not be a new phenomenon after all, 
but rather the actual condition of the international system as it had been all along. 
Deconstructionist perspectives reject the role of foreign policy as a “connection” 
or “bridge” between a priori existing nation states and their anarchic international 
environment. Instead, this image is considered a mere assumption of the realist 
world view and as such does not have to be perceived as an eternal given, but 
instead may be questioned. An enlightening constructivist account of foreign 
13 | Giddens, 1983, 289.
14 | Von Bredow, 2006, 38.
15 | Von Bredow, 2006, 44.
16 | Krasner, 1995, 120. 
17 | E.g. the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
18 | Giddens, 1983; Krasner, 1995.
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policy in international relations is introduced by David Campbell. Campbell 
questions the established Realist perspective of foreign policy analysis on the 
international state system, though he does not dismiss it outright. While Campbell 
does not dispose of the state, he rejects the realist assumption of the state’s unitary 
character and rather focuses on the emergence and construction of the national 
and international and the role of foreign policy in this process. He recognizes 
“foreign policy as the integral part of the discourses of danger that serve to 
discipline the state [and in doing so create its identity].“19 These dangers from the 
“outside” are regularly based on the distinction between the “inside” and “outside” 
in terms of difference (the self/other dichotomy20) to generate identity and unity 
within the community on the “inside”.  For example, imperialism in general and 
Great Britain in particular had fostered a Yemeni identity of the “urban Adeni” by 
the Red Sea. What followed was a foreign policy that explicitly turned away from 
“Western imperialism” and towards “Anti-Imperialism” of the Eastern Bloc. This 
coincides with Campbell’s conclusion that foreign policy does not create “bridges” 
between the national and the international, but rather boundaries between the 
two spheres, in the case of South Yemen a boundary against an “outside’” of 
neighboring states and “Imperialist powers” perceived to be hostile. 
This constructivist perspective as introduced by Campbell can be combined 
with the historic-sociological understanding of the international state system, 
which disputes the unitary character of states as well as the notion of the linear, 
or progressive emergence of states.21 In this perspective, the state is considered 
“an institution of coercion and appropriation which operates on two levels, the 
internal state-society dimension and the external state-state dimension,”22 which 
generates and implements foreign policy. Clearly, this study does not consider 
the concept of the state disposable for the analysis of international relations or 
foreign policy, but rather aims to use the concept of the state to “assess the role of 
other formative factors such as economic ideas and social forces.”23 This analysis 
concedes the constructed nature of the state, while embracing the historic-
sociological understanding of foreign policy generation between the internal and 
the external, the inside and the outside of the state. And even though states today 
are merely a certain kind of foreign policy actor among others in the globalizing 
world, they have emerged as the dominant actors in the realm of the international 
because states are the major implementers of foreign policy. 
A constructivist approach to foreign policy enables the scholar to choose one 
reality among the various possible narratives, while urging the scholar to justify 
his or her choice by uncovering the construction of this version of “reality”. To be 
19 | Campbell, 1998, 51.
20 | Derrida, 1997 (1976).
21 | Giddens, 1983; Mann, 1993; Campbell, 1992, 40-43.
22 | Halliday, 2006, 37.
23 | Halliday, 2006, 71.
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able to grapple with this complex reality, simplifying models are needed. However, 
these may not be mistaken for a law-like explanatory of past or present social 
development and change: “There is no key opening the gates to the secrets of 
human and social development, none which could reduce these in a comprehensive 
scheme.”24 Instead, the suggested schemes based on the preliminary thoughts on 
the state, as the main generator of foreign policy caught up between its inside and 
its outside, are considered a “sorting system” for the complex reality of current 
history, based on theoretical assumptions of so-called “medium-range”. 
With regard to foreign policy making, this analysis suggests a three-level-approach 
that modifies Waltz’s “three images of international relations”: The individual, 
the domestic, and the international.25  Waltz admits that “some combination of 
our three images, rather than any one of them, may be required for an accurate 
understanding of international relations,”26 and warns that any emphasis on one 
of the three images “may distort one’s interpretation of the others.”27 However, 
in the end he does exactly that and considers the “system level” the major level of 
analysis and source of explanation. The tendency to over-emphasize one “image” 
of course is ever present in any analysis occupied with foreign policy that connects 
all three of the images. Thus, this study is just as prone to give one level too much 
weight in the analysis as any other study.
Based on the assumption that foreign policy is an answer to demands from 
both the state’s “outside” and “inside”, the following paragraphs understand 
foreign policy making as a process and strive to locate this process within the 
“three images”. The modification of the “three images” considers the micro- and 
meso-levels/images to reside within the realm of the state as the major foreign 
policy actor. Also, one has to include the micro- and meso-level of the foreign 
policy actor, as well as the micro-and meso-level of the foreign policy host. The 
formulation of a state’s or organization’s foreign policy is located at the meso-level 
of foreign policy making. Foreign policy formulation is based on a state’s goals and 
interests among the diplomatic and/or administrative functionaries, and, at least 
in liberal democracies, in consultation with the public. The boundary between the 
state and the international, the interface between “inside” and “outside”, is defined 
by the macro-level of foreign policy making. The macro-level is where any foreign 
policy actor, be it a state, organization, company, or private person, is confronted 
with the demands of an “outside”, the international.28 Thus, the state’s scope of 
action is determined by demands from the “outside” and the “inside” at the so-
24 | Giddens, 1988 (1984), 300.
25 | On Waltz‘ concept of the “three images”: Waltz, 1959, 14f and 238f.
26 | Waltz, 1959, 14.
27 | Waltz, 1959, 160.
28 | Von Bredow, 2006, 44.
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called “inside-outside interface”.29 The “inside-outside-interface” is characterized 
by other qualities than the international itself, as foreign policies between two 
states and the resulting bilateral relations regularly change the characteristics, i.e. 
the rules and institutions, of the international. 
From this perspective we may finally be able to further specify the “foreign” in 
“foreign policy” according to the compositional semantics approach: Foreign 
in regard to what? At the core of its meaning the English term “foreign policy” 
only works in relation to the concept of the state, more precisely the nation state. 
The nation state formed itself as a political community based on a “self/other 
dichotomy” by referring to what the community had in common on the inside 
and defining what differentiated the community from the outside.30 “Foreign 
policy” is the policy of “us”, the community, towards all the others “outside” our 
community. Thus, “foreign policy” has played a major role in forming the political 
communities we know as nation states, becoming monopolized by the nation state 
in the process.
How do these reflections further the analytical approach? First of all, the 
presumptions do not deny the central role of the state, but do not define “foreign 
policy” as a simple unitary product of state action, either. Rather, the preceding 
reflections emphasize the interdependent, fluent character of foreign policy, 
constantly challenged from the “inside” and “outside” of the state within the 
“inside-outside-interface” and thus less a condition, but rather an interactive 
process between numerous actors.
“A political system [state] tries to promote its fundamental objectives and 
values […] while it is competing with other systems. This process is affected by 
social demands from within the system on the one hand, by demands from the 
[external] international system on the other. The result is a dynamic process of 
mutual impact and adaption on both the national and the international level.”31
Helga Haftendorn, interdisciplinary foreign policy analyst
This study aims to work with a comprehensive theoretical approach, integrating 
methods of political science and history. Two of the pioneers of a possible 
interdisciplinary perspective in Germany have been Ernst-Otto Czempiel and 
Helga Haftendorn, who considered foreign policy a process, as opposed to an 
instantaneous snap-shot. Though the definition quoted above acknowledges the 
(pre-)existence of the state as a “political system”, it also offers a differentiated view 
29 | This approach is inspired by R.B.J. Walker’s comprehensive account on International 
Relations and the role of the “inside/outside” notion. Walker 1990, 1992, and 2010.
30 | This approach brings together Gellner’s, Hobsbawm’s, and Ander’s account on the 
emergence of the nation state: Anderson, 1983, 36; Gellner, 1983, 48; Hobsbawm, 1983, 1ff.
31 | Haftendorn, 1989, 33.
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on the generation of foreign policy: Helga Haftendorn defines foreign policy as an 
“interactive process”.32 The outstanding characteristic of a process is that it evolves 
over time as a reaction to internal and external influences - it changes. Thus, this 
approach sharpens the analytical eye for the most interesting and possibly most 
important “moments” of foreign policy – its “turning points”, when continuity has 
to make room for change. 
Like any other policy, foreign policy is an answer to demands from the environment 
of the state, which come from both “outside” and “inside”. According to Czempiel, 
a state as a political system has to aspire to three major demands from within: 
Security from outside intervention, liberty and stability inside the system, and 
economic wellbeing of its society. He locates these three demands on the corners 
of a triangle. Their mutual relationship is what determines a state’s foreign policy 
goals.33 These goals are regularly re-prioritized, usually through reconsidering the 
relationship between the three demands. Also, these priorities may contradict each 
other in a “priority conflict”34 which sometimes renders it impossible for a state to 
include all of its goals in its policy. Due to complex factors of influence “outside” 
the state and a high number of other actors pursuing their foreign policy goals, 
states are confronted with the fact that they cannot expect to always act according 
to their priorities, let alone achieve all of their goals. The ability to pursue and 
achieve self-declared foreign policy goals depends on the nature of a state’s scope 
of action in the international realm on the one hand and the state’s resources on 
the other. A state’s resources may be classified as “hard facts”, such as territory, 
population, natural resources, perceived and actual military power, training 
and education, and “soft facts”, most importantly degrees of freedom, ideas, and 
innovation. Any retrenchment of resources or of the scope of action naturally leads 
to a limitation of possibilities for success of foreign policy. A possible reaction of a 
foreign policy actor to such limits could be either a change of strategy, or a change 
of mid-term or long-term goals. 
The term “policy strategy” usually refers to planned action of a political actor. 
With regard to foreign policy, Krippendorf further defines it as the “combination 
of single elements of a state’s foreign policy [generating a] relatively stable pattern 
of action.”35 Based on these preliminary assumptions, a foreign policy strategy 
in this analysis is defined as a superordinate road map, formulated at the state 
or meso-level of foreign policy making by diplomatic and/or administrative 
foreign policy actors to promote a specific foreign policy goal, or a set of goals, by 
combining an indefinite number of concrete foreign policy tools in a planned and 
32 | Haftendorn, 1989, 33. Weißbuch zur Sicherheit Deutschlands of 1994 and Weißbuch 
zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands of 2006.
33 | Compare: Lehmkuhl, 2001, 29.
34 | Haftendorn, 1989, S.32.
35 | Krippendorf, Ekkehardt, 1973, in: Siebs, 1999, 25.
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purposeful manner. A foreign policy tool is defined as any foreign policy measure 
planned and formulated by diplomatic and/or administrative foreign policy actors. 
These tools are realized on the micro-level of foreign policy output, that is, by the 
performing actor in the host state with the purpose to attain a foreign policy goal. 
2. hOW TO ASSESS FOREIGN POLICY: TOOLS AND CRITERIA
“Ultimately, foreign policy is a test of a nation’s character. […] [It] expresses the 
relationship we want with other nations. It must reflect our values and define 
our interests. The sacrifices we are willing to make in the pursuit of our foreign 
policy objectives also tell the rest of the world something about the courage of 
our convictions as a nation.”36
(Alexander M. Haig, U.S. Secretary of State 1981-1982)
After defining foreign policy as a process and clarifying which foreign policy actor 
is considered to be at the center of this analysis, the methods of how to assess 
change within the process of foreign policy have to be discussed. With regard to 
the analysis itself, first of all the most relevant “fields” of the respective foreign 
policy are identified, i.e., the target of the policy’s impact in combination with the 
tools used, followed by an evaluation of the “level” of this foreign policy. In his 
policy paper on the U.S. engagement in Yemen, Edward Prados, a researcher at 
the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, introduces 
a number of functional tools for foreign policy analysis, while explicitly referring 
to the role of the “intensity” of foreign policy.37 In the following section these 
concepts are reviewed critically and modified. 
Prados’ paper is one of the few current comprehensive studies published outside 
the military on the history of a Western country’s relations with Yemen. From 
his perspective, foreign policy is not only defined as an “active” policy, but it also 
follows the traditional understanding of foreign policy as political action of one 
state towards another. Prados clearly distinguishes between the active, dominant 
role as opposed to a receiving, even submissive, inactive part. Throughout his 
argument he tries to go beyond mainstream U.S. foreign policy perspectives, 
but does not fully succeed: Prados’ nationally colored perspective narrows his 
analytical view. Despite his critique of aggressive interventionism, he is not able to 
go beyond the demands of a policy paper and implicitly cleaves to realism’s notion 
of the struggle for power for its own sake. In addition to that, Prados’ “levels of 
engagement” as categories on the one hand unfortunately mix intensity and 
36 | Haig, 1985, 71 and 75.
37 | Prados, Edward. The United States and Yemen: A Half Century of Engagement. 
Occasional Papers. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 2005. 
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intention of actions that aim to have an impact on the receiving side of foreign 
policy. On top of that he includes moral motivation – “good” or “bad” intentions in 
his analysis – so that it is difficult to distinguish motivations from other interests 
with regard to the intended outcome of “national interest” in the policy. On the 
other hand, Prados fully ignores the agency of the recipient, and thus overlooks 
the influence of the host state on a state’s foreign policy. 
Prados argues that any form of engagement in another state, even the most intensive 
one, can be free of concrete harmful intentions of the foreign policy actor. However, 
the actor always pursues a goal with his actions, a fact Prados’ approach does not 
reckon with. A possible solution for this is to explicitly include the host state. For 
example, when comparing different cases of humanitarian intervention, Prados 
presumes a “good” intention of the foreign policy actor who offers military assistance 
for humanitarian purposes. However, “intention” in this case cannot be considered 
a reliable analytical category, as the only source available is the actor himself, who 
does not necessarily have to tell the truth. But ever since the first discussions on 
humanitarian intervention, consent of the host state is key to transform unlawful 
intervention into legal intervention.38 That said, a modified foreign policy approach 
of engagement that differentiates between “intensity” and “intention” may serve to 
analyze the actions and non-actions of the respective foreign policy actor and might 
be especially fruitful for evaluating the intensity of foreign policy activities during 
the different phases in a context of “developmental politics”: In modifying Prados’ 
approach, five levels of intensity are re-defined, referring not only to foreign policy 
as whole but also to different “fields of engagement”.
Then, Prados introduces three levels of intensity of engagement: “influence”, 
“involvement”, and “intervention”. Somewhat oversimplified, his approach turns a 
blind eye to many forms of political intent and action, especially at the margins of 
the spectrum of engagement. One may disagree that non-action does not qualify 
as foreign policy. However, the non-action or the delay of certain actions expected 
by the host state or the international community due to a state’s history of foreign 
policy behavior can be just as impactful as explicit measures taken. To provide 
a more complete picture of levels of engagement, another level of engagement 
below “influence”, labelled “interest”, is added. This stage of engagement 
includes policies that observe another state’s politics to determine whether 
and when an intensification of engagement might serve one’s own ends better. 
“Influence” is defined as foreign policy engagement in the sense of reciprocation 
with basic diplomatic exchange. “Involvement” implies a functioning working 
relationship with the host state. Lastly, “intervention” includes any actions 
aimed at manipulating the internal affairs of the host state, but this need not 
38 | On the legal and moral discussion on Humanitarian Intervention and its genesis: 
Welsh, 2005; Wheeler, 2000 and The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001. 
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“be accompanied by the threat of hostile action,”39 as Prados claims. Bearing the 
major hypothesis of this study in mind, the spectrum of intensity of engagement 
does not stop at intervention. To illustrate this, the level of “imposition” is added 
as the highest possible intensity of foreign policy. “Imposition” is defined as the 
active control of parts of the host country’s politics by the foreign policy actor and 
is regarded as the last stage before the de-facto inclusion of the host state into the 
territory of the foreign policy actor. The transition from one level of engagement 
to another is a gradual one. Accordingly, the transition from foreign policy 
“imposition” to “occupation” or “colonization” and thus intervention beyond the 
“limits of foreign policy” is also both gradual and possible.
„[T]hose who study foreign policy must concern themselves with politics at all 
levels […] it is in some profound sense a discipline with limitless boundaries: 
the discipline is imposed by the need to reorganize inquiry around the external 
behavior of nation-states […] but insofar as its independent variables are 
concerned, the scope of the field is boundless.”40
(James Rosenau, Political Scientist, 1987)
With regard to understanding a country’s foreign policy, its motives, goals, 
restraints and impact, there is no additional value in a mere enumeration of 
capitals visited, agreements signed or wars declared. This especially is the case for 
the approach of this study, as itexplicitly includes the host state of foreign policy. 
To be able to cope with the sheer amount of archival material, which is mostly 
occupied with exactly these “hard facts” of diplomacy, filtering tools that can focus 
the analysis towards its goal and thus generate new insights are needed. The first 
“sorting tools” have been introduced above, a method to identify change in foreign 
policy by considering the “fields of foreign policy” as well as the level of intensity 
of engagement, or the “levels of foreign policy”. Change in the “fields” and the 
“intensity of engagement” can be observed on all three levels/spheres of foreign 
policy making.
Most of the time, change at the micro-level of foreign policy, i.e., the actual 
policy on the ground, is connected to a change at the meso- or even macro-level 
of foreign policy making, and thus entailing a change to the foreign policy actor’s 
goals (meso-level) or a change to the scope of action within the framework of 
the international state system on the “inside/outside-interface” (macro-level). In 
other words, any foreign policy change on the ground may be an indicator of a 
more or less profound shift in a state’s foreign policy orientation. The reasons 
for this kind of change, though, may not only be found within the state itself, 
but also within the host state. As with Soviet activities, the level of East Berlin’s 
engagement depended on internal political developments in the extremely 
39 | Prados, 2005, 4.
40 | Rosenau, 1987, 4.
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unstable milieu of South Yemeni politics. This circumstance already illustrates 
the necessity to include the receiving side of foreign policy, in this case the PDRY, 
as explanatory for foreign policy and its changes. As a consequence, the analysis of 
the GDR’s foreign policy rests on a scheme of phases. In the case of South Yemen, 
it is less the stability of a certain phase which determines the room for foreign 
policy engagement, but rather the turning points and catalyst events, indicating a 
changing political situation in the country and the ability of the external actor to 
react. Thus, each chapter focuses on the turning point that initiates the phase as 
well as relevant catalyst events. To support and illustrate the argument, the most 
prominent events or political challenges within the “host state” in South Yemen 
are presented in more depth in each phase chapter to be able to characterize the 
GDR’s foreign policy in South Yemen. 
3. FOREIGN POLICY ENDS AT ThE OThER STATE’S SOvEREIGNT Y
To better analyze and interpret the GDR’s engagement in South Yemen, however, 
this study does not settle for a phase analysis of the foreign policy itself. Here, 
the major hypothesis ties in with the approach introduced before: East German 
engagement is considered a “policy of socialist state- and nation-building” which 
had far reaching consequences. Apart from the very concrete goal of international 
diplomatic recognition, the GDR also pursued a highly normative, or rather 
ideological goal. In South Yemen, East Berlin sought to establish a socialist state 
in its own image. This hypothesis gives rise to normative-ethical and empirical 
questions. Firstly: When does a policy based on an ideological motivation exceed 
the “limits of foreign policy” and turn into imposition? Secondly: Is it possible for 
an external actor to promote state- and nation-building towards a state in one’s 
own image and to induce social change in the host country? The following two 
subchapters are occupied with these questions and connect them with the GDR’s 
“policy of socialist state- and nation-building”.
The willingness of a state’s representatives to engage with another state regularly 
means opting for “involvement and interaction as opposed to isolationism.”41 
This can imply that one state seeks to influence the behavior of another state in a 
certain way.42 In doing so, the influencing state can exceed the “limits of foreign 
policy”. As indicated above, this study locates the “limits of foreign policy” where 
another state’s “sovereignty” begins. This means that the infringement of a state’s 
sovereignty is where the “limits of foreign policy” are exceeded. To be able to 
define this boundary though, the phenomenon of sovereignty in this context has 
to be analyzed and understood. The following subchapter explores the moments 
41 | Haass/O’Sullivan, 2000, 18.
42 | Prados, 2005, 4. 
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of friction in foreign policy and “sovereignty” and connects the results with the 
“policy of state- and nation-building” approach.
In the following, the concept of “sovereignty” is used in nominalist terms 
to include different meanings in different contexts.43 “Sovereignty”  is regularly 
defined with a focus on either internal or external state sovereignty, the former 
being popular in philosophy and political theory, the latter in the field of 
international law. Questions about the “limits of foreign policy” tend to be occupied 
with the “external” side of sovereignty. To fully understand the Janus-faced nature 
of the concept, though, the “internal” side of sovereignty has to be understood as 
well. Internal sovereignty mostly refers to what Francis Harry Hinsley defined as 
the “final and absolute authority in the political community,” where “no final and 
absolute authority exists elsewhere”44 in the respective territory. His definition 
rests on the essentialist understanding of sovereignty as it had been introduced 
by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes in the 16th and 17th century,45 while he also 
included Max Weber’s definition of the state as the agent that claims and owns the 
“monopoly of the legitimate use of [physical] violence within a certain territory.”46 
From this point of view, the monopoly of violence becomes a conditio sine qua non 
for the legitimacy and efficiency of the state, including its sovereignty as the final, 
absolute, and only authority within the given territory. Clearly, this definition has 
become constitutive of most conceptualizations of “internal sovereignty” in the 
tradition of Western thought, just as Georg Jellinek’s defines the sovereign state in 
the international state system as a prerequisite for “external sovereignty”.
Jellinek suggests three essential prerequisites for a state to qualify for external 
sovereignty: state territory, people, and authority.47 These three elements “are 
mutually dependent and thus their isolation is a mere hypothetical exercise as 
each of the three conditions the other two.” 48 Generally speaking, this approach 
considers “internal sovereignty” the basis for the justification of “external 
sovereignty”. “External sovereignty” in legal terms is derived from the equality of 
sovereign states, that is, states claiming “internal sovereignty” for themselves in 
the international state system, as expressed, for example, in the non-intervention 
clause in Chapter 1 of the UN Charter. The origins of these principles can be 
traced back to continental Europe and the Treaty of Westphalia.49 Singed at the 
43 | The argument follows Georg Jellinek, 1900; On “sovereignty” and “nominalism”: 
Bartelson, in: Adler-Nissen/ Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008.
44 | Hinsley, 1986 (1966), 26.
45 | For a discussion of Bodin's and Hobbes' understanding of “sovereignty”: Schmitt, 1922, 33.
46 | Weber, 2004 (1919), 310f.
47 | German: “Staatsgebiet“, “Staatsvolk“ and “Staatsmacht“.
48 | Jellinek, 1900, 393 and 426.
49 | The provisions of the Treaty are considered the condensation of the idea of sovereignty 
in Europe at the time, in: Schliesky, 2004, 87ff.
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end of the Thirty Years War, the Treaty is regularly considered a revolutionary step 
towards international regulations. The signatories accepted each other as equals 
representing a certain territory. This acceptance was based on the assumption 
of the other signatories’ claim to unquestioned internal state sovereignty. The 
Treaty’s provisions supposed to safeguard state sovereignty on the inside by 
preventing foreign interference from the outside and upholding state autonomy.50 
In international law, this conceptualization gradually evolved towards today’s 
concept of the nation state with its rights and duties as codified in the Charter of 
the United Nations.
According to the Charter of the UN of 1945, signatory states are obliged to 
observe the “sovereign equality of all its members.”51 This principle is specified in 
the so-called “Friendly Relations Declaration”52 of 1970 by including the provisions 
of Article 2(3) and (4): “sovereign equality” guarantees the rights inherent in full 
sovereignty to all member states including the inviolability of territorial integrity 
and political independence.53 Correspondingly, it demands the prohibition of any 
threat or use of force which is seen as jus cogens today. This principle is tightly 
linked with the principle of “non-intervention” of Article  2(7) which defines 
it as “the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside 
interference.”54 This right to “negative liberty”55 is where the normative question 
of the “limits of foreign policy” come into play. According to the International 
Court of Justice
“a prohibited intervention must be one bearing on matters in which each 
State is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely […]. 
Intervention is wrongful when it uses, in regard to such choices, methods of 
coercion, particularly force, either in the direct form of military action or in the 
indirect form of support for subversive activities in another state.”  56
Unfortunately, this narrow legal definition does not stretch to the normative 
question of the “limits of foreign policy” at hand, as its definition of “prohibited 
intervention” is solely focused on “methods of coercion”, usually with the goal 
50 | On the role of state autonomy with regard to legal sovereignty: Krasner, 1995.
51 | Charter of the United Nations, Ar ticle 2 (4).
52 | Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Appendix 
of GA/Res 2526 [XXV], UNYB, 1970.
53 | Declaration on Principles of International Law, 1970, Preamble.
54 | Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States of America), Separate Opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh President, 1986.
55 | Berlin, 2014 (2002), 244.
56 | Declaration on Principles of International Law, 1970, 202 to 209.
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to undermine the state and/or regime.57 The actual reason for this narrow 
understanding of ‘intervention’ is the prohibition of the use of force between 
states as one of the major principles of the UN Charter.58 As a consequence, acts 
of violence get prosecuted in praxis, even though the legal reading of the “non-
intervention clause” includes all “methods of coercion”.59 However, legal reality is 
no good reason to refrain from thinking outside the given framework of principles. 
The principles of “equal sovereignty” and “non-intervention” without doubt have 
been created with the intention to provide each member state with the right to 
settle its internal affairs by itself and to reject any assistance or interference from 
outside.60 As a consequence, this study claims that foreign policy can exceed its 
limits even before coercion and without force and that these actions already can be 
considered an infringement of sovereignty. 
What does this mean for a state’s sovereignty then? Generally, all states are 
considered to possess “equal sovereignty” in the international realm – at least with 
regard to legal provisions. The fact of “prohibited intervention” in the sense of 
“coercion” remaining unpunished in legal reality, however, leads to the conclusion 
that the concept of sovereignty can and has to be qualified,61 especially when going 
beyond the wording of legal provisions to discuss their actual output and thus the 
normative question of “sovereign equality”. Despite nominal equality, states are 
not equal with regard to their resources and influence. As a consequence, a state’s 
scope of action in the international realm depends on the “quality of its sovereignty”, 
meaning the degree of the state’s “autonomy”. Haftendorn defines a state’s autonomy 
as the ability to “enforce its values and goals despite competing values and goals 
of other systems (that is states),”62 while relying only on its specific resources. Her 
definition recalls realism’s “war of all against all”63 in the international system, where 
57 | Without qualifying it as prohibited, Vincent defines intervention very similarly as an 
“activity undertaken by a state, a group of states or an international organization which 
inter feres coercively in the domestic affairs of another state”. According to Vincent, 
intervention fur thermore “is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed 
at the authority structure of the target state.” Vincent, 1974, 13.
58 | Excluding the right of self-defence of Ar ticle 51 which manifests in Ar ticle 2 (4) 
and is interpreted teleologically as well as historically as comprehensive and absolute. 
Together with the monopoly on the use of force of the Security Council this shall support 
the maintenance of “international peace and security”. Charter of the United Nations, 
Preamble; Ar ticle 1, No. 1; Ar ticle 25.
59 | Vincent, 1974, paras. 202 to 209; Wheeler/Bellamy, in: Baylis/Smith, New York, 2001, 472.
60 | Apart from excesses like “crimes against humanity” or “genocide”, in: Welsh, 2004.
61 | On the opposing arguments of nominalist and essentialist approaches to ”sovereignty” 
and whether ”sovereignty” may be qualified or not: Adler-Nissen/Gammeltoft-Hansen and 
Bartelson, in: Adler-Nissen/Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008.
62 | Haftendorn, 1989, 34.
63 | Hobbes, 1996 (1651), 258.
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every state is fighting for its own survival and leaves us with at least two weak points. 
Firstly, autonomy of a state is declared the ideal condition, as it is defined as the 
prerequisite to achieve one’s foreign policy goals. Hence any strategy which does not 
rely on one’s own resources cannot be taken into consideration when assessing its 
success or failure with regard to declared policy goals. As a result, this traditional 
definition of “autonomy” does not include the relationship between the states apart 
from competition, even though cooperation is one of the major determinants of the 
international state system today. Secondly, the use of the word “enforce” leads to the 
impression that values and goals can only be attained through foreign policy strategies 
with a high level of intensity. “Soft” tools like diplomacy, mediation or non-action are 
not included. However, Haftendorn somewhat revised her definition of autonomy 
about a decade later. Now “autonomy” is defined as the ability to “convince” other 
states “to respect [the state’s] goals and values or accept these after certain adaptation. 
A structural dependent system on the other hand is forced to continuous 
adaptation.”64 By softening and differentiating her definition in this way, 
Haftendorn accounts for the fact that foreign policy offers a wide range of 
strategies and tools to achieve one’s goals on the one hand, and that “autonomy” 
in international relations as an ability not only relies on “hard facts” but also “soft” 
and sometimes vague factors like prestige and reputation on the other. Thus, 
she clearly puts a new focus on the “degrees of autonomy”, the capacity to act 
autonomously. While she equates a state’s “autonomy”65 with the state’s scope of 
action in the international realm in both versions of her approach,66 in 2001 this 
equation becomes more convincing, as the scope of action not only depends on the 
actions of other actors, but also on the “image” of the host state with these actors.
As a consequence, this study defines the quality of a state’s external sovereignty 
by the “degree of its autonomy” that is staked out by a state’s scope of action in the 
international sphere. The “limits of foreign policy” may be considered exceeded 
at the moment of infringement of a state’s “external sovereignty” by the actions of 
another international actor. And while this infringement does not simply suspend 
a state’s sovereignty, it may diminish its autonomy and thus impair the “quality” of 
its sovereignty. Reconsidering the argument that “internal sovereignty” proceeds 
“external sovereignty”, “external sovereignty” in the sense of the degree of a state’s 
autonomy can have an immediate impact on a state’s “internal sovereignty”, and 
thus may even endanger the very foundations of the state itself. By means of an 
argumentum e contrario, the forced curtailment of a state’s autonomy may be 
considered an infringement of sovereignty with regard to its internal affairs and 
thus an excess of the “limits of foreign policy”.
64 | Haftendorn, 2001, 13.
65 | German: Autonomiefähigkeit.
66 | Halliday appears to have a very similar understanding of state autonomy in 
international realtions. Halliday, 2006, 42.
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Reconnecting these conclusions with the conceptualization of foreign policy 
introduced above, the two highest levels of foreign policy intensity need to be 
reconsidered. “Intervention” may already aim to manipulate the “internal affairs 
or foreign policy activities,”67 while “imposition” may include the active control 
of parts of the host country’s politics. Without doubt, foreign policy at both levels 
of intensity, by whatever means, seeks to alter the conditions within the host 
country of foreign policy. All in all, this leads to the conclusion that both levels of 
intensity may give rise to the debate over whether measures taken by the foreign 
policy actor already are an infringement of the host country’s sovereignty in itself. 
Judgment of these cases should be based on the major benchmark for a state’s 
sovereignty: The state’s right to “negative liberty”68 and its ability to consent or 
renounce to measures taken. Unambiguously, foreign policy ends at the host 
state’s sovereignty.
3.1  On the Emergence of the Nation: Defining the ‘Known’ against the ‘Foreign’ 
After reflecting on the question about when foreign policy gives way to imposition, 
the puzzle about the “limits of foreign policy” offers another dimension to be 
explored. What can foreign policy actually achieve in the host country? Is an 
external power able to induce social change in the host country? To further 
think about these questions, a detour to the basic meaning(s) of ‘foreign policy is 
deemed necessary. The question, ‘foreign for whom and in comparison to what’, 
so far has remained unanswered. The ‘self/other-dichotomy’, one of the major 
paradigms in Postcolonial Studies, might offer a satisfying approach to explain 
what is considered ‘foreign’ from a state’s perspective. In his sweeping account on 
“Nations and Nationalism,”69 Ernest Gellner located the emergence of the “nation” 
within the process of transition from agrarian to industrial societies. What he 
is referring to is the transformation of Platonic “Gemeinschaft” (community) to 
Kantian “Gesellschaft” (society).70 This transition encompassed the dissolution 
of old structures which had given meaning to each individual’s lives within 
small communities. Meaning had mostly been derived from kinship in a society 
where everyone was aware of his or her position and what this position entailed. 
During the transition to industrial societies, however, the “feeling of belonging” 
and security was questioned and the “well-walked paths” around people’s villages 
were replaced by anonymous life in the city. In Gellner’s account “culture” 
became the replacement for this “feeling of belonging”. This culture could be 
acquired through education and literacy. In doing so, future members learned 
the “language” of the wider community – the nation –  like an initiation ritual. 
67 | Prados, 2005, 4.
68 | Berlin, 2014 (2002), 244.
69 | Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, New York, 1983.
70 | Gellner, in: Periwal, 1995, 1-7.
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Based on Emile Durkheim’s account of mechanical solidarity through mutual 
likeness that generated a “conscience collective”71 Gellner’s conceptualization of 
the “nation” first of all is about what people and what a political community have 
in common: shared beliefs and attitudes that can operate as a unifying force. 
Gellner’s approach has been challenged but also expanded by theorists following 
a critical or post-structural approach.72 His contemporary Benedict Anderson, 
for example, already focused on the “constructed”, or in his words “imagined” 
character of the nation state. According to Anderson, “print capitalism” allowed 
the transformation from the concrete local community to what he describes as the 
abstract “Imagined Community,”73 the nation. For Anderson, the written word is 
the basis for national consciousness, which has to unify members of the future 
nation who never met and possibly will never meet. The state was able to include 
the various and oftentimes competing social groups and individuals through the 
idea of the nation as “the secular, historically clocked, imagined community,”74 a 
community that was able to overcome the spatial distance between its members 
through the “imagined feeling of belonging”. Benedict’s conceptualization of the 
“nation” had a major impact on the various accounts of the “nation state” that 
followed.
  
Mostly influenced by Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of Western history,75 
post-positivist scholars examined the dichotomy of the “self” and the “other”, of 
“inclusion” and “exclusion” to analyze the emergence of political communities. 
These accounts conceptualize the “nation” with a focus on the necessity of an 
“other” against which the members of a community define themselves. This 
constructivist stance also emphasizes the “nation” to be neither eternal nor 
stable. David Campbell, for example, defines the state as both real and discursive, 
and diagnoses a “permanent need of reproduction” in an ongoing “process 
of becoming.”76 Campbell considers the nation state as created and recreated 
through the “discursive practice” of “othering”, excluding non-members from 
the community. Taking into consideration both traditional and deconstructive 
approaches, one may conclude that collective identities77 such as the nation are 
permanently generated and regenerated by both sameness and difference and 
both can operate as the unifying force of groups – in this case, political groups. 
71 | On Durkheim's notion of solidarity: Barnes, 1966, 163.
72 | This clearly has added to the epistemological shif t of perspective within the debates 
centered on nationalism and ethnicity. Brubaker, 2009.
73 | Anderson, 1983, 6. However only in combination with mass reproduction and a 
certain degree of literacy can “print capitalism” have relevant impact.
74 | Anderson, 1983, 35.
75 | Derrida, 1997 (1976).
76 | Campbell, 1998, 12.
77 | A conceptualization of “collective identities”, in: Eder/Giesen/Schmidtke/2003.
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Now the question remains: “Sameness” and “difference”; the “known” and the 
“foreign”; “us” versus “them”; with regard to what reference? This study locates 
the answer to these questions in the determinants of collective identities that are 
considered the basis for the formation of communities of any kind and may or may 
not be responsive to new ideas and values and thus social change. 
3.2 Identit y Formation, Social Change, and how they interrelate
Based on the questions “Who are you/we?”, “Who do you think you are?”, “Who do 
others think you are?”, the “Handbook of Identity Theory and Research” describes 
identity as
“the confluence of the person’s self-chosen or ascribed commitments, personal 
characteristics, and beliefs about herself; roles and positions in relation to 
significant others; and her membership in social groups and categories […]; as 
well as her identification with treasured material possessions and her sense of 
where she belongs in geographic space.”78
To handle the concept of “identity” in the context of social groups and 
communities, this analysis includes the three ideal types of collective identity 
coding introduced by Eder et alia: Primordial, traditional and universalistic/
cultural.79 When collective identity is coded primordially, “the boundaries of 
identities such as gender, generation and kinship are reinforced[…] constituting 
difference by “structures of the world which are given and cannot be changed by 
voluntary action.” While “primordial identities” rarely offer a choice of “opting in 
or out”, “traditional identities” are generally open to new members, even though 
they “engender hierarchical distinctions between the bearers of traditions and 
new members.” Furthermore, “traditional identities” are “constructed on the 
basis of familiarity with implicit rules of conduct, traditions and social routines.” 
The “traditional type” places “temporal continuity” at the core of its identity and 
does not draw from an external reference, as opposed to the “primordial type” 
drawing from nature and the “universalistic type” drawing from the “divine”, or 
transcendent logic. The “universalistic type” also allows new members to join, as 
the “boundaries between inside and outside can be crossed by communication, 
education and conversion.”
It is the markers of a “collective identity” that determine the rules of 
“membership”80 for the respective community. The dimension of “membership” 
captures “external categorization” as well as “internal self-identification” and 
78 | Schwartz/Luyckx/Vignoles(Ed.), Intrdocution: Toward an integrative View of Identity, 2011, 4.
79 | For the following approach and all related quotes: Eder et al., 2003, 25-34.
80 | This conceptualization of “membership” is an adaptation of Brubaker’s dimensions of 
nationalism. Brubaker, 2009, 26ff. 
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thus is considered the central category for self-definition of political movements 
by defining the group’s boundaries. This “social closure”81 generates loyalty and 
facilitates the mobilization of its members’ support when facing an opponent of the 
group. To further complicate this “social closure”, individual categories or groups 
of identification are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they can be multilayered.82 
This is one of the preconditions enabling “collective identities” to encompass huge 
communities, even nation states: As a consequence, the “nation” may not only be 
considered a created “imagined community,”83 but can serve as the identity of this 
community as a “collective identity” to integrate conflicting groups and overcome 
internal divides. For a “national identity” to evolve, this identity either has to be 
compatible with existing “collective identities” or foster social change by adapting 
to existing collective identities. 
But how can the “nation”, being an ideology, foster social change? Mann’s 
approach on the “sources of social power”84 is considered here and modified. 
According to Mann, the structure of societies is determined by four sources of 
social power: The ideological, the economic, the military and the political. Mann 
refuses explanations for the organization of society which rely only on one of the 
four sources, as all four of them regularly cause social change. However, he points 
out that they do so in varying constellations and intensity. Mann considers the 
sources of social power “entwined”, as “their interactions change one another’s 
inner shapes as well as their outward trajectories.”85 For social change to occur, 
the relation between the sources of social power has to shift, either by one or 
more sources intensifying or decaying. With his approach, Mann introduces an 
effective method to describe a society’s condition as well how it changes over time. 
However, what Mann notoriously leaves unanswered is what actually “causes” 
the constellation of the sources of social power to change. Why do, for example, 
economic questions become more important or prominent in a society? Why does 
militarism recede in others? Without doubt, these questions cannot be answered 
while detached from the case and its special characteristics. But there is one hub 
in society upon which social change seems to be pivoting: Identity.
81 | Brubaker, 2009, 27.
82 | An individual can be a man, a doctor, a democrat, a Muslim and a Yemenī at the same time.
83 | Anderson, 1983, 36.
84 | Mann introduced his approach in four volumes: Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social 
Power, Cambridge, 2012 (1993).
85 | The framing of this paper does not allow an in depth delineation on Mann’s various 
subcategories and theoretical argument. Instead, the author contends with a rough outline 
to frame her theoretical approach towards the role of identity in society. Mann, 1993, 1-91.
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Repeatedly, Mann refers to ‘identity’ as a social category that is shaped by one or 
several of the four sources of power and depicts this phenomenon as “interstitial 
space” in the social fabric: 
“The entwining classes and nation states produced emergent dilemmas for power 
actors to which clear solutions did not exist. […] [T]he very identity of classes 
and nations was still fluid, influenced by ideologists. Interstitial space existed for 
ideologies to propose their solutions and influence social identities.”86 
However, this observation belies the decisive role of collective identities within the 
process of social change, as pointed out by the hypothesis introduced above. As an 
integral part of the actors involved, identities channel the sources of social power 
and connect them with the relevant actors. Thus, collective identities are not only 
shaped by the sources of social power but also allow or prevent the disruption of 
the constellation of these sources and thus social change. What Mann describes 
as “interstitial space” may be interpreted as the “degree of responsiveness” 
of collective identities to social change. The consequence of this theoretical 
argument is that social change can only be accommodated, if the identities of the 
relevant actors, decision-makers, and recipients of these decisions are receptive 
to what this change entails. So social change of (political) communities can only 
occur through the transformation of the community’s “collective identity”. Hence, 
the probability of social change hinges on two variables: Firstly, the “fit” between 
the old “collective identities” and the “new” identity offered, and secondly, the 
“degree” of the old identity’s “ability” or “willingness” to accommodate change, 
interpreted as the “degree of responsiveness” to change.87
As pointed out above, collective identities are defined by what the group has 
in common and how the group differentiates itself from other groups. The shared 
characteristics of a group, the so-called “boundary markers” or “codes”, define 
who is a part of the group and who is not. Reconnecting with the two statements of 
the hypothesis, social change can be accommodated only if identities are receptive 
to what this change includes. This mostly means that they have to be able to adapt 
by incorporating new characteristics, i.e. “codes”, which are sufficiently similar to 
the new situation. If this fails, identities may lose their integrative function and, 
deprived from their essential core, fall apart. This may cause severe disturbances 
of social milieus, groups and individuals. What is more likely to happen to 
identities too rigid to adapt however, is that they fall back on their original “codes” 
and thus into their old shape. Being overwhelmed by or incompatible with the 
new situation, rigid identities might prevent social change in the end. Thus, this 
approach declares a certain “degree of responsiveness” of identities, meaning the 
ability to transform the codes of identity, a conditio sine qua non for any social 
86 | Mann, 1993, 40.
87 | The author calls this the “responsiveness-of-collective-identities hypotheses” (RCIH).
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change. In the case of South Yemen, this means that success or failure of the 
profound social changes taking place in Aden and its hinterland highly depended 
on the compatibility of the respective identity codes with the new concepts and 
values, at first introduced by the revolutionary regime and later on by the external 
actors, the GDR and Soviet Union.
4. ThE MA jOR hYPOThESIS: ThE GDR’S FOREIGN POLICY AS A 
POLICY OF STATE- AND NATION-BuILDING
Based on the preliminary hypothesis of the “responsiveness of identities”, the 
following section introduces the concept of state- and nation-building and its 
modification as a “policy of socialist state- and nation-building” as an attempt 
to actively promote or even force the change of “collective identities”. Fanon 
concluded that the most difficult and also dangerous time for post-colonial states 
after independence was the less glorious phase when the “wind of revolution 
los[t] its velocity”88 and national liberation had to be channeled into day-to-day 
politics. During the sensitive phase of development of the political community 
in South Yemen, the East German idea of nation- and especially state-building 
greatly influenced the creation of the South Yemeni state and upheld a certain 
relevance over time. This case study approaches the creation and establishment of 
South Yemen as a process of “nation building” actively pursued from the inside 
by the state’s political leaders89 but also from the outside, by East Germany and 
its delegates on behalf of Moscow. In other words, the meta-level of the GDR’s 
foreign policy making with regard to its goals somewhat coincided to a certain 
extent with the PDRY’s internal policy-making and the South Yemeni regime’s 
goals for their state. On first glance, one may conclude that a convergence occurred 
at the micro-level between the early NLF’s policies and the output of the GDR’s 
foreign policy, that is, its implementation. This concept allows to include both 
perspectives, the internal, Yemeni perspective, and the external, East German 
and Soviet perspective. A further assessment of the GDR’s impact on this nation-
building process in the PDRY might be a possible step beyond this study. 
“Nation-building was a strategic and competitive enterprise, part of the Cold War 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union,”90 says Hippler of the 
role of the concept of nation-building during the bipolar conflict. As a Western concept 
of developmental politics of the 1950s and 1960s, “nation-building” had been part 
of the U.S.’ containment and even roll-back policy to “represent an alternative to the 
88 | Fanon, 2004, 90.
89 | Already in 1990 Kostiner approaches the NLF/NF’s policies in the 1960s as a process 
of state-building, Kostiner, 1990, 11.
90 | Hippler, 2005, 5.
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victory of liberation movements and the ‘revolution’.”91 Based on “lessons learned” 
from Western state development, post-colonial states were supposed to follow, if not 
the same, at least a similar path of development. A political and economic system 
similar to the Western democratic model was the expected outcome. However, and 
regardless of different labelling, the general idea of nation-building was used by 
both sides of the Cold War to expand their spheres of influence. Just like the Western 
model of “democratization”, the Soviet Union offered a comprehensive model for 
nation- and state-building: The “planned development of socialism,”92 based on 
the principles of Marxism-Leninism. In both cases, Western “democratization” 
and Eastern “development of socialism”, nation-building was understood and used 
as a normative “political objective”.93 This must be kept in mind when using the 
parameters of the concept as a tool to analyze, or in a sense to “deconstruct”, the 
GDR’s foreign policy activities in South Yemen. All in all, a meta-hypothesis on the 
character of the GDR’s foreign policy in South Yemen and the possible motivation of 
the SED for the design and application of the “ideal type” of East Germany’s foreign 
policy can be derived: The policy in South Yemen was aimed at duplicating the East 
German process of the “planned development of socialism”.
In the following section, nation and state-building as a policy concept is 
introduced. To allow a more comprehensive understanding, certain characteristics 
of the modern state are addressed, though a full review of the concept of the state 
cannot be presented here. First of all, there is no proof that there even exists 
successful “nation-building” in the sense of active interference in social processes 
in a certain territory – whether by internal or external forces. One may settle for 
the possibility of “nation-growing” within a certain territory with the nation state 
as the ultimate outcome. While there cannot exist an ideal pathway to the nation 
and thus an ideal type of nation-building, various analysts have collected major 
preconditions which seem to be indispensable for successful “nation-growing” with 
a stable, integrative, and efficient nation state as an outcome. Tightly connected to 
these preconditions are certain social developments and occurrences that produce 
the assumption that it might be possible to actively promote these developments 
through the use of specific political tools and even the establishment of certain 
institutions. By bringing together these tools and institutions, a comprehensive 
policy approach was created, regularly referred to as “nation-building”. 
In the strictest sense of the word, the nation state may be described as a 
society that is formed into a political community by the idea of the nation and the 
91 | The term somewhat went out of fashion in the 1970s academically and politically but 
celebrated a popular revival after the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, and the Kosovo War, in: Hippler, 2005, 5.
92 | German: Aufbau des Sozialismus. The concept is based on Stalin’s “development of 
socialism in a country” under the condition of “capitalist encirclement”, in: Gieseke, 2010, 
21 and Schroeder, 1999, 119.
93 | Hippler, 2005, 6.
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form of the state. This suggests that the two terms “state building” and “nation 
building” are not identical, though closely related. “State building” focuses on 
state institutions and political actors, whereas the term “nation building” regularly 
includes a comprehensive perspective on the development of society as well as 
the “emergence of a […] national identity.”94 The latter oftentimes is considered 
the over-arching concept of which state-building is merely one of several 
elements. This study follows Hippler’s approach with the three major elements, 
or “preconditions”, for “successful” state- and nation-building at the core of the 
concept.95 Hippler’s “precondition triangle” consists of firstly, the communication 
and acceptance of an “integrative ideology”, secondly the “integration of society” 
and lastly the establishment of a functional “state apparatus” in the sense of state-
building.
The latter is the most obvious precondition for the nation-state and thus state-
building. While the character and functions of the institutions forming a state 
may vary, state institutions necessarily have to encompass the triad of ‘power-
people-territory’ as introduced by Georg Jellinek96 and, following Max Weber, 
provide for the penetration of territory by the state, that is, by its administration 
and physical violence in the sense of the “monopoly of violence.”97 However, the 
changes of the political system and society taking place during the emergence 
of a new state demand legitimacy for the pursued changes and the actors 
implementing them. On top of that, it has to tie in with a “higher purpose” to 
mobilize social support for this change. According to Hippler, “ideology” can 
serve as the integrative force promoting legitimacy for cause, measures, and end. 
As a consequence, the role of “ideology” may even be considered a prerequisite for 
the “integration of society” and transformation of the political system in general. 
In a nation state, social groups have to be connected to promote continuous 
exchange. However, these social groups must have both the will and ability to 
communicate with each other. While the latter has to be facilitated by communication 
infrastructure encompassing the whole territory of the emerging nation state, such 
as transportation, economy and mass media, the former is promoted by “feelings of 
sameness”98 or at least shared interest, which is something “ideology” may achieve. 
The historio-sociological approach to the “nation state” explicitly encompasses 
values and ideologies, “not as the constitutive domain of politics, but rather as part 
94 | Schneckener, 2003, 20.
95 | Hippler, 2005, 6-14.
96 | Weber, 2004 (1919), 310f; Jellinek, 1900, 393 and 426. 
97 | On the origins of the ”monopoly of violence”, as introduced by Thomas Hobbes and 
Arthur Schopenhauer and Weber’s account on the “monopoly of violence”: The Monopoly of 
Force, in: Anter, 2014, 25-35.
98 | For the role of the “other” with regard to self-identification: Taylor, 1994, 47.
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of legitimation and coercion.”99 Regardless of the nature of the “integrative ideology” 
evoked for the emergence of the state, its major task is to allow the various groups 
to identify themselves with this ideology and create a feeling of membership and 
belonging.100 This is how otherwise dissociated groups are unified. Should the 
superordinate national identity level be questioned or even missing, “a [nation] state 
will continue to be precarious.”101 Within the nation state a major aspect of “ideology” 
is the idea of the “nation”. But nationalism can be complemented, extended, or even 
replaced by other unifying ideological concepts, such as religion. In the case of 
South Yemen, the idea of the South Arabian nation102 in the 1960s was intertwined 
with socialism. Later on, the Aden regime tried to fully replace this South Arabian 
nation with their version of socialism. For them, the ‘nation state’ was considered a 
mere transitional phase towards international world communism.103 
The continuity and change of East Germany’s “socialist policy of state- and 
nation-building” in South Yemen is described and interpreted with regard to the 
fields and levels of engagement in the context of the four phases. The fields of 
engagement are associated with the triangle of preconditions for “successful” 
nation-building as introduced by Hippler.104 The analysis shows that East German 
policy prompted all three dimensions of nation-building – always in relation to 
the current political situation in South Yemen and according to its political and 
financial abilities. The “ideological”, however, is identified as the main driver 
of social change in the logic of “socialist state- and nation-building”: Marxist-
Leninist ideology serves as the umbrella of state development to integrate state 
and society. It supports the concrete political approach as well as the motivation 
and justification for action. “Ideology” is considered the decisive tool for the 
decision-makers to exploit “identity” for the “mobilization of the masses” and to 
form a national identity that aligns with their respective political goals. To sum it 
all up, “socialist state- and nation-building” served as a “road map” for the GDR to 
promote the establishment of first a socialist and then a Marxist state. 
99 | Halliday, 2006, 32; 37.
100 | The conceptualization of “membership” is an adaption of Brubaker’s dimensions of 
nationalism. Brubaker, 2009, 26ff.
101 | Hippler, 2005, 8.
102 | Dresch, 2000, 56; Holden, 1966, 25; Rogler, 2010.
103 | Ismael, 2005, 4f.
104 | Hippler, 2005, 6-14.
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Section B. AnALYSiS 

PART I – The GDR as a Foreign Policy Actor
The GDR’s effort to achieve its foreign policy goals were subject to internal and 
external limitations similar to any other state in the international realm, despite 
an admittedly narrow scope of action. In particular, the GDR’s relations to the 
Western powers and the Soviet Union’s bloc policy characterized the limited 
nature of East Germany’s autonomy. A self-directed foreign policy appears to 
have been almost impossible for the GDR. Nonetheless, East Berlin was able to 
find alternative ways within its “day-to-day politics” to promote its interests.1 As a 
consequence, the hypothesis that no true GDR foreign policy existed must be not 
only questioned but rejected.2 Whether these claims can be upheld is clarified in 
the conclusion of this study. The following five chapters provide the framework 
needed to embed the GDR’s activities in South Yemen within the GDR’s foreign 
policy in general and its activities in the Middle East in particular.
1 | For example during the first phase of the CSCE Process in Geneva and Helsinki in the 
early 1970s, in: Müller, in: DA 4/2010, 610.
2 | Gareis, for example, fully rejects the existence of an East German foreign policy in its 
own right, Gareis, 2006, 49.

CHAPTER 4. Squeezed between Bonn and Moscow:  
The GDR’s Foreign Policy – An Over view
The following three chapters focus on the two major external determinants of any 
GDR policy: The activities and policies of the Soviet Union and the competitive 
relationship with the “other” Germany. While the former can be considered the 
GDR’s early political and ideological midwife, and later on, its custodian,1 the 
latter remained a competitor and standard for comparison for Socialist Germany. 
The demands from within the national system itself are closely intertwined with 
these two external determinants and all three are considered mutually dependent. 
The most important watershed in the GDR’s foreign policy were the years between 
1969 and 1972. External pressures and new internal constellations had led to a 
policy change in West Germany and the “New Eastern Policy”2 of Bonn’s coalition 
of social democrats and liberals. These changes finally made it possible to end 
the GDR’s international isolation.3 When West Germany de facto recognized the 
GDR’s statehood by signing the “Grundlagenvertrag” in 1971,4 the GDR reached 
its long-sought goal of international recognition and was able to finally establish 
the foreign policy of a “normal” state in the international realm.5 In the following 
chapter, the GDR’s foreign policy is analyzed based on the two phases before and 
after this turning point, starting with a brief outline of the development of the 
GDR’s priorities in the international realm.
1 | See for example: Winzer, Otto, 1972, 3.
2 | German: Neue Ostpolitik.
3 | For a short overview on the “Neue Ostpolitik”: Görtemarker, 2004, 530-563. To this 
day, the most extensive analysis of the topic remains Baring, 1982. Interpretations and 
comments on the formation of the “New Ostpolitik”. Bender, 2008, 151; Görtemaker, 2004, 
475; Hacke, 1988, 162; Haftendorn, 1989, 41; Haftendorn, 2001, 180; Hölscher, 2010.
4 | “Vertrag über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen der beiden deutschen Staaten“ 
(Grundlagenvertrag) December 21 1972. 
5 | Siebs, 1999, 11.
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1. POLITICAL PROLOGuE: ThE CARDS ARE ShuFFLED ANE W  TWO 
GERMAN STATES AND ThE RuLES OF ThE COLD WAR
“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has 
descended across the continent.”6
(Winston S. Churchill, Speech at Westminster College on March 5 1946)
At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the obvious differences between the Western 
occupying forces and the Soviet Union could not be denied any longer. Reaching 
an agreement on a policy toward the “German Reich” appeared more and more 
improbable and already fundamentally different development paths within the two 
Germanys seemed likely7 – despite “almost identical industrial prerequisites.”8 
Only two years later Andrej Zhdanov, party secretary of the Communist Party 
in Moscow, announced what was to become the “Two Camp Theory”, an event 
considered by some to be the beginning of the Cold War:9 Two irreconcilable world 
camps faced and confronted each other.10 Just one year later Zhdanov’s scenario 
became reality when Nikita Khrushchev declared an ultimatum on Berlin’s status 
as a free city and blocked traffic between the western zones and West Berlin.11 The 
Berlin Crisis and the Korean War accelerated the formation of the two “camps”, 
or blocs. When in July 1955 the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the victorious 
powers finally failed as well, Khrushchev proclaimed his “Two States Doctrine”: 
Reunification could only occur on terms of both German states and would only be 
possible if the GDR-style socialism and its achievements remained.12 
The founding of the two German states in 194913 introduced an integration 
process for the two entities to join the respective economic and military systems 
of East and West, culminating in their memberships in the two major military 
alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact 
6 | Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, March 5 1946.
7 | Bracher, Dietrich, in: Hacker, Jens, 1989,  41.
8 | Schroeder, Klaus, 2006, 89f. On the changes of German economy during the war and 
the scope of economic destruction after the war in Central and Easter Europe: Applebaum, 
2013, 10ff.
9 | Applebaum, 2013, 219; Stöver, 2007, 74.
10 | Zhdanov, Andrej, September 1947, Zhdanov answers Harry S. Truman at the 
Conference of Communist Party of Europe, in: Lautemann/Schlenke (Ed.) 1980, 156f.
11 | On the Berlin Crisis and Blockade and possible interpretations: Stöver, 2007, 89ff; 
Wettig, 1999, 145-152.
12 | Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, in: Schroeder, 1999, 132: Wentker, in: Hoffmann/
Schwartz/Wentker, 2003, 65.
13 | Judt, in: Judt (ed.), 1998, 493; Sywotteck, in: Pfeil, 2001, 51.
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(WP).14 When neither the Soviet quelling of the uprising in June 195315 nor the 
erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 changed the Western powers’ strategy of 
restraint, it became clear that the West would not make any move to endanger the 
fragile balance in Europe.16 The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 signaled the climax 
of the East-West Conflict on the fringe of escalation. Scholars point to the attempts 
of superpowers and their allies to strive for an international détente in the wake of 
the crisis wake as the end of the first “hot” phase of the Cold War.17 Up to this point, 
the management of international crises had been achieved through the “classic 
instruments of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy,”18 though in the bloc conflict 
they had not yet been deployed comprehensively as preventive instruments. This 
process was about to change with the “Treaty Policy” of the late 1960s. The treaties 
generated the feeling of a certain safety in the atmosphere of détente, ushering 
in the second phase of the Cold War, and last until the late 1970s. Both sides of 
the Cold War arranged themselves with the status quo and after the Berlin Wall 
had been become a fact, it was obvious that the division of Germany was not to be 
easily remedied.19 If control over Germany was only possible for a part of it, the 
Soviet Union preferred two German states instead of one.20
Thus the birth of the two German states also sounded the bell for four decades 
of separation in the heart of the two superpowers’ confrontation. Haftendorn 
describes the German predicament as a “system of structural dependencies.”21 
Provisional occupation became permanent, as both superpowers hoped for more 
sustainable influence on Europe’s “political order”. Initially, American presence 
was meant to support the interests of Germany’s neighbors, particularly France, 
by preventing Germany from re-establishing itself as a European power. With 
the Berlin Crisis and the beginning of the proxy war in Korea solidifying the 
Cold War in 1948-49, the Western occupation forces changed their major goals, 
with Washington shifting from “Containment” to its “Roll-back Policy” so as to 
not only prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its sphere of influence, but to 
repulse any Soviet presence. Meanwhile, the West organized itself according to 
the newly divided Germany. Germany’s east and west had to fulfill their role as 
14 | Foitzik, in: Hoffmann/Schwartz/Wentker, 2008; Haftendorn, 2001, 60.
15 | Schroeder, 1999, 83; Wettig, 1999, 256.
16 | Staadt, in: Schwartz (ed.), 2008, 160ff; Alisch, in: Schartz (ed.), 2008, 150.
17 | Most depictions of the Cold War follow the scheme of three roughly described phases 
and tend to subdivide these depending on their approach: Halliday, 2005; Steiniger, 2004; 
Stöver, 2007. 
18 | Glaeßner, 1984, 239.
19 | Wentker, 2007, 316.
20 | Glaeßner, 1984, 239.
21 | Haftendorn, 2001, 11.
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bridgeheads at the “Iron Curtain”22 and soon became the major proxies for the 
Cold War in Europe.
The international power constellation at the time did not leave many alternatives 
for the two German states. During the early years of their existence the occupation 
forces controlled all areas of day-to-day life and granted only a little room for 
maneuvering at the national and especially the international levels.23 But even 
though both Germanys found themselves in similar positions in the late 1940s, 
their paths, predefined by their respective occupational forces, led them in very 
different directions of development. This is also true for their attempts to regain 
some autonomy in foreign policy. Despite the comparatively early establishment 
of foreign policy institutions in the young GDR,24 it remained highly dependent 
on foreign policy guidance by the Soviet Union and expanded its sovereignty 
solely “by grace of Moscow.”25 The institutions and competencies granted to West 
Germany, however, offered partial sovereignty to Bonn, including some measure 
of autonomy for its foreign-policy decisions.26
2. ThE GDR’S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES FROM ThE “PhASE OF 
RECOGNITION” TO ThE “hIGh TIMES OF DIPLOMACY”
“Foreign Policy means something dif ferent for a defeated […] Volk as the German 
Volk is [right now] from what it means for a Volk as we have once been. As long 
as we are still the object of other powers’ politics we cannot implement social 
policies, a proper national policy. Thus our […] first and foremost intention must 
be to […] become a subject of politics in our own right again.” 27
(Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1952)
22 | Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, March 5 1946. The theatre term “iron curtain” had 
been used in politics before, e.g. by the German Reichskanzler Theobald von Bethmann 
Hollweg in 1916 (“Der gescheiter te Taktiker Bethmann Hollweg,” sine anno) but is widely 
used as a metaphor for the division of the world during the Cold War.
23 | Wengst, in: Schwartz (ed.), 2008.
24 | The “Commission for Foreign Affairs“ (German: Kommission für außenpolitische 
Fragen) and the “Ministry for Foreign Affairs“ (German: Minsterium für Auswärtige 
Angelegenheiten), Scholtyseck, 2003, 6.
25 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 14.
26 | On the establishment of the FRG’s Foreign Ministry in March 1951: Schöllgen, 2004, 
29. On the expansion of Bonn’s international room of maneuver: Begrenzte Souveränität, 
in: Bierling, 2005, 111-169; von Bredow, 1999, 89.
27 | Adenauer, Konrad. Speech for the CDU. Bonn, 28 March 1952. Bulletin 38/52. 
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“The United Germany shall have accordingly full sovereignty over its internal  
and external affairs.”28
(Article 7(2) of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 1990)
With the “unconditional surrender” by the German High Command of the so-
called “Third Reich”29 on the 7th of May 1945,30 Germany forfeited its sovereign 
rights as an equal member of the international state community. In June 1945, the 
Allied Powers31 agreed that
”[t]here is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting 
responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country 
and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers”32
and thus claimed “supreme authority” over Germany. The founding of two separate 
German states just four years later did not do much to change this status and despite 
a successive expansion of the two Germanys’ competencies, first with regard to their 
internal affairs, later on to the international realm, their sovereignty remained restricted. 
It was not until Germany’s reunification in 1990 that the Allied Powers “terminate[d] 
their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole.” 33
When consulting sources from the West, conclusions about the GDR’s foreign 
policy regularly paint the state as a “non-active actor”, neither enjoying autonomy 
nor the incentive to achieve any goals in the international sphere. Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, for example, labels the construction of the Berlin Wall as proof of the 
failure of the GDR’s political system. According to him, East Berlin’s policies did 
28 | Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany September 12 1990 in: 
Bundesgesetzblatt 1990 Part II. October 13 1990 (pub.), 1318-1329. 
29 | On the origins and the controversies about the term “Third Reich” (German: “Drittes 
Reich”), in: Winkler,2000, 6f.
30 | Act of Military Surrender, in: Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United 
States of America 1776-1949. Vol. 3. Multilateral 1931-1945. Bevans, Charles I. (ed.). 
Department of State Publication 8484. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969.
31 | The “Allied Powers” at this point include the governments of the United States 
of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the 
Provisional Government of the French Republic.
32 | Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme 
Authority by Allied Powers. Introduction. 6 June 1945, in: Treaties and Other International 
Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949. Vol. 3. Multilateral 1931-
1945. Bevans, Charles I. (ed.). Department of State Publication 8484. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1969.
33 | Ar ticle 7 (1), Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany September 12 
1990. In Bundesgesetzblatt 1990 Part II. October 13 1990 (pub.), 1318-1329. 
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not go beyond maintaining grandfathering the GDR’s status quo after that.34 
Regardless of this judgment, the GDR did indeed declare and actively strive for 
policy goals during all phases of its existence, though any policy goal following 
the GDR’s foreign policy priorities was in some way connected to either the Soviet 
Union or West Germany, the two decisive determinants of the GDR’s scope of 
action. Recalling Czempiel’s triangle of priorities, the foreign policy interests 
of the GDR have been interpreted based on the relation between the priorities 
“security/peace”, “liberty/stability” and “economic welfare”. For the analysis of 
Bonn’s foreign policy, Helga Haftendorn added national unity to liberty/stability,35 
as it had been a pivotal topic among East German foreign policy priorities. As 
such, “National unity” and how its interpretation changed over time must be 
considered as well when discussing the GDR’s foreign policy interests.
“Security and peace” are not only the major goals of any state but may even be 
regarded a conditio sine qua non for the continuous existence of a state, comparable 
to food and shelter in Abraham Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs.”36 Without basic 
security from internal instability and external threats to its population, no state can 
uphold its existence in the long run. This ties in with Campbell’s interpretation of 
foreign policy as the “discourse of danger” in that it is premised on the delineation 
of a state’s inside and its outside. Throughout the GDR’s history, the major priority 
for the SED regime remained “security” in its most fundamental sense: to secure 
the GDR’s existence as a state, its territorial integrity, and thus the SED’s claim to 
power. Accordingly, East German foreign policy was first and foremost focused 
on the “dangers” outside the GDR. Hence, the tight integration of the GDR into 
the Eastern Bloc was not only in Moscow’s interest but also a primary foreign 
policy goal of the GDR. The major legal basis for this integration was the “Treaty 
of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” (Warsaw Pact) of 1955 and the 
bilateral “Treaties of Friendship” of 1964 and 1975.37 The Treaty of 1964 sealed the 
GDR’s integration as a state among others in the Eastern Bloc, though it did not 
explicitly affect “rights and obligations” agreed upon in “mutual […] agreements 
including the Potsdam Agreement.”38 Any other policy goal was subordinated to the 
SED’s overarching interest to secure the GDR’s existence while upholding the SED’s 
political autocracy. With its aggressive public policy, the SED leadership successfully 
tied the GDR’s survival to its own predominance. The VIII. Party Conference of the 
34 | Interview of Hans-Dietrich Genscher (2015), Minister of Foreign Affairs in the FRG 
from 1974 to 1992, by Miriam Mueller on January 16 2009.
35 | Haftendorn, 1989, 32-49.
36 | See: Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs,” in: Maslow, 1954.
37 | See: Extracts of the GDR’s First Treaty of Friendship with the USSR of September 20 
1955, in: Judt, 2008, 549.
38 | “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the GDR and 
Soviet Union.” June 12th 1964, Ar ticle 9, in: Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 894.
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SED in 1971 shows this focus on state survival: Each treaty mentioning territorial 
questions in Europe was supposed to acknowledge the territorial status quo and 
equated European security with “the security of its borders.”39
In the GDR “national unity” was declared a primary foreign policy goal as 
early as October 194940 and was closely connected to the GDR’s existence as a 
state as well as its self-perception as the “better”, anti-imperialist Germany until 
the mid-1960s. This strive for national unity was abandoned with the recognition 
of the existence of two German states in 1971.41  In the “Grundlagenvertrag.” the 
FRG was cautious not to endanger its foreign policy priority of reunification,42 as 
demanded for in the Grundgesetz. Bonn insisted on the continued existence of 
one German nation. This notion of “the continuity of a unified German nation.” 
even after the de facto recognition of the GDR, was naturally considered an 
imminent threat to the GDR’s existence as a separate sovereign state by the SED 
and thus part of the “discourse of danger” generating Eats German foreign policy. 
By “imagining”43 an East German national community, that is, creating a separate 
identity of a “socialist nation”44 the SED aimed to reduce this threat against its 
national existence.
“Liberty” as a foreign policy priority for the GDR first of all is interpreted as 
external “autonomy” as well as freedom from external influence and thus may 
also be considered part of the foreign policy “discourse of danger”. The FRG and 
its policies were perceived as an imminent threat to the GDR’s existence. Thus, 
one of the major goals was the termination and prevention of any direct or indirect 
influence by West Germany on the GDR’s internal affairs, i.e. to expand East 
Berlin’s autonomy towards its Western sibling. With regard to the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern Bloc, “autonomy” was defined profoundly differently. Indeed, the 
SED never really hoped for the GDR’s full sovereignty, in the sense of being able 
to act free from its creator’s interference. As early as 1947, the SED leadership 
had publicly insisted to aspire to an “autonomous foreign policy orientation.”45 
And indeed, compared to its Western sibling, the GDR started with an advantage: 
While Bonn still had to wait to reclaim the ability to run its state’s foreign affairs, 
East Berlin was granted a recognizable upgrade by Moscow in 1950.46 This 
“permit” included the ability to establish diplomatic relations and to give binding 
39 | Honecker, 1980, 379.
40 | First foreign policy declaration by the government of the GDR on October 24 1949 by 
Georg Dertinger, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the GDR, in: ND, Vol.4, No.250, October 25 1949.
41 | BVerfGE 36,1, vom 31.Juli 1973, Grundlagenvertrag; Hacke, 1988, 288; Haftendorn, 
2001, 200; Schroeder, 1999, 195. 
42 | Preamble, Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 23 1949.
43 | “Imagined Communities,” in: Anderson, 1983.
44 | Howarth, 2001, 88.
45 | German: “eigenständige außenpolitische Orientierung.” in: Scholtyseck, 2003, 5.
46 | Pieck, Wilhelm, “The Problems of German Foreign Policy” July 20 1950, in: Judt, 1998, 511.
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declarations.47  However, despite this apparent freedom in the early years, the GDR 
usually had to receive Soviet approval for its actions and all in all was not able to 
deviate from the foreign policy path predefined by Moscow.
”Economic welfare” in East German foreign policy firstly balanced the SED’s 
lack of legitimacy on the inside by appeasing the population through modest, but 
steady increases to their economic well-being. Secondly, the SED used economic 
policies to work toward international recognition as a state through foreign trade.48 
“Foreign trade is the strongest weapon in the fight for recognition of the GDR,”49 
summarizes Johannes König, East German ambassador to Moscow in 1956. 
Thus, “economic welfare” rather must be considered a foreign policy objective of 
medium range than a priority.
With its internal consolidation after the erection of the Berlin Wall, the sealing of 
the inner-German border and a positive economic trend, the GDR gained a certain 
self-confidence as a state. As a consequence, the SED aimed to loosen the tight 
corset of Moscow’s “reign” by proving its loyalty to the Kremlin, but also by attaining 
“autonomy through status” within the framework of bloc discipline. Through 
economic progress and preemptive subservience to the Kremlin, the SED attempted 
to establish itself as a model state within the Eastern Bloc to expand liberty “on 
the outside.”50 Liberty “on the inside,” however, was no policy goal of the SED. The 
ruling party reduced political rights and liberties of the East German population to a 
minimum right from the start. To sum it up, this first priority throughout the GDR’s 
history was to secure the GDR’s existence. “Security” was closely linked to liberty 
in the sense of a limited autonomy and “economic welfare” as a means to an end. 
These priorities were expressed by closely bonding with Moscow, establishing the 
GDR as the political and economic “No. 2” within the Warsaw Pact, and attaining 
recognition as an equal German state in the international community of states. All 
these priorities, including the political survival of the GDR, intersected with the 
overall state objective: To establish first a socialist and then a Marxist German state 
and subsequently guarantee its survival. 
47 | First foreign policy declaration by the government of the GDR on October 24 1949 
by Georg Dertinger, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the GDR, in: Neues Deutschland, Vol.4, 
No.250, October 25 1949.
48 | Muth, 2001, 81 and Wippel, 1996, 4.
49 | König, Johannes, ambassador of the GDR in Moscow 1956, Meeting of the heads of 
missions, in: PA AA, MfAA, A 15470.
50 | Schweisfur th concedes the GDR a role as a trailblazer towards the “federation” of the 
Eastern Bloc. Schweisfur th, in: DA, September 1977, 940 and Judt, 1998, 499.
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CHAPTER 5. Phase I: Between Internal 
Consolidation and International Recognition
The following section contends with the GDR’s policy in Phase I, from 1945-49 
to 1971-72. The phase can be divided into two sub-phases, before and after 1955, 
when the GDR, at least officially, was granted more autonomy in its foreign affairs. 
The early years of the GDR have to be considered of little relevance with regard to 
its international presence, as the Soviet Union exerted full control over the GDR’s 
foreign relations. However, to understand the social and political transformation 
from the former “German Reich” to the GDR and thus the socialist state- and 
nation-building process there, this period is briefly sketched out, with a focus on 
the role of the Soviet Union.
1. ThE SOvIE T uNION AND ThE WARSAW PACT: IN ThE BEGINNING 
ThERE WAS MOSCOW
In the beginning there was Moscow. Without doubt, this was just as true for foreign 
policy as for any other policy field in the East German state. After Stalin had given 
up his hopes for an expansion of its Soviet system over all occupied zones, the full 
and final integration of the new partial state in the Soviet Occupied Zone (SBZ)1 
became Moscow’s new primary objective, including the full control over the city 
of Berlin. Apart from numerous strategies toward the Western powers, Moscow 
applied extensive policies to ensure its control over the SBZ, and later on, the 
GDR. Wentker identifies three central policies: Direct military control, political 
and economic integration, and the policy of “Sovietization.”2
The policy of “Sovietization” can be subdivided into the “Sovietization” of 
society and of the “Sovietisation” political system, in which the latter was directed 
not only by Soviet functionaries but also by Germans on behalf of the Soviets: The 
new leadership in the SBZ had just returned from political exile in Moscow. These 
1 | German: Sowjetisch Besetzte Zone.
2 | Wentker, 2007, 3; Applebaum, 2013, Introduction.
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so-called “Moscow cadres” of the Communist Party (KPD),3 a term introduced 
by Peter Erler,4 were formed by exiled communists who had fled persecution by 
the National Socialist (NS) regime in Germany during the 1930s. During their 
exile, the politically well-connected “Moscow group” successfully seized and 
kept their leadership role among the other German communist exiles.5 Back in 
Germany after the war, the “Moscow cadres” had to face competition from others 
who had also convincingly opposed the NS regime, but were much more popular 
among the population. In particular, the Social Democrats, the traditionally more 
moderate leftist adversary of the Communists, emerged as a serious problem for 
future Communist leadership. With Soviet support, however, the Communist 
cadres were finally able to overcome their minority position through the forced 
merger of the Communist Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party, 
the SPD, in 1946.6  The result of the merger was the Socialist Unity Party,7 a “new 
type of party” based on principles formulated by Stalin. It took several more years 
to eliminate or silence dissidents within the new Marxist-Leninist party, the SED: 
Blackmailing, threats and military trials subverted any opposition from not only 
the former Social Democrats, but also from within the Communist wing itself 
against the strict new leadership backed by Moscow.
The political system established with the founding of the GDR in October 1949 
left room enough to accommodate a future transformation of the GDR towards the 
Soviet model. Furthermore, the loyal elites ensured that its accompanying values 
would be further entrenched into the political system and society of the GDR. 
The population of the SBZ did not have any choice when it came to embracing 
these new values transported by “Sovietisation.” According to Schroeder, this 
imposition of Soviet values upon the East German population created the fatal 
gap between state and society with which the GDR would struggle throughout its 
existence.8 The radical measures implemented with this policy also removed from 
power the traditional elites. This was justified by the goal of “denazification”, of 
which the disempowerment of former NS elites by the occupying force and the 
new regime was a side effect. The Soviet occupiers first of all aimed to prevent 
any former elites, including democratic actors connected to the Weimar Republic, 
from becoming a threat to the new functionary elites of the SED.
3 | Communist Party of Germany, German: Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD).
4 | Erler, in: Wilke (ed), 1998, 253. 
5 | Schroeder, 1999, 9f; Wettig, 1999, 90. In the Soviet Union these German communists 
again suffered political purges, this time by Stalin’s state apparatus. Those who survived only 
were able to do so through a sufficiently convincing political adaptation to the Soviet model.
6 | On the founding of the SED see: Malycha, 2009, 16ff; Wettig, 1999, 97-107.
7 | German: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED).
8 | Schroeder, 2006, 86.
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The long-term goal of “Sovietisation” and of the other early Soviet strategies was 
the integration of the new state into its sphere of control on the one hand and the 
successful development of “Socialism in one country”9 on the other. In 1924 Stalin 
had presented his argument for the possibility of the development of “Socialism in 
one country” as an intermediate step before worldwide socialism and communism. 
When in 1952 the “planned development of Socialism,”10 the official development 
program of the GDR, was announced, it clearly built on Stalin’s approach and was 
developed according to Moscow’s will. At the time, the existence of the SED and 
its claim to power fully depended on Soviet guarantees. Moscow had secured the 
SED’s loyalty and gradually transferred responsibilities for the “development of 
socialism” to the new party’s functionaries.
However, the GDR’s population at the time did not submit to its new regime 
unconditionally. People had not yet internalized the new values of the policy 
system. In June 1953, Soviet tanks had to forcefully end a popular uprising which 
had spread all over the country. The economic shift towards heavy industry 
combined with a collectivization of agriculture and the halting of production of 
consumer goods had led to a supply shortfall in early 1953. When in May the SED 
raised the central production target, the first workers went on strike. Protests 
spread from Berlin all over the GDR and the SED felt that it was not able to keep 
the uprisings under control. This internal insecurities coincided with vagaries in 
the Soviet Union. Stalin died in March 1953 with no clear plan for succession.11 
When Soviet tanks finally crushed12 the “popular uprising,”13 the SED’s existential 
dependence on Soviet political and military support could no longer be denied. 
And while the SED regime felt assured that the Soviet Union was still willing and 
able to guarantee the survival of regime and state, the former “Moscow cadres” 
were fully aware how much their dictatorship depended on the “big brother” in 
Moscow.
To secure the SED’s leadership of the GDR, the regime integrated the state 
politically and economically into the Eastern Bloc. The economy was integrated 
by implementing the Soviet economic system based on central planning,14 
accompanied by an intensification of heavy industry that increased dependence 
9 | Kapitel 6: Die Frage des Sozialismus in einem Lande, in: Stalin, 1946 (1924).
10 | German: planmäßiger Aufbau des Sozialismus. See: Schroeder, 2013, 110ff. 
11 | Wettig, 2011, 6, 62 and Wettig, 1999, 365.
12 | Order by the Military Commander of the Soviet Sector in Berlin, June 17th 1953, in: 
Judt, 1998, 512.
13 | German: Volksaufstand. While the SED regime kept talking about a workers’ uprising 
initiated by infiltrated enemies of the GDR, current research argues that the 17th of June had 
been nothing less than a nationwide uprising on the brink to revolution. See for example: 
Fricke/Steinbach/Tuchel, 2002, 322ff; Neubert, 2000, 80ff; Schroeder, 1999, 83.
14 | Ritter, in: Hoffmann/Schwartz/Wentker, 2008, 22f; Steiner, 2004.
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on imported raw materials from the Eastern Bloc and especially the Soviet 
Union. Foreign trade relations were artificially focused on the “socialist” world. 
The economic transplantation of this supposedly new German state into the 
Soviet satellite system was sealed when the GDR joined the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance of the Eastern Bloc (Comecon) in 1950.15 Political integration 
was promoted through the alliance of the militaries of the Eastern Bloc. In March 
1954, after the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the victorious powers again 
failed to produce any results, the Soviet government announced the recognition 
of the GDR as a sovereign state. East Germany was now supposed to decide on 
its national and international affairs “on its own discretion.”16 Meanwhile, Bonn 
had signed the “General Treaty”17 of the Western Allied Forces in May 1952, 
which came into effect in 1955. The treaty terminated the Occupation Statute and 
sealed Bonn’s NATO membership. The corresponding step on the other side of 
the “Iron Curtain” was the GDR joining the Warsaw Pact.18 This move ultimately 
limited the GDR’s sovereignty to a significantly larger extent than Bonn’s NATO 
membership, as the Warsaw Pact did not include any provisions for the case of 
retirement. Article 7 of the Pact denied the signatories the ability to become a 
member of any other alliance. There did not exist any mechanism of arbitration 
within the Pact except for the “exclusive [Soviet] monopoly of interpretation”19  and 
decision. Thus, even after 1954, the “reserved rights” of Soviet Union with regard 
to the GDR’s international affairs remained complex and muddled.
Nonetheless, the SED’s fear that they would be “sold by Moscow”20 due to 
strategic considerations remained high – especially when the Soviet Union 
established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955.21 
The bilateral “Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” 
can be considered the legal basis for the Soviet sphere of influence. And even 
though such a “Treaty of Friendship” in 1964 confirmed Soviet support of the 
SED regime,22 the regime still considered it necessary to overemphasize its loyalty 
toward its “big brother” via preemptive obedience. In 1968, a reformist movement 
led by the Czech regime and its figurehead, Alexander Dubček, First Secretary 
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (ČSSR), had swept over the country.23 
To force the ČSSR back in line, Moscow sent tanks to end the upheavals of the 
15 | Hoffmann/Schwartz/Wentker, Einleitung, 2008, 11.
16 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 14.
17 | German: “Deutschlandvertrag.”
18 | President of the GDR Otto Grothewohl signs the Warshaw Pact on May 15 1955, 
Picture: Beitritt der DDR zum Warschauer Pakt, in: Quelle: BArch Va 75468.
19 | Grewe, Wilhelm, in: Hacker, 1989, 77.
20 | Fricke, 1997, in: Scholtyseck, 2003, 90.
21 | Görtemaker, 2004, 336.
22 | Bahr, 1991, 45; Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 893.
23 | Karner, 2008.
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“Prague Spring.” The GDR proved itself a reliable “ally” and deployed troops of the 
national army, the “Nationale Volksarmee” (NVA), to the GDR-Czechoslovakian 
border.24 This intervention was a posteriori justified by the so-called “Brezhnev 
Doctrine,” which de facto declared the limitation of sovereignty of Warsaw Pact 
members.25  Disagreements among researchers about Ulbricht possibly having 
a positive attitude toward the reform movement in Prague, while Honecker had 
already opted for a “hard line”, may just be mentioned in passing as they are of little 
importance here:26 The SED regime clearly decided to stick closely to the Soviet 
path. The incident in Prague had triggered old fears within the SED leadership 
of national revolt and reminded them of their political dependence.27 From now 
on, a consistent fear of reformist movements in the neighboring countries of 
the Eastern Bloc that could undermine the SED’s autocracy settled in the minds 
of the functionaries. The latent mutual interdependence between the internal 
political developments in the GDR and its relationship with the USSR became an 
unwritten law.
The GDR had proven its loyalty during the “Prague Spring” and began to 
establish itself as Moscow’s international “junior partner.”28 Also, within less 
than two decades, the GDR had been able to emerge as the second industrial 
power after Moscow and in the process developed a new self-confidence.29 In 
the words of Egon Bahr: “Being just a satellite probably isn’t the most pleasant 
condition.”30 On several occasions the GDR led by Walter Ulbricht31 seemed to 
have some voice in decisions concerning the GDR and even Berlin. An example 
of this new self-confidence is Ulbricht’s active role during the Berlin Crisis of 
1958,32 as he urged the Kremlin to close the border. However, when this wish 
finally was granted in 1961, it was as a political calculation and not as a reaction to 
Ulbricht’s engagement. Emigration and brain drain after the revolt of 1953 threw 
into question the existence of the GDR, forcing Moscow to act.33 Nonetheless, 
and in spite of the GDR’s obvious dependence on Moscow’s protection and 
goodwill, Ulbricht demanded that the GDR be acknowledged as the model of a 
socialist industrialized nation and made it clear that he envisioned the GDR as 
24 | Wentker, 2007, 269.
25 | Malycha/Winters, 2009, 184f; Wirsching, in: Wengst/Wentker, 2008, 366.
26 | Wentker, 2007, 267f.
27 | Schroeder, 1999, 98.
28 | Gasteyger, 1976, 38.
29 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 23.
30 | Interview with Egon Bahr February 3 2009, in: Müller, 2009.
31 | From 1950 to 1971 Walter Ulbricht was General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the SED, and General Secretary of the SED, Müller-Enbergs/Wielgohs/Hoffmann (Hrsg.), 
2000, 868f.
32 | Stöver, 2007, 129; Scholtyseck, 2003, 18; Lemke, 2000, in: Scholytseck, 2003, 95.
33 | Lemke, 1995, 277.
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a truly sovereign state – though remaining shoulder-to-shoulder with Moscow 
in the near future.
Obviously, Ulbricht not only overestimated the GDR’s economic but also his own 
political capacities. His attitude led to “growing Soviet misgivings that the GDR’s 
foreign policy might leave its predefined path.”34 The Kremlin did not intend to 
take chances with its volatile “ally” Ulbricht. Moscow’s primary interest was not to 
secure a GDR led by Ulbricht, but rather a socialist GDR led by cadres loyal to the 
Kremlin.35 The President of the United States summarized the GDR’s importance 
to Moscow at the time: “When East Germany is lost, Poland is lost, and all of Eastern 
Europe is lost [to Khrushchev].”36 Consequently, the Soviet Union never intended to 
fully drop the reins on the GDR’s national politics and never hesitated to emphasize 
its presence: “We [the SU] have our troops deployed with them [the GDR]. This is a 
good thing and we’ll leave it at that”37. When in 1970 Ulbricht pointed out that “We 
are no Soviet state – only true cooperation!”38 his fate had already been decided. An 
internal putsch supported the Kremlin conspired to get rid of Ulbricht: On March 
1971, thirteen members and candidates of the SED Politbüro sent a letter to its Soviet 
counterpart, the CPSU, stating that Ulbricht endangered unity on the international 
level.39 The USSR disposed of its insecure ally Ulbricht and replaced their former 
political locomotive with the younger and apparently more obedient Erich Honecker.40
2. BONN: A PERMANENT BENChMARK? ThE GDR’S AT TEMP T TO 
PROMOTE ITSELF AS ThE “ALTERNATIvE GERMANY”
Apart from the close ties to the Eastern Bloc, it was mainly the GDR’s relationship 
with the “other Germany” that determined East Berlin’s scope of action both outside 
and inside its borders. This was also true for the GDR’s guarantor of existence, the 
Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc: Due to the GDR’s international isolation, its 
position within the Comecon and Warsaw Pact was vital for its survival. At any 
time East Berlin could have fallen victim to a change of plans in Soviet foreign 
policy and been sacrificed as a pawn in the Cold War game. This special role of the 
FRG for the GDR and its foreign policy is explored in the following sub-section.
34 | McAdams, 1993, in: Scholtyseck, 102.
35 | “The existence of the GDR is of interest for us, for all Socialist states.” in: Brezhnev, 
Leonid on August 20th 1970, in: BArch, SAPMO DY 30 Büro Honecker Nr.441656, in: Judt, 
2008, 516.
36 | Görtemaker, 2004, 364.
37 | Brezhnev, Leonid on August 20th 1970, in: BArch, SAPMO DY 30 Büro Honecker 
Nr.441656, in: Judt, 2008, 516.
38 | Ulbricht, 1970, in: Siebs, 1999, 113.
39 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 31.
40 | Schroeder/Staadt, 143f, in: Courtois, 2010.
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“West Germany was a giant. We, the GDR, were a dwarf. That’s something our 
folks from time to time tended to forget – until the very end.”41
(Wolfgang Bator, member of Section IV of the CC of the SED,  
Ambassador of the GDR to Tripoli and Teheran)
As early as October 1949, the newly installed SED government had staked out the 
field of its aspirations for the GDR’s foreign relations:42 It was the GDR’s declared 
goal to prevent “German imperialism” from regaining strength by establishing 
peaceful relations with all other nations as the “German alternative” to the Federal 
Republic in the West. For the next two decades, the GDR had to navigate within 
this narrow scope of action in the international realm to become an equal member 
of the international community - at first by focusing on the neighboring states in 
the Warsaw Pact and then on the Global South.43
In one way or another, both German states claimed to be the legitimate 
representative of the German people. In September 1949, GDR Prime Minister 
Otto Grothewohl declared: “The Soviet Occupation Zone has to be considered 
the real Germany. Accordingly, [the founding of the GDR…] means the creation 
of a government for the whole of Germany.”44 FRG chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
replied in even more concrete terms: “The Federal Republic of Germany remains 
the only legitimate representation of the German people until the day of German 
reunification.”45 In the end, only the FRG was able to use this claim as political 
leverage. Based on the argument that the government in East Berlin had not been 
formed by free elections and thus did not have any political legitimacy, Bonn 
considered itself the only legitimate German government and offered citizenship 
to all Germans, East and West. As soon as Bonn had regained partial sovereignty,46 
the narrative of the lack of political legitimacy of the “other Germany” was 
translated into the international realm. The so-called “Hallstein Doctrine”47 
41 | Interview with Wolfgang Bator May 27 2011. 
42 | First foreign policy declaration by the government of the GDR on October 24 1949 
by Georg Dertinger, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the GDR, in: Neues Deutschland, Vol.4, 
No.250, October 25 1949.
43 | In 1957 the GDR already had signed 71 international treaties, in: Muth, 2001, 38.
44 | Grothewohl, Otto, Governmental Declaration of September 8th 1949, in: SAPMO 
BArch NY 4036, No. 768, Pg.2, in: Judt, 1998, 493.
45 | “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist […] bis zur Erreichung der deutschen Einheit 
insgesamt die alleinige legitimier te staatliche Organisation des deutschen Volkes.” Konrad 
Adenauer speaking on October 21 1949 at the Parliament in Bonn, in: Hacker, 1989, 
46. The West “German people had acted on behalf of those Germans who were denied 
involvement,” in: Präambel, Grundgesetz für die BRD (constitution) of May 23 1949.
46 | After the “German Treaty” of 1952 had come into force.
47 | The name is not fully correct as “Hallstein Doctrine” had been introduced Wilhelm 
Grewe. Görtemarker, 2004, 338.
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of 1955 became a stumbling block for the GDR’s foreign policy until the 1970s. 
According to the doctrine, the FRG intended to terminate diplomatic relations 
with any state that established relations of this kind with the GDR. Naturally, at 
first no state was willing to risk its good relations with West Germany and its 
strong economy. Not even after the GDR’s Eastern Bloc allies had recognized its 
statehood in 1949-50 did the list of East German diplomatic relations get much 
longer, as only Mongolia, Yugoslavia and Cuba did so. However, things gradually 
began to change in the mid-1960s when the Hallstein Doctrine gradually lost its 
deterring effect on developing countries. Even countries in the “West” considered 
recognizing East Germany, mostly to improve relations with Moscow.48 This 
change is regularly attributed to the international atmosphere of détente after the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. However, this development was also rooted in various other 
dynamics, such as the growing self-confidence of the Global South, the emergence 
of the non-alignment movement, and the inner consolidation of the GDR after it 
had erected the de facto symbol of its continued existence, the Berlin Wall.
Whether the GDR’s change of strategy to attain international recognition in 
1959 was among these causes or a mere reaction to them is debatable:49  The 
East German strategy of “Recognition” moved somewhat outside “classic foreign 
policy.”50 Instead of aiming at the final goal of full diplomatic recognition, 
including permanent embassies, the SED regime intended to achieve progress 
through more modest but persistent steps by either initiating contacts below the 
governmental level or pushing for the establishment of commercial agencies. The 
early achievements of this policy were put to the test six weeks before the first 
conference of the non-aligned countries in September 1961, when the “Politbüro” 
decided to become active with regard to diplomatic recognition. When considering 
the GDR’s limited scope of action, this foreign policy maneuver has to be 
considered a success: The lion’s share of leading non-aligned states, such as India, 
Indonesia, Ghana, and Egypt, referred to “two German states” in their speeches.
But East German endeavors did not result in the expected outcome: Despite this 
promising development, Yugoslavia’s proposal for joint recognition of the GDR by 
all non-aligned countries was rejected. Furthermore, this East German move in 
the end led to a significant setback. Bonn felt threatened by the near-recognition 
of the GDR by the leading non-aligned states. West Germany decided to intensify 
the Hallstein Doctrine and extended diplomatic consequences for any state 
recognizing the GDR by cutting loss of developmental assistance and aid. As soon 
as East Berlin’s new strategy showed its first successes, Bonn again intensified 
its doctrine by making clear that the establishment of relations with the GDR 
on a consular level could lead to the reduction of financial aid by the Federal 
48 | E.g. the GDR singed the Test Ban Treaty in 1963 - despite the FRG’s misgivings.
49 | Engel/Schleicher, 1997, 183f. 
50 | Wippel, 1996, 12.
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Republic: “Depending on their intensity, any official contacts of third countries 
to Pankow [meaning East Berlin] will be answered with a reduction of our 
economic assistance.”51 Despite these steps taken and their success with regard to 
preventing countries from fully recognizing the other Germany, the government 
of West Germany was not able to stop the Hallstein Doctrine from disintegrating 
afterwards.52 The GDR’s government continued on its new path and created in 
1963 a strategy to finally overcome the Hallstein Doctrine.
Due to a limited budged, the GDR had to concentrate its strategy on a small 
number of selected countries in the developing world. Among those initial 
countries were two of the nine states from the wider Middle East, Algeria and 
Egypt. In both countries, East Berlin hoped to be successful with its strategy, and 
also that the two would have an impact on other countries in the region. While 
this initial design had no specific focus on the Arab world, only a few years later it 
seemed obvious that the key to overcoming international isolation lay in the Arab 
countries: “There were General Consulates in several countries [in the Middle 
East] which merely needed an upgrade [to become an embassy], for example in 
Syria, in Egypt.  In addition to that we had commercial agencies in most Arab 
countries.”53
On behalf of Willy Stoph, Head of the Council of Ministers,54  and drafted by the 
MfAA, the new “strategy of small steps” was complemented by a “resolution” in 1965 
to support the African and Arab people in their struggles for liberation with “non-
civilian materials.”55 Thus the strategy officially acquired a regional focus. Bonn’s 
response, more or less, was the “Peace Note”56 of 1966, which can be seen as West 
Germany’s last attempt to save the Hallstein Doctrine and its policy of legitimate 
representation. Erwin Wickert, a diplomat with the foreign office and author of the 
“Peace Note,” retrospectively phrased the motive for this diplomatic move as “the wish 
[…] to compound with the states of Eastern Europe.”57 When the Federal Republic sent 
the note in 1966 to all states but the GDR, this meant nothing less than a threat to 
the GDR’s position within the Eastern Bloc. In the case that the Eastern Bloc states 
would have accepted Bonn’s offer to agree to renounce the use of force and establish 
51 | Carstens, Karl. Runderlass, June 18 1964, in: AAPD 1964. Doc. 171. 688-690. 
52 | Gerlach, 2006, 65ff.
53 | Interview with Fritz Balke May 23rd 2011.
54 | Head of the Council of Ministers: German: Ministerratsvorsitzender, in: Müller-
Enbergs/Wielgohs/Hoffmann (Ed.), 2000, Stoph, Willy, 829f.
55 | Otto Winzer an Willy Stoph, May 28 1965, in: BArch, DC 20/13001, Bl.28-33; 
Storckmann, 2012, 108.
56 | German: Friedensnote. Friedensnote der Bundesregierung, 7.3.1966; Abdruck in: 
Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik (DzD), 1966, hrsg. vom Bundesministerium für inner-
deutsche Beziehungen, Reihe IV/Bd.12,1. 1981, 381-385.
57 | Blasius, 1995, 544.
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diplomatic relations, the GDR’s international isolation would have been complete.58 
The immediate political reaction by the states of the Eastern Bloc though was the 
so-called “Ulbricht Doctrine’, a “Reversed Hallstein Doctrine”: Any move towards 
the offer of the “Peace Note” had to be preceded by Bonn’s diplomatic recognition of 
the GDR as well as the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line.59 The “Ulbricht-Doctrine” 
was backed fulsomely by Poland, indicating some success for East Berlin’s policy of 
integration in the Eastern Bloc through rapprochement towards its neighbours. Not 
surprisingly, the major driving force behind this countermeasure against the West 
German policy was no one less than the Soviet Union itself.
Under the protective wings of Moscow, the GDR had survived the first decade 
of its existence. The “Soviet hegemony with regard to questions of foreign policy,”60 
meaning the integration into the Soviet bloc system, was regularly reaffirmed by 
the SED leadership.61 Reconsidering the two major determinants of East Berlin’s 
foreign affairs during the first phase of foreign policy, it becomes apparent that 
both of them significantly shaped the GDR’s foreign policy inputs and outputs. On 
the one hand, Moscow clearly exercised an active role and thus can be considered 
a directive determinant. Bonn on the other hand, remained at most a mirror for 
comparison, as there did not exist immediate political contacts between the two 
German states beyond agreements of practical relevance like issues concerning 
West Berlin.62 Bonn’s policy and actions, though highly influential on East Berlin’s 
foreign policy decision-making, were only indirectly a reactive determinant.
3. ON ThE “ROAD TO RECOGNITION”: ThE TuRNING POINT OF 
E AST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Attaining full diplomatic recognition as an equal member of the international 
community was the most pressing issue of East Germany’s foreign policy from 
the very beginning, as it would secure the GDR’s survival as a state and thus of 
the SED regime. Naturally doing so would require overcoming West Germany’s 
Hallstein Doctrine of 1955. Meanwhile, pressure on Bonn to change its diplomatic 
course towards the GDR was rising. Due to the thaw in Cold War relations during 
the late 1960s, the FRG’s allies at first urged Bonn to adjust and finally give up its 
58 | Haftendorn, 2001, 156.
59 | Weidenfeld/Korte, 1999, 588.
60 | Klessmann, 1988, 431 and Judt, 2008, 500.
61 | Extracts of the GDR’s First Treaty of Friendship with the USSR of September 20 1955 
in: Judt, 2008, 549.
62 | Judt, 2008, 503f; Weidenfeld/Korte, 1999, 413.
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Doctrine.63 Furthermore, Bonn could not afford to endanger its relations with a 
rising number of developing states that decided to recognize the GDR. 
In his personal notes, Egon Bahr, architect of the “New Eastern Policy”64 and 
a confidant of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, analyzed the situation in 
July 1969:
“With the establishment of diplomatic relations in Cambodia, Iraq, Sudan, 
Syria, and South Yemen over the previous weeks [between April and June], the 
GDR successfully thwarted our policy of non-recognition.”65
Even though Bahr relativizes the GDR’s progress due to the “progressive” and 
“instable” nature of these countries, he recognizes how much the situation has 
changed: “[T]he GDR had been able to establish relations with non-Communist 
states for the very first time.” Bahr warns of the possibility of the rest of the Arab 
world following these radical states to avoid being the last in line for the economic 
and political benefits offered by the Soviet Union in what he calls a “follow-up 
effect.” According to Bahr, the strategy of “non-recognition” could be upheld 
no longer when the benefits of the strategy failed to outweigh the damage done 
“due to terminated or diminished presence in these countries.”66 The “Hallstein 
Doctrine” had finally lost its last teeth: When Cambodia recognized the GDR,67 
Bonn did not terminate diplomatic relations, but merely froze them,68 while 
still upholding valid agreements. Bonn’s reaction to Aden’s establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the GDR was quite similar: While ongoing negotiations 
were interrupted, the West German ambassador stayed in Aden.
After earning initial recognition in 1969, East Berlin participated in the CSCE69 
in Helsinki in 1975 as an equal member and thus an internationally recognized 
sovereign state.70 Striking a swift agreement with the GDR about the future of 
63 | One of the transitional stages towards the dissolution of the Hallstein Doctrine was 
a modified version, also called Scheel Doctrine, that declared the regulation of the inner-
German dispute an injunction for the FDG’s non-action in case of the recognition of the 
GDR by third countries. This version was prolonged at least for the NATO-states until both 
German states joined the UN in 1973. Conversation Bahr, Verner, and Winzer. in: Dok zur 
DP 1973 bis 1974, 2005, 713f.
64 | German: Neue Ostpolitik.
65 | Aufz. des Ministerialdirektors Bahr, July 1 1969, in: AzAP-BRD 1969 Vol.1, 751f.
66 | Ibid.
67 | On the role of Cambodia in the GDR’s Policy of Recognition: Interview with Heinz-
Dieter Winter on July 3 2012.
68 | Kupper, 1971, 82.
69 | Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
70 | Müller, 2010.
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“inner-German relations,”71 including a de facto recognition of the GDR, had 
become inevitable for Bonn to prevent further international marginalization of the 
FRG. Based on the notion that “there existed an alternative to the elimination of 
communist regimes: to change them,”72 the socialist-liberal coalition adapted its 
policy towards the GDR and the Eastern Bloc according to its Western allies’ policy 
of détente. In doing so, the new government in Bonn hoped to expand its scope 
of action toward its Western allies by a changing its policy towards “the East.”73 
Bonn’s agreement with East Berlin, the “Grundlagenvertrag,” was considered 
the core of a catalogue of treaties that redefined West Germany’s relations with 
its Eastern neighbours as well as the Soviet Union.74 The treaty was based on 
“the existence of two German states in Germany.”75 By including the support of 
the Allied powers, Willy Brandt was hoping to keep the door open for a unified 
Germany – regardless of the implicit and explicit recognition of the GDR as a state. 
For the same reason, however, West Germany refrained from a full diplomatic 
recognition: From Bonn’s point of view, the relationship of the two German states 
would always be of a “special nature.”76
The “Grundlagenvertrag” finally supplanted both the “Hallstein Doctrine” and 
its weak counterpart the “Ulbricht Doctrine.” The GDR could finally hope to become 
a “fully respected partner” in the international sphere. Until the final years of this 
“Phase of Recognition” the GDR’s foreign policy not only had highly depended on 
the Kremlin’s guidance and affirmation, but also on the Soviet Union’s active support 
as a foreign policy proxy for East Berlin whenever the GDR wasn’t able to act itself.77 
Apart from its “de facto recognition” by Bonn, the most important outcome of the 
“Grundlagenvertrag” for East Berlin was the installation of the “direct line”78 between 
the two Germanys. Until then any contact between the two had been directed by 
Moscow and “in accordance with [the Kremlin’s own] interests.”79 From then on, 
the GDR at least was able to try to realize its own policies without depending on the 
Soviet’s pre-acceptance of every East German move in the international realm.
71 | According to the official policy of the FRG, the GDR was not considered a foreign state. 
This was expressed through the term “inner-German,” whereas East Berlin consistently 
spoke of “German-German relations” to emphasize its position about “normal diplomatic 
relations” between the two German states. Winters, in: Weidenfeld/Korte, 1999, 442-453.
72 | Schulze, 1996, 256.
73 | Haftendorn, 1989, 41.
74 | Haftendorn, 2001, 200.
75 | Wentker, 2007, 320.
76 | “Beziehungen von besonderer Art.” in: Gespräch des Min.pr. der DDR Stoph mit BK Willy 
Brandt, Erfurt 19.März 1970, in: Dok zur DP, 21. Okt. 1969 bis 31. Dez. 1970, Bd. 1 (2002), 405.
77 | Judt, 2008, 501.
78 | Wentker, 2007, 371ff and 413ff.
79 | Bahr, in: Die zweite gesamtdeutsche Demokratie, 2001, 192.
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CHAPTER 6. Phase II: From No.2 in the Eastern 
Bloc to Just Another Isolation:  
The “Policy of Self-Asser tion”
Even though East Berlin had achieved its major foreign policy goal of the “Policy 
of Recognition” in the 1970s, Bonn still maintained some reservations with regard 
to full diplomatic recognition of the GDR and East German citizenship. As a 
consequence, East Germany’s international status and further establishment as 
an equal member of the international state community still remained the major 
focal point of East German international engagement. All in all, one may speak 
not of the end, but rather of a transformation and diversification of the “Policy of 
Recognition” into a “Policy of Self-Assertion” based on a variety of foreign policy 
strategies. This policy change could first be detected in the 1960s, when the future 
Secretary-General of the SED, Erich Honecker, became considerably more active 
in foreign policy making, paving the way for his future political course.
Phase II of the GDR’s foreign policy again can be characterized by two sub-
phases which gradually merged into one another. After the GDR was established 
as an equal member of the international community of states, their “High Times 
of Diplomacy” would last for about a decade. Then, the internal weaknesses of 
the GDR, most prominently the SED’s lack of political legitimacy amid a pressing 
economic crisis, became more and more apparent. Whereas foreign trade during the 
second sub-phase of the “Phase of Recognition” had been used to promote political 
ends, this relationship was somewhat reversed now and ideological principles had 
yielded to economic pragmatism. And due to the growing economic and political 
problems of the late 1970s, the GDR gradually expanded its foreign policy on trade 
relations outside the Eastern Bloc to delay East German economic decline. Decay 
caused by insufficient flexibility of both the political and the economic systems 
exponentially accelerated in the late 1980s:1 When Gorbachev initiated a policy 
change toward more transparency (Glasnost) and reform (Perestroika),2 the East 
1 | Judt, 2008, 501.
2 | Courtois (Ed.), 2010, 83f; For a detailed account on the reforms: Kotz/Weir, 1997, 63-130.
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German regime was neither willing nor able to maintain its closeness to the 
guarantor of its existence and as such did not follow the Soviet Union on its new 
political and economic path.
In accordance with the first phase, the analysis of the second phase of the GDR’s 
foreign policy focuses on the two major external determinants: The dominance of 
the Soviet Union and East Berlin’s confrontation with the “other Germany.” The 
“other Germany” had served as a consistently reactive determinant for the GDR’s 
foreign policy during the “Phase of Recognition,” whereas Moscow actively shaped 
East Berlin’s foreign affairs as a directive determinant. This allocation profoundly 
changed after the establishment of official relations between the two German 
states. The mechanisms of consultation between the SED and CPSU (Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union) had become sufficiently routine after Moscow replaced 
Ulbricht with the less precarious and more loyal Honecker. Moscow settled for 
observing the GDR’s activities and providing emphatic “advice” if needed, instead 
of outright intervention.
1. KEEPING ThE DISTANCE FROM BONN – OSCILL ATING BE T WEEN 
“R APPROChEMENT” AND “DISSOCIATION”3
The second phase of the GDR’s foreign policy is characterized by East Berlin’s 
constant effort to balance its “rapprochement” with the “imperialist Germany,”4 
while keeping the distance necessary for justifying the GDR’s existence as the 
“better Germany.” In the early years of the “New Eastern Policy” and Bahr’s 
notion of “change through rapprochement,”5 the motives of West Germany’s 
policy change towards East Berlin were not fully clear to the SED regime. Thus, 
Ulbricht’s initial reaction was not only to keep his distance to Bonn, but even 
to increase it: “When Brandt implements a new ‘Ostpolitik’ now, we’ll execute 
a new ‘Westpolitik,’ one they haven’t seen before.”6 As a reply to Brandt’s “Unity 
of the Nation,” Ulbricht created the “Two Nations Hypothesis,” one of which was 
a “socialist and German nation state”7 in its own right, the “belated nation”8 in 
socialist terms. The new constitution of 1974 removed the last references to the 
3 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 30.
4 | Ibid., 33.
5 | Bahr, Egon, 1963, Akademische Akademie Tutzing, in: Haftendorn, 2001, 191.
6 | “Wenn Brandt eine neue Ostpolitik macht, dann machen wir eine neue Westpolitik, 
und zwar eine, die sich gewaschen hat.” Ulbricht, Walter, 1969, in: Scholtyseck, 2003, 28.
7 | Hacker, 1987; Schroeder, 1999, 206.
8 | Helmut Plessner on the role of the “belated nation” (“verspätete Nation”) and the 
emergence of Nation-Socialism in Germany, see: Bialas, 2010, 245ff. On the effor ts to 
establish a separate “socialist German nation” and the “Two-Nations Hypothesis” in the 
GDR, see: Hacker, 1987; Schroeder, 1999, 206.
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former unified Germany. Considering the “Grundlagenvertrag” and the following 
“policy of two German nations,” it is no wonder that the stagnation of the détente 
on the international level was mirrored on the inner-German level as well.
The GDR also attempted to distance themselves from Bonn by trying to make 
their economic model more attractive. Higher salaries and more availability of 
consumer goods were used to motivate workers, with the hope that this socialist 
version of “bread and circuses”9 would increase productivity. While Ulbricht had 
always kept spending in line with revenues, Honecker significantly overstretched 
the GDR’s economic abilities. From the late 1960s onward, the GDR’s economic 
difficulties grew in number and severity while attempts to modernize the rigid 
system failed. When Ulbricht was replaced, hopes were high for political and 
economic change for the better. In reality, however, Honecker put an end to all 
“tentative attempts of reform.”10 As a willing acolyte of the USSR, his economic 
policies also strictly followed the Kremlin’s course. As early as 1972 Honecker 
removed the remnants of any independent entrepreneurship and in doing so shut 
down the “last resorts of the bourgeois milieu.”11 At the time, Honecker had already 
realized the gravity of the looming economic crisis: “We might as well declare 
bankruptcy.”12 Regardless, the Secretary-General decided to keep these problems 
from the population and instead of austerity plans, he introduced extensive social 
policies.
In June 1971, Honecker announced “unity of economic and social policy”13 
to improve social benefits and the standard of living. The shortage of consumer 
goods was to be eased by short-term imports and mostly Western loans instead 
of long-term investments. At the time this “socialism of consumption”14 seemed 
to aim at nothing more than the appeasement of the population and to subsist 
in the shadow of the economic “wonderland” in West Germany. Social benefits 
were tied not to economic performance, but rather to the “SED’s will to survive.”15 
In combination with successes in the international sphere, these policies were 
supposed to mollify East Germany’s population and uphold the reign of the SED. 
However, the effort only accelerated the recession. The economic problems of the 
1970s erupted as a full-blown crisis in the early 1980s, significantly affecting the 
GDR’s activities in the developing world.
Honecker’s social offensive was in large part financed by political loans from 
Bonn. Thus the improvement in the GDR’s relations with its Western sibling 
9 | Schroeder, 1999, 199.
10 | Schroeder, 2006, 89.
11 | Neubert, 1997, 204.
12 | “An sich müssen wir Pleite anmelden.” Erich Honecker, 1975, in: Wentker, 393.
13 | German: Einheit von Wir tschafts- und Sozialpolitik.
14 | German: Konsumsozialismus, in: Siebs, 1999, 112.
15 | “Überlebenswille der SED-Führung.” Wentker, 2007, 393.
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was mostly motivated by economic considerations,16 bringing about other severe 
political problems: While conceding as little as possible to Brandt’s demands for 
“humanitarian relief” for the divided German population,17 Honecker tried to draw 
as much know-how and technology to the GDR as possible so that East Germany 
remained “No. 2” in the Eastern Bloc. Nonetheless, the “humanitarian relief” 
promoted more exchange of good, people and especially ideas, between the two 
Germanys. As a result, the GDR’s population became less and less convinced by 
negative news coverage of the “imperialistic West” and the efforts to control coverage 
by Western media on the GDR proved insufficient.18 These developments led to 
more citizens questioning the SED’s legitimacy and its political system, further 
undermining the party’s absolute claim of primacy. Also, the GDR’s economic 
dependency on West Germany became a never-ending source of conflict between 
East Berlin and Moscow: The Kremlin seemed to sense the imminent dangers 
posed by inter-German arrangements to the viability of the East German state.19
At the beginning of political exchange between the two Germanys, the GDR’s 
dilemma had become clear: The “unsolved conflict between claims of ideology 
and political reality,”20 as Ludz describes it. At first, international détente 
demanded “rapprochement” to the unloved sibling state; later on it was economic 
need demanding it. However, any relaxation of relations between the blocs and 
thus between the GDR and FRG somewhat questioned the GDR’s justification 
for existence. The GDR’s “rapprochement” regularly had to be accompanied 
by national “dissociation” based on the rules of “class struggle”21 to ensure the 
GDR’s ideological legitimation as the “democratic,” that is, socialist alternative. 
Regardless of the superficial reconciliation between East and West, the GDR’s 
foremost interest remained its “external and internal consolidation,”22 rather 
than further political “fraternization” with its sibling. In addition to that internal 
development had gained importance compared to Soviet influence and West 
German attraction during Honecker’s “reign,” as political and economic problems 
intensified and again endangered the GDR’s existence from within. After the 
16 | One of the most spectacular incidents was the so-called “Billion Deal” of 1983 
between the Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauß and the Head of Commercial 
Coordination (KoKo) Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski. Strauß granted two loans to the 
economical ailing GDR in exchange for the dismounting of the GDR’s border protection 
system, including its automatic guns and other concessions in visa issues and prisoners’ 
ransoms, in: Scholtyseck, 2003, 41.
17 | German: menschliche Erleichterungen.
18 | Trampe, in: Judt, 1998, 311.
19 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 41.
20 | Ludz, 1977, 300.
21 | ibid., 299.
22 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 32.
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“wave of diplomatic recognition” of the early 1970s, international acceptance and 
respect for Honecker as an esteemed statesman was more important for internal 
than for external policies.23 Honecker’s public appearances more often than not 
were intended to brush over the accumulating internal political, economic and 
social problems. The “discourse of danger” of foreign policy in the GDR had 
shifted from the external to the internal sphere.
2. GROWING DISTANCE FROM “BROThER MOSCOW”: “STE ADFAST 
FRIENDShIP” IN DANGER?
“Without us there is no GDR,”24 clarified Leonid Illich Brezhnev, reminding Erich 
Honecker of his loyalties towards the Soviet Union. In the GDR’s constitution of 
1974, the alliance with the Soviet Union was declared “irrevocable.”25 Internally, the 
GDR was continuously kept on a very short political “leash.” However, the USSR 
apparently had other plans for “Socialist Germany” with regard to its position 
in the international community. At least outside the Eastern Bloc, it appeared to 
be in the Kremlin’s interest to generate the image of a sovereign GDR. During 
any negotiations concerned with questions of sovereignty of the young state, 
Moscow stressed the GDR’s autonomy and demanded to draw into consideration 
East Berlin’s position. During the negotiations of a treaty package called the 
“Ostverträge” (Eastern Treaties) in the early 1970s, Hermann Axen,26 at the time 
chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the GDR, even considered the 
GDR as the Soviet Union’s “main consulting partner.”27 With regard to the topic 
such a characterization might even be true, but Moscow did neither need nor 
desire to consult any of its satellite states. However, the “big brother” withdrew 
more and more from the GDR’s day-to-day politics, first from the internal, then 
from the external sphere.28 Gradually, and within the predetermined scope of 
action, the GDR used its new leeway to establish itself as a “junior partner”29 to 
the Soviet Union internationally and within the Warsaw Pact.
Without doubt, the SED functionaries were well aware of the dubious character 
of its “limited sovereignty”: Soviet “consultant” were to remain in the GDR 
23 | Wentker, 2007, 372.
24 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 30.
25 | Constitution of the GDR of 1968, Version October 7 1974, Ar t.6(2).
26 | From the late 1960s onward, Hermann Axen was considered the “architect” of the 
GDR’s foreign policy. In 1970 he became a member of the Politbüro, in 1971 chairman 
of the committee for foreign affairs of the Volkskammer. in: Müller-Enbergs/Wielgohs/
Hoffmann (Ed.), 2000, 34.
27 | Axen, 1996, 356.
28 | Wentker, 2007, 367.
29 | Gasteyger, 1976, 38.
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throughout its existence.30 They were supported by a wide network of undercover 
informants which guaranteed the leadership in Moscow to be informed of any 
political developments within the country. This arrangement was an open secret 
and political functionaries would act in anticipatory obedience and refuse to deviate 
too far from the field of political maneuver Moscow had staked out for them. To 
that effect, the “exchange of dictators”31 from Ulbricht to Honecker in 1971 meant 
more than a simple change of the figurehead. Honecker’s inauguration was not 
only an act by Moscow’s grace but a well-planned stroke which moved the GDR 
closer to the Kremlin again.32 Another revision of the constitution bore witness 
to this development: The GDR was to pursue a foreign policy of “socialism and 
peace, for international understanding and security” based on the “Leninist policy 
of peaceful co-existence”33 and the “irrevocable”34 alliance with the Socialist Soviet 
Republics was lifted to constitutional rank.
This political bond was not meant for eternity. Its demise, however, in the end 
was caused by quite other reasons than the Kremlin might have feared. The 
disintegration of relations between East Berlin and Moscow can be traced back 
as far as the 1970s and was tightly interwoven with the GDR’s economic ties with 
West Germany. When the Kremlin found out about the extent of East German 
financial dependency, Honecker avoided the open confrontation with Brezhnev 
and sent Axen on his behalf.35 The disagreement over East Germany’s policy 
towards its capitalist counterpart was never really addressed and remedied and 
thus kept smoldering below the shining surface of Soviet-East German relations. 
Meanwhile, the GDR had to witness an improvement of Soviet-West German 
relations and old fears of being “sold” as a political pawn sacrificed by the “big 
brother” were just as present as ever before.
The first harbinger of estrangement between East Berlin and Moscow was 
Brezhnev’s surprisingly moderate reaction to political unrest and opposition 
in Poland in 1980. The SED regime readily declared the reformist movement 
a “counter-revolutionary” danger – clearly the “shock of 1953” had never lost its 
sting. But the Polish “aberration” from the path of Soviet bloc discipline did not 
result in the merciless military intervention by the Soviet Army East Berlin had 
been hoping for.36 Apparently, political and economic pressures prevented a Soviet 
30 | On the early activities of the Soviet secret services and their interconnectedness with 
the East German secret service see: Kowalczuck, 2013, 30-46 and 53.
31 | Schroeder, 2006, 89.
32 | Wentker, 2007, 363.
33 | Constitution of the GDR of October 7 1974, Ar t. 6; Hänisch, in: Hahn/Hänisch/Busse/
Lingner, 1974, 207.
34 | Constitution of the GDR of October 7 1974, Ar t. 6 I.
35 | Scholtysek, 2003, 33f.
36 | 
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reaction similar to the earlier “counter-revolutionary” incidences in the GDR, 
Hungary or the ČSSR. Times indeed had changed when Moscow opted against 
the possible political damage and loss of prestige caused by a military enforcement 
of the Brezhnev Doctrine.
3. ThE DOuBLE-EDGED SWORD OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION 
AND ThE END OF ThE GDR
The early years of this second phase of the GDR’s foreign policy can be considered 
the “High Times of Diplomacy.” The GDR became significantly more active and 
the analyst might recognize long-term foreign policy strategies. Due to a lack of 
alternatives, East Berlin’s foreign policy efforts after the “wave of recognition” 
in general displayed a noticeable focus on mediation and multilateral support.37 
With the blessing of the Soviet Union,38 the GDR became considerably more active 
within the framework of international organizations and conferences like the sub-
organizations of the United Nations39 or the CSCE Process. The latter turned out 
to be a double-edged sword for the SED regime, though. By signing the Final Act 
of Helsinki in 1975 Honecker himself had confirmed a comprehensive guarantee 
of human rights.40 The Conference in Helsinki in the end provided the “legitimate 
reasoning for the people in the Eastern Bloc and especially the GDR which could 
not simply be put aside by the ruling party.”41 The gap between political promises 
and social reality was made clear.
In the European context the two major fields for the GDR’s foreign policy goals 
were the CSCE process and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) 
negotiations, but not for long. Just as many contemporaries had predicted, the 
“European Peace Process” and its conferences somewhat stagnated in the late 
1970s. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the new “ice age” in the Cold War 
also froze any movement in the European power constellations. The functionaries 
of the SED had to realize that the GDR, even though it was now an equal member 
of the international community, still was subject to the rules of the bloc and that 
it remained a small state with little to no leverage on the playing field of Europe. 
This realization without doubt further intensified the GDR’s engagement towards 
the countries of the Global South:42 First the Arab states, then Africa, and finally, 
in the late 1980s, Asia. Outside Europe, the GDR more than ever aimed to make its 
37 | Muth, 2001, 23.
38 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 35.
39 | Both German states obtained a full UN membership in 1973.
40 | Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).
41 | Müller, 2010.
42 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 36.
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mark as the “better Germany,” free of a colonial past. In the meantime, the Soviet 
Union, the major determinant of East German foreign policy, was well on its way 
to political transformation.
3.1 “Limits” May Change: The Transformation of the Major 
Determinant of East German Foreign Policy
“Perestroika - the process of change in our country – star ted from above. It 
could not have been otherwise in an authoritarian state.”43
(Mikhail Gorbachev, former General-Secretary of the CPSU)
After Brezhnev passed away in late 1982, the transitional phase with two secretary 
generals of the Communist Party, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov Konstantin 
Ustinowich Czhernenko, revealed the first structural problems of the huge 
political “Empire” Moscow had built.44 Despite several attempts to reform the 
Bolshevik system, the Soviet Union never actually touched its central principle of 
organization, the “Communist Party Dictatorship,” including the “omnipresent 
surveillance and social penetration”45 to uphold political control of society. 
Interestingly, this politically self-controlling system, which was exceptionally 
resistant to change, carried the seeds for its own destruction within: “The 
centralized, autarchic, dictatorial institutions of the Soviet system [also] dictated 
that the source of change had to originate from within and at the top.”46 The 
hierarchic structure focused on a single, ultimate decision-maker who could move 
beyond the control of its system of origin: the Secretary-General of the CPSU.
The new and noticeably younger Secretary-General of the Communist Party, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, aimed to tackle the country’s problems by introducing a 
strategy of “radical reform”47 that he officially announced at the XXVIIth party 
meeting in February 1986. With the initial support of the “hard liner” and without 
immediately challenging the existing structures, Gorbachev aimed to change 
the system incrementally. The first priority was to change its actors. Gorbachev 
simply replaced the majority of his opponents.48 Clearly, his reform endeavors 
did not rest on pluralist inclusion of interests, but rather upheld the “Leninist 
tradition [of] centralized political power.”49 Nonetheless, this new path included a 
comprehensive new foreign policy that was confirmed at the Comecon meeting in 
November 1986. This new approach firstly aimed to stop Moscow’s confrontation 
43 | Gorbatchev, 1996, 76.
44 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 42.
45 | McFaul, 2001, 36; On the ”Political Structure of the Soviet Sys.”: Kotz/Weir, 1997, 23—33.
46 | McFaul, 2001, 39.
47 | Hewett quoting Gorbachev, in: Kotz/Weir, 1997, FN 80, 55; Scholtyseck, 2003, 43. 
48 | Adelman/Palmieri, 1989, 233.
49 | McFaul, 2011, 57.
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with the West, secondly to create a feeling of security for the other international 
actors with regard to the Soviet Union, and thirdly to reduce spending on security 
and developmental aid.50 Most importantly, the new policy meant nothing less 
than the official termination of the Brezhnev Doctrine. This “Wind of Change,”51 
as the international atmosphere of the time was summed up by the West German 
band The Scorpions, was bound to have an extremely high impact on the Socialist 
alliance.
This is where real trouble started for the SED-led GDR. Already in the 1970s, 
Honecker was hoping to be able to visit the FRG as the official Head of State of 
the GDR. East Germany considered this high-ranking visit a significant step to 
full diplomatic recognition by the “other Germany.” But the Kremlin at the time 
rejected outright the endeavor and even the official agreement on a visit in April 
1983, which had been a success for East German diplomacy, did little to impress 
the Soviet Union. At the very last minute the SED regime had to cancel the trip. 
This attitude in Moscow was not about to change before the profound shift in 
Soviet leadership under Gorbachev. When in 1987 Honecker finally visited Bonn, 
East Berlin considered it a decisive step for the GDR toward full sovereignty 
and diplomatic recognition. However, it instead may be considered the very last 
moment of “diplomatic glory” for a decaying state and an aging party elite that was 
neither willing nor able to react to Moscow’s policy change or the shifts within the 
bipolar international system.
The ongoing disagreements between Moscow and East Berlin over how the 
latter should frame its relations to the “other Germany” were now complemented 
by more severe discrepancies. Moscow’s policy change and the new scope of 
action it granted to the members of the Warsaw Pact questioned basic ideological 
and political foundations of the Eastern Bloc, which had been part of Moscow’s 
“guarantee of existence” for the GDR and thus an integral part of the SED’s “Policy 
of Survival.” The USSR immediately translated “Glasnost” and “Perestroika” to the 
international sphere and opened up new doorways for the members of the Warsaw 
Pact and the ideological allies of the Global South. In a short time, the internal 
and external room for these regimes’ maneuvering extended significantly. For the 
GDR, however, this policy change barred the path that the “SED state” had followed 
for over four decades, while the SED regime was not able to make use of this 
newfound freedom. In an often-quoted interview in 1987 with the West German 
magazine “STERN,” Kurt Hager, member of the Politbüro and assigned with 
questions on ideology, summarized East Germany’s position towards Moscow’s 
reform policies in the most pointed way: “Would you […] put up new wallpaper just 
50 | Kanet, in: Greiner/Müller/Weber, 2010, 57. On the effect of Gorbatchev’s policy change 
on the ”international community states,” esp. the “West”: Adelman/Palmieri, 1989, 242.
51 | The Scorpions, Album “Crazy World,” Lyrics “Wind of Change” in English and Russian; 
Also see: Zum Mauerfall, in: Spiegel Online, October 27 1999.
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because your neighbor decided to do so?“52 The GDR’s political system, its policies 
and functionaries were not flexible enough to leave this dead end and find an 
alternative.53 Gieseke even speaks of an emerging “schism” between Moscow and 
East Berlin at the time. Mielke had prevented a meeting between functionaries of 
the KGB and MfS in April 1989, as he was “worried about the negative impact of 
the Soviet reformative spirit.”54 In retrospect, one may conclude that the GDR had 
been a child of the Cold War. Hence, the only thing left to do for Honecker and his 
generation was to cling to the old ideology of bloc confrontation in their foreign 
policy. Even though the “Big Brother” in Moscow had proclaimed a new style of 
fashion, Honecker kept faith with “socialism in the colors of the GDR.”55 
3.2  Why the Dissolution of its “Foreign Policy Limits” meant the End of the GDR
Inspired by changes in nearby countries, most prominently in Hungary and 
the ČSSR, the summer 1989 witnessed an increase in refugees who tried to flee 
the GDR via West German embassies in the neighboring countries. The lack of 
legitimacy inside the GDR had built up and erupted in enormous demonstrations 
in the GDR’s bigger cities: In the month of October hundreds of thousands took 
to the streets, from Leipzig to Berlin. The SED regime’s “discourse of danger” 
had manifested. However, the people and the regime alike could not yet be sure 
about the true intentions and extent of Moscow’s “new” course of policy towards 
the members of the Warsaw Pact – especially not with regard to the value of an 
SED-led GDR for the Kremlin. In the end the Soviet Union’s troops did nothing 
to intervene and nothing to save the SED regime. In late October of 1989, the SED 
Politbüro decided to dethrone Honecker to save a socialist GDR, the “Primacy of 
the Party,” and thus their own neck. But the change to the new leader, Egon Krenz, 
came too late to make any difference,56 as this was also the moment when “the full 
truth about the condition of the GDR’s economy came to light.”57 Overstrained 
and still inflexible, the new regime stumbled into both drastic and uncoordinated 
action. Triggered by a double entendre in a public interview by Günter Schabowski, 
the “wall” in Berlin had to yield to the will of the people.58 After almost three 
52 | Kein Tapetenwechsel: Kurt Hager beantwortete Fragen der Illustrier ten Stern, in: 
Stern, April 9 1987.
53 | Muth, 2001, 9 and 22.
54 | Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 203.
55 | Honecker, Erich, Report of the Politbüro to the VII. Conference of the Central 
Committee, in: Neues Deutschland, December 2 1988.
56 | On the downfall of Honecker see for example Malycha/Winters, 2009, 333-339, 
Schroeder, 1998, 300f. 
57 | Schroeder, 1998, 308.
58 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 48; Schroeder/Staadt, in: Courtois, 2010, 138. 
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decades of detention in their own country, the people in the GDR regained their 
full freedom of movement.
The GDR had broken. It was a period of fundamental changes in East German 
society, and also for the political system. Consequently, these changes also 
disrupted the centralized process of foreign policy making profoundly. Heinz-
Dieter Winter, at the time Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, remembers: “There 
were almost no internal orders and directives anymore. I had to find my own line 
of argument.”59 The ambassadors mostly had to act on their own accord. While 
the MfAA and its embassies at first tried to continue their regular work under the 
new circumstances, the first and final free elections in East Germany in March 
1990 sealed the GDR’s fate. The only task left to the foreign policy apparatus was 
to administer its dissolution and find new assignments for the former personnel.60 
The newly granted scope of action in the international realm could neither be 
filled nor used by the decaying regime. While the international realm demanded 
more flexible foreign policy reactions, the GDR’s old one-party system could not 
afford this flexibility internally. The time was up for any gradual reforms.
The people of the GDR had been calling for free elections for a long time, 
and finally won them in March 1990. This election presented the choice between 
a supposedly reformed separate socialist GDR or German reunification under 
Article 23 of the “Grundgesetz” of the FRG. The outcome did not leave any 
doubt: Despite all its endeavors between bribery and coercion, the SED-led GDR 
had not been able to “integrate” its own population. The majority voted against 
gradual reforms along a “Third Path” and for the end of the GDR. They voted 
for a unified Germany under the umbrella of the “Grundgesetz.” In the end “the 
democratically elected government under […] Lothar de Maizère (CDU) became a 
kind of executive organ for the liquidation of the GDR.”61
Just as Moscow’s active role in determining the GDR’s foreign policy at the 
time had diminished, Bonn’s role had increased. At first Bonn took the place as 
the major determinant of the GDR’s foreign policy and expanded its impact up to 
the point that the GDR’s “foreign policy initiative was incrementally taken over by 
Bonn” during the “2+4 negotiations.”62 At the same time, the end of the GDR was 
somewhat the harbinger to the last throes of East Germany’s other foreign policy 
determinant, its “guarantor of existence.” “Glasnost” and “Perestroika” had come 
too late to save the sclerotic political giant that was the Soviet Union:
59 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
60 | Phone interview with Werner Sittig May 7 2014.
61 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 51.
62 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 50; The “2+4 negotiations” resulted in the Treaty on the final 
settlement with respect to Germany of September 12 1990; PA AA MULT 781.
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“Once Gorbachev opened up the agenda of change […], the dynamics of 
simultaneous political and economic change had a logic of their own that 
eventually could not be controlled by Gorbachev.”63
Apart from the fading ideological glue, massive economic problems and the 
waning of the existential fear of the Warsaw Pact members coincided with a 
“period of interpenetration”64 by ideas and “Weltanschauungen” which challenged 
the ideological pillars of the Soviet system. The Marxist promise of “salvation 
on earth”65 had not been fulfilled. Today, current discourse names an “imperial 
overstretch”66 of Soviet power in the Global South as one of the many reasons for 
the Soviet Union’s dissolution, calling it a “Failed Empire.”67 In addition to that, 
another decisive aspect should not be overlooked. The Cold War had been a war 
after all, an “inter-systemic war,”68 as Halliday puts it. And the Soviet system, at 
least economically, had lost this war. Meanwhile, the SED regime had kept on 
walking its well-trodden path of Real Socialism and thus had to walk its very own 
road to perdition all by itself – the GDR’s last and only policy decision outside the 
Soviet-approved room for maneuver.
63 | McFaul, 2001, 60.
64 | Shearman, in: Shearman, 1995, 18.
65 | Löwenthal, Messianism, Nihilism and the Future, in: Schmeitzner (Ed.), 2009, 462.
66 | The “Imperial Overstretch Hypotheses” is regularly connected to Edward Gibbon’s 
monograph “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire” published in six volumes between 
1776 and 1789. Gibbon argues that the collapse of Rome had actually been caused by 
the exhaustion of its military and economic ability which in turn led to the decay of its 
comprehensive citizenship. Gibbon, Edward, in: Womersley, 1994. 
67 | Zubok, 2007, 227.
68 | Halliday, 1993.
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CHAPTER 7. The “Three Spheres of Foreign 
Policy Making”:  
Par ty, State, and Society
“Of course that is the downside of a centralized state like 
this. When the boss says: “This is how you do it,” then this 
is how you do it.”1
iNTerview wiTh wolfgANg bATor oN The 27Th of mAY 2011
To understand East German engagement in South Yemen, we have to understand 
the mechanisms and details of East German foreign policy. What institutions, 
bodies, or persons formulated, interpreted, and implemented the policy? Who 
was supposed to execute this policy within East-Berlin’s tight scope of action? 
Compared to Western democracies, the internal structures of the GDR did not only 
pose a very different background for foreign policy making, they also played quite 
a different role for foreign policy formulation itself. The political system excluded 
any significant participation in the state’s external affairs that was beyond the 
control of the party apparatus. Companies, cultural societies, youth groups, the 
media – the SED selected any actor who was about to move outside the allied states 
of the Eastern Bloc with great care. The party instructed them to adhere to the 
Party’s foreign policy directives and monitored them closely for compliance.2 To 
be able to analyze and interpret the generation of East German foreign policy in 
South Yemen, this chapter first sketches the determinants of the political system 
of the GDR. Then, the Soviet Union’s policy towards East Germany in the first 
decade after WWII3 and the “planned development of socialism”4 are introduced 
in more detail. Second, the chapter gives a short account on foreign policy actors in 
1 | Interview with Wolfgang Bator, May 27 2011.
2 | A major task of the HV A of the MfS was to monitor GDR citizens working or studying 
abroad and to find out about their possible plans for escape, in: Kowalczuck, 2013, 252.
3 | The major policies draw on Wentker’s findings and modify his analysis, Wentker, 2007, 3. 
On Soviet policies towards Eastern Europe also see: Applebaum, 2013, Introduction.
4 | Schroeder, 1999, 119ff; Schroeder, 2013, 110ff.
110
the GDR, as well as the decision-making process at the national level. Finally, this 
chapter introduces the relevant actors for the case study of South Yemen. Based on 
these findings, this chapter develops and presents the “Three Spheres Approach,” 
a general conceptualization of East German foreign-policy-making.
1. ON ThE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF ThE GDR AND ITS SOCIAL REALIT Y
“As Marxists we should know: When we form a government, we will never give it 
up again, neither because of an election, nor because of any other procedure.”5
(Gerhart Eisler, Chief of the Department for Information) 
In democracies not only is the reciprocal relationship between the national and 
international level decisive for foreign policy generation – so too are the demands 
from within the national system. For example, Robert D. Putnam’s theoretical 
approach of the “two-level game” is fully based on the fact that interest groups at the 
national level are able to put significant pressure on their government to influence 
the country’s foreign policy and its strategies according to their preferences.6 On 
the international level, governments aim to consolidate their internal power and 
reelection within the national system: “First of all we have to make sure that we 
keep our majority at home.”7 Furthermore, foreign policy decision-making in 
democracies is complicated by both the separation of powers as well as attempts to 
represent “the will of the people” in policy. A concrete example is the ratification 
of an agreement or treaty. For this step, state policy cannot simply be “run” by 
the government, as von Bredow points out.8 A functioning democracy regularly 
demands a positive vote in parliament at the national level as a prerequisite for 
the ratification of international agreements, such as in the U.S.A. or the Federal 
Republic of Germany.9 In conclusion, pressures from within the system may 
determine a state’s scope of action to a similar extent as external factors do.
Unfortunately, the convincing model of the “two-level game” and the resulting 
conclusions turn out to be useless when looking at the one-party system of the 
GDR. The central principle of organization, “democratic centralism,”10 created 
a political system based on the absence of democratic control by and political 
participation of the governed. In Ursula Lehmkuhl’s reply to Czempiel’s argument 
5 | Eisler, Gerhart, quoted in: Suckut, 1991, 160f. Gerhart Eisler had been a major functionary 
during the founding years of the GDR, in: Müller-Enbergs/Wielgohs/Hoffman (Ed.), 2001, 180f.
6 | Putnam, 1989, 433ff.
7 | Stoltenberg, 1986, in: Putnam, 1989, 437.
8 | Von Bredow, 2006, 38. 
9 | Brugger, 2001, 36f und Maurer, 2003, 443f.
10 | The first Party Congress of the SED in January 1949, Avantgardeanspruch und 
innerparteiliche Diktatur Januar 1949, in: Judt, 1998, 46f.
A Spectre is Haunting Arabia – How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen
111
about the limitations of foreign policy originating at the national level, she notes 
that in “dictatorial-authoritarian systems”11 the state and its official agents remain 
the only relevant actors in the international realm. She puts forward the socialist 
dictatorships in Europe in the 1970s as explicit examples. According to Lehmkuhl, 
the leading elites in socialist regimes not only directed the state’s foreign policy 
without any interference from within, but also restricted, controlled, and guided 
any international exchange below the level of government to uphold their 
monopoly of power. What Lehmkuhl does not take into consideration, though, 
is the growing dependence of the dictatorial government, in this case the SED 
regime, on foreign policy outcomes. In the GDR, economic and political success in 
the international realm over time had come to compensate for the regime’s lack of 
legitimacy and a tool to appease the population. Therefore, foreign policy making 
in the East German socialist dictatorship was not fully decoupled from society, but 
indeed was one of the few policy fields in which the regime intended to satisfy its 
population’s demands. 
As a consequence, the following sub-chapter aims to serve two purposes: First, 
it clarifies the role of internal conditions and developments of the GDR’s political 
system12 in forming foreign policy and introduces a general conceptualization 
of East German foreign-policy-making, the formulation of the “Three Spheres.” 
Second, the sub-chapter summarizes the major features of the “planned 
development of socialism,” which was the “road map” for the SED’s policy of 
state-building in 1952. In Chapter 10, “Methodological Prelude: Between Bonn 
and Moscow,” these features are connected to Hippler’s approach to state- and 
nation-building. This connection serves as the method of analysis for the concept 
of socialist nation- and state-building to interpret concrete East German foreign 
policy in South Yemen.
1.1  “It only has to look Democratic”: The “D” in GDR
Reconsidering the initial quote in this chapter by Eisler, it reminds of the often-quoted 
statement by Ulbricht, “It only has to look democratic while we keep everything in our 
hands.”13 Even though the authenticity of the latter quote is sometimes questioned, 
it still aptly summarizes the SED’s approach to the GDR and its nation- and state-
building process. As Schroeder’s comprehensive analysis of the political system of the 
GDR and its history concisely suggests in its title “Der SED-Staat,”14 the state and its 
institutions were incorporated into the party apparatus and not the other way around. 
11 | Lehmkuhl, 2001, 29.
12 | Internal developments of polity and politics, Van Waarden, in: Schubert/Bandelow, 
2004, 257f.
13 | Ulbricht, Walter, May 1945, in: Leonhard, Wolfgang, 1961, 365. Leonhard, as a former 
member of the “Ulbricht Group” and the “Moscow cadres,” quotes Ulbricht from his memory.
14 | Schroeder, 1999 (2013).
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Accordingly, Storckmann pinpoints that academic discourse in Germany today is 
beyond the question whether the GDR was ruled by the SED, but rather occupied 
with the “how” of party rule.15 As such, the following sub-chapter is occupied with 
Real Socialism, the East German interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and how this 
interpretation directly affected the GDR’s political system.
1.2  Mar xism-Leninism, Its Claim to Truth, and the Promise of 
“Salvation on Earth”16
Despite the “democratic” in the middle of the country’s name, its leading party 
never had the intention to establish a Western-style democracy, instead choosing 
to found a “dictatorship of the proletariat.”17 The principle is not only in accordance 
with the theoretical approach of Marxism-Leninism, but also based on the role 
model of the Soviet system. This study does not allow for a thorough discussion 
of the ideological differences between Marx and Engels’ writings and Lenin’s18 
interpretation of them, nor an examination of the gap between Lenin’s theory and 
his praxis after 1921.19 Nonetheless, the major differences at the very least have to 
be named to be able to interpret the discrepancy between the GDR’s constitutional 
ideals and East German political reality. 
According to Marx and Engels’ approach of “historical materialism,” it was 
inevitable that the capitalist system would exhaust itself at one point. Then, the 
“dictatorship of the proletariat” would overcome the condition of the worker’s 
exploitation to finally realize worldwide communism.20 However, both authors 
repeatedly warned their contemporaries that not any outcome of history could 
be “deducted from a general theory,” as “history [was] a consequence of the 
interaction of many factors that must always be empirically analyzed in their 
specific situations.”21 Current Marxist theorists such as John F. Sitton often use 
sections of Marx and Engels’ writings to emphasize the differences between their 
writings and Lenin’s and Stalin’s interpretations22 led to the totalitarian reality of 
15 | Storckmann, 2012, 55.
16 | Löwenthal, Messianism, Nihilism and the Future, in: Schmeitzner (Ed.), 2009, 462.
17 | The Dictatorship of the Proletariat [in Russia], in: Courtois (Ed.), 2007, Courtois, 1917 
bis 1922, Die Oktoberrevolution, 63. 
18 | Born in 1870 as Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, he later on was known as Vladimir Ilyich 
Lenin. Read, 2005.
19 | Lenin abolished any possibility of political opposition after the Kronstädter Uprising 
of March 1921. Löwenthal considers this a turning point at which Lenin leaves behind his 
own theoretical principles. Löwenthal, Jenseits des Stalinismus, in: Schmeitzner (Ed.), 
2009, 395.
20 | Baudouin, Jean, Marxismus, in: Courtois, 2007, 568; Kowalczuck, 2013, 25. 
21 | On this interpretation of Marx and Engels’ “Historical Materialism,” see: Sitton, 2010, 24.
22 | Josif Wissaryonowich Zhugashwili.
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Real Socialism in the Soviet Union and the GDR. These modern Marxists contrast 
with Richard Löwenthal, who does not attempt to “save Marxism” by emphasizing 
the differences between Marx’s writings and Real Socialism. Rather, Löwenthal 
addresses Marx’s writings as a theoretical starting point that caused Marxism-
Leninism’s landslide development toward a “totalitarian ideology.”23 
The academic debate over “totalitarianism” is a crucial one in the social sciences. 
As such, a comprehensive discussion of the topic simply exceeds the scope of this 
study. Thus, neither the history, nor the theoretical debate on “totalitarianism” 
will be discussed here;24 Rather, the argument contents itself with the referral 
to Löwenthal’s enlightening insights on the transformation of Marx’s writings 
through Lenin and the consequences that this transformation entailed. According 
to Löwenthal, it was Lenin’s approach that transformed Marx’s 
“abstract […] myth of the inevitable victory of the proletariat that would bring 
about the classless society [into an] unconditional identification of the hope 
of secular salvation, not with the victory of a class, […] but with the power of a 
specific organized group and its leader.”25
Despite the ideology’s explicit secularism, Löwenthal considers Marxism-Leninism 
a political religion, as it “promise[s] salvation on earth,” and “the millennial rule 
of the saints.” What Löwenthal also touches here is the difference between Lenin’s 
theory and political praxis. According to Lenin, “the end justifies the means” 
for the higher, quasi-transcendent goal of a better world. The ultimate goal of 
worldwide communism could only be reached by the realization of Lenin’s version 
of a vanguard party under his leadership. Any opposition to this leadership was 
considered an obstacle to the ultimate goal, as Löwenthal lucidly comments: “An 
abstract paradise may justify crimes – but only a concrete Messiah can authorize 
and order them.” In Real Socialism, it was the vanguard parties and their leaders 
who stepped forward to fill the role of this Messiah.
While Lenin relocated the driving force of revolutionary change from the whole 
of society to a Soviet-style vanguard party,26 his contemporary, Stalin, modified 
the idea of worldwide revolution and its role in achieving worldwide communism. 
23 | This study cannot offer a full discussion of Totalitarianism. According to Löwenthal, 
one of the core elements of a totalitarian ideology and system is the: “institutional 
possibility of terror”, in: Löwenthal, Die totalitäre Diktatur, in: Schmeitzner (Ed.), 2009, 
552. The quotes of the following paragraph can all be found in Löwenthal, Die totalitäre 
Diktatur, in: Schmeitzner (Ed.), 2009.
24 | On the “Totalitarianism” debate in Germany: Süß, 1999, 16-27.
25 | Löwenthal, Messianism, Nihilism and the Future, in: Schmeitzner (Ed.), 2009, 462. 
For the following quotes in this paragraph also see: Löwenthal, in: Schmeitzner (Ed.), 2009, 
462-464.
26 | Read, 2005, 66.
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Stalin’s notion of “socialism in one country”27 considers the establishment of 
Socialist regimes in nation-states an intermediate step before worldwide socialism 
and communism can be achieved. The concept is considered a law-like principle, 
laying the foundations of “scientific socialism,”28  which “declares history an object 
of exact science.”29 Stalin’s argument follows a progressive logic of development with 
world communism being the inevitable outcome of history. This encompassed the 
necessity to “give back all functions of the state to society”30 and thus included the 
inevitable withering away of the nation-state in the end, at least in theory. According 
to Löwenthal, Lenin had moved away from his own aspirations rather grotesquely 
and his successor “only carried Leninism to its logical conclusion,”31 just as one may 
interpret the German version of Marxism-Leninism a “logical conclusion” of Lenin’s 
ideas and writings in combination with Soviet instructions to the SED regime.
1.3 The Two Conditional Determinants of the GDR’s Political System: 
“Democratic Centralism” and the “Primacy of the Part y”
“Political power was exercised by two parallel bureaucracies in the Soviet Union, 
those of the state and the Communist Party. On paper, the party had a democratic 
structure, […] [b]ut in reality, power flowed from top to bottom, not from bottom to 
top. The general secretary was the dominant figure in the system, and the political 
bureau, chaired by the general secretary, was the most important organ for policy 
formulation […] The central committee had a full-time executive staff known as 
the “secretariat,” which served as the executive arm of the politburo. […]
[I]ndividual party members merely carried out the policies decided at the top.”32 
(Kotz and Weir on the Political Structure of the Soviet System)
According to Lenin, it was the elitist vanguard party that had to lead the revolution 
and transformation of society toward communism. From this notion, two 
mutually dependent principles emerged as the major determinants of the Soviet 
political system: “Democratic centralism”33 and the “primacy of the party.”34 
Though neither of the two principles was explicitly included in the first East 
27 | Kapitel 6: Die Frage des Sozialismus in einem Lande, in: Stalin, 1946 (1924).
28 | German: Wissenschaftlicher Sozialismus. The concept is opposed to “critical-utopian 
socialism“ of Saint-Simon and Fourier, in: Dilas-Rocherieux, Yolène, Sozialismus: Courtois 
(ed.), 2010, 688.
29 | Dilas-Rocherieux, Yolène, Sozialismus, in: Courtois (ed.), 2010, 688.
30 | Schroeder, 2013, 520.
31 | Löwenthal, Die totalitäre Diktatur, in: Schmeitzner (Ed.), 2009.
32 | Kotz/Weir, 1997, 23f.
33 | The first Party Congress of the SED in January 1949, Avantgardeanspruch und 
innerparteiliche Ditatur Januar 1949, in: Judt, 1997, 46f.
34 | Schroeder, 1999, 421.
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German Constitution of 1949, they served as the political compass during the 
early years of East German “state- and nation-building” and later on grew into a 
specific German form. 
“Germany is an indivisible, democratic Republic.”35
(Article 1, Constitution of the GDR 1949)
Without doubt, the constitution and the constitutional reality of the GDR could not 
have been further apart. Officially, the Volkskammer was declared the “highest 
organ in the Republic.”36 However, neither the Soviet occupiers nor the SED ever 
wanted Parliament to wield actual political power. All in all, with some minor 
exemptions, the East Germany political system followed the Soviet model:
“The organization of political institutions within the Soviet Union concentrated 
special powers of agency among a select group of decision-makers. In contrast 
to pluralist regimes, the Soviet political system did not allow for alternate 
centers of political power either within or outside the state.”37
Just as in the Soviet Union, internal and external decision-making in East Germany 
was centralized in the party by what Jessen called the “secret constitution of the 
GDR.”38 As a consequence, the political system did not include regulated control 
by the governed based on free elections, nor did it provide for any other control 
outside the SED party apparatus. In addition to that, loyalty of party cadres was 
secured by a tightly controlled cadre selection process. The political elite relied on 
its own structures and recruited personnel and functionaries independently from 
the rest of society. This apparatus was tightly intertwined with the state and its 
institutions, including party equivalents to state institutions at all levels. Within 
this system, the party was supposed to overrule any state actions and decisions.39 
The “primacy of the party”40 was the fundamental determinant of the political 
system, as Fürnberg’s song so succinctly summarizes: “The Party is always 
right.”41 This notion also includes the universal truth claim of “the party,” which 
35 | Constitution of the GDR. October 7 1949, Ar t. 1.
36 | Constitution of the GDR. October 7 1949, Ar t. 51-70. 
37 | McFaul, 2002, 34.
38 | German: heimliche Verfassung der DDR; Jessen, in: Judt, 1998, S.77f; Richtlinien über 
die Fer tigstellung von Regierungsvorlagen zur Entscheidung durch die zuständigen Organe 
des Parteivorstands sowie über die Kontrolle der Durchführung dieser Entscheidungen, 
Anlage Nr. 5 zum Protokoll Nr.57 der Sitzung des Kleine Sekretariats [des Politbüros] am 
17.Oktober 1949, in: SAMPO-BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3/57.
39 | The so-called “Kompetenzkompetenz“, Schroeder, 1999, 388.
40 | Schroeder, 1999, 421.
41 | “Das Lied der Partei” by Louis Fürnberg, 1950. in: Judt, 1997, 47; See: Giordano, 1961.
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pertained to the provision and interpretation of ideological principles.42  This 
claim, originally introduced in the Party statute of the SED,43 was finally raised 
to constitutional rank in 1968 when the “leadership of the working class and its 
Marxist-Leninist party”44 acquired priority over any other constitutional norm.
The idea of absolute party leadership was based on the principle of “democratic 
centralism.”45 Schroder describes this principle of political organization as the 
“strict party hierarchy” wherein “lower levels were subordinated to higher levels 
of organization. [Thus] all fields were subject to the highest level of leadership.”46 
The official interpretation of socialist publications stresses that the principle 
was based on “collective leadership,” the socialist interpretation of democratic 
participation. The consequences implied by this, however, were “absolute party 
discipline; minority’s subjugation under the majority; unconditional commitment 
to the higher organ’s decisions for the lower organs and their members.”47 Hence, 
every political decision on any level, including questions of cadre selection, had to 
be approved by each higher authority, while every state entity had to answer to its 
administrative equivalent within the SED.
Apart from the praxis of personal unions among higher party posts and 
state functions, party and state were connected by two major state organs, the 
“Ministerrat” and the “Staatsrat,” both pro forma elected by the “Volkskammer.” 
While the former brought together the ministries, secretaries of state and high-
ranking administrative officials, the latter was formed after Wilhelm Pieck’s 
death as the “collective representation of the state.”48 Together they acted as the 
communicative and administrative interface between state and party.
The principle of “democratic centralism” also extended to the party apparatus. In 
theory, the highest organ within the party structures was the Party Congress, an 
assembly of all party members. In between Congresses, the Central Committee,49 
a body of well-served and loyal Party members, was supposed to lead. In reality, 
however, the Party Congress acclaimed what had been decided by the CC, and 
later on by its smaller version, the “Politbüro.”50 In the final decade, decisions were 
further concentrated within the Politbüro’s Secretariat, the “small Politbüro.”
42 | Muth, 2001, 10.
43 | Stellung des Bereichs Kommerzielle Koordinierung im Partei- und Staatsgefüge der 
DDR, in: Deutscher Bundestag, 1994, 103.
44 | Ar ticle 47 II, Constitution of the GDR of 1974.
45 | The first Party Congress of the SED in January 1949, Avantgardeanspruch und 
innerparteiliche Ditatur Januar 1949, in: Judt, 1997, 46f.
46 | Schroeder, 1999, 389.
47 | German: “Demokratischer Zentralismus“, in: Kl. polit. Wörterbuch, 1973, 148-150.
48 | Diedrich/Ehler t/Wenzke (ed), 1998, 10.
49 | German: Zentral Kommittee (ZK).
50 | Schroeder, 1999, 398.
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“We don’t demand negative proof of non-culpability [with regard to National-
Socialism], [or] neutrality, we demand positive proof of participation.”51 Thus, the 
Party was also organized hierarchically, with obedience and loyalty emerging 
as the most important merits of the party members. As a consequence, party 
loyalty became the prominent prerequisite for professional success. In these 
early years it became apparent that the political system marginalized the GDR’s 
constitutional organs, including the government.52 This was accompanied by a 
power concentration in the hands of the SED, its leader, the secretary-general, and 
his secretariat. This was especially true for the field of foreign policy. In addition 
to that, the SED system of nomenclature cadre recruitment ensured loyalty and 
conformity to the political course of the party.53
1.4 “Homogenization of Society” and the Creation of the “Socialist Human”
The ultimate goal of social policies under both Soviet occupation and SED 
governance was the reconstruction of German society as  a socialist, and thus 
homogenized, society. In the late 1940s, the Kremlin had launched intensive and 
comprehensive “Sovietization” in the Soviet Occupied Zone (SOZ, SBZ), a forced 
transformation of society as a whole. This also meant that “the Soviet Union did 
import certain key elements of the Soviet system into every nation occupied by the 
Red Army, from the very beginning.”54 The narrow timeframe of implementation 
did not allow for voluntary or gradual adoption of the transported values55 and 
can be considered a first example in GDR history where social change became 
a matter of official declaration: “Social stratification changed profoundly during 
the existence of the GDR, while the ultimate goal of a classless society was never 
achieved.”56 Political forces outside the SED were either channeled into a bloc 
party system or swallowed by newly founded mass organizations.57 Likewise, the 
Catholic and Protestant churches had been disempowered and marginalized early 
on as well.58 
To eliminate any possibility of control by the governed and thus fully secure 
the “primacy of the party,” the SED had to eliminate civil society and the agency 
51 | Tagung  der Oberbürgermeister, Landräte und leitender Mitarbeiter der Regierung, 
2-4 April 1949, in: BArch, SAPMO, NY 4277/4, Blatt 147, Quoted in: Kowalczuck, 2013, 23.
52 | The organs of the President, the Council of Ministers and the State Council, which were 
founded in the 1960s, degenerated rapidly and ended up as mere executive institutions, 
in: Muth, 2001, 10. 
53 | Schroeder, 1999, 407.
54 | Applebaum, 2013, Introduction. 
55 | Schroeder, 2006, 86.
56 | Segert/Zierke, in: Judt 1998, 169. 
57 | Schroeder, 1999, 101-104.
58 | Goerner/Kubina, 1995.
CHAPTER 7. The “Three Spheres of Foreign Policy Making“: Par ty, State, and Society 
118
of its actors. As a consequence the only other independent source of social power 
disappeared, allowing the party to monopolize any communication between the 
political system and society. To perfect regulation of the political system and 
its exchange with society, public opinion was deliberately steered by a party-
controlled media. Former editor-in-chief of the “Nachrichten des DDR Funks,” 
the radio broadcasting organization of the GDR, summarizes:
 “Information policy was an important, at cer tain times the most important sinew 
of the leadership and apparatus of the SED. In short, the monopoly worked like 
this: There was reality, and there was truth about this reality communicated by 
the Party.”59 
In the field of international relations, the East German public almost fully 
depended on party-directed information on happenings outside their state’s 
borders. The intense control disrupted the connection between society and the 
rulers’ politics and eliminated any basis for assessment of the SED’s politics. 
In accordance with Lenin’s notion of “socialist journalism,”60 the major task of 
the media in the GDR was to impart ideology to the “masses” by supporting 
“collective propaganda” and “agitation.” In the GDR, this was especially the case 
for international coverage, even more so after international recognition. While the 
primary goal of “Auslandsinformation”61 before the 1970s had been the promotion 
of recognition,62 its major task afterward was to disrupt and fend off Western 
ideological influences.63 Growing economic difficulties increased the need for 
reports of political success and distraction through state media. One of the most 
effective party instruments to form both the public space and the media, even was 
of constitutional rank:  “Boycotting demagoguery”64 was introduced under Article 
6 of the GDR’s constitution of 1949 as a criminal offense. In its vagueness, this 
article opened the door for excessive punishment of any unwanted oppositional 
behavior. As a consequence of full media control and concentration of political 
and social forces in mass organizations, there neither existed free public space 
nor any civil society to speak of. The centralization of the economic system had 
59 | Klein, in: Spielhagen, 1993, 84. 
60 | Lenin, in: Function of socialist journalism, Excerpt in: Wörterbuch der sozialistischen 
Journalistik, Berlin-Ost, 1984, in: Judt, 1998, 354f.
61 | English: international information or propaganda. Until now there only exist very few 
studies on this tool of the GDR’s foreign policy. Brünner, 2011, 14.
62 | Protokoll Nr.8/63 der Sitzung des Politbüros, March 27 1983, Annex 5, in: BArch 
SAPMO, DY 30/JIV 2/2 A 953, 1.
63 | Brünner, 2011, 29.
64 | “Boykotthetze”, in: Ar ticle 6(2), Constitution of the GDR of 1949, October 7 1974.
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enforced the socialization of all larger companies.65 Thus, all social and non-
state organizations of economic importance were either embedded in or at least 
associated with the party in one way or the other.66
However, “homogenization of society” went beyond the public space. According to 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, the creation of the socialist society was only possible by 
creating the “new human.” This “new human” first and foremost was defined as 
part of the “collective” and free of egoism.67 Accordingly, youth in the GDR always 
played a highly political role in the “planned development of socialism” to ensure 
the next generation’s ideological loyalty and engagement. This goal was pursued 
by forming and “educating the socialist personality”68 early on in children’s lives. 
The GDR’s pedagogy drew extensively from Anton Semyonovich Makarenko’s 
writings. Based on the idea of the mutability of human nature, Makarenko 
elaborated on the creation of the “new human” and the logic of “collective 
education.” His pedagogical approach aimed at minimizing individualism for 
the sake of solidarity in the collective community. According to Makarenko, the 
ideal type of the “socialist human” had be reeducated through a “homogenized 
socialization process” to form the ideal of the “homo sovieticus”69 in the end. 
The SED’s education policy fully embraced Makarenko’s concept: Socialist 
education in the GDR meant that “the individual was transferred from one collective 
to the other throughout his life.”70 Applebaum quotes Otto Grothewohl in this 
context, calling the youngest children the “cleanest and best human material”71 
for the GDR’s Socialist future. About eighty per cent of East German infants 
and toddlers spent their days at the “Kinderkrippe” while ninety-five percent of 
children under six learned about socialist virtues in kindergarten.72 Furthermore, 
the obligatory forms of social organization were complemented by “facultative” 
organizations, such as the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ) founded in 1946 and its 
preparatory organization, the Ernst-Thälmann Pioneers.73 Not surprisingly, these 
“facultative” organizations ostracized all those who refused to join and celebrated 
the “good socialists.” Finally, the youth received vocational training in the “Betrieb,” 
65 | On the requisition of some property categories in Germany, October 30th 1945, 
excerpt of military order by the Soviet Military Administration, in: Judt, 1998, 183.
66 | On the reorganization of political society and its actors see: Schroeder, 1999, 416 
and 532f.
67 | Segert/Zierke, in: Judt (ed.), 1998, 171.
68 | Segert/Zierke, in: Judt (ed.), 1998, 177.
69 | Alexander Zinoview, quoted in: Applebaum, 2013, 300.
70 | Schroeder, 2013, 738.
71 | Otto Grotewohl in: Partei und Jugend: Dokumente marxistischer-leninistischer 
Jugendpolitik, East-Berlin, 1986, quoted in: Applebaum, 2013, 301.
72 | Numbers in Anweiler, 1989, in: Schroeder, 2013, 746.
73 | Segert/Zierke, in: Judt (ed.), 1998, 177.
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the socialized enterprises idealizing collective production. The idealized idea was 
that the “new human” was integrated in collective communities from the cradle 
to the grave. Even the social nucleus of the small family was included in this 
logic. The families were supposed to dissolve into other social collectives, mostly 
by reducing the time families spent together. 
1.5 Conclusion: A Substitute for Legitimacy? The GDR’s Carrot-and-
Stick-Policy
After “Nazi Germany,” many functionaries and the population alike at first 
had hoped for a “better Germany” in this young, socialist state.74 However, the 
harsh realities of the GDR were hard to reconcile with the high hopes of the 
early founding years: Economic hardships, suppression of opposition, political 
cleansings, and the forced “homogenization of society” quickly disillusioned 
early idealists. Elections were considered a mere formality without any effect 
on political conditions. After the national uprising of 1953 against SED rule was 
quelled violently by Soviet tanks, the number of refugees trying to flee westwards 
reached an all-time high.75 The GDR’s citizens simply decided that there was no 
other way than a “walking ballot”76 to turn their backs on East Germany. The 
SED’s reaction was to make “fleeing the Republic” a criminal offense.77 And even 
after the wall was built in Berlin and the inner-German border further fortified 
after 1961, thereby significantly reducing the numbers of registered refugees, 
the Ministry of State Security successively expanded their personnel and their 
operational activities.78 To prevent the GDR’s citizens from leaving the country 
and starting their new lives as citizens of the Federal Republic, state control 
intensified in an unprecedented way. These repressive measures are one of the 
most impressive examples for the citizens’ lack of identification with their state. 
Over the decades, the SED-regime developed and applied two major strategies to 
counter its lack of legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry. The first major strategy 
was the oppression of resistance and opposition. The intensity of this strategy 
74 | See, for example, the memories of the GDR author Christa Wolf on the hopes for the 
creation of a “new society” after the defeat of German fascism, June 1987, in: Judt, 1998, 59f.
75 | Compared to East-West migration, the numbers migrating from the FRG to the GDR 
were relatively low. Including the last year before the founding of the two German states, 
only about 600.000 people moved from West to East, in: Wunschik, 2013.
76 | German: Abstimmung mit den Füßen; Müller-Marein, 1961.
77 | After 1957 the attempt to leave the GDR without state permission, the “unlawful 
border-crossing” under § 213 Abs. 2 StGB of the DDR, usually led to a prison sentence, 
Stöver, 2007, 237. 
78 | From 1961 to 1968 the MfS personnel increased by more than fif ty per cent, in: 
Schroeder, 1999, 436.
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decreased somewhat after the closing of the inner-German border and the erection 
of the Berlin Wall. Then the strategy transformed into a policy to create fear among 
the population by assumed or real surveillance carried out by a specialized security 
apparatus. The second major strategy was the appeasement of the population. 
Socialist welfare promises and grants fed into this strategy, as well as notions 
of the “socialist nation” that were intended to create a feeling of community and 
belonging. Just like sports and culture, foreign policy achievements served as an 
integrative factor to legitimize this nation and its policies to distract the population 
from its internal strife. 
In conclusion, “foreign policy” in the GDR not only highly depended on the 
two major structuring determinants, the Soviet Union and the “other Germany,” 
but also must be considered a too used to appease society and achieve internal 
national consolidation.79 Being part of the political system, foreign policy served 
as a tool to secure the SED’s position; it was a “maid of politics.”80 Hence, one 
has to disagree with Lehmkuhl’s conclusions about the restricting influence of 
national politics on the scope of action in foreign policy. She contends: “the more 
authoritarian the rule on the inside, the higher the ‘autonomy’ of the state from 
internal determinants on the outside.” In theory, this would result in an extremely 
high level of autonomy for the GDR in the international system. However, even 
without including the restrictions posed by the international determinants, such 
autonomy never existed. 
The combination of the principles of “democratic centralism” and the “primacy 
of the party” transformed the SED’s retention of power into a moral and legal 
sine qua non for the GDR’s survival as a socialist state. Hence, and in spite of the 
obvious separation and apparent independence of governors from the governed, 
there existed a profound flaw of insecurity in the power relationship that ostensibly 
was so fully dominated by the SED. Any questioning of the SED and its cadres 
had to be avoided at any cost. From the very beginning, the SED had to struggle 
with a lack of legitimacy – not only with respect to the FRG, but towards its own 
population as well. This assumption agrees with Gidden’s “dialectic of control/
leadership.” Giddens denies the existence of situations of absolute powerlessness, 
as long as one option to act remains: “[S]ubordinates and the ones subjugated to 
power regularly may claim a considerable scope of action, as the rulers depend on 
the cooperation of the ruled.”81 In the GDR, the existence and thus the autonomy 
of the state did depend on the affirmative behavior of its citizens. Apart from 
fear and collaboration, the SED regime’s power and thus the existence of the 
79 | Ludz, 1971, in: Scholtyseck, 2003, 54. Even though many of his conclusions must be 
reviewed critically today, Peter Christian Ludz contributed to research on the GDR and its 
political and social realities in the 1970s in an extraordinary way.
80 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 53; Siebs, 1999, 19ff.
81 | Joas, 2011, 416f.
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state itself depended on acquiescence, or at least apathy, of the population. As 
a consequence, this acquiescence was ensured by the population’s awareness of 
Moscow’s guarantee of existence for the SED regime. The crushing of the June 
uprising in 1953 made that clear in no uncertain terms.
2. IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN “SOCIALIST 
GERMANY”
“International relations, like all politics, is also most vividly interpreted, as 
much as anything, through what people think and believe. […] [H]erein lies the 
international importance, and impact of ideologies – sets of belief about how 
the past shapes the present, […] how the world works, and, equally important, 
about how it should [sic!] work.”82
(Fred Halliday, 2005)
First, foreign policy in the GDR had been ideologically embroidered and geared 
toward the “planned development of socialism.” Second, due to the GDR’s role in 
the Cold War, East Berlin’s foreign policy had to clearly position the GDR within 
the Bloc confrontation to secure its existence as the “German alternative.” And 
third, any element of foreign policy had to be firmly based on the ideological 
principles of Marxism-Leninism. According to Lenin, Marxism-Leninism83 was 
based on three “inseparable elements:”84 Dialectic and historical materialism, the 
political economy of capitalism and socialism, and scientific socialism. According 
to Marx’s approach of “historical materialism,”85 socialism is considered the 
transitional phase between capitalism and communism. This approach was 
adopted by Lenin who then predicted that the socialist phase would follow the 
seizure of power by the proletariat.86
Lenin expected that not all countries would aspire to this ideal nor struggle to 
make it a reality. His successors in the Soviet Union thus concluded that the world 
would be divided into two camps until the ultimate goal of a communist world 
society was achieved: The camp of the “imperialistic-anti-democratic West” and the 
camp of the “anti-imperialistic-democratic East.”87 At first, this camp division was 
82 | Halliday, 2005, 195f.
83 | Official interpretations and recommendations with regard to Marxism-Leninism were 
centralized exclusively at the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the central committee 
of the SED“ (German: “Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus bei Zentralkomitee der SED“).
Sindermann, 1980.
84 | Schroeder, 2013, 716.
85 | Baudouin, Jean, Marxismus, in: Courtois, 2007, 568; Kowalczuck, 2013, 25.
86 | Dilas-Rocherieux, Yolène, Sozialismus, in: Courtois (ed.), 2010, 688.
87 | Zhdanov, Andrej, answering Stalin’s and Truman’s “declarations of war” on Sept 22 1947.
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interpreted as a violent struggle. The resolutions of the XX Party Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956, however, modified this to the 
more pragmatic approach of “peaceful co-existence.” It was meant to regulate the 
relations between socialist and capitalist states based on “mutual respect for each 
other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in internal affairs,” but 
also included “a specific form of class struggle […] on the international level”88 that 
focused on economic and social development. Derived from this highly ideological 
view of the international system, the GDR developed its own interpretation of 
Marxist-Leninist principles as the basis of its foreign policy.
“Socialist Foreign Policy [rests] on the nature of class of a Socialist state, which 
is shaped by the character of the ruling working class and its revolutionary 
fighting party. The Communist and the working parties of the Socialist countries 
analyze every stage of development of international relations based on a fruitful 
application of the theory of Marxism-Leninism.”89 
(“The Little Political Dictionary,” East Berlin, 1973)
“The Little Political Dictionary,” a widely read reference book in East Germany 
and today a priceless source of the GDR’s ideological orientation on many topics 
of social life, lists the following “general laws” for the “development of socialist 
society.” These “laws” are especially relevant for the field of foreign policy, as they 
form the basis of the socialist interpretation of international relations:
“[1] To erase national oppression and establish equality and brotherly friendship 
between the peoples; [2] to promote political and economic approximation of 
the countries of the community of Socialist states; [3] to uphold solidary of our 
working class with the working class in other countries.”90 
The concept of “proletarian internationalism”91 was considered the most important 
principle of the GDR’s foreign policy towards the Global South and was included 
in the GDR’s constitution of 1968 under the term “socialist internationalism.”92 
The concept is based on Marx and Engels’ idea of “internationalism” as introduced 
in the “Communist Manifesto”: Capitalist nations have to rely on a working-class 
proletariat for their development. These proletarians “know no country,” but share 
“common interests.”93 And due to capitalism diminishing the role of national 
88 | Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 87.
89 | Außenpolitik (English: foreign policy), in: Kleines politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 86f.
90 | Außenpolitik, in: Kleines politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 86f.
91 | Sozialismus und Kommunismus (English: Socialism and Communism), in: Kleines 
politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 761.
92 | Ar ticle 6 of the Constitution of the GDR of 1968.
93 | Marx, in: Gilbert, 1978. 
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borders, proletarians all over the world would be able to connect and unify. As neo-
Marxist Alan Gilbert points out, there are no further specifications to be found 
in the “Communist Manifesto” on how this unification is to evolve, so he draws 
from other writings by Marx:94 The actual unifying force for the “international 
proletariat” is a common enemy threatening the very existence of the workers, 
thus generating a “want for solidarity.”95 To promote the spread of socialist 
societies, “internationalism” is supposed to forge an alliance “with the national 
liberation movement to support peoples and states fighting against colonialism 
and its aftermath.” This support is summarized under the label of “international 
anti-imperialistic solidarity”96 and includes any other “support of countries of the 
socialist world system who fell victim to imperialistic aggression.”97
The concepts of “international socialism” and “international anti-imperialistic 
solidarity” were integrated into the Soviet Union’s strategy towards the countries of 
the Global South and copied by the GDR – though the GDR took them considerably 
more seriously than the other states of the Warsaw Pact: East Berlin was struggling 
for its survival and hoped to broaden its international maneuvering room under 
Moscow’s wings. Ingrid Muth distinguishes between ideologically-inspired long-
term strategies and goals and pragmatic mid- and short-term policies.98 A former 
diplomatic functionary herself, her conclusions strongly resemble the conclusions 
of other former diplomatic personnel: Many of those who had been part of the 
GDR’s state apparatus are still convinced of the ideological orientation of the GDR 
and share the opinion that its ideology merely failed due to its neglect of socialist 
ideals. 
According to Muth, the elite first of all rigidly followed ideologically-defined 
long-term interests that led to severe discrepancies and even “mistakes” in the end. 
However, Muth’s assessment has to be reviewed critically. Even though a significant 
number of functionaries and bureaucrats of lower rank in the diplomatic field 
were quite convinced of the truth and success of these ideological foreign policy 
concepts,99  actors higher up in the hierarchy followed a more realistic approach. 
Whenever ideological principles were contradicted by the rational reasoning of the 
state, the SED leadership would adjust ideology to political realities rather than the 
other way around. In conclusion, ideology very rarely was an actual limitation on 
the GDR’s scope of action and it may and must be doubted that the SED’s political 
94 | Alan Gilbert refers to Marx’s critique of German Social Democracy's Gotha Program, 
in: Gilbert, 1978, 348ff.
95 | Marx, Karl, Critique of German Social Democracy's Gotha Program, in: Gilbert, 1978, 349. 
96 | German: antiimperialistische Solidarität.
97 | Außenpolitik, in: Kleines politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 86f.
98 | Muth, 2001, 50.
99 | As the interviews with Wolfgang Bator, Heinz-Dieter Winter, Fritz Balke and Hans 
Bauer have shown.
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elites felt more obliged to this socialist idealism than to rational “raison d”état.” 
Ideology merely remained the basis of foreign policy theory, a theory that had to 
yield to the demands of political praxis.
3. FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS, ThEIR COMPE TENCIES AND 
ThE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: ThE “ThREE SPhERES 
APPROACh”
Foreign policy has been defined as an “interactive process,”100 evolving over time 
due to influences both inside and outside of the state. Among the major internal 
factors of influence are the actors who develop foreign policy as a reaction to internal 
and external circumstances. Thus, the GDR’s foreign policy making is described 
by situating the most relevant actors within the structures of the political system. 
With regard to responsibilities of foreign policy making, the former foreign policy 
personnel Muth identifies three hierarchical levels, equivalent to the overall 
structure of socialist society in the GDR: first, the “party apparatus,” second, the 
“state apparatus,” and finally, the homogenized “political actors of society.” All 
in all, this is just another way to look at the concept of political power of Marxist-
Leninist vanguard parties known as “democratic centralism.” Nonetheless, Muth’s 
approach can further elucidate the discrepancy between the “written” political 
system and its political reality. In the following, Muth’s approach is introduced 
and modified. 
First of all, notional inconsistencies and weaknesses in Muth’s approach have to be 
pinpointed. Muth introduces the term “foreign policy apparatus”101 for her three-
level approach. Unfortunately, she does not use the term consistently. Most of the 
time, the term in her work refers to all foreign policy actors,102 but Muth sometimes 
narrows down its meaning to the actors of level two and three to contrast them 
with level one, the party apparatus.103 To generate more conceptual coherency, this 
study opts to consistently use the term “foreign policy apparatus” for all actors 
– party, state or society – occupied with foreign policy in the GDR. This use of 
the term firstly emphasizes the close connection between the three levels and 
secondly accounts for a significant weakness of Muth’s approach: The party level, 
though superordinate to levels two and three, always had to rely on the legwork 
of state and society actors. This undeniable dependency of the party apparatus 
– regardless of the party’s overpowering dominance in foreign-policy-making – 
and the overlapping of functions are not captured by the concept of hierarchical 
100 | Haftendorn, 1989, 33.
101 | Muth, 2001, 54f.
102 | For example Muth, 2001, 57.
103 | Muth, 2001, 249.
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levels. As a consequence, this study replaces the term “level” with “sphere,” while 
the numeration indicates the actors’ position in the process: The first sphere, 
the party apparatus, directs the second sphere, the state apparatus, and the third 
sphere, the homogenized political actors of society. The term “sphere” offers both 
meanings necessary for a convincing conceptualization of East German foreign 
policy making: It expresses the close connection between the three kinds of actors 
and the party’s dependence on the unconditional loyalty of state and society actors. 
3.1 On the Director of Foreign Policy and Its E xecutive: Inter weaving 
Power between the Spheres of Part y and State
East German Foreign Policy and its Ministr y
Foreign policy defined as any state policy beyond the state’s borders usually is 
conducted by designated state actors, typically a state’s foreign ministry, its 
minister and the head of state. In the GDR’s political system, however, the spheres 
of party and state were closely intertwined to ensure full control of the party over 
all political decisions and decision-making processes. This also applied to the field 
of foreign policy. Thus, the majority of analysts of East German foreign policy tend 
to describe the MfAA as a mere executive organ of Politbüro directives. Opposing 
this interpretation, former MfAA personnel Wolfgang Bator gives his personal 
perspective on the GDR’s foreign policy making of the early 1960s and thereafter. 
According to Bator, foreign policy directives usually were based on the work of the 
MfAA, processed by the Volkskammer and its commissions, and then decided 
by the Politbüro. This account of the process of GDR foreign policy making as 
primarily “bottom-up” and only secondarily “top-down” undeniably idealizes East 
German foreign-policy making. The political system’s mode of operation first 
of all was based on “top-down” administrative processes.104 But to simply label 
the MfAA a mere executive organ oversimplifies the working procedures of the 
ministry and its interconnections with the corridors of power in the Politbüro. 
All in all, both perspectives encourage the right questions about the foreign 
policy network and the distribution of responsibilities. While Bator’s perspective 
may help to understand the self-perception of foreign policy personnel, a 
perspective farther removed from the individual actors reveals that the GDR’s 
state apparatus first of all was tailored to suit the SED’s needs. Just as in the Soviet 
Union,105 the ultimate decision-making responsibility lay with the party, regardless 
of the sources of information on the topic, and thus with its most powerful organ, 
the Politbüro, and later on the Secretary-General of the SED, Erich Honecker. Bator 
admits:
104 | Möller, 2004, 56f.
105 | Shearman, in: Shearman, 1995, 14; Malcom, in: Shearman, 1995, 23-26.
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“Ultimately, the Politbüro decided on the final version and this directive was 
binding for everybody. […] And before this decision [was] made […] not much 
happened.”106
The MfAA was merely meant to be “handyman and advisor”107 to the SED’s 
socialist foreign policy, just as any other state organ was supposed to serve the 
party policies. 
Nonetheless, the field of foreign policy has to be considered a special case 
among the SED’s policies: The external inputs and outputs of foreign policy in 
the end laid beyond the SED’s – and even the Soviet Union’s – sphere of control, 
especially after the international recognition of the GDR in the early 1970s. In 
addition to that, foreign policy making in the GDR depended on the influence 
of individuals. Thus, foreign policy making was more flexible than forms of 
policy-making. Furthermore, the MfAA’s role in the process varied considerably 
over time and space due to the personalities of the respective minister, the head 
of section in the MfAA, and the ambassadors, as well as their relation with the 
secretary-general. Even though the MfAA clearly acted on behalf of the SED and 
its Politbüro, the ideal of full party control over the GDR’s foreign policy could not 
always be achieved in practice.
By law, the MfAA was subordinate to the “Ministerrat” (Council of Ministers)108 
and the parliament, the “Volkskammer.” While the “Ministerrat” indeed 
instructed the MfAA as an executive organ implementing party decisions,109 the 
“Volkskammer” was irrelevant in the decision-making process. Article 112 of the 
GDR’s constitution of 1949 leaves “the exclusive law-making responsibility with 
regard to foreign relations“110 to the “republic,” meaning the state organs and, most 
prominently among them, the GDR’s legislative body. However, constitutional 
reality never granted the “Volkskammer” any room for actual policy-making. 
“Democratic centralism” in principle declared the “Volkskammer” a mere organ 
of acclamation for the decisions of the party apparatus, the Central Committee 
and the Politbüro,111 while the “Ministerrat” served as an implementing organ for 
these decisions. 
106 | “Important decisions always demanded for a Politbüro resolution,” in: Interview with 
Wolfgang Bator May 27 2011 and Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
107 | Storckmann, 2012, 137; Wentker, 2007, 382-387.
108 | Verordnung über das Statut des Ministeriums für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten vom 
14.Dezember 1959, in: Gesetzblatt der DDR, Part I, No.18, March 23 1960, 160ff.
109 | Schaubild Partei und Staat, in: Schroeder, 2011, 38f.
110 | Constitution of the GDR, 7th of October 1949. This formulation cannot be found in 
the version of 1968 anymore, but is expressed implicitly.
111 | This was secured by the SED’s majority of votes within the parliament, Neubert, 
2000, 880; Weidenfeld/Korte (ed.), 1999, 181.
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Personal relationships between ministers with high-ranking party positions, 
however, positioned the “Ministerrat” at an important juncture between party 
and state. From here, foreign policy tasks were delegated to the ministries. Until 
Honecker’s “reform of leadership” in 1976, the central figure of this juncture was 
Willy Stoph, a member of the “inner circle” of power from the very beginning. 
Stoph, a former KPD intelligence agent, had become a member of the Politbüro 
in 1953 and served as Minister of Interior and Defense in the 1950s, until he 
succeeded Otto Grothewohl as Head of “Ministerrat” in 1964.112 In 1976, Stoph was 
finally sidelined when Honecker claimed the position as Head of “Ministerrat” for 
himself. Instead he was “promoted” to Head of “Staatsrat” and thus was banished 
to second-tier representation.113  
In the early years of the GDR, the Soviet occupying forces established a 
“Commission for Foreign Affairs”114 in East Berlin and then the “Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs” only shortly thereafter. In comparison to the FRG, which was not 
able to resume work in its foreign office until March 1951,115 this was an early move 
by the Kremlin toward granting supposedly more autonomy to the GDR in the 
international realm. Nonetheless, these early years of the MfAA were characterized 
by close guidance and supervision of the Soviet Control Commission (SCC) while 
foreign policy was made in the office of Secretary-General Walter Ulbricht.116 As 
a result, foreign policy personnel for a long time lacked the ability or will to act 
without concrete orders.117 
The Role of the Central Committee in the Process of Foreign Policy Making
The GDR’s foreign policy in the beginning was formulated among the members 
of the Central Committee as the “most important body for decision-making and 
coordination”118 and its “Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen des ZK,” the 
“Section of International Relations” (CC Section IV). The section, headed by its 
112 | Müller-Enbergs/Wielgohs/Hoffmann (Ed.), 2000, Stoph, Willy, 829f. Pieck’s and 
Grothewohl’s deaths in 1960 and 1964 profoundly changed the major foreign-policy 
constellation, the triumvirate of “Grothewohl – Pieck – Ulbricht,” which had dominated the 
early years of East German foreign policy making.
113 | Schaubild Partei und Staat, in: Schroeder, 2011, 38. 
114 | “Kommission für außenpolitische Fragen“, Scholtyseck, 2003, 6.
115 | Schöllgen, 2004, 29.
116 | Muth, 2001, 75 and Lemke, in: Pfeil, 2001, 71.
117 | First Foreign Minister Georg Dertinger decries the situation in 1951: “Due to habit, 
there prevails an understandable but fundamentally wrong attitude: the good friends 
of the SCC will straighten it out. If there is something to do, they’ll tell you to! This is a 
fundamentally wrong attitude. [Now] [W]e have to rack our own brains!”. Dertinger, 
stenographisches Protokoll der Tagung der Chefs der Missionen der DDR, 3.Tag, March 9 
1951, in: PA AA, MfAA, A 15465.
118 | Meyer, 1991, in: Scholtyseck, 2003, 70.
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long-lasting Secretary Hermann Axen, claimed responsibility for foreign policy 
making119 though it mostly focused on countries where strong party ties already 
existed.120 Indeed, it was ZK Section IV, not the MfAA, that commissioned country 
analyses and policy papers. It also had the final say about suggestions from the 
embassies.121 After the death of its section head, Paul Markowski, the section’s 
influence started to wane.122 Until their fatal accident in Libya, Paul Markowski123 
and Werner Lamberz,124 were considered the central figures of foreign policy 
making in the Global South. According to Möller, it was the duo who took over 
the political aspects of agreements, while Alexander Schalck-Golodkowsi of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade was responsible for the economic.125 After Markowski’s 
and Lamberz’ death, Schlack-Golodkowski began to fill the emerging power 
vacuum on the economic side, while Honecker did so on the political side. The 
secretary-general’s interest in the field was clearly growing. None of Markowski’s 
successors as Head of CC Section IV were able to reclaim his power and influence.126
Apart from the MfAA, other state organs claimed significant responsibilities in 
the field of foreign relations early on: The Ministry of Foreign Trade127 and Inner-
German Trade, the Ministry of Culture, and even the Ministry of Education. The 
ministries were under the authority of different sections of the CC, leading to an 
unexpected side effect of the system of “democratic centralism”: Efficient policy 
communication between the ministries and the SED leadership, and in turn a 
ministry’s impact on policy-making, depended on whether the CC secretary 
responsible for the ministry or section occupied with foreign policy was a member 
of the Politbüro, the “inner circle” of power.128 The same applies for the “rule 
that each Secretary of the Politbüro was responsible for [one or several countries 
of focus].”129 In addition, the fragmentation of responsibilities among the state 
119 | BStU MfS HA II 28713, 263.
120 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter on July 3 2012.
121 | Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit 
Schlußfolgerungen für das weitere Vorgehen auf diesem Gebiet in der VDRJ, June 27 1972, 
in: PA AA MfAA C 156276.
122 | Paul Markowski, Müller-Enbergs/Wielgohs/Hoffman (Ed.), 2001, 553f.
123 | Ibid., 553f.
124 | Lamberz had been a member of the Politbüro since 1971, in: Scharfenberg, 2012, 59. 
125 | Möller, 2004, 326.
126 | Egon Winkelmann succeeded Markowski, who was followed by Günter Sieber in 
1981. Winkelmann kept the post until 1989.
127 | German: Ministerium für Außenhandel (MAH). The Ministry was responsible 
for “planning, implementation, and control of the entire foreign trade,” including the 
preparation and completion of bi- and multilateral agreements, in: Möller, 2004, 59. 
128 | Muth, 2001, 56, 61 and 63.
129 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 52.
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organs naturally led to unhealthy competition for attention of the “inner circle” of 
the CC and the Politbüro.130 
Civil Societ y Actors without Civil Societ y?
“There existed no organizations ‘on the side,’ like, for example, NGOs.”131
(Wolfgang Bator, former East German diplomat)
In the GDR, the majority of state and society actors in the field of foreign policy,132 
such as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Agency of Service for Representation 
Abroad,133 the League of the United Nations,134 and the Committee of Solidarity, 
were subordinate to the CC International Relations Section. The “Foreign 
Information” Section oversaw the League of International Friendship,135 as well 
as any media activities outside the GDR136 or media reports on foreign affairs for 
the GDR public, including the major publishing house. The described dominance 
of the party over the state’s foreign policy actors becomes more tangible with the 
following example of publication policy: In preparation for Honecker’s official visit 
to Ethiopia and South Yemen in 1979, the party tightly controlled the number of 
texts written, and features produced:
“The media in the GDR will receive orientation about amplified coverage about 
both countries and the bilateral relations in preparation of the visits and for the  
journalistic work about the visits themselves by the Section Agitation. […] For 
the purpose of their support, the media will receive written materials […].”137
130 | Muth, 2001, 73; Storckmann, 2012, 78; Wentker, 2007, 53.
131 | Interview with Wolfgang Bator May 27 2011.
132 | Organization refers to Muth’s work based on Wagner, Matthias, Ab morgen bist du 
Direktor. Das System der Nomenklaturkader in der DDR, Berlin, 1998, 138-210, in: Muth, 
2001, Annex VI “Overview subordination of state and society institutions of the foreign 
policy apparatus to the Party apparatus,“ 249f.
133 | German: Dienstleitungsamt für Auslandsvertretungen der DDR.
134 | Founded in 1954.
135 | German: Liga der Völker freundschaft.
136 | Like Radio Berlin International, the foreign affairs agency PANORAMA and the 
publication house “Zeit im Bild,” which published material on the GDR used abroad, and 
finally DEWAG (Deutsche Werbe- und Anzeigegesellschaft; English: German Society of 
Promotion and Advertisement), which coordinated promotion and organization of trade 
shows and exhibitions.
137 | Brief Oskar Fischer an Joachim Herrmann, Mitglied des Politbüros und Sekretär des 
ZK der SED, 1979, in: PA AA MfAA C 4959, 23.
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Thus, no actor, not even the MfAA itself nor its embassies, had the authority to 
decide on materials to be distributed abroad. The decision on publications, and 
more often than not their content as well, lay with the “Foreign Information” 
Section.138
Nonetheless, mass organizations and other society actors such as the 
“Societies of Friendship” played a significant role abroad, especially before the 
“wave of recognition” in the 1970s. They not only have to be considered the 
predecessors of, but for quite some time even the GDR’s substitute for official 
diplomatic state relations. Of course, the party leadership did everything to 
secure control over these makeshift actors of foreign policy as well. While the 
work of these societies and mass organizations in the respective countries was 
coordinated and controlled by the embassies,139 the SED created a central organ 
to control their work within the GDR. Founded in 1952, the “Society for Cultural 
Relations” was supposed to coordinate all these societies, each of which had to 
work closely with the state and thus the party organs.140 Until the late 1950s, these 
societies were open for engagement from the public sphere, but then the members 
were added in accordance to a quota as defined by the SED. The Society’s work 
in the GDR and abroad, including publications, was of course financed by the 
state. In 1961 it was succeeded by the “League for International Friendship,” which 
immediately focused on the formation of “committees of recognition.”141 Hence, 
these societies played a significant role in East-Berlin’s foreign policy for the next 
decade until the GDR was finally recognized internationally and able to establish 
“regular diplomatic relations” with a majority of states itself. As a consequence, 
the relevance of the “Societies of Friendship” and its equivalents decreased, as did 
the importance of the “Foreign Information” Section.
The Centralization of Responsibilit y in the Field of Foreign Policy
As in other policy fields, responsibility for the field of foreign policy was over 
time withdrawn from constitutional state organs. The influence of the party was 
growing, mostly at the expense of the MfAA’s responsibilities. This process was 
clearly in the interest of the members of the Politbüro142 and can be reconstructed 
by looking at the succession of personnel at the top of the Ministry for Foreign 
138 | Muth, 2001, 67.
139 | Interview with Wolfgang Bator May 27 2011.
140 | Muth, 2001, 89.
141 | Muth, 2001, 93f.
142 | Compare the loss of the MfAA’s responsibilities from 1959 to 1970, which is even 
documented in the official Statutes of the MfAA, “Verordnung über das Statut des MfAA” of 
December 14 1959 and of February 18 1970; See also: The Department of the Head Deputy 
of the International Relations Section at the Central Committee of the SED, Training of Party 
Secretaries of diplomatic representations from August 11 to 18 1967, in: BArch, SAPMO, 
DY 30/IV A 2/20/1141, quoted in: Muth, 2001, 56.
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Affairs. Until the mid-1960s, the most influential post in the MfAA was not 
the minister, but the state secretary. The reason for this was that the first two 
ministers were both members of bourgeois bloc parties that had been selected to 
appease the “integrated” political actors. From the very beginning, the post of state 
secretary was occupied by a loyal party member.143 The secretary’s role changed 
in 1965 when Otto Winzer became minister. At least in the field of foreign policy, 
the centralization process of political responsibilities and decision-making was 
quite complete.
Winzer died in 1975 and was succeeded by Oskar Fischer, the second and last 
SED foreign minister.144 Fischer showed more initiative than his predecessor and 
aimed to regain certain responsibilities for the MfAA by tightly integrating the 
ministry into the party structure. In Fischer’s view, the ministry was supposed to 
work like a section of the Central Committee145 and thus he aimed to centralize 
it even further. Fischer, the former leader of the youth organization “Freie 
Demokratische Jugend” (FDJ), “obviously had been trained within the MfAA to 
be qualified for his future position as minister.”146 In his analysis, Möller even 
considers Fischer’s appointment a consequence of Honecker’s inauguration. 
Heinz-Dieter Winter, a high-ranking East German diplomat and GDR vice-
minister of foreign affairs from 1986 to 1990, remembers the close relationship 
between Honecker and Fischer, who used this contact to skip the regular processes 
of decision-making: “Sometimes even Axen was excluded.” Winter considers it 
likely that there existed a range of issues in foreign affairs that no MfAA personnel 
other than the Minister knew about, such as certain weapons exports.147 All in all, 
Fischer’s style of leadership furthered the integration of the MfAA in the “primacy 
of the party” system instead of expanding its scope of action.
Both the ministry and its minister remained more reactive than proactive with 
regard to foreign policy making, their domain more a supportive than a directive 
one. This arangement is also due to the fact that Honecker aimed to concentrate all 
foreign policy authority in his own hands. As a consequence, the development of 
this Honecker-centred foreign policy often reduced the highly-centralized political 
system to absurdity. Honecker’s final authority in all matters of the international, 
143 | Wentker, 2007, 44.
144 | During the last months of the GDR’s existence, Markus Meckel took over the MfAA 
in Lothar de Maizière’s cabinet before de Maizière himself became foreign minister. 
Scholtyseck, 2003, 51.
145 | Muth, 2001, 71.
146 | Grunert, 1995, in: Möller, 2004, 57; After he had taken office, Honecker had 
rewarded his “fellow conspirators” by including them in the Politbüro, along with a high 
number of Honecker’s loyal followers and comrades from the FDJ, among them Egon Krenz 
and the new minister of foreign affairs, in: Hertle/Stephan(ed.), 2012 (1997), 29.
147 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
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for example, sometimes allowed ambassadors to cut through red tape and address 
the secretary-general directly instead of consulting the MfAA first:
“When we were lucky, we [the MfAA] received a copy. We had our opinion on 
the ambassador’s suggestions. But this opinion was of no more importance. 
Honecker had decided as he saw fit.”148
Storckmann even claims that “Erich Honecker already had been pulling all the 
strings of security policy during [the late years of] Ulbricht’s reign.”149 According 
to Storckmann, the ministries of Defense, Interior and State Security had reported 
to Honecker, not Ulbricht.150 There is no shortage of indications that this early 
power shift toward Honecker began well before Ulbricht’s departure.
Thus, the centralization process in the field of foreign policy did not stop at 
the party level but rather expanded into the party apparatus itself. Over time, the 
ZK of the SED lost authority to the smaller, elitist circle of the Politbüro, while the 
government ministries only could claim some influence if the minister was also 
a member of this party organ. In addition, the gradual shift of power toward the 
secretary-general accelerated after Honecker’s inauguration. Wilhelm Pieck’s and 
Otto Grothewohl’s deaths in 1960 and 1964, respectively, had ended the major 
foreign policy power constellation of “Grothewohl – Pieck - Ulbricht.” And while 
Ulbricht had always held on tightly to the strings of foreign policy direction, he 
nonetheless had been aware that “his rule depended not only on Soviet support, but 
also on the loyalty of the leading party institutions and its apparatus.“151 Honecker, 
on the other hand, gradually extended his sphere of influence into the parallel 
system of party and state. From there, he created a separate apparatus of decision-
making comprised of loyal henchmen. In 1976, Honecker took over the position 
as head of the Staatsrat as well, the organ of international representation, deciding 
on matters of national defense.152 Current academic discourse considers Honecker 
as the major director of East German foreign policy from the early 1980s on.153
Nonetheless, these assessments remain generalizations about a policy field 
that has to be considered the most complex, with regard to responsibilities and 
influence, in the GDR’s short history. Oftentimes, the position of the secretary-
general of the SED has been likened to the leader of the CPSU, omnipotent and 
omniscient. And indeed the decision-making processes in the GDR shifted the 
148 | Ibid.
149 | Storckmann, 2012, 71f.
150 | Storckmann mainly refers to interviews with former NVA personnel, but also presents 
several examples to support his claim. Storckmann, 2012, 73f.
151 | Wentker, 2007, 371. Also see Storckmann on Honecker’s “collective style of 
leadership,” in: Storckmann, 2012, 71.
152 | Diedrich /Ehler t/Wenzke, Rüdiger (ed), 1998, 10.
153 | Scholtyseck 2003, 70; Siebs, 1999, 61-63; Storckmann, 2012, 70; Wentker, 2007, 372.
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position of the secretary-general, if it had ever been, far away from a “primus inter 
pares.”154 Nonetheless, to simply conclude that  Honecker had “nearly unlimited”155 
influence does not do justice to the complex reality of the GDR’s day-to-day 
politics.156 One must recognize the existing limits of human capacity, not only due 
to Moscow’s watchful eye, but also to an inherent competition between the various 
organs included in the process of foreign-policy making. Honecker’s ubiquitous 
signature of “Einverstanden E.H.” or “Einverstanden Erich Honecker”157 may not 
simply be considered automatic proof of the secretary-general’s omniscience, as 
the signature does not automatically mean Honecker had the time or interest 
to read all of the document in question. Even though one may assume that the 
majority of functionaries acted in anticipatory obedience,158 this clearly does not 
exclude other actors reaching beyond or even working against Honecker’s ideas of 
foreign policy.
The “Inner Circle” of Power and the Role of the “Ministries in Arms” 
in Foreign Policy Making
Despite the increased concentration of foreign policy decision-making in the 
hands of the secretary-general, the “inner circle” of policy-making included both 
the party and the state level throughout the GDR’s history. According to Wentker, 
the formal processes of decision-making in the higher state and party organs 
assured the consent of the central functionaries and thus their loyalty, which was 
indispensable for the regime’s survival.159 This “inner circle” regularly included 
the leading figures of the security apparatus. An indication as to who was in this 
“inner circle” can be found in the context of who was present when high-ranking 
military and political officials visited from allied countries. During South Yemeni 
Minister of Defense Muti’a’s visit in May 1972, he met with not only Walter 
Ulbricht, Willy Stoph, and his deputy Weiß, but also Minister of Defense Heinz 
Hoffmann, Minister of Interior Colonel-General Dickel, and Minister of State 
Security Erich Mielke.160 Apart from Weiß all of them dealt with issues of security 
and the “ministries in arms.”
While the “soft” ministries, such as the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry 
of Education, were subordinate to a section of the CC, the “ministries of power” 
or “ministries in arms” regularly moved beyond this system of control. “The 
ministries of power” – the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the 
154 | Modrow, 1994, 44.
155 | Wentker, 2007, 371. 
156 | Möller, 2004, 35; Storckmann, 2012, 111.
157 | Malycha/Winters, 2009, 211; Möller, 2004, 341; Storckmann, 2012, 127.
158 | Möller, 2004, 40f; Storckmann, 2012, 59.
159 | Wentker, 2007, 376.
160 | Aktenvermerk Treffen Genosse Minister Mielke mit Genosse Minister Armeegenereal 
Hoffmann, in: BStU MfS HV A Nr.778, 1.
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Ministry of State Security (MfS) – were all linked directly to the Politbüro and this 
“inner circle” of power clustered around the secretary-general. This arrangement 
intensified after Ulbricht was succeeded by Honecker, as he had been working 
closely with the MfS and its Minister Mielke during the 1960s. But when he 
became secretary-general, Honecker finally was able to initiate, formulate, and 
implement international policies of the security apparatus himself.161 The three 
ministries listed above were in constant exchange with their Soviet overseers, 
though the development of this subordinated relationship developed differently 
for each of the three ministries. While the MfS and the Ministry of Interior 
successfully emancipated their day-to-day business from Soviet supervision in 
the late 1960s, the Ministry of Defense never was able to claim a comparable 
autonomy. The Ministry of Defense de jure led the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), 
but de facto all relevant decisions were made by the Politbüro, which received 
its orders concerning the military from Moscow. Nonetheless, longtime Minister 
Heinz Hoffmann was well-established within the GDR system. Thus, he was able 
to realize at least some of his policies based on his personal position.162 However, 
the NVA and its ministry were far more integrated into the hierarchy of the 
Warsaw Pact and thus into the Soviet sphere of control than any other ministry. 
The NVA’s policy in the developing world is an excellent example for the character 
of the relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the Soviet-led Warsaw 
Pact: In early 1972, Minister of Defense Heinz Hoffmann asked for permission 
to answer requests by states of the developing world to support their military 
training. In July 1972 this request was granted163 and the GDR began to expand its 
military engagement. In conclusion, the activities of the NVA abroad in general 
and the Near and Middle East in particular contribute to an analysis of the wider 
Soviet strategy rather than to one of the GDR’s foreign policy, motives, and goals. 
However, military issues as a focal point of collaboration cannot be ignored when 
analyzing East German engagement in the Global South.
The Reciprocal Relationship between Leading Figures in East German 
Foreign Policy Making and Their Institutions
As indicated above, some individuals were able to move beyond both the centralized 
structures of foreign policy making and the strict party-state parallelism. 
The reasons for exemptions like these usually can be found in a combination 
of personalities and connections to the “inner circle,” but sometimes also in 
the responsibilities of the organ or institution itself. Oftentimes, this included 
161 | Möller, 2004, 37.
162 | Before Hoffmann took office as minister of defense in 1958 he had served within 
the HV A of the MfS, as head of the Kasernier te Volkspolizei (KVP), the GDR’s police and 
as vice-minister of interior, East Germany’s police, in: Diedrich/Ehler t/Wenzke (ed), 1998, 
261, 267, 356, and 644. 
163 | Engelhardt, 1993, in: Möller, 2004, 30.
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personal unions of a high-ranking state post and a seat in the ZK or even the 
Politbüro. This was a popular method to assure the functioning of “democratic 
centralism” in the sense of party-state parallelism. The following subsection 
introduces three major figures in East German foreign policy making who moved 
somewhat outside the regular hierarchy of authority, but have to be considered 
highly influential: Hermann Axen, Gerhard Weiß, and Günther Mittag.
Axen, oftentimes considered the “architect of the GDR’s foreign policy,”164 was 
the secretary of the CC responsible for Section IV starting in 1966. He remained 
a central figure in the field of East German foreign policy until he was forced 
to leave his post during the Peaceful Revolution of 1989. In 1979 he became 
head of CC “International Information” Section .165 With regard to final decision-
making, Axen’s political power was quite limited166 and only was included in the 
“inner circle” of actual policy-makers when the powerful wished so. However, 
Axen’s impact on East German foreign policy making as a close confidant of 
Ulbricht may not be underestimated: One of the major tasks of his Section IV 
was to coordinate relations with the communist parties of the Eastern Bloc and 
thus with the CPSU.167 Accordingly, Axen always was well informed about the 
current state of affairs between East Berlin and Moscow. Also, the theoretical 
analysis and policy papers produced by Axen rooted Honecker’s foreign policy 
in socialist ideology. Axen had been close to Ulbricht and joined the Politbüro in 
1970 where “international relations” became his field of expertise, but was able 
to hold onto most of his competencies under Honecker as well. Most importantly 
for this analysis, Axen became member of the Koko late in his career in 1981 and 
remained, more or less, a major consultant on the Middle East for Honecker until 
the late 1980s.168
In the field of foreign policy, one example for a mere coordinator working well-
beyond his position is Gerhard Weiß. He had been vice-chairman of the Ministerrat 
from 1965 to his death in 1986 and advanced as a member of the Foreign Policy 
Commission of the CC in 1971.169 From 1958 to 1970, he was Vice-President of the 
“German Arab Society”170 and acted as a coordinator for military exports and “non-
164 | Müller-Enbergs/Wielgohs/Hoffman (Ed.), 2001; Axen, Hermann, 34.
165 | German: Abteilung Auslandsinformation. This section was the successor of the 
Section Agitation which at first had been part of the Section International Relations. in: 
Muth, 2001, 65; In the late 1980s Axen even was Head of the ZK Section of International 
Economy, in: Modrow, 1994, 34.
166 | Storckman, 2012, 78ff.
167 | Möller, 2004, 38.
168 | On the demise of Axen’s position see: Uschner, Manfred, in: Storckmann, 2012, 79.
169 | Müller-Enbergs/Wielgohs/Hoffmann (Ed.), 2000, Weiß, Gerhard, 901.
170 | On the GDR’s Societies of Friendship (Freundschaftsgesellschaften), see: Golz, 2003.
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civilian solidarity support” in the 1960s and 1970s.171 From 1969 onward, Weiß 
had a working group at his disposal, formed by high representatives of the MfAA, 
MfNV and MAW:172 Wolfgang Kiesewetter, from 1963-1971 a vice-minister of the 
MfAA,173 Werner Fleißner, from 1964 to 1985 a vice-minister of the MfNV,174 and 
MAW Secretary of State Hans Albrecht.175 Between 1965 and 1977, foreign policy 
procedures regularly included a proposal for support by the minister of foreign 
affairs or his deputy to Stoph, his deputy Weiß, Minister of Foreign Trade Horst Sölle, 
and the Chair of the Planning Commission Gerhard Schürer. Confirmation clearly 
depended on Weiß. An example for this process are the letters on the establishment 
of a Generalconsulat in Aden in August 1968.176 However, under Honecker, Weiß 
was “eliminated” from the coordination process in 1977 and in the course of political 
centralization, his former responsibilities were moved to the MfNV.177
Based on the power shift towards the position of secretary-general under 
Honecker, another important figure in the realm of the GDR’s foreign policy 
was on the rise: The “No. 2” in foreign affairs in the 1980s, Günter Mittag. For 
Storckmann, Mittag is one of the most prominent examples of an individual 
actor who extended his sphere of influence considerably beyond his nominal 
function.178 Positioned at the interface between foreign policy, foreign economy, 
and secret service, Mittag found himself at the interface of foreign policy power in 
the GDR. In the late 1970s, Mittag took over the presidency of two foreign policy 
commissions, the AG “BRD-Westberlin” and, more importantly for the Middle 
East, the “Commission for Coordination of Non-civil Activities in the Countries of 
Asia, Africa, and the Arab world.”179 The commission was meant to coordinate all 
contacts and activities concerning the “developing countries” in Africa and Asia. 
Later on it was simply called “Mittag Commission,”180 an undeniable indicator 
for Mittag’s role. The commission was closely connected with the “Kommerzielle 
Koordinierung” (Koko), a special unit with the explicit task of acquiring foreign 
currency for the internationally weak economy of the SED regime.
171 | Storckmann, 2012, 121ff.
172 | BArch, DC 20/16653, Also see: Storckmann, 2012, 125.
173 | Müller-Enbergs/Wielgohs/Hoffmann (Ed.), 2000, Kiesewetter, Wolfgang, 423.
174 | Ibid., Fleißner, Werner, 215.
175 | Ibid., Albrecht, Hans, 19.
176 | Briefe Winzer an Stoph, Weiß, Sölle, Schürer, August 1968, in: PA AA MfAA C 1219/71.
177 | Storckmann, 2012, 127.
178 | Storckmann, 2012, 89; Wentker, 2007, 378.
179 | Translation of name shortened by author. German: “Kommission zur Koordinierung 
der ökonomischen, kulturellen, wissenschaftlich-technischen Beziehungen und der 
Tätigkeit im nichtzivilen Bereich der Länder Asiens, Afrikas und des arabischen Raumes“, 
Protokoll Politbüro Nr.49/77, 12 December 1977, Annex 13, Bl. 156, in: SAPMO BArch, 
DY30 J IV 2/2 1705. 
180 | See, for example, Möller, 2004, 40.
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Mittag’s role with regard to Koko is more evidence of his special position within 
the foreign policy making process. Founded in 1966, the Koko’s task was to “acquire 
forex ‘outside the plan’ [through arms trade or trafficking], as well as products banned 
by Western embargo.”181 The Koko is regularly mentioned in context of military 
relations and exports, its major function being exchange transactions to increase 
foreign currency reserves.182 It relied on several dummy companies, like the IMES 
(Internationale Messtechnik) GmbH founded in 1981 or the “Ingenieur-Technischer 
Außenhandel” (ITA). On behalf of but officially without knowledge of the SED, these 
dummy companies struck the deals in the field of military trade with political friends 
and enemies alike, including terrorist groups.183 The decision-making process and 
responsibilities of the Koko were quite complex: While Honecker himself was 
responsible for inner-German affairs, Erich Mielke decided on security issues, and 
Mittag on questions related to the economy.184 Furthermore, and despite its official 
affiliation with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Koko was directly subordinate 
to the Secretariat of the CC and Mittag. Under Schalck-Golodkowski’s leadership, 
the unit itself acquired functions and responsibilities similar to those of a section 
of the CC.185 The working processes related to the Koko had to be connected to and 
coordinated with the party. At first this was mostly achieved by Mittag himself, 
later on also by Schalck-Golodkowski. The Koko’s mode of operation was deeply 
entrenched with the work processes of the MfS and especially the HVA, at times 
even observed and directed by the MfS, again highlighting its importance and the 
level of secrecy applied to it.186 All in all, the Koko is an excellent example for the 
SED-leadership’s tendency to obscure certain foreign policy decisions by creating 
additional organs not only beyond the state but also beyond the party apparatus. The 
case of Koko furthermore illustrates how the GDR’s foreign policy over time more or 
less was used as a tool of East Germany’s security, military, and economic policies. 
Just like any other policy field, foreign policy was subordinate to pragmatic goals 
when deemed necessary by the “inner circle.”
181 | Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 236.
182 | Möller, 2004, 61.
183 | Aktivitäten von Unternehmen des Bereiches KoKo zur Devisenerwir tschaftung, in: 
Dt. BT (ed.), 1994, 170-250; On arms tarde with Iraq-Iran and terrorist groups in particular 
see: ibid., 191ff and 204; The Koko was actve until the very last year of the GDR, 1989-90. 
Bericht über die ADR nach Nord- und Südjemen, Arbeitsgruppe BKK, January 30 1989, in: 
BStU MfS BKK Nr.95 Teil 1 von 2, 30-36; Storckmann, 2012, 90.
184 | Buthmann, 2004, 5.
185 | Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), 1994, 103.
186 | In 1983 the independent working group “Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung (AG 
BKK)“ took over the surveillance and guidance of the Koko from the HA XVIII/7.Befehl 
Nr.14/83 des Ministers für Staatssicherheit, September 1 1983, in: Dt. BT (ed.), 1994, 
107 and 115. Buthmann, 2004, 5; Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 236f; 
Möller, 2004, 61.
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3.2  The Fogg y Fringes of the Political System: The Ministr y of State 
Securit y and the HVA in the International Sphere 
In the parallel structures of party-state hierarchy, the MfS clearly occupied a 
special position and ranked at the highest level of decision-making.187 However, 
the MfS never operated outside the structure of the GDR’s political system and 
“democratic centralism,” and always remained subordinate to the party. The 
following section introduces the structure and responsibilities of the Ministry of 
State Security to offer information on responsibilities and changes in structure 
and personnel. This extensive approach allows to both evaluate and understand 
the comprehensive archival material of the MfS as well as to interpret the MfS’ 
role in the GDR’s foreign policy in South Yemen.
Between Secret Ser vice and Secret Police: The Origins and Functions 
of the Stasi
“The major function of the MfS [or Stasi] is […] to guarantee state security of 
the GDR against attacks by all internal and external enemies [of the state].”188
(Dictionary of State Security, 1985)
The Stasi relied on two major principles that had been significant elements of 
the Soviet secret police as a “new type” of service: The “enemy” of one’s state 
was not first of all defined by competition for resources or power, but based on 
ideological bogeymen. In doing so, the distinction between internal and external 
enemies189 gradually vanished and “preventive” action could be justified even 
before actual crimes under GDR law had been committed.190 Thus, the Stasi was 
both a secret police and a secret service,191 not only spying on “external” but also 
“internal” enemies. Of these, the ministry found plenty among its own citizens, 
not only because of real opposition against the SED regime, but also because of 
the ministry’s self-perception: Kowalczuk considers the early Stasi personnel a 
paranoid group “surrounded by overactive enemies.”192
When in 1950 the Department of Defense of the Political Economy193 was extracted 
from the Ministry of Interior and reformed as an independent ministry, this step 
neither draw much attention by the public, nor drew international recognition as 
187 | Schaubild Partei und Staat, in: Schroeder, 2011, 38.
188 | Das Wörterbuch der Staatsicherheit, 2001, 164.
189 | Kowalczuk, 2013, 27f.
190 | Schroeder, 1999, 437.
191 | Engelmann (et al.), 2011, 11; Kowalczuk, 2013, 13 and 249. 
192 | Kowalczuk, 2013, 24.
193 | German: “Hauptverwaltung zum Schutze der Volkswir tschaft.”
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a significant change of the political system.194 However, the new Ministry of State 
Security195 (MfS) was meant to play a significant role in the establishment and 
maintenance of the SED dictatorship. The super-ministry cast a conspiratorial net to 
gather any information, regardless of importance or political relevance. Furthermore, 
the MfS incrementally extended its responsibilities within the system.
The notorious Stasi did not settle for mere observation of “hostile-negative 
forces”196 from within. Rather, it aimed to subvert and destroy these “forces,” that 
is, groups and individuals, through conspiratorial operations.197 The activities of 
the Ministry included recruiting, bribing, or threatening friends and family of 
the suspect, known in Stasi jargon as the “target.” Violence and murder – even 
though not common practices – were part of the ministry’s aresenal.198 After all, 
its political mandate as “shield and sword of the party”199 granted it universal access 
to every part of society. Nonetheless, the GDR’s secret service was never quite the 
omnipotent center of power as the picture painted by the media might suggest:
“Officially, the Ministry of State Security had been a state institution. In fact 
it had been founded as a party organ of the SED and as such by the Soviet 
occupational forces and its Communist Party.”200
Institutionally, the Stasi was positioned under direct control of the secretary-
general of the SED and to a certain extent the Politbüro as well.201 Hence, the 
MfS was fully embedded in the political system of the SED and – at least in 
theory – subsumed under the principle of “democratic centralism.” As part of 
the GDR’s foreign policy as directed by the Politbüro, the MfS always hovered 
under the watchful eye of Soviet supervision.202 Like the German police of the 
SOZ, the installation of the MfS itself had been prepared and accompanied by 
Soviet institutions, notably the People’s Commission for Internal Affairs and the 
194 | Engelmann (et al.), 2011, 213; Kowalczuck, 2013, 21.
195 | German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS).
196 | German: feindlich-negative Kräfte.
197 | Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), 1994; 107; Schroeder, 1999, 445.
198 | On the MfS’ “mode of operation” and work procedures also see: Dt. BT (ed.), 1994, 
107; Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 245-255; Schroeder, 2013, 576-579.
199 | Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit als Herrschaftsinstrument der SED. Kontinuität 
und Wandel, Protokoll der 23. Sitzung der Enquete-Kommission, “Aufarbeitung der 
Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland“, 15. Januar 1993, in: Materialien 
der Enquete-Kommission, Vol. VIII; Schroeder, 1999, 430.
200 | Kowalczuk, 2013, 54.
201 | Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 200f.
202 | Hilger, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 99.
A Spectre is Haunting Arabia – How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen
141
People’s Commission for State Security of the USSR,203 renamed “KGB” in 1954.204 
For example, every work unit was supported by their own “instructor” from the 
Soviet Union.205 As a consequence, the structures of the security services, organs 
of the SOZ and later on the GDR, were modelled on Soviet institutions, just as East 
Berlin aimed to do in South Yemen about two decades later.
Development on Soviet terms was guaranteed by the fact that the majority 
of early functionaries of the GDR’s secret service had been trained and educated 
in Moscow. All of them, in one way or the other, had proven their loyalty to the 
Soviet ideology and system.206 The Stasi’s longtime Minister Erich Mielke, who 
had fled to the USSR in 1931 to be trained as a military-political lecturer at the 
Lenin School, is one of the most renowned examples.207Throughout the 1950s, 
Soviet counselors obtained not only the position to observe, but also the authority 
to control the processes and decisions of the GDR’s secret service.208 The early 
activities of Soviet security organs may be considered an indicator of the role of 
the GDR in Moscow’s security strategy for Central Europe. “After all, the KGB 
built up the SOC/GDR as their own line of defense against [secret] services of the 
West”209 and as a home base for Soviet espionage. And despite a tenacious shift 
from full supervision to guided cooperation between Stalin’s death in March 1953 
and 1958,210 the Stasi remained tightly connected with and depended on Soviet 
guidance throughout the GDR’s existence.211
203 | NKVD – Narodnyjkomissariat vnutrennich del; German: Volkskommissariat des Innern, 
in: Werth, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 38. In February 1941 the KVD was divided 
into NKGB and NKVD. NKGB - Narodnyi komissariat gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti, in: 
Werth, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 38; From 1946 both NKVD and NKGB were 
considered ministries: MVD and MGB. For fur ther information on the restructuring of NKGB 
and KGB see: Hilger, 2009, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 44ff; Engelmann (et al.), 
2011, Soviet Secret Service, 275. On the influence of the KGB see: Borchert, 2006, 42; 
Kowalczuk, 2013, 43-45; Schroeder, 1999, 431.
204 | From 1954 to 1978 Komitet gossudarstwennoi besopasnosti pri Sowjete Ministrow 
SSSR; German: Komitee für Staatssicherheit beim Ministerrat der UdSSR. The KGB in 
Berlin-Karlshorst, Wentker, 2007, 367.
205 | Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 200.
206 | Kowalczuk, 2013, 46ff and 67.
207 | From 1952 to 1957 Erich Mielke had been Vice-Minister of State Security and 
then succeeded Ernst Wollweber as Minister of State Security. He remained in office until 
December 1989, in: Müller-Enbergs (et al), 2000, 579f.
208 | Engelmann (et al.), 2011, Soviet Counselors, 56.
209 | Hilger, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 100.
210 | Hilger, 105 and Gieseke, 200, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009.
211 | Borchert, 2006; Engelmann (et al.), 2011, Soviet Secret Service, 275-279; 
Schroeder, 1999, 433f.
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Espionage or Politics? The Activities of the MfS Abroad
The Stasi’s task of preserving “peace and security” within the GDR became 
even more pressing after the international recognition of the GDR due to the 
perceived and actual influence of “Western ideology and thought.” Gieseke even 
considers the MfS the “decisive guarantor of inner stability under the condition 
of détente” inside and outside the GDR.212 The major actor for the Stasi’s work 
beyond the GDR’s borders was the HV A,213 the former Hauptabteilung XV.214 
To this day, researchers haven’t been able to fully analyze and reconstruct the 
duties and working-processes of this section, as the lion’s share of its files were 
either destroyed or manipulated before they could be secured and reviewed after 
1990.215 Nonetheless, some significant progress has been made in this respect 
due to ongoing archival research in Germany. This research allows for a rough 
description of the work of the HV A, its subsections, and estimate numbers of 
personnel.
Role and competencies of the HV A
Even more than in other fields, the Stasi’s activities outside the GDR were controlled 
and later on guided by the Soviet Union. Despite a certain air of elitism held by the 
HV A and its employees, it had always been an integral part of the Stasi. As such 
the HV A received direct orders from the minister of state security who himself 
had to rely on the advice of the KGB.216 Just as with the leadership of the MfS itself, 
the HV A had been under the reign of one single functionary almost throughout 
the whole existence of the GDR: Markus Wolf. At the age of eleven Wolf had 
immigrated to the Soviet Union. When he returned in 1945, he came equipped 
with the “fitting pedigree” for the future East German state. Wolf advanced as the 
head of HA XV as early as 1953217  and became head of the reformed Section “HV 
A” in 1956 until he resigned due to private reasons in 1986.218
212 | Gieseke, 2001, 84.
213 | English: Main Administration A. “A” in HV A does not stand for “Aufklärung” (English: 
reconnaissance). The name is modelled on the No.1 Administration Section of Espionage of 
the KGB (komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti), the Soviet Committee for State Security, 
in: Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 21 and 41; The former Major Department XV (Hauptabteilung XV) 
was renamed to HV A in 1956, Engelmann (et al.), 2011, 131 and 142f. 
214 | The Hauptabteilung XV was restructured as the HV A in 1956. Its major field of 
activity was West Germany, Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 208.
215 | Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 43.
216 | Schroeder, 1999, 447; Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 41.
217 | In 1953 HA XV was formed out of the “Institute for Economic Research“ (German: 
Institut für Wir tschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung), founded in 1951, Müller-Enbergs, 
2011, 20f.
218 | Müller-Enbergs (Ed.), 2000, Markus Wolf (Mischa), 935f; Wolf, 1997, 437.
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Within the MfS, the HV had been assigned had a special role.219 Nonetheless, it 
applied just the same methods as the other MfS Sections and was tightly connected 
with them.220 Organized in a strictly hierarchical way, the MfS was subdivided in 
Hauptabteilungen (HAs) that were under direct control of the minister or one 
of his deputies. The guidelines of responsibilities for the HAs followed either 
thematic or operational considerations.221 In this context, MfS Minister Mielke’s 
style of leadership is regularly described as patriarchal  if not despotic. For this 
reason, Möller ascribes the efficiency and success of the ministry’s work rather to 
the independent nature of the ministry’s highly specialized subunits222 than to 
its inflexible leader. This probably was the case for the sections occupied with the 
ministry’s activities abroad, especially the HV A, as they relied not only on their 
own employees, but on a wide network of “unofficial employees,” their agents and 
spies, as well.
Like all sections of the MfS, the HV A was not only assigned to observe, but to 
act – reactively and preemptively. In the case of the HV A, this meant inside and 
outside the GDR, towards its own citizens as well as the citizens of the “partner 
countries.” Officially, the sections’ work was based on two “pillars:” First, the 
work of the legal residencies, that is, official representations abroad, and second, 
the cooperation with the “partner countries.” Former special officers (OibEs)223 
never ceased to emphasize that these two were always supposed to be separate, 
while downplaying the special role of illegal residencies and illegal intelligence.224 
However, residential work and cooperation with the “partner countries,” meaning 
their secret services, always tended to blend together, as in Aden. Furthermore, 
both legal and illegal residencies were integrated into the GDR’s trade missions, 
other international representations, and later on embassies abroad, all of which 
were usually led by OibEs. This was made possible through the Politbüro directive 
219 | In 1958-59, the HV A was reorganized and subdivided into eight sections and 
“Object 9,” the separate school for HV A cadres. Also, the head of the HV A was one of 
several deputies of the minister of state security, which also illustrates the prominent role 
of the HV A within the ministry. Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 41.
220 | Like the other sections, the HV A relied on the Officers on Special Mission (OibE), 
IME (IM–experts), GSMs and a network of IMs abroad. IME: Unofficial Employees on Special 
Mission, German: Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter im besonderen Einsatz; GSM; Societal Employees 
for Security. German: Gesellschaftliche Mitarbeiter für Sicherheit.
221 | English: Main Sections.
222 | Möller, 2004, 42.
223 | Officers on Special Mission, German: Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz. These MfS 
officers could rely on a second identity and usually acted from an important political, 
social or cultural position, e.g., as security personnel of GDR representations abroad, in: 
Engelmann et al., 2011, 226f;
224 | Bernd Fischer and Rudolf Nitsche, in: Fischer, 2009, 20; Nitsche, 1994, 51. “illegal 
residencies”: German: illegale Residenturen.
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of February 1957 that aimed to create “a type of IM immediately depending on 
the MfS.”225 Oftentimes these IMs worked undercover, mostly as delegates 
or representatives of other ministries both abroad and in the GDR. Thus, and 
especially before “international recognition,” illegal residencies and intelligence 
were at the center of East German foreign policy.
Among the different subsections of the HV A, subsection HV A III must be 
considered the most relevant for this analysis, as one of its major tasks was to 
coordinate support for those countries of the Global South that were classified as 
countries of “socialist orientation.” In the following, its structure and leadership 
are introduced. Until 1971, the subsection HV A III was led by Horst Jänicke, 
who travelled to Aden frequently.226 His next post was deputy head of the HV 
A, which illustrates the importance of subsection III within the HV A. Jänicke’s 
successor in subsection HVA III, Werner Prosetzky, was followed by Horst 
Machts in 1983 and lastly Dietmar Bauer in 1989.227 HV A III/B coordinated the 
lion’s share of activities in the Middle East in general and gathered and analyzed 
general information. Unit HV A/B/4, the former unit HV A III/7, focused on 
Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, the two Yemens and the PLO.228 Head of unit HV A III/7 
was Herbert Fechner, of unit HV A/B/4 Klaus Guhlmann. For the whole unit, 
Müller-Enbergs registers seven operative employees and 15 IMs/KPs from abroad 
and counts 140 process files.229 During the 1970s, Oberstleutnant Fiedler, head of 
a working group on the “young nation states,” regularly appears as addressee of 
reports, information, or financial statements in the HV A III/7.230 
225 | Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 96.
226 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 36 and 38.
227 | Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 73.
228 | Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 42 and 80. 
229 | Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 85.
230 | Hilfeleistungen gegenüber jungen Nationalstaaten auf nichtzivilem Gebiet. 
Übersicht über Ausgaben […] von 1967 bis 1976, Brief Oberst Henning Abt. Finanzen an HV 
A/III, 26.April 1977, in: BStU MfS Abt. Finanzen Nr. 1393, 151-161 (166 including notes); 
Brief Stellver treter HV A an MfS Abt.Finanzen Oberst Hennig, November 30 1977, in: BStU 
MfS Abt. Finanzen Nr.1419, 163.
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Other Stasi Sections and their role abroad
Apart from the HV A, other sections of the Stasi active abroad or involved with 
international issues were HA I, HA II, HA XX, and HA XXII. HA I was assigned 
to observe the activities of the Ministry of National Defense and its subordinate 
organs including the NVA itself.231 HA II was occupied with counter-intelligence 
and, in addition to the special officers of the HV A (OibEs), its employees were 
deployed in the embassies for just this purpose.232 HA XX focused on the prevention 
and termination of “political-ideological diversion”233 and “political underground 
activities,”234 both inside and outside the GDR. The “struggle against ideological 
enemies,” that is espionage and surveillance towards the West, demanded close 
cooperation between HV A, HA II and HA XX.235 After Honecker succeeded 
Ulbricht in 1971, HA II almost quadrupled its personnel, to “penetrate and 
control the recently established diplomatic representations of Western states.”236 
Furthermore, the newly established international diplomatic representations of 
the GDR were infiltrated as well. It was the assigned task of the HV A employees 
to watch GDR citizens and prevent possible defections or treason.237 The internal 
exchange of information, espionage and counter-intelligence within the Stasi 
naturally eased the path to involvement of the HA II and HA XX in the Global 
South, as will be seen in the analysis of the MfS’ activities in South Yemen.
Finally, Special Section XXII was involved in all countries connected to 
international terrorist groups. Due to the public’s interest in the subject, the files 
of Section XXII are likely the most quoted in the media, though the files only offer 
restricted information with regard to actual operations abroad. In 1975 the section 
was founded as a “counter-terrorism unit,” though it also verifiably excelled in 
supporting international terrorist organizations and cooperated with the Koko.238 
Terrorist groups in the Near and Middle East were observed and “handled” in 
XXII’s subsection No.8. This subsection also coordinated the infiltration of these 
groups with IMs, among them the Abu-Nidal and the Carlos Group, both of which 
had close ties to the South Yemeni regime.239 The recruitment of international 
231 | Engelmann et al., 2011, 120f.
232 | Möller, 2004, 42.
233 | German: politisch-ideologische Diversion (PID), Suckut, 2001, 303; Auerbach  et 
al., 2008, 151.
234 | German: politische Untergrundtätigkeit (PUT), Suckut, 2001, 17; Auerbach et al., 
2008, 150.
235 | Auerbach et al., 2008, 157.
236 | Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 229.
237 | Kowalczuk, 2013, 252.
238 | Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), 1994, 207; Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 
2009, 235; Möller, 2004, 44.
239 | Möller, 2004, 45.
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IMs was combined with the education and training of members of these terrorist 
groups, coordinated by Section XXII and implemented by Section AGM/S.240
Three phases of the Stasi’s “foreign policy”
Müller-Enbergs defines three phases marked by turning points for the HV 
A’s activities: The erection of the wall in 1961 and the enforcement of the 
“Grundlagenvertrag” in 1972.241 In the following, the three phases of HV A activities 
are interpreted with regard to the GDR’s foreign policy towards the Global South, 
among them the states of “socialist orientation” and especially South Yemen. While 
the HV A had mostly focused on the newly formed FRG before 1961, the scope of 
operations in the Global South was broadened significantly thereafter, including 
the profile of the special officers (OibEs) and the work of the responsible subsection, 
HV A III.242 As a consequence, the Ministry gradually expanded its influence abroad 
at the expense of the regular diplomatic personnel of the GDR until the “wave of 
recognition” in the early 1970s. Until then, the HV A had had to fully rely on illegal 
residencies, that is, disguised operative bases abroad. However, due to the lack of 
diplomatic relations and thus representations, this had also meant a “monopoly of 
information” (Müller-Enbergs) for the HV A in the international realm at the time.
Consequently, this had to change after the establishment of official diplomatic 
relations and embassies. Afterward, the number of legal residencies grew and 
the HV A’s work became more integrated into the GDR’s “official” foreign policy 
endeavors: The GDR had successively expanded its cooperation with developing 
countries of “socialist orientation” and in doing so promoted a “state-building 
policy” with a focus on security organs and the educational system of recipient 
countries, the most prominent of which were South Yemen, Ethiopia,243 and 
Nicaragua. It was mostly the special officers (OibEs) who were highly involved in 
the installation of secret services modelled on the GDR’s system in the “partner 
countries,” including the training of personnel and the preparation and the 
delegation of so-called advisory groups.244 Furthermore, East German embassies 
now served as the ideal coverage for short-term visits of Stasi personnel. In early 
240 | AGM/S: Arbeitsgruppe des Ministers; English: Working group of the minister.
AGM/S was also occupied with acts of sabotage abroad. It later on was renamed Section 
XXIII, in: Möller, 2004, 45 and 47. On the recruitment process see for example: Operative 
Einschätzung des GMS “Leonhardt“-Vorg.-Nr.XV 3481/82, August 28 1986, in: BStU 
MfS AGMS Nr.1020-88, 66-68. On training courses see for example: Konzeption für die 
Durchführung eines Sonderlehrganges zur Ausbildung von Mitarbeiter des MfS VDR Jemen, 
Section X to Section XXIII May 4 1988,  in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 125f.
241 | Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 22.
242 | Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 42.
243 | Borchert, 2006, 201 und 241; Dagne, 2006.
244 | German: Beratergruppen; In this, the HV A worked closely with the GDR’s Army, the 
NVA (German: Nationale Volksarmee), Kowalczuck, 2011, 259; Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 73.
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1984, for example, four high-ranking Stasi employees, of the HV A Section N, and 
two delegates from HA III, visited Aden to check on the condition of the GDR-
financed surveillance base “Netzwerk 3,” with the two HA III delegates travelling 
under cover as MfAA diplomats.245
3.4  Responsibilities for and in the PDRY: East Berlin and the 
Diplomatic Mission in Aden
According to Wolfgang Bator, former GDR ambassador, each embassy, regardless 
of its size, had a section or at least one diplomat each responsible for political affairs, 
foreign trade, and culture. All of them officially answered to the ambassador.246 
The East German embassies on the ground mostly fulfilled an executive and 
coordinating function, directed by the MfAA in Berlin.247 Apart from the minister 
of foreign affairs, one of his deputies in Berlin was assigned to coordinate and 
decide on the relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East. After 1972, 
this was Klaus Willerding,248 and after 1988 Heinz-Dieter Winter.249 Sometimes 
this deputy was head of the respective regional section.
The “Arab States/Near and Middle East” Regional Section
South Yemen was part of the “Non-European Countries No.3: Arab States” regional 
section, which was renamed “Arab States Section” and then “Near and Middle East 
Section” in the 1970s. Head of this section in the late 1960s was Kiesewetter and after 
him Siegfried Kämpf.250 He was followed by Karl-Heinz Lugenheim who officially 
245 | Konzeption für die Durchführung einer Dienstreise im Rahmen der Aktion “Netzwerk 3“, 
in: BStU MfS HA III Nr.8, 212-215. In South Yemen, this part of the GDR’s nation- and state-
building policy was coordinated by HA X which first of all regulated relations of the MfS with 
security organs of countries of the Eastern Bloc but also other close allies like South Yemen 
and thus worked closely with the HV A. Möller, 2004, 42. See for example a comprehensive 
file on South Yemen, BStU MfS Abt.X Nr.324 Teil 1 von 2; Korrespondenz Oberst Kempe 
(Abt.X) und Oberst Machts (HV A), Zusammenarbeit mit den Sicherheitsorganen der VDRJ, 
February/March 1989, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr.324 Teil 1 von 2, 23-25.
246 | E.g. the “culture section,” coordinated and directed the activities of East German actors 
from the social sphere, esp. the “Societies of Friendship”. Int. with Wolfgang Bator May 27 2011.
247 | The major sources for the succession of personnel are archival material and Muth, 
who relies on Radde, Jürgen, Der Diplomatische Dienst der DDR. Namen und Daten, Köln, 
1977, in: Muth, 2001, Annex XVII “Overview of the Heads of Country sections from the 
1960s to 1972-73 and Annex XIX “Overview of personnel of diplomatic missions of the GDR 
from 1949 to 1975, 279-295.
248 | Brief Scharfenberg an Rost, December 20 1973, in: PA AA MfAA C 1555/76, 116f.
249 | E-Mail Heinz Dieter-Winter, May 26 2014.
250 | Brief von Winzer an W. Stoph und Prof. K. Hager, June 12 1969, Berlin, in: PA AA 
MfAA C 1219/71, sine pagina. Kämpf followed in 1970.
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remained head of the section from 1970-1977.251 In between, Günther Scharfenberg 
substituted for Lugenheim for about half a year until Günter Mauersberger took over 
in July 1972.252 In 1977 Wolfgang Konschel became the new section head, followed 
by Wolfang Schüßler from 1978 to 1985. Heinz-Dieter Winter took over until 1986 
and was succeeded by the last head of section, Reiner Neumann, who served until 
1990. Another important link between the foreign policy headquarters in East 
Berlin and the respective embassies in the 1970s was the official appointment of a 
Politbüro secretary to one or several countries as his “countries of focus” to improve 
political relations and personal contacts. “The relations of the PDYR [for example] 
were assigned to Gerhard Grünberg”253 who appears regularly as the coordinator of 
meetings with high-ranking Yemeni delegations in East Berlin.254
East German Ambassadors to Aden
With regard to the number of diplomats and employees, the embassy in Aden 
was one of the biggest East German embassies in the Global South. All in all, six 
ambassadors were sent to Aden: Karl Wildau, who had been general consul in 
Aden since 1968, served as ambassador from July 1969 to 1972. He was likely well 
acquainted with Honecker, as he married Honecker’s daughter Erika.255 Wildau 
was dismissed from his post after South Yemen complained about the disclosure of 
secret information by the minister of justice to Soviet and East German officials.256 
Wildau was succeeded by Günther Scharfenberg who remained in office until 
1978 and thus was the longest-serving ambassador to the PDRY. Scharfenberg 
was replaced by Ernst-Peter Rabenhorst who remained on his post until 1981. 
Rabenhorst had been a member of the CC “International Relations” Section and 
had recommended himself for the post during a visit to the PDRY while consulting 
on foreign policy regarding the establishment of relations with Washington and 
Bonn in 1974.257 Rabenhorst was succeeded by Reiner Neumann who had to leave 
the country due to the “January 1986” massacre. The next ambassador to Aden, 
251 | Beschlußvorlage [sic!] zur Konzeption Entwicklung der politischen, ökonomischen 
und kulturellen Beziehungen zur VDRJ 1968, in: PA AA MfAA C 1219/71; E-Mail Heinz 
Dieter-Winter, May 26 2014.
252 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 17.
253 | Grünberg, member of the Politbüro since 1966 and mostly occupied with question 
of agriculture, was assigned to enter tain relations with the PDRY at the highest party level. 
Scharfenberg, 2012, 52.
254 | Stenografische Niederschrif t der Beratung mit der Delegation der NLF Südjemen am 
2.11.1970 im Hause des ZKs, in: BArch, SAPMO/DY 30/11407, 5-71. 
255 | Erika Wildau, in: Der Spiegel, No.49, 1988,
256 | SAPMO BArch, DY 30/IV B/2/20/285; Scharfenberg, 2012, 33.
257 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 48; A few years later Rabenhorst even published an ar ticle on 
the PDRY’s progressive development in the SED magazine on theory and praxis of scientific 
socialism “Einheit” (Unity). See: Rabenhorst, 1977.
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Freimut Seidel, then gradually aimed to revive relations. Though East German-
South Yemeni relations did not recover fully until 1990, they were very well on 
their way after March 1989. Seidel left the country in 1989 and Werner Sittig 
took over in August. Sittig witnessed the beginnings of Yemeni unification and 
initially was supposed to establish the GDR embassy of a unified Yemen in Sana’a. 
However, he wasn’t able to put his experiences to use anymore. Sittig was only to 
serve until 1990 and was the very last ambassador of the GDR sent to Aden. With 
unification on the horizon, Sittig was called back to East Berlin to take over as 
Head of the MfAA Near- and Middle East Section258 under the last two ministers 
of foreign affairs in East Germany, Markus Meckel, from April to August 1990 
and Lothar de Maizière, for the final three months of the existence of the GDR.
Inside the Embassies: Cadre Selection and Responsibilities
Future embassy staff and their families had to meet a certain “standard” of Party 
loyalty. This was especially true for the ambassador and his family for two major 
reasons: The ambassador firstly was considered responsible for the East German 
“collective” in his country of service. The “Aden collective” was comprised of 
more than 240 GDR citizens.259 But secondly, the ambassador was afforded much 
mobility and had to act independently but in accordance with the SED regime in 
countries of the developing world. As a consequence, ambassadors were tested 
and screened thoroughly with regard to their party loyalty. Werner Sittig, for 
example, reports of that each ambassador had to attend the SED party school 
for one year.260 An everyday example for the self-controlling nature of the system 
is the reaction of the HV A resident’s wife to the arrival of the Scharfenberg 
couple in Aden. Repeatedly she reminded Scharfenberg’s wife, Meike, of the 
fact that she was not an SED member which was a rare condition for the wife 
of an East German ambassador.261 This exception probably occurred due to 
extraordinary circumstances. The Scharfenbergs had met merely a year before 
Günter Scharfenberg was called upon as ambassador.262 Furthermore, he was only 
the second choice, after Wolfgang Bator, to serve in Aden. Nonetheless, the post 
demanded a high level of experience in both the state and party apparatus, and 
in the middle of the “wave of recognition,” there was an extreme shortage of able 
and loyal foreign policy cadres. Thus, it must have been enough for the Politbüro 
at the time that “there didn’t seem to exist any doubts about Meike’s political 
reliability and attitude,”263 whereas this clearly didn’t stop the MfS personnel from 
commenting on the situation.
258 | Notes on telephone interview with Werner Sittig, May 8 2014.
259 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 88.
260 | Notes on telephone interview with Werner Sittig, May 8 2014.
261 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 25.
262 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 13; 16.
263 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 16.
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Officially, it was the ambassador who had the highest authority over GDR citizens 
abroad. In reality though, this authority depended on the character of each 
ambassador and his relationship with the MfS residents. Scharfenberg reports 
about a conflict of “positions” between himself and the visiting political cadres: 
“But regardless of the political cadre’s position at the headquarters [in East 
Berlin], abroad, the ambassador was the designated representative of ‘party 
and government.’”264
However, the ambassador’s authority by no means was a given that any ambassador 
could rely on. According to the principle of “democratic centralism,” the ambassador 
was regarded a representative of the government, i.e., the state sphere, and thus 
subordinate to any high-ranking party representatives. Apart from Scharfenberg, 
several former ambassadors report of conflicts due to an unclear assignment of 
responsibilities with visiting cadres, especially Stasi delegates. Heinz-Dieter Winter 
remembers: “The Resident and his people had their own rooms. I visited the 
embassy in Aden in 1990. The ambassador had no access to these rooms,”265 At 
the time, the Stasi’s work obviously was beyond the ambassador’s sphere of control.
Not only did the ambassador’s family have to prove they were “in line” with 
SED politics. Indeed, every other GDR citizen had to display his or her loyalty to 
the regime. This was ensured by the expansion of the system of control from the 
GDR to its “partner countries.” Aden was no exceptional case in this regard and 
not only official HV A officers, but also several East German and Yemeni IMs 
were on duty at the embassies until the very last days of East German foreign 
policy, usually without knowledge of the ambassador himself.266  According to 
former special officer (OibE) Rudolf Nitsche, the special officers of the Stasi within 
the MfAA were meant to merely provide “counter-surveillance” for the MfAA 
and its representatives abroad, while working “just like any other” international 
secret service. But even though Rudolf Nitsche emphasizes that neither the HV 
A in general, nor the special officers in particular were intended to “spy upon 
employees of the MfAA [in the GDR and abroad],”267 Nitsche’s own history tells a 
different story. Under the code name “Winter,” he was appointed deputy of a GDR 
trade mission in the Arab world in 1966 – without the knowledge of the head of 
the mission. Nitsche writes about these years: 
264 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 34.
265 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter, July 3 2012.
266 | Abschrif t einer IM-Information der HA VII, Abt.1, February 28 1990, in: BStU MfS HA 
VII 7054, 51-53. In the PDRY, MfS-officers remained active until the official disbandment 
of the Ministry, announced in January 1990 by Hans Modrow. Gieseke, in: Kaminski/
Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 209.
267 | Nitsche, 1994, 51.
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“One should be aware that only the best and most conscious citizens of the GDR were 
appointed to posts in the capitalist [countries]. I expected to join a small, steadfast 
socialist collective of convinced and collegial Genossen. I was badly mistaken.”268
Among others, Nitsche was on duty to improve what he viewed to be scandalous 
circumstances by intensifying control of the MfAA functionaries even before they 
were sent abroad, such as through Nitsche’s “operation” in the MfAA to form the 
“Internal Information” Section.269 Regardless of a certain autonomy for the East 
German embassies and their employees, the watchful eye of the SED regime was 
omnipresent. The Stasi observed and reported about life and work of the diplomatic 
personnel at home and abroad to be able to react to internal disloyalties, but also 
preemptively to prevent possible “treason” or attempts to flee the GDR.
4. SuMMARY: COMPE TENCIES AND INFLuENCES OvER TIME
This chapter aimed to embed the actors involved in East German foreign policy 
making into the reality of the GDR’s political system to be able to interpret the 
GDR’s activities in South Yemen as typical or atypical for East German foreign 
policy making. While concrete implications of the relations between the actors 
are illuminated in Chapter 8 on the dominant foreign policy strategies in the 
Arab world, this chapter sketched the complex system of the GDR’s foreign policy 
making process in general to assess the role and position of the Aden embassy 
and its policy within the system. This chapter pointed out two actors which moved 
outside the rigid hierarchical system that was East German foreign policy, though 
both were an integral part of it: The major external determinant of foreign policy, 
the Soviet Union, and the Stasi and its officers.
Moving beyond the SED System of Foreign Policy: The Stasi and Moscow 
After two decades of access to a huge corpus of documents, research and academic 
discourse on the structures, decision- and policy-making process of the Stasi, 
research has moved from its infancy to adolescence,270 but a big share of material 
still awaits academic attention and thus oftentimes conclusions remain speculative 
at best. The MfS  was able to gradually expand its own sphere of action within 
the political system of the GDR. The Stasi was able to create a certain aura of 
omniscience, elitism, and influence within East German society and successfully 
combined this policy with an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, insecurity, and 
268 | Nitsche, 1994, 55.
269 | English: Internal Information Section; Nitsche, 1994, 40. Later on after the “wave 
of recognition” the “Schutz und Sicherheit” Section was formed, simply called “Section S” 
in this context.
270 | Schroeder, 2013, 558; See also: Engelmann (et al.), 2011; Gieseke, 2011; 
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even fear among the foreign policy personnel to use the “wrong” that is, non-party 
conform, political statements and engagement in public.  Abroad, this created 
extraordinary power for a ministry which otherwise was subordinate to the party 
like any other state institution.
The work of the GDR’s secret service in the Global South, and particularly in the 
Arab world, played a decisive role in the GDR’s activity during the establishment 
of a communist state system. This was especially the case in efforts to support 
the socialist state- and nation-building of the Aden regime. All in all, the MfS 
and the adjunctive section HV A both served the same purpose as the MfAA: 
“[T]o stabilize the GDR-system, [and] secure the rule of the SED”271 by increasing 
East German prestige abroad and improving the political and economic outputs of 
GDR foreign policy. The concrete case of South Yemen gives an excellent example 
of this involvement, as will be shown in the analytical chapters on the GDR’s 
policy in the country.
Apart from the foreign policy headquarters in Berlin, it was not only the Stasi 
that had a close eye on East Germany’s embassies. “[C]lose contacts between the 
GDR’s diplomats abroad and the Soviet representatives had to be emphasized.”272 
To this day, the mechanisms and processes of Soviet control over the GDR’s foreign 
policy remain insufficiently analyzed. Nonetheless, it may be concluded that the 
Soviet urge and “need for control”273 of the SED regime seemed to decrease over 
time. After 1955 there merely remained the Soviet embassy to direct East-Berlin’s 
politics, at least officially. Nonetheless, Moscow made sure to create its very own 
power base in East Germany by establishing their organizational system and 
thus securing a certain structural power for themselves: Similarities between 
the Soviet and the East-German security services KGB and Stasi were numerous, 
among them a hierarchic system modelled on military ranks.274 This emphasizes 
the special role of the Stasi within the system and may explain its employees’ 
self-perception as a distinctive political elite. In addition to that, the Soviet Union 
ensured control of East German activities abroad, based on the close cooperation 
between KGB and MfS, but also between Soviet and East German diplomats in the 
respective countries, such as South Yemen.
Foreign Policy Responsibilities in the GDR: Three Phases of Development
As indicated above, the reality of power distribution among state and party organs 
did not correspond with the constitutional political system. Constitutional genesis 
rather has to be considered a belated confirmation of actual circumstances, as 
the constitutions of 1968 and 1974 merely adapted constitutional law to political 
271 | Müller-Enbergs, 2011, 20.
272 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 62.
273 | Wentker, 2007, 29.
274 | Kowalczuk, 2013, 48.
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realities. Distribution of responsibility within the GDR depended on two factors: 
First, the efficiency of the complex relation between party and state and second, 
the personality and the power network of foreign policy functionaries. Based on 
these two factors, three phases of development of foreign policy responsibilities 
can be identified that coincide with Müller-Enbergs’ three phases of the Stasi’s 
activities abroad, but also agree with the major phase of East German foreign 
policy introduced in chapters 5 and 6: The first “Phase of Collective Improvisation” 
from the founding of the GDR to 1961, the second “Phase of Consolidation and 
Professionalization” until international recognition in 1971-72, and the third and 
last “Phase of Established Administration” until 1989 during which the state, its 
political system and the ruling elite were able to act from an established position.
Understandably, the transition from the “Phase of Consolidation and 
Professionalization” to the “Phase of Established Administration” is the most 
relevant period for collecting information on the development of power distribution 
within the foreign policy apparatus. The expansion of the GDR’s activities in 
the international sphere in the 1960s, mostly in the Global South, had led to a 
“certain […] professionalization“275 of the foreign policy apparatus, while selection 
processes and training made sure that foreign policy personnel were among the 
most loyal to the party, its policies, and political survival.276  Muth mentions the 
common slogan according to which the MfAA personnel first of all were “workers 
for the party before they were diplomats.”277 Hence, Wolfang Bator’s memories as 
a long-time, high-ranking foreign policy functionary cannot be too surprising. 
His impression of a more influential role of the MfAA on the GDR’s foreign policy 
without doubt belittles the fact that the CC and Politbüro not only decided on the 
final version of foreign policy directives, but also whether the draft handed in by 
the MfAA was to be discussed at all. In addition to that, the majority of the MfAA 
personnel were integrated into the party at a considerably high level, ensuring that 
they were less likely to suggest policies outside the general “party line,” as they 
had internalized what was expected from them.278 Furthermore, these personal 
unions of party posts and other functions oftentimes created shortcuts in the 
“chain of command,” and policy-making sometimes became an almost impossible 
task without consent of the highest party levels.
275 | Wentker, 2007, 191.
276 | As early as March 1949, diplomatic personnel was trained at the Institut für 
Internationale Beziehungen (IBB), the Institute for International Relations, in Potsdam-
Babelsberg, in: Crome, 2009, 9.
277 | Muth, 2001, 73.
278 | On the process of “internalization” in the sense of creating “habits of order and 
obedience” as part of what Foucualt described as “subjectification” see: Foucault, 1995 
(1975), 242.
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All in all, the actual accomplishment of the MfAA may not be found in proactive 
policy-making, but rather has to be sought in the reduction of friction losses 
within the spider web of responsibilities and involvement between party, state, 
and “society actors”: Within the second and third sphere, responsibilities were 
highly fragmented, and the MfAA was able to acquire the role as coordinating 
“mediator”279 between state and society actors. During and right after the “wave 
of diplomatic recognition” of the early 1970s, the MfAA personnel had high hopes 
for the extension of its authority, but these hopes were not to be fulfilled. Only 
occasionally did the room for actual “policy-making” expand, as in the case of the 
GDR’s embassy in Aden:
“After consultations […] with Genosse Dr. Weiß in August [1973] and delegation 
Heydel in Aden in fall 1973, we aimed to process relations with the PDRY through 
the embassy as a matter of principle.”
However Scharfenberg does not end here, but continues: “insofar as there 
do not exist immediate contacts between central state institutions of the GDR 
and partners of the PDRY.”280 Thus, the question of responsibility with regard 
to decision-making always had an easy answer: Regardless of the contacts of the 
GDR state apparatus with the respective county, it was always the party apparatus 
and its “inner circle” that decided on matters of importance.281 Despite a certain 
influence with policy suggestions in emergency situations, the MfAA rarely left 
the policy path staked out by the leaders of the SED. The MfAA rather remained 
an active executive “subordinate regulator.”282 The one-party system combined 
with nomenclatural recruitment concentrated the decision-making process of all 
policy fields in a very small circle of decision-makers.283  Furthermore, the already-
centralized political system over time condensed power distribution among 
the SED’s leading functionaries even more, so that in the 1980s, individuals’ 
opinions and interpretations, most prominently those of the secretary-general, 
became highly influential. On the one hand, this allowed for quicker and more 
flexible responses than before, but also led to rash actions without the necessary 
comprehensive consideration, as will be illuminated with the analysis of East 
Berlin’s foreign policy engagement in Aden.
279 | Muth, 2001, 67.
280 | Brief Scharfenberg an Willerding, Aden, March 20 1974, in: PA AA MfAA C 1555/76, 4f.
281 | Schmitt’s definition of the “exception” as “a danger to the existence of the state” 
reveals his wish for the securing of the state’s existence, Schmitt, 2005 (1922), 6.
282 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 71; Wentker, 2007, 382.
283 | Principles of nomenclature in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, June 18 1964, in: PA 
AA, MfAA, LS-A 29, in: Muth, 2001, 268.
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Section B. AnALYSiS 
PART II – The GDR in Yemen

CHAPTER 8. The GDR and the “Arab World”:  
A Small State’s “Fill-In Policy”
Until now, no in-depth analyses of East German activities in the Middle East 
nor any brief overviews on the four full decades of East German engagement in 
the region have been published. This is mostly due to the lack of case studies 
on East German foreign policy in the Middle East from the 1970s onwards, but 
also to significant gaps in research on the GDR’s foreign policy in general. The 
following chapter cannot be considered this long-awaited overview, as it is merely 
conceptualized to support the analysis of the GDR’s engagement in the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen. Any interpretation of the GDR’s activities in the 
Global South must remain piecemeal, as there is no way to “accurately assess the 
nature and volume” of East German aid. It was not before the mid-1980s that the 
GDR was urged by the UN and World Bank to publish systematized numbers,1 
and even these cannot be considered fully reliable: Foreign aid remained a tool of 
a foreign policy, serving political and ideological ends. Thus, any interpretations 
with regard to the actual volume of spending have to content themselves with 
a short- to medium-range explanation. In addition to that, there did not exist a 
central agency to coordinate the GDR’s policy towards the Global South: Though 
the Politbüro decided on the formation of a “Commission for the Developing 
Countries” in 1977,2 this decision was not enforced to any effect before German 
reunification.
Despite this pessimistic outlook, this chapter intends to offer a foothold and 
orientation on East German engagement in the Middle East for future research. 
Based on the Soviet interests in the Middle East during the Cold War, the 
following chapter firstly sketches the GDR’s activities in the region and how it 
had to navigate within this rather narrow scope of action. Secondly, this brief 
1 | Howell, 1994, 307.
2 | German: Kommission für Entwicklungsländer, “to coordinate the economic, cultural, 
scientific-technical and non-civilian activities in the countries of Asia, Africa and the Arab 
world,” in: Beschluß des Politbüros, Protokoll Nr. 49/77, December 20 1977, in: BArch, 
SAPMO, DY JI 2/2 1705; also see: Döring, 1999, 44ff; Howell, 1994, 313.
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outline introduces the East German engagement in the Middle East before and 
after international recognition and thirdly concludes with the three dominant 
strategies that structured East German activities in the Middle East.
1.  ThE MIDDLE E AST BE T WEEN WAShINGTON AND MOSCOW: 
PAWN OR PL AYER?
“The Soviets were responsible for the whole world and left small bites to their 
agencies in East Berlin, Sofia, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Prague.”3
The GDR’s activities in the Middle East had mostly been shaped by Moscow’s 
interests in the region. The following subsection places the Middle East within 
the wider framework of the Cold War to sketch the relationship between the 
international and the regional. Then, the political development and processes 
in the region are summarized briefly along major events, most of which were 
conflicts, in the wider Middle East to identify Soviet interests and strategies in the 
Cold War.
Halliday diagnoses a “reciprocal relationship”4  during the Cold War between 
the international and the regional levels, the system and the sub-system, and 
the globe and the Middle East. He also considers the Cold War both a “global, 
formative context” and a system of ‘strategic control,” reaching out to steer regional 
actors as well.5 The relationship between the international level and the regional 
level had changed significantly after the “high colonial epoch” between 1918 and 
1945 and was now characterized by more interaction between “global and regional 
forces.” Halliday’s approach clearly ascribes more agency to the regional actors 
of the Middle East, going well beyond the image of the region as produced by 
the narrative of the superpower conflict.6 Halliday diagnoses a considerably more 
active role of regional actors. Thus, one may imply an overall change of character 
of foreign policy of the global towards the regional powers in the Middle East with 
the onset of the Cold War. With regard to the levels of engagement, “imposition” 
of external actors, i.e., colonial powers, was replaced by the two superpowers 
oscillating between “intervention” and “involvement” to “influence” due to the 
growing agency of regional actors who were not only willing, but also able to 
pursue their own interests.
This change in relationship was demonstrated during the Suez Crisis of 1956 
when Egypt unilaterally nationalized the Suez Canal. The former global and 
3 | Kowalczuck, 2013, 251.
4 | Halliday, 2005, 98.
5 | Ibid., 127.
6 | With this approach, Halliday opposes Westad, who emphasizes the agency of the two 
superpowers, Westad, 2005, 272ff.
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colonial powers, the United Kingdom and France, supported an Israeli initiative 
to prevent what they considered Egypt’s seizure of the canal and in doing so once 
more demanded a major power position in the region. In the end, the United 
States prevented this military move. Still, from then on the Middle East and its 
regional powers were both pawns and active players in the global conflict: While 
the region cannot be considered the major venue of the bloc confrontation, it 
was still “vital to [the superpowers”] security.”7 This was especially true for an 
extremely sensitive field of foreign policy and economy: For both superpowers and 
their allies, the Middle East emerged as the primary recipient of their arms trade 
among the countries of the Global South.
1.1  Heading for New Shores: Moscow’s Early Engagement in the Middle East
Compared with the United States, the Soviet Union had a noticeably higher 
interest in the events and power distribution in the region, even though it “had 
no direct interest in Middle Eastern oil”8 at the time. Rather, the relevance of the 
region to the USSR was of a more immediate nature: the Greater Middle East 
directly bordered its territory and sphere of influence.9 Apart from the countries of 
the Middle East in its immediate vicinity, the Horn of Africa and Bab Al-Mandab 
were of utmost geostrategic importance for the Kremlin. Not only as a possible 
naval base between Africa, Europe, and Asia, but also as part of the shipping 
route between the European West, the Black Sea, and the Asian East on the Sea of 
Okhotsk that surrounded the vast territory that was the Soviet Union.
Until the so-called “détente period” of the Cold War in the early 1970s, Moscow 
officially pursued a foreign policy based on ideological assumptions, conclusions 
and goals that were formulated as ideological principles. The major school of 
Marxist-Leninist thought  in the field of International Relations was the concept 
of historical materialism. The concept predicts the deterministic expansion 
of communism and its culmination in world communism. When the hope for 
Europe as a possible field of Communist expansion was extinguished with the 
Berlin Crisis of 1948-49,10 the Soviet Union began to search for new sinecures 
to actively support the expansion of their worldview in competition with the 
“imperialist West.” To support the “developing world” in its transition to socialism 
and finally communism, the countries of the Eastern Bloc applied the principle 
7 | Halliday, 2005, 124.
8 | Ibid., 98.
9 | In the Middle East, the Soviet Union bordered Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey from east 
to west. Political and ethnic organization of the USSR before 1990, in: Putzger, 2001, 190.
10 | The United States and their allies had clearly expressed that they would not give up their 
sphere of influence in Central Europe during the Berlin Crisis as evidenced by the spectacular 
support of West Berlin with essential supplies by air in 1948/49. Wettig, 1999, 147.
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of “international” or “anti-imperialist solidarity” to their foreign policy. Marx and 
Engel’s writings do not offer much guidance on the topic. Lenin, however, did:
“The Communist International has to formulate and argue for the principle 
that the backward countries can achieve the Soviet order and […] communism 
without going through the capitalist stage - with the support of the proletariat of 
the most progressed countries.”11
In retrospect, the comprehensive ideological approach and the Soviet Union’s 
foreign policy were in constant reciprocal exchange and thus mutually dependent. 
As a consequence, ideology considerably influenced Soviet strategy in the Near 
and Middle East – though it never determined it exclusively. On the one hand, 
Moscow carefully selected its closest allies among the most loyal socialist countries 
of the developing world and focused its attention on the countries of “socialist 
orientation.” The concept “was elaborated as a developmental model based on 
the Soviet system.”12 On the other hand, however, and with regard to mid-term 
considerations, Soviet policy towards the Middle East also has to be considered 
“Realpolitik”: whenever it was deemed politically or economical beneficial, the 
Kremlin did not hesitate to side with conservative and even reactionary regimes.13
Halliday distinguishes between four periods of the Cold War in the Middle East 
that can be used to illustrate the changes in Soviet engagement in the region over 
time.14  During the first phase from 1946 to 1955, the Soviet Union focused its efforts 
on the “non-Arab” north of region, Turkey and Iran, while it “possessed neither 
the will nor the capacity to challenge the [W]est in the Arab world itself.”15 This 
changed profoundly during the second phase from 1955 to 1974. While the United 
Kingdom successively lost ground in the Middle East, the Kremlin expanded its 
sphere of influence. In the early years of the Cold War, Washington considered 
the Soviet Union’s new interest in the Middle East less motivated by “economic 
need or lack of oil resources, but part of a drive to communize the world.”16 This 
assessment was not far off from the truth at the time, as the official policy change 
from Andrei Zhdanov’s “two camps theory” to Nikita Khrushchev’s doctrine of 
“peaceful coexistence” in 1961 indicates.17 This perceived threat was answered by 
Washington with the so-called “Eisenhower Doctrine” of 1957, which aimed “to 
11 | Lenin, Werke, Vol.31, 1959 (1966), 232. 
12 | Shearman, in: Shearman, 1995, 16.
13 | Katz, 1986, 8.
14 | Halliday, 2005, 99.
15 | Halliday, 2005, 99.
16 | Choueri, 2000, 191.
17 | Khrushchev, Nikita S., On Peaceful Coexistence, Moscow, 1961. Kanet, in: Greiner/
Müller, Weber (ed.), 2010, FN 5, 47.
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deter the aggression of ‘international communism’ and ensure ‘the continued 
independence’ of the free nations of the Middle East”18 through economic and 
military assistance. Obviously, Washington included the Middle East into the 
wider frame work of Cold War rivalry – and for the states of the Middle East, it 
was clear that from then on they no longer could avoid taking sides in the conflict.
After some maneuvering, Moscow finally sought strategic alliances with 
the “progressive”19 regimes in the region who pledged themselves to some sort 
of Arab nationalism. The losses in French and British prestige and influence in 
the Middle East following the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War not only helped 
Moscow’s attempt to establish itself as the dominant external actor in the Middle 
East but also allowed the Kremlin to profile itself as the alternative to “Western 
imperialism” and a “major ally of a number of radical Arab nationalist regimes”20 
such as Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and South Yemen – against the “imperialist 
imposition” of the West, but also in opposition to the conservative forces of the 
region. This policy pattern was readily picked up by Moscow’s student, the GDR: 
The Kremlin’s policy explicitly aimed to include coordinated action of the Warsaw 
Pact states under Soviet supervision.21
During this period, Soviet engagement intensified from “influence” to 
“involvement” and “intervention,” as evidenced by, for example, Moscow’s support 
of Egypt’s involvement in the Yemeni Civil War in 1962-63.22 A year before this 
engagement, Nasser had introduced an Egyptian version of socialism.23 This 
“Arab socialism” paired George Antonius’ notion of “Arab nationalism”24 with 
a vague socialist concept based on political instruments. Here Rome Spechler 
identifies a distinctive phase of Soviet policy toward Egypt and the Middle East 
over the period between the two Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973:25 During 
the expansion of their influence from 1955 onward, the USSR further intensified 
its involvement while emphasizing its claim to political and especially military 
control over the Arab states. Beginning in the mid-1960s, developmental aid was 
advanced as a popular tool on both sides of the Cold War rivalry to expand their 
18 | Choueri, 2000, 191.
19 | Choueri, 2000, 192.
20 | Halliday, 2005, 99.
21 | Storckmann rightly decries a lack of sound archival findings on the coordination 
between Moscow and its political orbit of Warsaw Pact states due to lack of access to the 
relevant archives in Moscow: Storckmann, 2012, 38. Nevertheless, archival documents of 
the GDR allow some insights to the processes and thus permit generalized conclusions to 
a cer tain extent. 
22 | Ferris, 2008.
23 | Arabic: al-ishtirāk īyah al-’arabīyah; English: Arab Socialism, see: Hanna/Gardner, 
1966, 77f.
24 | Antonius, (1938) 2000.
25 | Rome Spechler, in: Marantz/Steinberg, 1985, 134f.
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respective sphere of influence. On the Soviet side this approach culminated when 
Leonid Brezhnev announced the approaching victory of the socialist world system 
over the dominant capitalist system in the 1970s.26 Part of this strategy was the 
explicit inclusion of the most able states of the Eastern Bloc to support the Soviet 
Union’s publicized developmental policy in the Global South, most prominently 
the Poland, GDR, and the ČSSR.
1.2  Maneuvering as an Established Actor: Moscow’s Consolidation 
and E xpansion in the Region
“The Soviet Union is now firmly established in the Middle East, and is 
undoubtedly there to stay.”27
(The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969)
After the initial years of establishing the Soviet Union in the Middle East, Moscow’s 
strategy toward the region may be summarized as a Janus-faced approach. The 
support for the revolutionary nationalist movements in the region, foremost those 
with socialist leanings, remained their first priority. Cooperation with “reactionary” 
actors nonetheless was always an option out of pragmatic considerations. Nasser’s 
defeat in the Six-Day War against Israel and his death three years later paved the 
way for a policy change in Cairo toward Moscow under its new leader, Muhammad 
Anwar al-Sadat. In July 1972, al-Sadat demanded the withdrawal of Soviet advisors 
due to Moscow’s refusal to provide more sophisticated weapons in the Arab war 
against Israel.28 In the light of the changes in the superpower relationship toward 
détente, Moscow clearly intended to restrain any violence against Israel.29 Al-
Sadat declared October 31 of the same year the “target date” to remedy this lack of 
military support, otherwise the renewal of the Treaty of Friendship and thus the 
Soviet use of Egyptian port facilities would be at stake.30 However, in April 1973 al-
Sadat announced: “The Russians are providing us with everything that’s possible 
for them to supply. And I am now quite satisfied.”31 When Egypt finally attacked 
Israel on Yom Kippur in 1973, Washington considered the Soviet involvement an 
infringement of the détente.32
26 | Hakhnazarov, Georgij, 1974, in: Kanet, in: Greiner/Müller, Weber (ed.), 2010, FN 5, 
46 and 51.
27 | Hunter, 1969, in: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), 127.
28 | Halliday, 2005, 119.
29 | Rome Spechler, in: Marantz/Steinberg, 1985, 135.
30 | Ibid. 142.
31 | A saber rattles in Cairo, Interview by Arnaud de Borchgrave with Anwar al-Sadat, in: 
Newsweek April 9 1973.
32 | Quandt, 1973.
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A final judgment on Moscow’s intentions is neither possible nor necessary 
here. What has to be pointed out is the delicate political dilemma of the Soviet 
leadership: While Moscow had agreed to significant steps toward a détente with 
Washington, it still had to prevent military deployment close to its borders and 
uphold alliances with the Arab world.33 As mentioned above, Moscow’s attitude 
of restraint before 1973 may be considered the logical consequence of Moscow’s 
détente policy, and Moscow’s policy change a result of political pressure by Cairo. 
On the other hand, Soviet maneuvering might also be the outcome of a tactical 
move of Cairo and Moscow. Either this is not the case, or Cairo was able to attain 
the upper hand in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship in the end. Undeniably, Egypt, 
the dominant regional power, left the Soviet side and turned toward Washington 
and the West in the mid-1970s. This policy change in Cairo culminated in the 
Camp David Agreement of 1979, which was followed by the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt in February 1982.34 Al-Sadat had 
recognized Israel as a state and thus – from the perspective of the rest of Arab 
world – had accepted Israel’s existence, its policies, and given up the Palestinian 
cause. Egypt was isolated among the Arab states.
Moscow was quick to stigmatize its former ally by the Nile as a henchman 
of imperialism and develop a full-fledged argument in accordance with Marxist-
Leninist ideology. This position was integrated into the GDR’s official reading of 
politics in the Middle East. The GDR’s Institute of International Relations fully 
agreed with Moscow on the fact that Egypt “in fact had turned away from the 
Arab Front [and…] “had broken with the commitments of the Arab League. […The 
Camp David agreement] had weakened the anti-imperialist alliance and opposed 
cooperation with the Soviet Union.”35 Socialist commentators are quick to interpret 
the participation of the United Sates in the process of approximation between 
Egypt and Israel, as well as Washington’s investment in the Middle East conflict 
in general, as solely motivated by self-interest. This stance is vividly summarized 
by the term “separate policy.”36 The quoted East German analysis directly links all 
violent conflicts in the region with this “separate policy,” as it “had destroyed Arab 
unity,”37 e.g. the Lebanon War of 1982, and emphasizes the condemnation of this 
policy by the Communist and Workers’ parties of Bulgaria, the ČSSR, Hungary, 
Poland, the USSR, and the GDR on November 25 in 1978.
This example illustrates how Soviet policies and activities regularly engaged a 
number of other Eastern Bloc states, most prominently the ČSSR, Hungary, Poland, 
and the GDR.  As involvement in the Middle East increased, competition between 
33 | Halliday reminds us of the connection between the Kremlin’s fear of a U.S. American 
missile deployment in Turkey and the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Halliday, 2005, 125. 
34 | Peace Treaty Egypt and Israel 1979, in: Jaeger/Tophoven (Ed.) 2011, 182f; Hourani, 2003, 504.
35 | Hänisch et al, 1982, 35.
36 | 
37 | 




the states increased as well, for their prestige in the host country, their position 
among the other states of the Warsaw Pact, and above all, Soviet benevolence. 
Interestingly, the GDR pleaded for an improvement of the competitive situation in 
early 1978.38 Regardless, it had become clear to Moscow that a coordinated strategy 
was needed to avoid further “friction losses” within its own ranks. In December 
1978, the Committee of the Ministers of Defense of the Warsaw Pact39 put forward 
a draft on coordinated engagement with regard to military support according to 
“proletarian internationalism.” About one year later, during the 12th meeting of 
the Ministers of Defense, the states of the Warsaw Pact finally agreed on the basic 
principles of coordination for military relations with the Global South.40 During 
that time the vice-minister of defense of the USSR listed the focal countries of 
the Global South: Ethiopia, Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Libya, 
Algeria, and South Yemen. These efforts clearly not only reached the mentioned 
Arab states, but also had a certain impact on their willingness to cooperate: Only 
two years earlier, the leading parties of four of the enumerated states together with 
the Palestine Liberation Organization had announced a political merger as the 
“National Front” in the Tripoli Declaration of December 1977.41
“Of the eighteen Arab states only one […] was a full supporter of the Soviet 
Union, embracing the theory of ‘scientific socialism’ and modelling itself on the 
Soviet pattern of political and economic development.”42
(Fred Halliday, a Marxist scholar of Middle Eastern Studies)
Why and how did one of the least significant countries in the Arab world become 
Moscow’s closest ally in the region? One may say that in the end there simply did 
not exist any better options for the Kremlin. During the Ethiopian-Somali War, 
South Yemen served as a military shipping center, but also offered active support 
in the fighting. In the process, Moscow understandably lost Somalia’s political 
trust and its naval base in Somali Berbera accordingly. The radical regime in Aden 
successfully replaced Cairo and Berbera as Moscow’s new unofficial military 
38 | NVA-General Theodor Hoffmann to Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitri 
Fjodorowitsch Ustinov, February 21 1978, in: BArch, AZN 30552, Bl. 14f, quoted in: 
Storckmann, 2012, 170. Hoffmann had been trained in the USSR and advanced to Minster 
of Defense of the GDR in 1989, Müller-Enbergs/Wielghos/Hoffmann (Ed.), 2000, 369.
39 | Protokoll 11. Sitzung Komitee der Verteidigungsminister TS des Warschauer Vertrages 
vom 4 bis 7.12 1978, Ost-Berlin, in: BArch DVW 1/71035, 318-357.
40 | Protokoll 12. Sitzung Komitee der Verteidigungsminister TS des Warschauer Vertrages 
vom 2 bis 6.12 1979, Warschau, in: BArch DVW 1/71036, sine pagina.
41 | The Tripoli Declaration, 2 to 5 December 1977, in: Letter dated 5 December 1977 from 
the Permanent representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addresses 
to the Secretary-General, Annex, A/32/411, 6 December 1977, I; Halliday, 1990, 155.
42 | Ibid., 126.
A Spectre is Haunting Arabia – How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen
165
stronghold in the region.43 This cooperation did surprise some observes of the 
time, but its roots stretched back some time.
The Kremlin’s interest in the Red Sea had surfaced as early as the late 
1960s. Unofficial support for the PFLOAG,44 a revolutionary group of the Arab 
Peninsula, started in 1968 and became official in 1971.45 The PFLOAG was 
closely allied with Aden and aimed to overthrow the conservative rulers of 
the area, first and foremost those of its country of origin, Oman. The support 
of PFLOAG is a revelatory example for the long-term nature of Moscow’s 
regional strategy in the Middle East.46 Soviet engagement was never direct 
and remained mediated, usually carried out by two levels of middlemen: On 
one level there were its closer allies, like the GDR. These allies implemented 
Moscow’s policy as messengers to the second level of middlemen, in this 
case the PDRY.47 The second level then executed the mediated policy, which 
meant direct support of PFLOAG through training and equipment. The use of 
political henchmen was part of a “low-key strategy,” used whenever Moscow 
wanted to be able to deny its active involvement.48 Soviet restraint in the mid-
1970s is especially noticeable after relations with Cairo had started to taper off. 
Due to the evolving détente, Moscow acted carefully with regard to any support 
for revolutionary movements in the region, even with regard to the PLO and its 
liberation case against Israel.
The third phase of the Cold War in the Middle East, from 1974 to 1985, saw the 
peak of Soviet influence in the region, as well as its subsequent decline of power. 
Despite the loss of its major ally in Cairo, Moscow went to great lengths to remain 
among the major regional powers by fostering old alliances and forging new 
ones. Meanwhile, Soviet interests switched from long-term involvement to “more 
immediate benefits.”49 In the early 1980s, Moscow could rely on the Ba’athist 
regimes in Syria and Iraq, both located near Soviet territy. Libya replaced Egypt as a 
43 | Halliday, 1990, 204f.
44 | Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG).
45 | Halliday, 1990, 184.
46 | In the mid-1960s the Dhofar Liberation Front located at the Oman-South Yemeni 
border, changed its name to PFLO, Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and again in 
1968 to PFLOAG, Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf. Chubin, Adelphi Paper 
No.157, 1980, in: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (Ed.), 301.
47 | The GDR Afro-Asiatic Committee of Solidarity was active in developing relations to the 
PFLOAG throughout the 1970s, in: Bericht über den Besuch des Ministers für Auswärtige 
Angelegenheiten der VDRJ, Mohammed Saleh Aulaqi in der DDR in der Zeit vom 1. bis 
5.Februar 1972, PA AA MfAA C 156276, 61; Brehony, 2013, 77 and 81.
48 | Chubin, Adelphi Paper No.157, 1980, in: The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (Ed.), 302.
49 | Yodfat, 1983, 115.
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close ally by the Mediterranean Sea and in Ethiopia and South Yemen the Kremlin 
had positioned itself around the Horn of Africa. Nonetheless, the high times of 
Soviet prestige and presence in the Middle East were coming to an end. Moscow’s 
allies in the region, though loyal and determinate, for the bigger part were among 
the poorest, politically weakest, and most isolated in the region. Meanwhile, 
the Soviet Union began to face the first severe economic difficulties of its own, 
forcing Moscow to cut its developmental spending and focus on economically 
more beneficial investments.50 This withdrawal in engagement was officially 
explained by a policy change toward the Global South, but also toward the states 
of the Warsaw Pact. As a kind of “empowering policy,” the Kremlin under Mikhail 
Gorbachev gradually sought to create a perception that it was loosening its grip on 
its dependent allies. This policy change was meant to firstly ease the economic and 
political burden created by its ideologically motivated policy and secondly to assure 
the U.S. and the West of Moscow’s willingness for détente.
Half a decade earlier, Moscow had become involved in a conflict on its very 
own doorstep and paid a high price in trust and prestige among the Arab states. 
In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had intervened on behalf of the radical regime. 
Shortly thereafter, the Iraq-Iran war broke out and complicated matters for the 
next decade, as Moscow was not able to openly support Iraq. In Afghanistan, the 
Kremlin was ensnared in a vicious war it could not win – a “bleeding wound”51 for 
the Soviet Union in the Middle East – while internationally it faced an unsolvable 
dilemma, as Westad summarizes:
“From early 1986 onwards, there was considerable tension between Gorbachev’s 
basically Marxist understanding of Third World events on the one hand, and his 
wish for détente with the United States on the other. […] The Americans wanted 
to see the Soviets begin to give in [with regard to Third World expansionism] 
before other bilateral issues could be solved.”52
When in 1988 the Soviet Union finally withdrew from Afghanistan, it was not 
only considered a defeat of Soviet Third World engagement at the time, but in 
retrospect can be considered the end of the Cold War in the region.53
Despite some preludes after the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, it was 
not until the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War that the Cold War fully encompassed 
the Middle East and with it its major conflict, the Arab-Israeli dispute. Hence, 
when reconsidering Halliday’s four phases, one may conclude that the region 
was quite important for the Cold War and vice-versa during the second and third 
phase, between the Suez Crisis and the decrease of Soviet involvement in the mid-
50 | Kanet, in: Greiner/Müller/Weber, 2010, 56 and 59.
51 | Gorbachev, XXVII CPSU Congress 1986, in: Westad, 2005, 371. 
52 | Westad, 2005, 371.
53 | Kanet, in: Greiner/Müller/Weber, 2010, 58.
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eighties.54 During that time, the Soviet Union presented itself as a major, and at 
times as the dominant external actor in the region. While its activities were clearly 
motivated by geopolitical considerations of national security, the Kremlin included 
the states of the Middle East into its wider ideology as “national democratic” states 
or countries with a ”socialist orientation” under the label of “anti-imperialist 
solidarity.” Throughout its engagement in the region, the Kremlin aimed to 
distinguish itself as the guarantor of “security and sovereignty of all states of [the 
Middle East],”55 while condemning the United States’ strategies as power- and 
interest-driven. And while Lenin’s writings were regularly used to explain and 
justify this ideological approach to the Cold War in general and the Middle East 
in particular, Soviet statements accordingly were used as claims of truth by East 
German functionaries and analysts alike.56
Moscow’s official reading of politics in the Middle East dominated the GDR’s 
foreign policy approach throughout East Germany’s existence as a separate state. 
Not surprisingly, the Kremlin’s high times of engagement in the region from the 
1970s to the early 1980s coincide with the GDR’s most active phase in the Middle 
East. In the following section, the GDR’s foreign policy activities in the Arab world, 
and sometimes in other countries of the wider Middle East, will be sketched, 
oscillating between the two major determinants of East Berlin’s foreign policy, 
Moscow and Bonn. Based on the assumption that indeed there existed an East 
Germany “policy” toward these countries that deserves the label, decisive policy-
turns are pointed out, while sketching the emergence of new fields of engagement 
to support the above statement of a coherence between Soviet and East German 
levels of engagement in the region.
2. ThE GDR’S “POLICY OF RECOGNITION” TR ANSL ATED TO ThE 
MIDDLE E AST
The GDR’s room for maneuvering in the Middle East was sharply staked out by 
characteristics and actions of the Federal German Republic. However, the region 
turned out to be politically rather welcoming for East Berlin. In combination 
with the increase of political agency on the side of the Arab states as described by 
Halliday,57 this resulted in what Das Gupta considers the East and West German 
“race for the Third World’s favor”58 in the Arab world. Bonn could not be as close 
to the Arab world as it might have wished and left certain gaps or at least room 
54 | Halliday even states that as early as 1980 the bloc confrontation was supplanted by 
a regional contention, the Iraq-Iran-War, as the dominant conflict. Halliday, 2005, 100.
55 | XXVI. Party Congress of the CPSU 1981, in: Hänisch et al, 1982, 46.
56 | Lenin, Vol.22. 1959 (1960), 265 quoted in Hänisch et al, 1982, 44.
57 | Halliday, 2005, 98.
58 | Das Gupta, in: Wengst/Wentker, 2008, 132.
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for political maneuvering in the “Arab world” - more than in other regions in 
the world. The restraint on West German policy that created these gaps for East 
Berlin was the German-Israeli relationship: While Bonn’s policy in the Middle 
East always had to balance between the Arab countries and the Jewish state, East 
Berlin’s relations with Tel Aviv were non-existent until the mid-1980s.59 West 
Germany had accepted the responsibility as the “Third Reich’s” successor in 
title which meant that it had also acquiesced to the moral, political, and financial 
obligations toward the Jewish people. In addition to that, the FRG’s relationship 
with Israel became one of the major indicators of West Germany’s metamorphosis 
in shedding National Socialism and militarism once and for all. As a consequence, 
any rapprochement to the Arab-Palestinian cause of Bonn conflicted with Israel’s 
interests, endangered West German-Israeli relations, and with it, West Germany’s 
reconciliation with its past.60
The GDR benefited directly from this West German dilemma: The SED 
leadership severed its connections to the past and introduced a foreign policy 
of “Marxist connotation.”  The SED leadership explicitly dissociated itself from 
Germany’s recent history, including any responsibility for the atrocities of 
the National Socialist regime. This policy decision of East Berlin was justified 
by differentiating between the Jewish people and the State of Israel. Based on 
this presumption, East Germany denied all responsibilities for Israel as a state. 
Thus, the GDR simply rejected compensation payments demanded by Israel 
for suffered injustice until its very last months of existence.61 Ideologically, the 
separation between the people and state of Israel also allowed the GDR to brand 
Israel as part of the “imperialistic-antidemocratic West“62 and thus an adversary 
to peace and the self-determination of the Palestinian people. This policy move 
with regard to Israel was to become one of the few relevant political “advantages” 
of the GDR in the international sphere over the Federal Republic. Without the 
inherited responsibility for the political actions of “Nazi Germany,” the German 
twin excluded the Holocaust from its anti-fascist interpretation of history.63
59 | On East and West German relations with Israel see: Meining, 2002, 269; Timm, 1997a, 25f.
60 | This was not about to change before the first tentative steps of the Arab-Israeli peace 
process of the early 1990s.  
61 | First concrete steps had not been instated before spring 1989. Brief des DDR-
Außenministers, Oskar Fischer, an Ministerpräsident Hans Modrow über die Aufnahme 
diplomatischer Beziehungen zu Israel vom 15.Februar 1990, BArch/DO4, Nr. 1549 and 
Ministerratsbeschluß über die Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen der DDR zu Israel am 
13.Juni 1990, BArch, DC 20, I/3-1991, in: Timm, 1997b, 587; 590 and Trigor, Yehoshua, 
Untenable position for the DDR, in: Jerusalem Post, May 7th, 1991; First talks had been 
held as early as 1974, in: Meining, 2002, 381.
62 | Zhdanov, Andrej, September 22 1947.
63 | Hartewig, in: Zuckermann, 2022, 56.
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2.1 East Berlin Turns from Tel Aviv and toward the Arab world
When the GDR officially turned away from Tel Aviv64 in 1956, its new foreign 
policy approach clearly followed Soviet logic:
“The struggle of the Arab people against imperialism and Israeli aggression is 
an integral part of the struggle between the forces of freedom and socialism on 
the one hand and international imperialism on the other. In this strategically 
important region, rich in oil, the growing national liberation movement and social 
progress cause the hatred of imperialists and oil monopolies. They conspire 
against this movement, unleash wars, and launch aggressive attacks.”65
As a consequence, all the target countries of the GDR’s early policies were led by 
strong leftist liberation movements. These were considered promising candidates for 
“socialist development” and either had already acquired or were striving for a leading 
role in the region. Clearly, East Berlin was hoping for international recognition in 
the Arab world. Even before the GDR gained formal international sovereignty in 
1955, East Berlin had initiated first contact with Egypt, its major partner country in 
the Arab world until the early 1970s: By 1953 the GDR had already established a trade 
mission in Cairo.66 Two years later, the first visits by an East German minister to 
countries outside the Eastern Bloc were to India and Egypt.67 In 1958 Egypt was the 
first country to receive financial aid from the SED regime and in 1961 the GDR was 
the seventh-largest donor state to Cairo, though Western Germany ranked third.68 
During these years, trade and cultural agreements were conducted with Egypt and 
Syria, followed by trade agreements with Lebanon and Sudan. After the downfall of 
the monarchy in Baghdad in 1958, Iraq became another focal country. Accordingly, 
it comes as no surprise that the “German-Arab Society” became the first East 
German Society of Friendship in 1958.69 These early contacts in the Arab world and 
East Berlin’s reputation of advocating for “liberation movements” were combined 
to put forth an international image of the GDR as a “peace state.” This image 
probably motivated several of these movements to turn to East Berlin for support, 
i.e., military equipment. After an early phase of aloofness to these requests, East-
Berlin decided to get involved. The actual reasons for this policy change have not 
64 | In December 1955 East Berlin rejected Tel Aviv’s aide-mémoire that asked for redress, 
Meining, 2002, 257f; Also see: Timm, 1997, 25; 34f.
65 | Int. Beratung der Kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien, Moskau, 1969, in: Kleines 
Politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 561-565.
66 | Dok zur AP der DDR I, 1954, 505f.
67 | Dok zur AP der DDR Republik V, 1958, 279.
68 | Wippel, 1996, 17.
69 | Wentker, 2007, 55.
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yet been brought to light. Nonetheless, Moscow ordered the SED to act.70 In 1965, 
the Ministerratsvorsitzende Willy Stoph assigned Foreign Minister Otto Winzer 
to draft a “fundamental resolution” on the support of the African and Arab peoples 
in their struggle of liberation with “non-civilian materials”:
“Any achievement of these peoples’ struggle of liberation will have a positive 
effect on the anti-imperialist attitude of other African an Arab states. By 
supporting these  liberation movements, the GDR will improve its position with 
the progressive forces in Africa and the Arab world and thus promote the roll-
back of Western imperialist influence.”71
The Politbüro quickly followed suit.72 With this, the NVA, the Volkspolizei,73 and 
the MfS were ordered to sift through their stocks to find equipment to be sent 
to the GDR’s “partner countries.” Coordination, transport, and delivery were 
put in the hands of the MfAA and the MfS. Even though this directive appears 
to be quite specific, Storckmann rightly considers it an “indicatory decision,”74 
which profoundly shaped the character of the GDR’s engagement in the Global 
South. Furthermore he verifies the interdependence between military exports 
and the GDR’s “policy of recognition” in the 1960s.75 Accordingly, other decisions 
on military engagement followed, like military training and visits by military 
delegations.76
2.2 The Role of Anti-Semitism in the GDR’s Middle East Policy
The Soviet position toward Israel had been muddled from the very beginning:
“Moscow had hoped to extend its influence on the young state of Israel, but 
was disappointed when Israel emerged as a democratic country modelled 
on the West: [In the early 1950s] Soviet foreign policy was turning away from 
Israel and more and more toward supporting and exploiting Arab nationalist 
movements.”77
70 | Storckmann, 2012, 109.
71 | Otto Winzer and Willy Stoph, May 28 1965, in: BArch, DC 20/13001, Bl.28-33. Also 
see: Storckmann, 2012, 108.
72 | Politbürositzung January 10 1967, Annex 5, in: BArch SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2/1093.
73 | English: The People’s Police.
74 | Storckmann, 2012, 109.
75 | Based on his analysis of documents and minutes of the Ministry of Defense and 
Gerhard Weiß, Storckmann, 2012, 123ff.
76 | Storckmann names the exchange of military delegations in the early to mid-70s, such 
as the exchange of delegations with Syria, Iraq and Egypt in 1971, Storckmann, 2012, 113.
77 | Thomson, Gerald E., 1967, in: Ostow, 1990, 54.
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Arab anti-Zionism was a dependable link between the Arab world and the states 
of the Warsaw Pact. “Chauvinist Zionism,”78 Judaism, and the Jewish state were 
identified as and used to form a homogeneous opponent of the “just cause” of the 
PLO and the “Arab struggle.”79 The SED was able to use this pivotal conflict in 
the region for its own ends. Regularly, East Berlin’s struggle for existence against 
“imperialist Germany” was equated to the Palestinian fight for self-determination. 
This “policy of fraternization” against the “Washington-Bonn-Tel Aviv axis”80 
included straightforward anti-Semitism81 and turned out to be an extremely 
fruitful and sustainable strategy for the GDR in the Arab world.
Over several years, the obvious focus on Israel by West Germany escalated 
to the severance of diplomatic relations by the majority of Arab states: When the 
actual extent of a West German-Israeli arms trade came to light in 1964, the 
new chancellor Erhard’s prestige in the Arab world was substantially damaged. 
Naturally, East German representatives did everything possible to claim this 
diplomatic vacuum for themselves. In the same year, Egypt’s invitation for Walter 
Ulbricht to visit Cairo as a Head of State was a spectacular example for an apparent 
ascendancy of the GDR in the international realm.82 For the GDR’s population, 
the ostentatious reception of Walter Ulbricht “of course was a highlight. It was an 
official state visit with all the bells and whistles,“83 remembers Fritz Balke, Vice-
Consul in Yemen’s north from in 1969.
However, one has to consider Cairo’s explicit fraternization with East Berlin a 
warning for Bonn rather than an actual commitment to the GDR: As a reaction 
to Ulbricht’s visit, West Germany established diplomatic relations with Israel 
in May 1965 while ten Arab states terminated their diplomatic relations with 
Bonn in return.84 From East Berlin’s point of view this should have been the 
straw to break the camel’s back and ought to have led to the GDR’s international 
recognition. But Nasser remained hesitant toward the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. Nonetheless, East Berlin’s hopes for a final breakthrough and the “en 
78 | Timm, 1997a, 24.
79 | Timm, 1997b, 395ff.
80 | The Egyptian newspaper al-ğumhur īya on Bonn’s credit for Israel in September 1969, 
in: Neues Deutschland vom 2.Oktober 1969, S.7.
81 | Eckard, Gabriele, The GDR and Anti-Semitism?: A Comparison of Jan Koplowitz’ Novel 
Bohemia, mein Schicksal (1979) and Horst Seemann‘s Film Hotel Polan und seine Gäste 
(1981), in: Shofar: 2008, 86.
82 | Blasius, 1998.
83 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
84 | Compare Ludwig Erhard’s speech on Germany’s Near East Policy at the German 
Parliament on February 17 1965. Excerpt in: Auswärtiges Amt (ed.), 1989, 165; Also see: 
Gerlach, 2006, 48.
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bloc recognition by the Arab countries”85 remained high, but it took another five 
years of diplomatic “courtship”86 by the GDR’s diplomats in Egypt and Syria before 
the Arab states finally gave in. Until then, East Berlin could do nothing more 
than to live with the status of relations with these two leading states as it was. 
As a consequence, the GDR had begun to direct its efforts to the less powerful 
but possibly more receptive actors of the region – such as the two Yemens – and 
continued its incremental “policy of recognition” with new enthusiasm.
3. ThE GDR AND ThE MIDDLE E AST DuRING ThE “hIGh TIMES OF 
DIPLOMACY”
Against East German hopes, the “wave of recognition” did not simply sweep over 
the Arab world: “Most of the Arab states [North Yemen among them] did not 
establish diplomatic relations before the ‘Grundlagenvertrag’ was signed in 1971.”87 
However, in May 1969 the “breakthrough in international diplomatic arena”88 
finally was within reach. The radio channel “Free Europe,” financed by the U.S. 
Congress, speculated about the visit of Iraq’s foreign minister to the Soviet Union 
and East Germany in March: “[S]teps for the deepening of cooperation in political, 
economic and cultural fields”89 might have been taken there. Kuztnetzov’s 
discussion with PDRY President al-Sha’abi in June 1969 completes the picture:90 
Even though Bonn had offered significant financial aid to Baghdad to prevent Iraq 
from recognizing East Germany, Moscow apparently was willing to offer at least 
as much.
Without doubt, the Kremlin’s political and financial insistence played the major 
role in the last mile toward East Germany’s recognition. In May 1969
“Foreign Minister Gromyko supposedly expressed that any fur ther arms delivery 
by the Soviet Union [to Egypt] depended on the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with the GDR.”91
85 | Ibid., 330.
86 | Reinhardt, 1969, 331.
87 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
88 | Miller, 1969.
89 | Gould, 1950.
90 | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Genossen Kiesewetter mit dem sowjetischen 
Gesandten, Genosse K.P. Kusnezow, June 11 1969, in: PA AA MfAA C 1223/71, 67-71.
91 | Helwig, 1969, 894 and Instructions for the Soviet ambassador in Cairo, May 16th 
1969, in: BArch SAPMO, DY 30/3524, 108-111, quoted in: Wentker, 2007, 285.
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In June, the SED was informed that “[T]he Soviet representation to the UN is 
working toward the diplomatic recognition of the GDR in collaboration with 
missions of other countries.”92 This included the PDRY, which continued to 
advocate for the GDR’s membership to the UN. Thus, the Arab world indeed 
played its role to increase pressure on West Germany’s “Hallstein Doctrine.” A 
prime example is the case of South Yemen, as Chapter 10 of this book describes 
in greater detail.
After the “wave of diplomatic recognition,” which had been building up since 
1969 and reached full force after the signing of the “Grundlagenvertrag,” the 
GDR’s foreign policy did change in a profound way, transforming from its “policy 
of recognition” to a “policy of self-assertion.” Accordingly, East Germany’s policy 
toward the Middle East also was rather “continued by other means” than a radical 
breach. East Berlin explicitly built on its first decade of foreign policy making 
by keeping and even expanding its ideological focus. In 1974 the SED included 
the “support for anti-imperialistic struggle” around the world as introduced by 
its new constitution.93 The principle of “anti-imperialist solidarity” as a policy 
directive became centrally coordinated by a new commission of the Politbüro 
three years later.94 On the occasion of the XIth and also final Party Congress of the 
SED, Honecker explicitly included the continuation of the GDR’s active support 
policy of “International Solidarity” toward the “liberated states” of Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America in their “struggle for peace and social progress” but also toward 
those people who were still in the middle of this “struggle.”95 This move toward 
central coordination of “anti-imperialist solidarity,” and thus a comprehensive 
developmental strategy in the late 1980s, not surprisingly coincides with Soviet-
led coordination for military relations of the Eastern Bloc with the Global South.96
From then on, East Berlin’s foreign policy expanded and transformed significantly. 
The GDR’s political coming of age followed its internal consolidation after the 
closure of the border in 1961 and coincided with a period of economic growth. This 
92 | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Genossen Kiesewetter mit dem sowjetischen 
Gesandten, Genosse K.P. Kusnezow, June 11 1969, in: PA AA MfAA C 1223/71, 67-71.
93 | Constitution of the GDR of 1968, Version October 7 1974, Ar t.23. 
94 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 36.
95 | Bericht des ZK der SED an den XI. Parteitag der SED, April 17 1986, 41ff, in: Protokoll 
der Verhandlungen des XI: Parteitags im Palast der Republik in Berlin 17. bis 21. April 
1986, Berlin (Ost), 1986; Protokoll Nr.23/87 der Sitzung des Politbüros, June 9 1987, 
BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2/2224; Ordnung für die Koordinierung und Abrechnung der 
Hilfeleistungen der DDR gegenüber Entwicklungsländern, in ökonomischer Hinsicht weniger 
entwickelten sozialistischen Ländern, Beschlüsse des Sekretariats, Oktober 1988, in: 
BArch, SAPMO, DY 34/13551.  
96 | Protokoll 12. Sitzung Komitee der Verteidigungsminister des Warschauer Vertrages 
vom 2 bis 6.12 1979, Warschau, in: BArch DVW 1/71036, sine pagina.
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translated into a new self-confidence, both within the Eastern Bloc and toward 
the international community of states. East Berlin became more active as part of 
Moscow’s international strategies and policy making but also aimed to fill its new 
room for political maneuvering with own initiatives. Having its own case in mind, 
East Germany tried to emphasize the “right to self-determination” internationally 
and support movements and states following this principle. For example the 
GDR had been one of the first states of the Eastern Bloc to contact and establish 
diplomatic relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1969.97 
Not only among the states of the Warsaw Pact did East Berlin position itself as 
Moscow’s “junior partner.”98 The states of the Global South, first and foremost in 
Africa and the Middle East, also began to perceive the GDR as a confidant of the 
powerful Soviet Union.99
After international recognition, several of the countries of “socialist orientation” 
received a strategic “upgrade” by the GDR. These countries were supposed to follow a 
“socialist path of development”100 and in the Arab world they accounted for about ninety 
per cent of East German trade with the region.101 However, most of the countries of 
“socialist orientation” were located in sub-Saharan Africa and thus the GDR’s foreign 
policy focus moved away from its former major partners in the Middle East to provide 
more substantial support to Ethiopia, Ghana and Sudan.102 After the sixth conference 
of non-aligned countries in Havana in 1979, the GDR began to strive for “Treaties 
of Friendship” with states following a “socialist path of development”103 – a form of 
bilateral bond which had been reserved for the socialist states of the Eastern Bloc.
However, East German international recognition coincided with new challenges 
for the small country emerging from its relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Significant changes to the GDR’s external economic determinants were caused by 
Moscow’s inability to uphold the GDR’s oil supply coupled with mounting difficulties 
of the GDR’s economy.104 Both trends significantly affected East Germany’s activities 
in the Middle East with regard to oil imports and arms exports to acquire foreign 
currency. And while the former can be considered a success, the latter cannot. To 
secure its energy supply, East Berlin had to develop new strategies, among them 
canvassing for alternative oil suppliers. Hence, it was a stringent foreign policy 
incentive to improve relations with oil exporting countries – most importantly the 
97 | Maeke, 2012; Wippel, 1996, 29.
98 | Bock, in: Bock/Muth/Schwiesau, 2004, 235; Muth, 2000, 27. 
99 | Bücking, 101.
100 | Wippel, 1996, 28.
101 | Wippel, 1996, 32.
102 | See for example: Schleicher/Schleicher, 1993.
103 | The East German Treaties of Friendship followed the Soviet model, for example 
East-Berlin’s Treaty with Aden in 1979, in: Jemen (Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche 
Vereinbarungen der DDR, 1987, 140-1.
104 | Wippel, 1996, 30. 
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OPEC states.105 In the early 1980s East Berlin tried to increase its foreign currency 
reserve without being detected by Moscow through the international trade company 
IMES. It worked in the greatest secrecy and in doing so was able to ignore East 
German foreign policy principles. Former Vice-Foreign Minister Winter comments: 
“I’ve always considered it problematic that questions of arms deals mostly were kept 
secret and lacked sufficient control.”106 Regardless of this secrecy, a high number 
of IMES’ business transactions simply turned out to be inefficient with a higher 
cost than revenue.107 All in all, the extremely pressing need for foreign currency 
and oil during the 1980s created a “double standard” in East German international 
behavior. More often than not, pragmatic considerations overruled ideological 
principles, a characteristic which similar to Soviet “realpolitik” in the region. Also, 
this “double standard” challenged one of the major foreign policy strategies of the 
GDR in the Near and Middle East, the “strategy of the honest broker.”
4. ME ANS TO AN END: ThE GDR’S FOREIGN POLICY STR ATEGIES 
IN ThE AR AB WORLD
“The imperialist countries aim to subvert and push back both the progressive 
development of some Arabic states and the anti-imperialist attitude and non-
alignment-policy of most members of the Arab League. They exploit the discord 
among the Arab states and do not refrain from political, economic, and military 
coercion.”108
(The GDR’s Little Political Dictionary on the Arab League)
For the most part, even analysts who acknowledge the existence of legitimate East 
German foreign policy refuse to speak of coherent East German policies or even 
strategies. Wippel argues that “[f]oreign relations never exceeded single strategies, 
as they were not merged into a long-term, coherent Near East and trade policy.”109 
Siebs, on the other hand, considers East German developmental policy a “provisional 
arrangement.”110 According to him, the GDR’s decision-makers tended toward 
spontaneous actions, especially after gaining international recognition, while they 
often ignored the official foreign policy decisions and concepts. In addition to that, 
there never existed a dedicated administrative unit, or budget for development 
policy, let alone a separate ministry. Nevertheless, Siebs’ judgment concedes the 
existence of such a policy, albeit a provisional one. And indeed, the GDR did opt for 
105 | Wippel, 1996, 30 and 32.
106 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2013.
107 | Buthmann, 2004, 22.
108 | Kleines politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 499.
109 | Wippel, 1996, 6f.
110 | Siebs, 1999, 100.
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a comprehensive developmental strategy in its final decade. Part of this development 
was due to international pressure by the World Bank and the United Nations to 
present reliable data on developmental aid and technical assistance, but it also had 
become a pressing issue due to East Germany’s economic problems.
In 1977 the Politbüro decided on the formation of a “Commission for the 
Developing Countries.”111 A decade later, this commission provided the 
Politbüro with a draft on the “results and efficiency of the scientific-technical 
cooperation of the GDR with the developing countries” and in October 1988 
Gerhard Schürer, Head of the Planning Commission, presented a paper which 
aimed to incorporate developmental engagement into the GDR’s foreign policy 
and trade policy.112 During the “last year of the GDR,” its development policy also 
was a topic at the grassroots roundtable on democratization held in February 
1990. This also included the emergence of the first truly non-governmental 
organizations in the field, the “Society for Solidarity in Development Co-
operation” and the “Society for Development Policy.” However, neither the 
concepts of the late SED nor the ideas of the newly emerging civil society actors 
were put into practice – time was running out for the SED regime, but also for 
the GDR itself. In October 1990, Bonn’s Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
(BMZ) incorporated the GDR’s aid program. “[F]rom then on, only those 
projects were to be continued which conformed to the development principles 
of the former West Germany.”113 East German foreign policy had missed its 
“window of opportunity” to develop and enforce a full-f ledged policy toward 
the Global South by a hair’s breadth.
However, and even though East Berlin did not implement a coherent foreign 
policy concept for the “developing countries” or the Middle East,114 dominant 
policy strategies toward the Middle East can be identified in retrospect. A big part 
111 | German: Kommission für Entwicklungsländer, “to coordinate the economic, cultural, 
scientific-technical and non-civilian activities in the countries of Asia, Africa and the Arab 
world,” in: Beschluß des Politbüros, Protokoll Nr. 49/77, December 20 1977, in: BArch, 
SAPMO, DY JI 2/2 1705; also see: Döring, 1999, 44ff.
112 | Bericht des ZK der SED an den XI. Parteitag der SED, April 17 1986, 41ff, in: 
Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XI. Parteitags im Palast der Republik in Berlin 17. Bis 21. 
April 1986, Berlin (Ost), 1986; Protokoll Nr.23/87 der Sitzung des Politbüros, June 9 1987, 
BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2/2224; Ordnung für die Koordinierung und Abrechnung der 
Hilfeleistungen der DDR gegenüber Entwicklungsländern, in ökonomischer Hinsicht weniger 
entwickelten sozialistischen Ländern, Beschlüsse des Sekretariats, Oktober 1988, in: 
BArch, SAPMO, DY 34/13551.  
113 | Howell, 1994, 320.
114 | The proposal to formulate a comprehensive concept among the members of the 
“Mittag Commission” had been declined in 1978, due to the lack of concepts for the 
individual countries. Möller, 2004, 40.
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of these were born of necessity to live and work with the strong competitor West 
Germany: Bonn’s successful moves to keep the GDR in international isolation 
forced East German foreign policy personnel and SED functionaries alike to 
become creative with regard to their foreign policy strategies. Muth, for example, 
considers the GDR’s activities in Africa “active, at times [even] innovative.”115 The 
following subsection identifies three pivotal East German strategies toward the 
developing world and the Middle East.
4.1 Toward Recognition: A “Strateg y of Focus and Low-Profile”
From 1959 –63116 the GDR established a strategy to attain international recognition, 
labelled here as a “strategy of focus and low-profile.”117 The Hallstein Doctrine was 
meant to be overcome through modest but persistent steps, especially by the “third 
sphere” of the foreign policy apparatus, i.e., society and its mass organizations, 
while the GDR’s resources had to be concentrated on a small number of selected 
countries. By working below official diplomatic channels, especially in countries of 
little interest for Bonn, East Germany aimed to initiate relations through personal 
connections and social groups. The most important vehicle for this strategy were 
the “progressive” and communist parties.
This strategy was especially relevant for the GDR’s focal countries in the Arab 
world.118 Major actors, apart from parties and trade unions, were the Societies 
of Friendship, the Committees of Solidarity and, especially in North Africa, the 
Free German Youth (FDJ).119 On the ground these actors were supposed to be 
coordinated by the MfAA and the embassies.120 The GDR’s foreign policy strategy 
in the Middle East and all over the “developing world” was complemented by 
propaganda dispensed by SED officials and its media whenever East Germany was 
present at international sports competitions, academic conferences, or economic 
exhibitions.121 Thus, any international activity in the international realm was 
considered political, as it could be used in the “struggle for recognition.” On various 
occasions, such as sports events or business conferences and exhibitions,122 first 
115 | Muth refers to Ulf Engel’s and Hans-Georg Schleicher’s monograph on the GDR’s 
foreign policy in Africa of 1997, in: Muth, 2001, 27.
116 | Engel/Schleicher, 1997, 183f; See also Ch 8. The GDR and the “Arab World”: A Small 
State’s “Fill-In Policy.”
117 | Von Bredow had described the GDR’s performance during the negotiations of the 
CSCE-process as a “low-profile” strategy, Von Bredow, in: Equete-Kommission, Band VIII, 
1999, 954.
118 | Wippel, 1996, 4.
119 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
120 | Muth, 2001, 67.
121 | Bericht des ZK der SED an den V. Parteitag der SED, July 1958, in: Judt, 1998, 503.
122 | Judt, 1998, 503f.
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contact was supposed to be established through low-level relations between civil 
society organizations such as the “Societies of Friendship.”
Previously, the “Societies of Friendship” had been centralized and connected 
to the one-party system as a “transmission” between party and society. From there 
it was only a small step to establish party relations between the SED and Marxist, 
socialist, or at least left-wing associations in the host country. Ideally, the “partner 
state” was already led by such a party or the respective party at least was aspiring 
to take over leadership. “Historic determinism” envisaged that these parties in 
the long run were to transform their society and political system toward first 
socialism and then communism. This policy of “one-party expansion” naturally 
was in accordance with the approach of Sovietization led by a vanguard party.
One of the two major determinants of East Berlin’s foreign policy, Bonn’s 
“claim of exclusive representation,” forced East Berlin to establish and develop its 
international contacts below the governmental level and thus was an important 
trigger for the emergence of the GDR’s “low-profile strategy.” Combined with East-
Berlin’s limited economic resources, the strategy was complemented by a focus 
on certain selected countries to finally overcome the international limits of the 
GDR’s foreign policy created by West Germany. As soon as diplomatic relations 
were established, the GDR was able to simply build on its “low-profile strategy” 
by connecting the “second” and “third sphere” relations between the parties and 
society actors with the “first sphere,” the state and its government, through official 
bilateral agreements, such as agreements on scientific-technical cooperation or 
the “Kulturarbeitspläne.”123
4.2 Improving the Well-tried Concept of Focus: Ideological 
Reasoning and the Countries of “Socialist Orientation”
East Berlin was somehow able to make a virtue out of necessity. Its “strategy of 
focus and low-profile” was further developed throughout the 1960s, especially 
with regard to concentrating foreign policy on a few select countries. The concept 
of “anti-imperialist solidarity” had been used as a moral coating for the GDR’s 
policy toward former colonies and “developing countries” early on and included 
the support for the liberation movements in the Global South.124 Based on this 
logic of mutual solidarity between socialist countries, the SED expanded the 
strategy based on the Soviet concept of the countries of “socialist orientation.”125 
These countries became prioritized due to their “ideological orientation,” or rather 
the likelihood of their becoming a socialist state.
123 | Examples of this are South Yemen and Algeria. Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter 
July 3 2012.
124 | Kowlaczuck, 2011, 262.
125 | Shearman, in: Shearman, 1995, 16.
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In the beginning, the SED did not offer its diplomatic personnel a specific 
definition for this category: “There was a huge discussion over the years about this 
term ‘states with a socialist orientation.’ Hermann Axen all of a sudden declared: 
‘These are the ones, these aren’t.’”126 The categorization of “developing countries” 
and thus also countries of “socialist orientation” had evolved over the years 
and after some time was defined officially. For example in the “Foreign Policy 
Dictionary” of 1980127 the countries of the world were categorized as follows: First, 
countries that had opted for a “capitalist path of development.” These were of 
lower priority, as the GDR usually had not much to offer where Western states 
were involved. Second, countries where the struggle between left-wing or Marxist 
groups and “reactionary powers,” that is “bourgeois,” “capitalist,” or powers of 
Western democratic orientation, had not yet been decided. And third, countries 
of “international importance,” those following a path of “socialist orientation.” 
For sure, this categorization of non-socialist “developing countries” partly was 
motivated by pragmatic considerations: The distribution of the very limited 
resources to promote the GDR’s international recognition needed some kind of 
justification beyond economic interest.
Without doubt the countries of “socialist orientation” enjoyed the highest foreign 
policy priority among the “developing countries.”128 In 1969 these were Algeria, 
Egypt, Iraq, Libya, the PDRY, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria. All of them also ranked 
high in foreign trade volume – except for the extremely poor states of Somalia 
and the PDRY. These two are not even mentioned in the East German Yearbook 
of Statistics.129 In the most comprehensive overview of East German foreign trade 
with the Middle East available, neither of the two is to be found among the first 
thirteen trading partners either.130 Nonetheless, Somalia and the PDRY verifiably 
received the same preferential treatment as the other focal countries of the Middle 
East and Africa inclined toward “socialist orientation.” They were contrasted 
with those “developing countries” governed by a “national bourgeoisie” that were 
considered to be following some kind of capitalist path. Everyone else was grouped 
into the in-between states where “weak class structures” had not yet been able 
to induce socialist development.131 Two cases hovered somewhere between this 
last category and the countries of “socialist orientation” without being labelled as 
126 | Interview with Wolfgang Bator, May 27 2011.
127 | Wörterbuch der Außenpolitik und des Völkerrechts, 1980, 153f.
128 | Kanet, in: Greiner/Müller/Weber (ed.), 2010, 50.
129 | German: Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1973 and 1979, Staatliche Zentral-
verwaltung für Statistik (ed.), Staatsverlag der DDR, Berlin (East), 1973 and 1979.
130 | The thir teen top-ranking destinations of East German trade with the “Middle East” 
between 1949-1989 are: Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, in: Wippel, 1996, 44-46.
131 | Categorization of non-socialist “developing countries” in: Wippel, 1996, 19f.
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such. The PLO and Ethiopia both enjoyed a special status. The former on the one 
hand was not a state but gradually became more of an official partner, especially 
after it was granted status by the United Nations in 1974. The latter, on the other 
hand, clearly replaced Somalia as the closest partner not only of Moscow, but also 
of East Berlin, in the Horn of Africa after the Soviet pullout from Berbera in the 
late 1970s.
Most interestingly, among all these countries, South Yemen not only was 
grouped with the high-priority category of countries of “socialist orientation,” 
it also topped the list of “solidarity spending.” This kind of developmental aid 
at times was up to a half, of overall East German “developmental aid.”132 This 
clearly shows Yemen’s significance in East German development policy. Between 
1966 and 1984, the GDR spent about 248 million GDR marks on “international 
solidarity,”133 of which South Yemen received the biggest share with 94 million, 
followed by Vietnam with 48 million, Tanzania with 22 million and the PLO with 8 
million.134 This categorization of the “developing countries” clearly had an impact 
on the shape of the GDR’s foreign relations that should not be underestimated. 
Based on fundamental ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism, it turned into 
an inflexible dogma that could not be questioned135 – even after it had proven to 
be of little to no use with regard to possible success or failure of the GDR’s foreign 
policy activities. In many cases the categorization led to East German investments 
beyond any political benefit for the GDR, with South Yemen being one of the most 
prominent examples.
4.3 The Strateg y of the Honest Broker
“As opposed to the anti-Arab policy of the West German Republic’s government 
which is supporting British colonial terror in Aden morally and materially, 
the GDR sides firmly with the people of Aden fighting for their right of 
self-determination.“136
(MfAA official on April 8th 1967)
From the very beginning, the two Germanys had been proxy states of their 
allied superpowers and thus competitors. Bonn’s integration into the capitalist 
Western hemisphere and affiliation with “imperialism” made it possible for the 
GDR to successfully promote its propaganda of the “German alternative” among 
132 | For example Howell, 1994, 313.
133 | Each GDR citizen had to give 25 marks for solidarity purposes a month, in: Interview 
with Wolfgang Bator May 27 2011. 
134 | Möller, 2004, 43. As Möller rightly remarks, Ethiopia paradoxically is missing in this list. 
Möller is referring to Monika Tanzscher’s findings. Tantzscher, in: Timmermann (Ed.), 1996, 614.
135 | See for example Muth, 2001, 40.
136 | Public decl. by MfAA official on April 8 1967, DOK zur AP der DDR XV/2, 1970, 1026f.
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the post-colonial states. East Berlin skillfully marketed the GDR as a “better 
state” through its cultural and educational foreign policy and aimed to create 
a positive image among the public of its “partner countries.”137 The other aim 
of this “public relations campaign” was to discredit the “other Germany.” East 
Berlin emphasized Bonn’s negative reputation to exploit disagreements between 
the Arab states for its own ends. This attitude can be found regularly in its party 
organ “Neues Deutschland.” In 1969, the Algerian news agency APS commented 
on the changes of the Hallstein Doctrine: “Bonn’s institutions appear to disregard 
the sovereignty of the countries of the Third World.”138 Hence, at least some Arab 
countries considered the Hallstein Doctrine to have marginalized their very own 
sovereignty by dictating their preferred diplomatic behavior to the Arab world. 
This attitude of course came in handy for East Germany’s campaign against West 
Germany.
Using the slogans of “anti-imperialist solidarity” once again, East-Berlin 
aimed to present itself as the more humane version of Germany to the states of 
the Global South and used this notion to justify its existence. When the GDR 
gradually accepted German separation, it began to focus on the principle of 
“peaceful coexistence” that locates the “struggle” of the two opposite political and 
social systems not with the military but rather in the field of economic and social 
development. The socialist scholar Werner Hänisch paints Europe as the “main 
battlefield for peace and international security [where] the confrontation of the two 
political systems”139 could be felt the most. He conventionalizes the “BRD” (FGR) 
as a symbol for the “aggressive policies of world imperialism” led by the United 
States of America. The GDR, on the other hand, in his view is indispensable for 
any solution of Europe’s problems of security and cooperation, a “better Germany” 
that promotes “progress and peace.”140 Hänisch’s position does nothing more than 
summarize the regime’s position on the matter.
Foreign trade also tied in with this “strategy of the honest broker.” The GDR did 
not separate its foreign trade and development policy mostly because development 
policy was often used either for economic or political ends or both.141 This was 
the case in the Arab world, where the GDR’s trade policy followed the “pattern 
of traditional North-South Trade”: Finished products were exported, especially 
technical equipment and machinery, while raw materials were imported.142 
Though East German products were mostly not able to compete in terms of 
137 | Das Gupta, in: Wengst/Wentker 2008, 119.
138 | “Interesse für DDR wächst ständig,“ in: Neues Deutschland, Oktober 2 1969, 7.
139 | Hänisch, in: Hahn/Hänisch/Busse/Lingner, 1974, 209f.
140 | Hahn/Hänisch/Busse/Lingner, 1974, 44f.
141 | Wippel, 1996, 5.
142 | Wippel, 1996, 15.
CHAPTER 8. The GDR and the “Arab World“: A Small State‘s “Fill-In Policy“ 
182
quality with products from other industrialized countries, and in particular West 
Germany, they were often priced competitively.
Foreign trade with “developing countries” was embedded in the wider 
framework of development. Developmental policies of the time usually meant a 
strategy based on investments, credits and technical assistance that were tied to 
conditions that benefited the donor nation. Despite the often fair conditions for the 
host states,143 the GDR used the concept of “tied credit” and “tied aid” just like any 
Western nation. Usually, this meant that the receiving country had to spend aid 
and credits on GDR machinery and expertise. Wippel suggests that credits were 
supposed to be repaid with profits obtained from these economic improvements 
financed by GDR capital.144 Nonetheless, the exchange of investment and finished 
products for raw materials largely characterized the GDR trade policy in the Global 
South in general and the Middle East in particular.
All in all, the GDR was able to offer a foreign trade policy which at times 
appeared to be more beneficial and thus attractive for the economies of post-
colonial states: East Berlin was one of the few emerging industrialized nations 
advocating for the establishment of the “most-favored-nation clause,”145 while it 
also offered to barter in international trade arrangements significantly longer 
than other industrialized states.146 Where possible, “traditional North-South trade” 
evolved toward cooperation, for example in industrial production. East German 
foreign trade policy was complemented by “economic and scientific-technical 
cooperation,” such as by providing tools meant firstly to enable the host countries 
to use and repair GDR machines and thus be able to sell them, and secondly to 
strengthen bilateral relations and generate trust. However, East Germany did not 
abstain from measures that exploited the recipient, either. Its policy toward the 
“Global South” by and large was not far off from Western liberal trade policies that 
the GDR condemned as “imperialist” and “neo-colonialist.”147
143 | Winter mentions governmental loans to Syria with only about 2.5% to 3% interest 
and a maturity of up to twelve years, Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2013.
144 | Wippel, 1996, 32f.
145 | The “Most-favored Nation Clause” guarantees that any trade advantage granted by 
one state to another has to be granted to any other state as well. The clause, for example, 
is valid among the GAT T-states today. Socialist International Economic Policy aimed at the 
implementation of this clause for all of the WTO. Woll, 1990, 609ff.
146 | This traditional foreign trade approach is based on the direct exchange of goods and 
served the import-demanding economy of the GDR extremely well. Interview with Wolfgang 
Bator May 27 2011. 
147 | Scholtysek, 2003, 36.
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5. CONCLuSION: ThE GDR IN ThE MIDDLE E AST: A ShOWCASE OF 
E AST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY  STR ATEGIES 
Interestingly, the East German policy change at the turning point of “recognition” 
is not only visible in the GDR’s Middle East policy.  The region itself is an excellent 
case study in which one can reconstruct a policy change that coincided with the 
replacement of Ulbricht by Honecker. The “strategy of focus and low-profile” had 
defined the intermediate goal to establish consular and general consular relations 
as the last step before full recognition. Even though in the early 1960s there 
were only two countries from the wider Middle East fulfilling this requirement – 
Algeria and Egypt – only a few years later it was obvious to the SED regime that the 
key to overcoming international isolation lay in the Arab countries. 
“There were general consulates in several countries already which merely 
needed an upgrade [to become an embassy], for example in Syria, in Egypt. In 
addition to that we had commercial agencies in most Arab countries.”148
The Middle East turned out to be one of the few fields where East Berlin was able 
to actively implement a foreign policy – not in spite of but due to the restrictive 
impacts of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic. From the early 1960s to the 
late 1970s, the two German states switched the main venue of their conflict to the 
developing world, that is, first and foremost the Arab states.149 While East Berlin 
passively stepped in wherever Moscow ordered it to, the GDR reacted proactively 
to West German restraints and gaps in international activities. Thus, the GDR’s 
policy in the Middle East can be characterized as a “fill-in policy” between Bonn 
and Moscow based on the three major strategies of “focus and low-profile,” 
”socialist orientation,” and the “strategy of the honest broker.”
Moscow’s control of the GDR’s internal and external affairs remained constant 
over this first phase of East Berlin’s foreign policy. However, the GDR was 
granted a semi-sovereign status after 1955 and under Ulbricht’s leadership 
seemed to have some voice in decisions concerning its “SED state”150 and 
even Berlin. Ulbricht’s policy toward Moscow can be characterized as active, 
though this did not lead to a self-directed foreign policy. Rather he tried to 
“incorporate the GDR’s interests into the Soviet Union’s policy.”151 On behalf 
148 | Interview with Fritz Balke May 23rd 2011.
149 | See Chapter 3.  Analytical Approach: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreign Policy 
on the “levels of engagement” and Muth, 2001, 31.
150 | Schroeder, 1999.
151 | Bonwetsch/Filitow, 2000, in: Scholtyseck, 2003, 96.
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of the Kremlin,152 the GDR had presented itself as the “peaceful” alternative 
to West Germany in the developing world. Its lack of diplomatic ties and 
international prestige made it appear to be an “honest broker” for the young 
nation-states in Africa, Asia and the Arab world. In addition to that, the GDR 
was able to distance itself from German history and heritage, while claiming the 
traditionally positive relations between Germany and the Arab world for itself. 
As opposed to Bonn, East Berlin saw no necessity to take into consideration 
interests or sensitivities of Israel, while it could rely on traditionally good 
relations between Germany and the Arab states.153 Thus, despite regular direct 
competition with the well-heeled FRG, the GDR was able to establish intensive 
relations with a number of “developing countries.”154 And even though it did 
not have comparable financial means at its disposal, Eastern Germany as a 
rising industrial nation during certain periods was able to offer attractive 
developmental aid through trade, technical support, educated personnel, and 
even certain monetary concessions.
Until the early 1980s, the Arab countries remained the major destination of 
foreign diplomacy and trade for East Berlin. Despite the extension of its foreign 
trade, the GDR’s global economic involvement had intensified only modestly. 
Developmentally motivated trade and aid remained rather insignificant in 
comparison to other donor nations.155 Nonetheless, former short- and mid-term 
foreign trade arrangements grew into long-term foreign trade relations based 
on trade and aid agreements and East Berlin acquired more diverse trading 
partners.156 Even though many countries in the Middle East sympathized with 
the GDR, the decline of its status in the region was predestined. In the 1970s, 
East German foreign policy in the “developing countries” began to show its first 
cracks. After the specious prosperity during the last 1960s, major economic 
problems surfaced. East Berlin was often unable to fulfill its foreign policy 
promises. Technical projects in particular suffered from parts shortages in the 
GDR. Bator, for example, mentions “permanent difficulties” with deliveries “from 
home” to the flour mills in Libya.157 Similar problems were reported from South 
152 | Compare relations to Egypt: “Abschluss eines Abkommens über den Handels- 
und Zahlungsverkehr mit Ägypten,” March 7 1953, in: Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der 
Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 505.
153 | Compare Signing of German-Yemeni Communiqué, in: Dok zur AP der DDR III, 1956, 696.
154 | By 1979, not even a decade after the wave of recognition, East Berlin had signed 
over 50 governmental agreements with “developing countries,” in: Möller, 2004, 43.
155 | Wippel, 1996, 5.
156 | Wippel, 1996, 30.
157 | Interview with Wolfgang Bator May 27 2011. 
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Yemen.158 Furthermore, Scharfenberg reports on the planned sale of a cold-storage 
warehouse for potatoes in the mid-1970s. In the end a Danish company won the 
bid. It simply offered better conditions.159 As a result, East Germany simply was 
not able to compete with other economic actors for reasons that had nothing to 
do with its political standing and prestige. The scope of trade and aid it could 
offer clearly had its limits and the GDR remained a rather insignificant partner 
in foreign trade for the Arab states. Thus East-Berlin only remained attractive for 
those countries which lacked alternatives, such as South Yemen, which had been 
marginalized by its fellow Arab states.
158 | A motor from the oil mill had to be used to substitute the broken engine of the flour 
mill. Scharfenberg, 2012, 45.
159 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 45.
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CHAPTER 9. Forging a National Identity in 
Yemen’s South: 
Social Change between Foreign Interference and a Fragmented Nation
“[Only about] a hundred years ago, the divisions of Arabia 
were expressed in loosely defined geographical terms 
– al-Sham, ‘the North,’ al-Yaman, ‘the South,’ […]  and 
in terms of ancestral origin. A particular region might 
have developed a cohesive cultural identity, as Yemen 
did early on, but there were no fixed borders. ‘Territory 
equaled sphere of influence’; boundaries were as mobile 
as people.”1
Tim mAckiNTosh-smiTh, briTish AuThor liviNg iN sANA’A, YemeN
1. ON ThE RELE vANCE OF IDENTITIES FOR ThIS STuDY
This chapter grapples with a regularly ignored aspect of foreign policy – the 
“receiving” side of the external actors’ efforts, the host state. The analysis of South 
Yemen’s society at this pivotal political turning-point of Yemen’s modern history 
aims to overcome the tendency of similar case studies that often degrade the “host 
country” to a static structural element or passive “pawn” of the international 
“game.” Only by taking into account the specifics of the “receiving side of foreign 
policy” and by including the “host” into the analysis as an autonomous actor, is 
assessment of the impact by internal and external influences on these societies, 
actors, actions and ideas possible. In turn, only then can the “limits of foreign 
policy” in theory and praxis be explored and understood comprehensively.
The political analysis of this chapter focuses on the struggle for independence 
in South Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s – a time when new external 
actors expressed their interest in the British Crown Colony, most prominently the 
GDR and the Soviet Union. The radical National Liberation Front’s  main goal was 
1 | Mackintosh-Smith, 2007 (1997), 30.
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consolidate the socio-politico preconditions needed to seize power and establish 
their idea of a Marxist state in accordance with the concept of socialist state- and 
nation-building. How and why did a revolutionary Arab regime adopt Marxism-
Leninism as their state ideology, even though there did not exist any other Marxist 
state in the region? The answer to this question is first detected in the emergence 
of a new political identity in South Yemen’s urban center Aden, a highly dynamic 
social environment, and second in the changes of identities among the rural 
population of the “tribal space” in South Yemen. The following depiction of Yemeni 
society at the beginning of the GDR’s involvement in the country is based on an 
approach to identities defined in terms of “spheres of influence” and “ancestral 
origin”2 and focuses on the overlapping, sometimes conflicting, sometimes 
mutually enhancing identities and how they stifled or enhanced social change 
by supporting or resisting internal and external forces. Thus, instead of merely 
describing the society “on the other end” of the GDR’s international activities, 
the analysis interprets the findings in the light of the correlation between the 
“responsiveness of identities” and social change, as introduced in Chapter 3’s 
“Analytical Approach.”
To use “identity” as an analytical category in International Relations has 
become quite common over the last two decades and has even been integrated 
into a recent analysis of Yemen itself. Unfortunately, this analysis by Stephen W. 
Day “Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen” approaches “identity” on the national 
level similarly to how Samuel Huntington applied the concept to the international 
level.3 For Day, “identity” is something static, resilient to internally or externally 
induced change. Based on his hypothesis of “Yemeni Regionalism,” Day defines 
regional divisions as the decisive determinants of people’s (political) identity4 in 
Yemen, as they are “far more significant than the relatively superficial north-
south boundary drawn by the British and Ottoman empires in the early 1900s.”5 
This approach has to be rejected as oversimplified.6 First, even though Day 
rightly denies the north-south divide to be the major source of identification, the 
divide remains one of the most relevant sources of positive and negative political 
and social identification to this day. As Brehony has clarified in his narrative 
of the PDRY’s history, before unification, the leaders of both Yemens always 
considered the North and the South as shat.rayn, as two halves of one country 
that were supposed to unite one day.7 Today, two decades later, only time will tell 
2 | Mackintosh-Smith, 2007 (1997), 30. On the role of “origin” (Arabic: aṣl) with regard to 
tribal identities, also see: Dahlgren, 2000, 6.
3 | Huntington, 1993; 1996. For a critical account on Huntington’s conceptualization of 
identity see: Salter, 2002.
4 | Lapid/Kratochwil (ed.), 1996.
5 | Day, 2013, 7.
6 | On the oversimplified nature of Stephen W. Day’s approach see: Petouris, 2013.
7 | Brehony, 2013, Introduction. 
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whether the recently re-emerged distinct southern identity can be reconciled 
with what some southerners today consider “northern occupation,”8 or finally be 
integrated in a unified Yemeni identity. Thus, the “north-south divide” clearly 
has to be considered equally relevant as other codes of Yemeni identification. As 
shown in the sub-chapter “Identity, Nation-Building and Social Change” of this 
study, identities may not be perceived as unchanging constants that feed from 
only one source. Even artificially created social divides, like census categories or 
borderlines, may develop a meaning of their own, due to people adapting their to 
the reality of day-to-day circumstances, as shown by many studies concerned with 
“identity politics.”9 Thus, regional ties are an important determinant, but neither 
the only nor the decisive factor for a people’s political identification. All in all, 
Day’s understanding of “identity” simply appears to be to too rigid to include the 
multi-layered character of Yemeni loyalties.
The following chapter first offers an overview of the historic external influences 
relevant to modern Yemen’s history and depicts the modern Yemeni nation-state 
as a consequence of both external intervention and internal Yemeni strife. Second, 
Yemeni tribal identities are contrasted with the emerging urban identity in the 
city of Aden, while illuminating the role of British presence during the change. 
Collective identities are characterized along three ideal types of collective identity 
coding as introduced by Eder et alia: “primordial, traditional and universalistic/
cultural.”10 With regard to this approach, the major focus rests on the ambiguity 
between the overlapping “primordial-traditional” identity coding of the tribes 
on the one hand, and “universalistic/cultural” coding of an evolving urban 
population on the other. This division is identified as one of the major reasons 
for the emergence of a distinct identity of “the urban Adeni” in South Yemen as 
opposed to Yemeni tribal-regional identities. Accordingly, it is expected to produce 
an effective framework for interpreting the emergence of the only Marxist state 
in Arabia. The chapter lastly explores the impact of two supposedly contradictory 
ideological concepts, Arab nationalism and socialism, on the decisive political 
actors in South Yemen and how these concepts finally merged into, or rather were 
consumed by, Marxism-Leninism and its most fervent advocate in the Arab world, 
the National Liberation Front and future Yemeni Socialist Party.
8 | Dresch, 2000, 150.
9 | Nobles, in: Eisenberg/Kymlicka, 2011, 31-51.
10 | Eder et al., 2003, 25-34.
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2.  FROM TRIBAL L ANDS TO A DIvIDED YEMEN: A hISTORY OF 
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE
Before its unification in the early 1990s, Yemen had never been a “nation-state” 
in the modern sense. However, and as opposed to much of the Arab world, the 
concept of the “state” is not new or alien to Yemen, neither today nor in its ancient 
past.11 Landmarks such as the Marib Dam, which was built about 2500 years ago 
by the Sabateans, have served as sources of identification for
“those Arabs who trace their ancestry back beyond the time when nationalities 
were invented, to Qahtan, son of the Prophet Hud, great-great-grandson of Sam 
and progenitor of all southern tribes.”12
The political separation of Yemen’s traditionally tribal society between 1962-63 
and 1990-94, however, appended a new, artificial source of identification for 
Yemenis, induced by external interference in the region. The following section 
connects the geostrategic characteristics of modern Yemen to the motivations of 
the two powers that dominated the region in the past and, more or less, created this 
divide in Yemen: the Ottoman and the British empires. South Yemen’s geographic 
position was the major reason that determined Ottoman and British interest and 
among the priority interests of the Soviet Union as well. Thus, this chapter begins 
with the “geopolitical” relevance of South Yemen and its “geographic identity.”
2.1  The Shared Histor y of “Geopolitics” and International Relations
Even though the term “geopolitics” has been radically redefined and reframed 
since the end of the Cold War, the idea that geographic factors determine power 
distribution in international relations remains a focal point in international 
politics. Introduced by Rudolf Kjellén in 1899, the term “geopolitics” swiftly 
became a trendy concept in international politics at the time. During and after 
WWI, “geopolitics” was established as the basic pattern of foreign policy strategy 
in theory and praxis, as it was regarded as one of the most comprehensive 
approaches to explain power politics. In its most radical interpretation, it was used 
to justify dominance and subjugation of peoples in the Global South by colonial 
powers and later emerged as a decisive analytical tool of foreign policy analysts 
under the German National Socialist regime. As a consequence, Atkinson and 
Dodds speak of a “shameful category”13 in the field of geography. Nonetheless, 
the interrelation of human geography and politics cannot be denied outright: A 
nation-state’s endowment with regard to its geographic position, natural resources 
11 | Ayubi, 1995, 4.
12 | Mackintosh-Smith, 2007 (1997), 30.
13 | Atkinson/Dodds, 2 002, 1.
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and level of education does determine its scope of action in the international realm 
to a significant extent. The division between “hard” and “soft facts” of a country’s 
availability of resources remains part of any analysis of foreign policy today, even 
without the explicit label of “geostrategic” factors. After the end of the Cold War, 
constructivists finally began to critically reframe a concept they regarded as 
overly static. Following Ó Tuathail, this study agrees that geopolitics “cannot be 
abstracted from the textuality of its use,”14 and thus includes geopolitical factors 
only in relation to their historical context and political relevance, interpreting 
them as a tool of foreign policy representations and justifications.
2.2  Yemen‘s Geostrategic Relevance: Past and Present
Throughout history very different external actors have shown an interest in the 
remote place that is Yemen. Over the past decade, the unified state has gained a 
reputation as a “safe harbor” for terrorism: Al-Qaeda seized the opportunity of 
increasing internal turmoil in the country and chose to establish a new foothold 
for itself in the Middle East. When the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda15 
merged to form “al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP) in 2009,16 public 
opinion and the media tended to interpret the rise of the terrorist network in light 
of Osama bin Laden’s family ties to Wadī Hadramaut.17 Despite the symbolic 
meaning, the expansion of Al-Qaeda rather is in large part due to Yemen’s 
geostrategic determinants. Al-Shishanī, a researcher of the “Emirates Center for 
Strategic Studies and Research” points out the worth of Yemen for al-Qaeda in 
200718 by referring to Syrian Abu Musa’ab al-Surī’’ s19 book, “The Responsibility 
of Yemenī People toward Muslim Holy Shrines and Wealth” of 1999. Apart from 
rugged, mountainous terrain, as well the seemingly infinte plains and deserts 
combined with weak infrastructure, for al-Surī the rebellious and martial spirit 
of the Yemenī people as well as their poverty is what distinguishes Yemen as “a 
14 | Toal (Ó Tuathail) 1996, 65.
15 | Transcription: al-Qā’eda; English: The Basis.
16 | Masters/Laub, 2013.
17 | Arabic: Wad ī Ḥaḍramaut. Bin Laden’s father Muhammad bin Awad bin Laden was born 
in “Wadi Douan in the Hadhramawt [sic!]” and moved to Saudi Arabia in the 1950s, in: Bin 
Ladin [sic!] family and Usama bin Laden, in: Burrowes, 2010, 56.
18 | Al-Shishani, 17th of January 2013, in: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and 
Research.
19 | Abu Musa’ab al-Sur ī’ writes under the pseudonym of Omar Abdul Hakeem. Al-Sur ī was 
released from Syrian prison in February 2012. He is known to be one of the main advocates 
of “leaderless jihad” that demands the formation of cells without linking up with al-Qaeda‘s 
global network. He currently is considered one of the most influential ideologists of al-
Qaeda and other jihadist movements, see: Flade, in: Die Welt, 14th of February 2013; On 
al-Sur ī’s background also see: Said, 2015, 35-44.
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strong natural bastion for the people of Arab Peninsula, if not for the whole of 
Middle East.”20 A fellow-traveller of bin Laden since the 1980s, al-Surī currently is 
considered one of the most influential ideologues of the network. The impact of 
his comments on Yemen’s potential as a long-term base of operation for al-Qaeda 
must not be underestimated.
While the “soft facts” of Yemen’s geostrategic position play an equally important 
role for al-Qaeda today as the “hard facts,” earlier power actors were almost 
exclusively interested in Yemen’s geographic position between Europe, Africa, 
and Asia. Both before and after the dawn of aviation, the southern tip of the Arab 
Peninsula provred to be a key economic and military outpost due to its strategic 
location near the Bab al-Mandab, the gate to the Red Sea on the western coast of 
the former YAR. In addition, it boasted, in a perfect location, a natural port in the 
south – Aden.21 Once called the “eye of Yemen”22 and to this day the major urban 
center in the south, Aden presents itself as “a magnificent natural fortress:”23 
The town center is nestled within the crest of an inactive volcano, almost fully 
surrounded by a semi-circle of mountain slope and rock-face which gave  the 
downtown its name, “Crater.” From the ocean, the entry to the port is guarded by 
a second volcanic peninsula, home of “Little Aden,” and the rocky Sirah Island,24 
almost blocking the settlement from view when approached by sea.
The eye of the Ottoman Turks eventually fell on the green and humid coastline 
south of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina,25 from which coffee, the “black gold” 
of the highlands, was shipped to Europe. After landing in Moch by the Red Sea 
in 1526,26 the Ottomans were able to fight their way east until the Yemeni imam’s 
son halted their expansion at the mountain stronghold Thula. From that point 
on, the northern Yemeni highlands remained a continuous nuisance for the 
Ottoman Empire. The costs of upholding Ottoman rule near the Yemeni tribes 
almost exceeded the benefits of access. Nonetheless, Yemen’s produce and its 
coastline appeared to be too valuable for the Ottomans to give up – even after the 
20 | Al-Shishani, January 17 2013, in: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and 
Research.
21 | Shaharam, Adelphi Paper No.157, 1980, in: The Int. Institute for Strategic Studies 
(Ed.), 301; Linde, 1987, 1.
22 | Burrowes, 2010, 10.
23 | Gavin, 1975, 2.
24 | Aden, Aden Colony and the Port of Aden, in: Burrowes, 2010, 10.
25 | Ottoman expansion to the holy sites of Islam under Selim I, in: Houarani, 2003, 283f; 
Karpat, 2000, 241ff; Peri, 2001, 45.
26 | Masters, Bruce, “Yemen and the Ottoman Empire,” in: Ágoston/Masters, 2009, in: 
Modern World History Online.
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British decided to secure the port of Aden for the Crown and thus limit Ottoman 
expansion to the south.27
“My British colleague asked me why Aden was important for the GDR. According 
to him, there was not much to gain apart from stones. I answered with yet 
another question: What had Great Britain hoped to gain there for over 130 years 
[of their occupation]?”
(Günther Scharfenberg, East German ambassador to the PDRY from 1972 to 1978) 
The English East India Company was the first to set foot on future British soil, 
long before any troops were to arrive. In 1609 the Company landed in Ottoman 
Mocha28 and about two centuries later, London officially expressed its interest in 
the Crater and the surrounding hinterland: “As early as 1825 the British Consul-
General […] had begun warning Muhammad Ali Pasha29 against interfering with 
Aden.”30 Gavin, who published one of the most detailed works on the British 
presence in southern Arabia prior to 1959, suggests that the Ottoman expansion to 
the Bab al-Mandab probably had not been of great concern to the British, “[b]ut the 
establishment of a first-rate power so near to India as Aden”31 would have posed 
a major threat to British trade routes. Furthermore, a refueling station between 
Suez and Bombay at the time was desperately needed and thus British economic 
interests coincided with regional power politics. In January 1839, “[t]he British flag 
was hoisted and Aden became the first colonial acquisition of Queen Victoria’s 
reign.”32 The British had arrived at the Bab al-Mandab.
The expansion of the Ottoman sphere of influence in the northern part of 
Yemen in 1872 was followed by an agreement with the British on separate spheres of 
influence that was set at the “Anglo-Ottoman line” of 1904, the future demarcation 
between North and South Yemen.33 Clearly, the Crown had no interest in the allowing 
the Ottomans, the other major foreign power in the region, too establish themselves 
too close to Aden - not least due to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. However, 
27 | Kuehn, 2011, 9; 46.
28 | In 1728 the Sultan of Lahj separated his territory including Aden from Zaidi influence 
in the north, and about a century later the British East India Company was able to establish 
intense economic relations. Blumi, FN 8, in: Al-Rasheed/Vitalis, 2004, 115; Faroughy, 
1947, 50; Mackintosh-Smith, 2007 (1997), 31; Willis: in: Al-Rasheed, 2004, 121.
29 | Muḥammad Al ī Pasha had been Wāli (Governor) and self-declared Khedive (Eng. 
Viceroy) of Egypt and is considered the “founding father” of modern Egypt. See: Fahmy, 
2000 (1998), esp.179 and Dresch, 2000, 9.
30 | Gavin, 1975, 26.
31 | 
32 | 
33 | Burrowes, 2010, 275; Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 11; Koszinowski, Thomas, Jemen, in: 
Nohlen/Nuscheler (ed.), 2003, 366f; Mackintosh-Smith, 2007 (1997), 31.




London did not have to worry about the Ottoman Empire’s influence in the region 
for long. The Ottoman reign in Yemen never fully penetrated the country to begin 
with34 and early in the 20th century the Ottoman Empire gradually disintegrated 
due to power struggles within. Muhammad Ali Pasha and his successors in Egypt 
ascended from a mere nuisance to serious competition for the central power of the 
Ottoman Turks. Over time Egypt gained relative autonomy from Ottoman central 
rule and in combination with secessionist movements motivated by ethnic, religious, 
and political differences between rulers and ruled all over the Ottoman territory, the 
Ottoman Empire gradually fell apart.
In the Empire’s weakest hour, Zaidi Imam Yahia gained independence for 
his Mutawakilite Kingdom of Yemen35 and in doing so, definitively laid down the 
boundaries between north and south in 1934. The Zaidi teachings legitimized 
Yahia’s reign based on his ancestry to the Prophet Muhammad36 and depictions of 
him as “the embodiment of Prophetic authority by means of erudition and symbolic 
acts centering on prayer, generosity, and the banishment of evil.”37 As a consequence, 
Yahia, the religious leader of one of the oldest Shiite dynasties, was able to fight 
the foreign invaders with the support of the legend of the rightful ruler defending 
against illegitimate occupation.38 To secure the status quo, Yahia then followed a 
path of extreme conservatism. The King’s authoritarian style of leadership left little 
room for any social change in his realm. Over the decades Yahia had thoroughly 
prepared his son Ahmad as his successor39 - even though Zaidi rule traditionally 
had not been legitimized through direct lineage, but through the combination of 
political merit and noble ancestry from the family of the Prophet.
After Yahia was assassinated in old age, people hoped for a leader more open to 
the outside world. Ahmad, however, followed his father’s well-trodden paths: the 
father had tried to seal off his realm from outside influences while simultaneously 
upholding a Schaukelpolitik between Washington and Moscow. The son followed 
the same strategy. After Ahmad had renewed the trade agreement of 1928 with 
the Kremlin in 195540, the Yemeni Kingdom received substantial financial aid and 
34 | Faroughy, 1947, 51; Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 11.
35 | Arabic: zayīd ī; Imām al-Ḫād ī Yahiā ‘ibn al-Ḫusein; al-mamlaka al-mutawwakil īya 
al-yamanīya.
36 | Arabic: Muḥammad.
37 | Vom Bruck, 2005, 1.
38 | For more details about the back and for th between the Ottomans the British, and the 
various rulers between the coast and mountain area during WWI and after see: Dresch, 
2010, 11 and 28
39 | Arabic: Aḥmad. Dresch, 2000, 44.
40 | Braun, 1981, 35.
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probed possible relations with the GDR. 41  After a short intermezzo as a member 
of Egyptian Nasser’s United Arab Republic (UAR), Ahmad feared he would be 
overpowered by Cairo’s new strength and again put out feelers to the “West.”42 In 
doing so, the Kingdom managed to maintain the necessary distance from both 
sides of the Cold War while keeping the social changes in Aden at bay. In the 
meantime, Ahmad tentatively initiated minor structural reforms to soothe public 
opinion while upholding the country’s isolation. But he clearly underestimated the 
political changes taking place in the region and their impact on the Yemeni people. 
Baby steps seemed to accelerate political events by adding to the pressure within 
the tight limits of Ahmad’s control. Numerous murder attempts demonstrate the 
widespread dissatisfaction with his reign and monarchy.
When Imam Ahmad finally died of natural causes in September 1962, his son 
al-Badr was not able to prevent the “Free Officers” under Abdallah al-Sallāl from 
seizing power through a military “coup d’état.” The short-lived imam fled the scene 
and mobilized supporters of the Zaidi lineage. What followed were five years of 
civil war between republicans and royalists backed by Nasser’s Egypt and the Saudi 
kingdom until Cairo’s defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967 forced Egypt to agree to a 
mutual withdrawal. Naturally, the years of ongoing war in the north had a significant 
impact on developments in the south: In fall 1963, violent resistance against British 
occupation erupted and in the end forced a British pullout four years later.
3.  DE TERMINING A YEMENI IDENTIT Y IN ThE SOuTh 
In their introductory chapter on South Yemen’s social structure, Ismail and 
Ismail emphasize its complexity and the diversity of its origins and rulers in a 
land that had always attracted external interest, but upheld its isolation due to the 
“rugged nature” of both the terrain and its people. However, the two authors also 
identify “a common denominator running through the complex social history of 
South Yemen […] – the network of kinship, clan ties and social identity known as 
tribalism.”43 The following chapter aims to identify the major characteristics of 
41 | Besuch des Kronprinzen des Königreichs Jemen 1956 in Ost-Berlin, in: Kronprinz des 
Königreichs Jemen, Emir Seif el-Islam Mohammed el-Badr, vom 25. Juni bis 2. Juli 1956 in 
Berlin, in: DzAP der Reg der DDR III, 1956, 687; Besuch des Ministers für Post-, Telegrafen- 
und Telefonwesen des Königreiches Jemen, Qadi Abdulla Ben Ahmed el Hagri, 1961, in: 
Chronik, in: DzAP der Reg der DDR IX, 1962, 452.
42 | Hare (Kairo) an State Department, 19.3.1959: FRUS 1958-1960, XII, Nr. 368, in: 
Berggötz, 1998, 311.
43 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 5. The authors describe three social strata: the tribal units, the 
“religious sheikhs and town-dwelling tribesmen,” and the “masakin,” the poor. Ismail/
Ismail, 1986, 7f.  
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this “common denominator” while keeping in mind the problematic nature of the 
term “tribalism.” 44
3.1  On the Significance of Tribalism in a “Modernizing” Societ y
The gradual separation between north and south that began in the mid-19th 
century45  and culminated in the founding of two separate states in the 1960s did 
little to separate the tribes46 and tribal federations from their political affiliations. 
Nor did it affect the tribes’ status as sources of identity. Even during the late 
years of President Saleh’s presidency in unified Yemen, the Yemeni media coded 
national identity in tribal terms with state officials wearing traditional tribal 
dress or embroidering their political campaigns with their tribal affiliations. 
Today, tribal identity tends to blur and mix under urban influences such as 
TV programs, lifestyles, and the latest fashions. Nevertheless, the use of tribal 
esthetic markers47 has intensified in towns and cities even by those who were 
not formerly defined as tribal. 48 Notwithstanding today’s conflicts between the 
competing political groups, they seem to agree on the ideal of a self-determined 
Yemeni state, while tribal identity serves as the main point of reference in creating 
contextual cohesion. Before the founding of the two nation-states, approximately 
ninety percent of the Yemeni population were considered tribal and with some 
exceptions most urban Yemenis still cherish their tribal affiliations. However, this 
inclusion of supposedly “traditional” markers and values into more modern ways 
of living by no means has to be an irreconcilable contradiction. This study rejects a 
conceptualization of “tradition” and “modernity” not as opposites or a dichotomy to 
be found in their pure form, but rather understands them as “complementarities.” 
“Tradition” and “modernity” are perceived as sources of identification that feed a 
continuous and “intense struggle between various ideas of modern and tradition.” 
Thus, a diversity of many “moderns” and “traditions” in society is imaginable, 
just as Dahlgren describes Aden in the early 1990s as a “fusion of traditional and 
modern.” 49 
44 | On the emergence of a “modern Yemeni identity” also see: Weeden, 2004, in: Al-
Rasheed/Vitalis, 2004, 275.
45 | For a brief introduction to the division of the country between the Ottoman Empire in 
the North and Great Britain in the South see: Dresch, 2000, 11.
46 | Arabic: qabā’il.
47 | Also compare Adra, 2012, 66.
48 | Adra, 2010, 55.
49 | Dahlgren, 2000, 2. Dahlgren refers to Eickelman and Piscatori’s argument of 1996 
that “a sharp division between tradition and modern oversimplifies a complex process of 
interaction in a society where religion and tradition coexist with economic development 
and elements of modern culture.”
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Tribal identities somewhat “miraculously” survived military nationalism in the 
north and social nationalism in the south. They are currently experiencing a 
political revival in the insecure milieu of the post-Saleh era. Ayubi clearly agrees 
with Gellner:
“The importance of studying tribalism in Arabia and the Gulf is not only 
warranted by the significant demographic and economic weight nomads [and 
sedentary tribes] still represent in some of these countries, but because of its 
at once surviving, but changing, social and political significance.” 50
Ayubi rejects the anthropologic depiction of tribes as “isolated” units, sealed off 
from modernization and thus from social change by external impact and introduces 
two counter-arguments: First, Arab tribes rely on strong social interconnectedness 
due to the wider “socio-economic activities […] of the surrounding social space.” 
Second, “tribalism as a ‘state of mind,’ as a set of values, and as a pattern of 
social organisation” may of course be influenced by modernization, but can have 
an impact on “new and presumably ‘modern’ structures” in return. 51 Ayubi’s 
arguments support the “responsiveness-of-collective-identities hypothesis” 
introduced in Chapter 3 of this book. He depicts tribal identities as mutable under 
external influences, while claiming a meaningful social impact of their own. The 
following section discusses the “boundaries,” “codes,” and values constructing 
qabyalah, the conceptualization of tribal identity in Yemen, and how British 
colonial rule became the decisive source for identity change in the country’s 
modern south.
3.2  Politics and Qabyalah: The Tribe as a Political Unit
“[T]ribes may or may not be cultural units, […[ they certainly are political ones.”52 
Any definition of the tribe as a social entity, be it among anthropologists, historians 
or sociologists, is sure to be challenged. 53 As the category of the “tribe” has been 
used for a wide range of social entities in place and time, this disagreement won’t 
be solved in the near future. Nonetheless, the term offers classification of the basis 
of social structures in Yemen like no other, especially in relation to “modern state 
formation” there. This analysis understands a tribe first and foremost as a “social 
unit” and a “pattern of social organization”54 complemented by a political and 
50 | Ayubi, 1995 (2006), 124.
51 | 
52 | 
53 | Tapper, 1990, 50; Lewis, 2014, 15.
54 | Ayubi, 1995. (2006), 125.




a military dimension. 55 For the tribes in South Yemen a territorial reference is 
added, as the regions have become closely connected with certain families.
However, the tribe as a social entity in Yemen goes beyond this basic approach. 
Yemeni tribal identifications are embedded in complex historically grown dependencies 
and as the dominant form of social organization, the “tribe” encompasses all spheres 
of social life. All over Yemen tribal customary law regulated – and still regulates – 
rights and obligations of the tribe as well as their relation to the city dwellers. 56 Without 
doubt there do exist profound differences of certain customs and rules between the 
Yemeni tribes, most of all between those of the north and those of the south. But as 
Ayubi points out, “tribalism” can be regarded “as a ‘state of mind’, as a set of values, 
and as a pattern of social organization”57 that suggests the hypothesis that – despite 
change over place and time – major identity markers that the various Yemeni tribal 
identities had and have in common do exist. 58
Today’s rules of political conduct in Yemen remain strongly influenced by “tribal 
ways.”59 For the most part, tribal identities have mostly been shaped positively, as 
the coding relied on what a certain tribe had in common as a community. These 
shared codes also constructed tribal identity negatively by forming the boundaries 
against the neighbouring tribes. To operationalize tribal identities in Yemen, this 
analysis follows Eder’s three ideal types of collective identity coding. 60 First and 
foremost, Yemeni tribal identity is coded “primordially”: A tribe dates back its 
lineage to one or several shared ancestors. In the case of the tribes and clans in the 
south of Yemen, this ancestor is Qahtan,61 who is regarded as the ancestor of the 
southern Arabs or oftentimes referred to as the “true Arabs.”62 The concept of the 
“true Arabs” serves as a unifying construct for “southern Arabia” to this day. The 
Qahtanis63 traditionally reject religious or ethnic supremacy of the Hashimis, 64 
who are part of the Adnani tribe, which can be found in the north and a few towns 
in the south. However, the distinct tribes in the south cannot be considered closed 
social or religious classes. Intermarriage between tribes has always been allowed. 
55 | Adra, 2010, 86
56 | Arabic: ˁurf and adah, see for example: Dahlgren, 2000, 6; Lewis, 2014, 21.
57 | Ayubi, 1995. (2006), 125.
58 | Al-Dawsari, 2013.
59 | For a current analysis on the relationship between state and Yemeni tribes, see: 
Lewis, 2014.
60 | This analysis will elaborate on the different characteristics of the typology in more depth.
61 | Arabic: Qaḥtān.
62 | As opposed to Adnan who is believed to have fathered many of the tribes in the north. 
The Adnanī tribe is regarded as the origin of the Quraīš, the tribe of the Prophet Muḥammad 
to whom the Zayīd īs trace their ancestry, in: Stookey, 1982, 3. Also See: Ismail/Ismail, 
1986, 7f; Manea, 2010, 4.
63 | Arabic: Qaḥtānīs
64 | Arabic: Hašīmīs.
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There clearly is more to tribal membership than just kinship: the abstract “blood 
relationships”65 of the tribe are regularly confirmed and contextualized by concrete 
“local traditions and civic practices”66 that allow them to take over political roles. 
The south today is still dominated by tribal confederations relying on the fertility 
of tribal land, most of them peasants who boast an ancient history of agricultural 
civilization. Private land ownership regularly was and is restricted to cultivated 
land: “pasture land is shared by residents of a village, and water for domestic 
use is accessible to all.” 67 Tribal territory is the basis for the tribes’ social status68 
in accordance with the Arab proverb “Your land is your honor.”69 The status of 
the southern tribes traditionally was defined in contrast to the city dwellers, 
the religious elite, merchants, and craftsmen. This status rested on their two 
prominent abilities derived from the territorial character of these tribes: farming 
and warfare.
For these tribes, warfare and agriculture depend on each other. Every large 
stretch of cultivated land is well-fortified with guard towers, and tribe members have 
a responsibility for not only the lot but all tribal land. 70 Warfare is still considered a 
part of daily life in Yemen. There is no generation that did not experience war on a 
larger scale, not to mention the countless local feuds that can be dated back decades, 
sometimes centuries, erupting in some regions as street fighting or spontaneous 
shootings on a regular basis. Nonetheless, these occurrences bring to light the most 
decisive feature of tribal identity: personal and tribal honor. Tribal customary law, 
which refers to pre-Islamic practice, traditionally obliges the tribes to protect the urban 
population of those cities within their domain as well as the connecting pathways.71 
This obligation has survived to this day, as shown during the upheavals in 2011-12. 72
“The notions of a single place called “al-Yaman” and of one Yemeni people are 
old ones. […] In addition, Yemenis have a sense of a shared history and are 
inclined to define themselves in terms of a vaguely recollected past greatness. 
[…] At the same time, most Yemenis equate being Yemeni with being Muslim. 
65 | Eder et al., 2003, 36.
66 | Eder et al., 2003, 36.
67 | Adra, 2010, 71.
68 | Whereas water rights regularly define the actual property rights over land, in: 
Lichtenthäler, 2000, 144ff.
69 | Arabic: ārḍaka ¿arḍak.
70 | Dresch, 1993, 334.
71 | Oftentimes cities were declared “designated sanctuaries (hijrahs) where violence 
was prohibited.  Tribes still tend to avoid warfare within dwellings, in: Adra, 2010, 85; Also 
See: Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 5.
72 | Al-Dawsari on the role of “Tribal Governance,” in: Al-Dawsari, 2012; Lewis, 2014, 4.
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The Islamic nature of Yemen and Yemenis is implicit and is assumed to be in the 
nature of things.” 73
(Robert D. Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Yemen)
Despite the differentiation between tribes and tribal federations, all tribes north 
and south share a mutual feeling of being Yemeni. As Burrows rightly summarizes: 
“The notions of a single place called ‘al-Yaman’ and of one Yemeni people are 
old ones.”74 Historic references and cultural commonalities are connected by 
belief and language. In terms of Eder’s categories of identity coding, the belief 
system of Islam adds a “universalistic” dimension to Yemeni identity, shifting 
the ultimate source of identity to the transcendent realm. Overlapping with what 
can be considered the “traditional coding” of identity, the religious practices of 
Islam are shared by all tribes and, at least in the south, these are not crossed by 
sectariaan divides. 75 In addition to that, the tribal and local dialects are very close 
to classic Qur’anic Arabic and thus Yemeni tribes share an understanding of “high 
Arabic,” the basis for written standard Arabic. 76 In conclusion, common ancestry, 
tribal structures, and the similarity of customs and codes have provided the often 
competing Yemeni tribes of both north and south with a shared social framework, 
a “lowest common denominator” valid all over Yemen until modern times.
3.3  Defining against the “British Other”: Who is “the Urban Adeni”?
“A visitor to Aden in that period [of the 1950s] had the impression that Aden was 
an alien city in Arab country.” 77 
After depicting the tribe as the central reference of identity formation in both 
Yemens, the following section takes a closer look at the impact of British colonial 
interference on the socio-politico milieu in Aden and its hinterland, especially the 
Western Aden Protectorate. The major focus is on the evolution of a specific urban 
identity in Aden that is considered a decisive prerequisite for the independence 
movement against colonial occupation and thus for the emergence of an Arab 
version of Marxism in South Yemen.
The British Crown settled for a strategy to maximize political influence 
outside the city of Aden at a minimum cost by using what they considered to 
be the existing power structures and binding the majority of sultans to advisory 
73 | National identity, traditional, in: Burrowes, 2010, 254.
74 | Burrowes, 2010, 254; Also see. Lewis, 2014, 32.
75 | As opposed to the political north, Yemen’s south does not suffer from sectarian 
divisions as the prevailing majority considers itself scha’āf ī Sunnī, Manea, 2010, 4.
76 | Stookey, 1982, 3.
77 | Muheirez, Abdallah Ahmad, 1985, in: Dahlgren, 2000, 8.
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treaties.78 This approach at the time appeared to be the most practical to secure 
the port of Aden from the threat posed by often uncooperative tribes from the 
hinterland. As a consequence, the intensity of British rule decreased in accordance 
with growing distance from the city that led to a socio-political dissolution 
between Aden and the hinterland, including a “buffer” or “transitional zone” 
surrounding it. 79 Current research even suggests two distinct strategies of 
British colonial rule toward the port of Aden and its “hinterland,” defining spaces 
as “city” and “tribe,” to ensure the safety of Aden’s port and its trade routes over 
land and sea. 80 According to Willis, the British had defined a “tribal space” in 
Aden’s hinterland. There, the occupational policy was to exert a type of indirect 
rule by preserving “traditional, social, and political forms.” In contrast to this 
policy, Aden society was to be recreated as a “colonial civil society” based on a 
strong “commercial class.” 81  
Regardless of British intent, British rule in any case had established the 
preconditions for the emergence of a distinct identity of “the urban Adeni” in a 
metropolitan society alien to the Yemeni context. Even though still connected to 
the hinterland by tribal and economic ties, the “Protectorate of Aden” introduced 
a new way of life in a place that its contemporaries considered “the most politically 
sophisticated territory in Arabia.”82 Aden emerged as a cosmopolitan island which 
had grown beyond its socio-politico surroundings. Based on Benedict Anderson’s 
concept of “official nationalism,” the following section shows how British 
occupation policy actually facilitated the emergence of this distinct identity with 
some national connotations among the population of Aden.
On the Way to a True Cosmopolitan: The Creation of an Adeni Public
The Crown Colony at the Gulf of Aden had been intended to emerge as the main 
shipping center of the British-Indian trade route, a “new Singapore,”83 and at that 
time was considered geopolitically invaluable in connecting the continents of 
Europe, Africa, and Asia.84 With the Suez Canal still open, the decades before and 
after World War II caused an economic and societal boom in Aden.85 From 1931 to 
78 | Arabic: ṣulṭān; Before colonization “the power of the sultan was [...] contingent upon 
support given him by the tribes and townspeople” and had to rely on the power of sheikhs 
who themselves were “subject to some degree of scrutiny by those who selected them.” in: 
Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 9f; Also see: Willis, in: Al-Rasheed, 2004, 122.
79 | Manea, 2010, 5.
80 | Willis, in: Al-Rasheed, 2004, 120.  
81 | Willis, in: Al-Rasheed, 2004, 121f.
82 | Holden, 1966, 25.
83 | Willis, in: Al-Rasheed, 2004, 120.
84 | Gavin, 1975, 22ff.
85 | Brehony, 2011, 5.
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1946 the city population increased by more than seventy percent86 and employment 
opportunities drew workers from the whole country and even Yemen’s neighbors.87 
Aden lived through the establishment of the Western capitalist system based on 
industrialized production in less than two decades. This included the detachment 
of the city from the traditional Yemeni social system of dependency between 
the rural tribes and the “townsfolk.” During this rapid transformation, Aden’s 
industrializing society saw the formation of classes with a growing crowd of wage-
workers.88 This political incubation was supplemented by the founding of several 
newspapers, political clubs, and blue-collar unions: in 1956 twenty-five of these 
unions organized in the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC).89 Without doubt, 
these were the beginnings of a modern public in the city of Aden.
“Official nationalism” encompasses the effort to merge the “nation” with the 
dynastic power into a congruent whole - a venture which Anderson debunks as 
the attempt of the colonial power to conceal the discrepancy between the evolving 
national consciousness of the ruled and the dissonant nationality of the rulers. 
While all characteristics of “official nationalism” described by Anderson emerged 
within British colonial rule in Aden, 90 one of them has to be considered the most 
decisive in terms of creating the Adeni society and catalyzing the emergence of a 
distinct “Adeni identity”: compulsory standardized education based on the model 
of British public schools:
“An educational system was set up based on the public-school ethos with Arab- 
Islamic overlay.[…]The British brought boys from Sayyid and other influential 
families into a milieu where free thought was encouraged.”91
Paradoxically, it was British education that created several of the preconditions 
for the identity of the “urban Adenis” and thus for the future revolutionaries to 
emerge: Access to political writings, room to discuss new ideas, and sufficient 
literacy to publish them. In addition to that, British rule established a modern 
economy that offered jobs for qualified workers and employers, thereby providing 
for another space of political engagement. In Anderson’s words economy and 
education
86 | Dresch, 2000, 58.
87 | Dresch, 2000, 71ff; Stookey, 1978, 31-57. 
88 | Slaughter, 1985, 24.
89 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 23. On the political clubs see: ibid, 15.
90 | Anderson points out five characteristics of “official nationalism”: state education, 
propaganda, rewriting history, militarism and affirmation of the dynasty, in: Anderson: 
1983, 101.
91 | Mackintosh-Smith, 1997, 164.
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“constituted simultaneously a colonial community and an upper class. [This 
class  was] economically subjected and exploited, but [was] essential to the 
stability of the empire.”92
Willis builds on and reformulates Gidden’s interpretation with regard to the 
Aden case: According to Willis, the British had actively sought to transform “the 
social and political and social identities of the colonized with the constitution of 
society and economy as objects of rule, and more specifically, urban commercial 
society.”93 The “urban Adenis” were mobilized by the hope of transforming from 
political subjects, in this case second-class subjects to the Crown, to equal citizens 
of an independent state in which the rulers and the ruled  belonged to the same 
nation.94
Defining the “Urban Adeni”: Why the Former Yemeni “Ruling Class” 
Joined Forces with the Poor
The question remains how and why the better-educated and all in all better-off 
Sayyid sons came to join the poor and multi-ethnic wage-workers and unemployed 
for the same cause. At that time, “discontents of the very poor and complaints of the 
more privileged coincided only in anti-colonial rhetoric.”95 While the “privileged” 
were involved in riots caused by English opposition to employing Egyptian and 
thus Arabic teachers in 1958, the reasons for the workers’ “discontent” were of 
a very different nature, as they suffered from unemployment and hunger. What 
united these quite different worlds was an anti-colonial “resentment”96 that in 
Gellner’s words regularly stems from the fact that “the rulers of the political unit 
belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled.”97 This “resentment” 
was caused by the shared experience of objectification through British policies. In 
addition to that, unlike in India, the British never transferred any power to the 
new and educated indigenous class the Empire had created among the colonized 
population of Aden. Until 1937, the British exercised Aden’s official business 
from Bombay and the Bombay Presidency.98 As a consequence, the overpowering 
presence of Indian and thus alien culture appeared to “dominate the country.”99 
All this diminished, or maybe veiled, the differences which might have otherwise 
surfaced between the “educated” and the “working class” Adeni.
92 | Anderson, 1983, 58.
93 | Willis, in: Al-Rasheed, 2004.
94 | Gellner, 1983, 1.
95 | Dresch, 2000, 85.
96 | Fanon, 2004, 89.
97 | Gellner, 1983, 1.
98 | Under its executive, the Governor General of India in Delhi; Blumi, in: Al-Rasheed/
Vitalis, 2004, 122; Burrowes, 2010, 73.
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All in all, the general character of British colonial rule helped to the Yemenis and 
Arabs in Aden overcome their differences by shifting the focus on the even bigger 
differences between the Arab “Adenis” and the foreigners. This further unity 
was further forged through policy tools, like the British census, that defined the 
distinction between rulers and ruled in the multi-ethnic society. In Aden, census 
categorization constructed individual and group identities “directly through its 
activities of counting and classifying,” but also “indirectly through the vigorous 
responses provoked among those counted and classified.”100 The categories of 
“Arab,” “European,” “Indian,” and “Jewish”101 created a coherent Arab identity, 
distinct from the identities of the minorities. These minorities were associated 
with British rule and embodied the “other” against which Adenis defined 
themselves. About two-thirds of Aden’s population were of Arabic decent, but not 
even half of them were “Adeni-born”: British records simply did not distinguish 
between Adenis, Yemeni Arabs and Arabs of other origin.102 Even though the 
Arab population would not forget its national origins at first, this categorization 
allowed all of the urban population in Aden to identify with the city, no matter 
where they came from. In the colony, the Empire ruled through European and 
Indian clerks and officials. This practice exposed “the imperium as a protracted, 
almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferiors, or less advanced 
peoples.”103 While Indian clerks and tradespeople governed the “Adenis” through 
administration and employment, these administrative and political acts created 
the category of the “Adeni” and with it the identity of the “urban Adeni.”
However, the British census categorizations did not only unify the Arab 
melting-pot of Aden and add to the construction of the urban Adeni identity. They 
also furthered the establishment of Arab nationalism as the notion that allowed 
the Adenis to identify as cosmopolitan and Arabic, while still maintaining their 
religious identification. “The urban Adeni” could have been a religious blue-collar 
worker, one of the first teachers of Yemeni origin teaching in Arabic and English, 
or an atheist intellectual who brought home new ideas from his studies in Cairo 
or Damascus. And even though Aden’s society and economic system fostered the 
emergence of class, it did not seem to matter much at the time, as every “Arab” 
shared the same relationship to the occupying power. The collective identity of the 
urban Adenis was coded “primordially” by a shared feeling of “Arabness” based 
on origin, promoted by the “universalistic” code of Arab nationalism and framed 
by a vague, but powerful nationalist idea of being “Yemeni.” Both dimensions 
formed the boundary toward the “other” represented by British occupation. 
Simultaneously, “the urban Adeni” adapted new practices established by the 
British, such as the daily walk to the workplace, reading the newspaper or listening 
100 | Berman, in: Eisenberg/Kymlicka, 2011,  54
101 | Aden Population 1839 to 1955, Appendix B, in Gavin, 1975, 445.
102 | Gavin, 1975, 445.
103 | Said, 1993, 10.
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to the radio, and attending political meetings. These practices can be considered 
the fragile beginning of a shared tradition among “the urban Adenis.” 
3.4  A “Tribal Identit y” under British Rule?
“[The Western Aden Protectorate] was a mosaic of principalities governed by 
emirs, sultans, sheikhs, each jealous of his nominal sovereignty, and peopled by 
tribes so resistant to outside influence that even the most doctrinaire of London 
theoreticians could not seriously contemplate direct rule by British officials.”104 
The intensity of British rule decreased the further away one was from Aden. 
While this very modest form of British rule beyond Aden had served the Empire’s 
interest for a long time, it became clear that London would not consider giving 
up its strategic and economic pivot between Europe and India any time soon. 
Thus, as a reaction to the fear of losing authority over the port of Aden, the Crown 
transformed its indirect rule to a proper Crown Colony in 1937, in part due to the 
unrest in India and the resulting increased importance of Aden to the British 
economy. 105 However, Yemeni resistance became more and more pressing. Thus, 
the Crown devoted significant resources to a campaign in the 1950s to ensure the 
support of the more powerful sheikhs in their Protectorates and to unify South 
Yemen as the Federation of South Arabia (FSA).
Final Throes of British Occupation: The Failure of the Federation of 
South Arabia
Based on the initiative of the Governor of Aden Sir Tom Hickinbotham, the 
Empire’s last attempt to unify the South under its rule was the “Federation of South 
Arabia.”106 Hickinbotham had developed the idea of a unified “south Arabia” as 
the nationalist counterpart to pan-Yemeni nationalism. His successor, Sir William 
Luce, continued this policy and created the Federation of Arab Emirates of the 
South (FAAS) by unifying six major players. In combination with “Britain’s only 
claim to presence in the area defensible before world opinion […], her treaties with 
the twenty-five relatively major ruling houses,”107 the next governor, Sir Charles 
H. Johnson, aimed to finally merge the FAAS and the Western Aden Protectorate 
into the Federation of South Arabia (FSA). However, this foray, which tried to 
mobilize tribal support by relying on what the British considered to be tribal 
hierarchies, turned out to be a disaster. In the end, former south Yemeni allies 
turned their backs on the Crown and denied it their signature.108 Despite several 
104 | Stookey, 1982, 51.
105 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 13.
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other participating leaders, the Federation never came into force. Two days after 
the British had gathered all their signatures, Imam Ahmad, ruler of the north, 
died in his sleep and in so doing freed the way for the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).
While the country had expected Aden to be the first “liberated place” in Yemen 
and thus the birthplace of Yemeni unity, the establishment of a republic in the 
north came as a surprise. The fire of violent resistance in Aden was fed with new 
inspiration, and started to smolder within the tribes far away from the city as well. 
Obviously, the Empire’s officials had mistaken the lordly demeanor of the sheikhs 
as the ruling power of absolute monarchs. But apart from some exceptions for 
imams, 109 the tribes traditionally relied on the quality of their leadership with 
regard to “qabyalah,” the shared values of tribal identity in Yemen. Unfortunately 
for the British policy, not all members of the tribes seemed to agree with the 
decision of their sheikhs to collaborate with the British. Clearly, the British 
administration had no ideas to offer the “rifle-carrying tribesmen” that could 
compete with Cairo’s resounding appeals to Arab brotherhood and denunciations 
of colonialism.”110 It came as a big surprise for the British when, pressured by their 
tribesmen, many of the leaders broke their alliance with the colonial power.
British Perceptions of the “Yemeni Character”
One may speculate about the British (male) perspective on Yemeni political 
behavior by piecing together some attitudes and opinions of the time. Hamilton, 
a British officer who served in the Crown Colony before and during the Second 
World War, suggested that tribal political life followed very different rules than 
the British had assumed. Hamilton noted a difference from the Western tradition 
of hierarchical rule:111 “Yemeni tribesmen didn’t seem to understand the word 
‘rule.’ They were in fact shy of ruling.”112 With this statement, though expressed in 
colonial language, Hamilton might not to be too far off from characterizing Yemeni 
societal organization. According to the tribal ideal, tribal customary law is based 
on egalitarian principles. Honor and tribal virtues are considered universal for 
every member of the tribes and thus neither wealth nor power of the individual or 
the tribe should have any implications for the validity or application of tribal law.113 
The power of tribal leaders is supposed to rely on the quality of their leadership, 
while the relation to the clan members is comparable to the concept “primus inter 
pares.”114 Tribal self-definition crystallizes around the ideal of the tribesman as a 
109 | In this case polit. authority is hierarchical and derived from a relig. leader, an Imām.
110 | Gavin, 1975, 333.
111 | On the origins of “Feudalism,” see: Onuf, 2013 (1989), 216; Spruyt, 1996 (1994), 36ff.
112 | For a more thorough assessment of Hamilton’s and other British officals’ views on 
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“man of his word,” courageous, generous, independent, and dutiful with respect 
to kinship and his wards. Thus, not violence and coercion, but rather persuasion 
through argumentation, reparations, and intercession are considered the desirable 
and honorable solutions for social conflict. This interdependence of tribal honor, 
virtue, and the traditional customary rules is summarized by the Arabic term 
“qabyalah.” Regardless of the actual realization of these virtues in social life, the 
Yemeni approach to the distribution of political power was alien to the processes 
of generating and perpetuating Western political hierarchies.
The Impact of Modernization on Traditional Tribal Lifest yle
In the late 19th century, much of the so-called Middle East had entered the 
“modern world [while the] centralization of imperial administrations and military 
modernization went hand in hand.”115 Whereas the larger part of the Arab world 
embraced “modernization,” the impact on Yemeni tribes, even from the bigger 
Yemeni cities themselves, had been minimal. As a consequence, the “ways of 
modernity” reached the remote tribes much later than more populated parts of 
Yemen. When the tribes finally had to deal with “modernization,” they regularly 
refused any involvement beyond what their traditional lifestyle could easily 
incorporate. This can be explained by tribal identities’ extremely low degree of 
“responsiveness,” as described above. The ideas promoting individualism, but also 
bureaucratic authority, simply did not resonate well with tribal identity.
Tribal lifestyle blocked the British from accessing the social tribal sphere. If 
there was any at all, contact with the British colonial power was kept highly official 
and restricted to the political realm. Cooperation with the colonial power was one 
option among others for the tribes, typically reserved for when political necessity 
demanded it and it would not transform into long-term arrangements with the 
occupying power. Even though the tribes “lacked the conveniences associated with 
industrial society, they maintained a pride in their own heritage and civilization 
that contrasted radically with the attitude of colonized peoples. Not well-informed 
about modern industrial and technological capabilities, rural Yemenis had very 
little reason to question the validity of their own civilization that once controlled 
the coffee trade, commerce in silk and spices from Asia, and the legendary incense 
route.”116 Not surprisingly, the tribes usually considered themselves as an equal, 
if not superior partner to the British. The tribal leaders and fighters outside Aden 
and its closer hinterland had no reason to consider themselves inferior and it can 
be doubted whether they actually felt oppressed by the British presence before 
British air strikes reached their homes.
Not all of the tribes had regular exposure to the British and even fewer considered 
them a dominating colonial power. But eventually contact with modernization 
115 | Choueiri, 2002, 650.
116 | Adra, 2010, 65. On Yemeni consciousness of its pre-Islamic history also see: 
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did have an impact, as soon as some notions were translated into a language 
more fitting to the social context. Technical advancement remedied the gap in 
knowledge on the “modern ways.” Radio broadcasts from Cairo, and after 1962 
also from Sana’a, delivered colonial occupation as well as the solution to “a mass 
audience among the poor and the remote”117 in the Yemeni hinterland. The radio 
broadcasts coincided with the British expansion of infrastructure. By building 
roads and rail tracks, the British often disrupted the supplementary incomes 
of many tribes from “levying tolls or transporting goods by camel.”118 All of a 
sudden, the southern tribes suffered from hardships that they could link directly 
to the British presence.
Arab nationalism, in conjunction with Nasser’s Arab version of socialism,119 
translated “Western” ideas like the nation and the state into concepts closer to 
Arab social development.120 The ideas of Arab nationalism assumed a strong 
national identification within the Arab countries based on “distinct ethnic rights 
and histories”121 shared by all Arab people. It formulated “anti-colonial” notions 
and – in its extremist guise – called for violent resistance against domination. Thus 
Arab nationalism both raised awareness of the foreign power, but also offered 
a framework for the southern tribes to comprehend their negative experiences 
with the colonial power. Arab socialism as a political concept, on the other hand, 
not only explicitly included religion but derived its constitutive political values 
from Islam. As a consequence, nationalism was transformed into something 
more attractive for people whose identity was strongly connected to their ethnic 
history and Islam. Thus it can be coded “universalistic” and “traditional.” Both the 
construct of Arab nationalism and the moderate ideas of Arab socialism resonated 
well with the tribal codes of independence, autonomy, and warfare. Even among 
tribes hostile to each other could now express a common history and culture with 
their neighbors. Thus, the British Empire paradoxically served as a unifying force: 
without disturbing the coherence of “qabyalah” among the tribes in the process, 
the British served as the invading, foreign power that promoted the construction 
of a Yemeni nation.
117 | Gavin, 1975, 333.
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4. IDEOLOGICAL TEMPL ATES: POLITICAL INFLuENCES FROM ThE 
MIDDLE E AST AND EuROPE
 “It was not until af ter the Second World War that an ideology arose that was 
capable of binding together and organizing South Yemeni opposition to colonial 
rule: Arab nationalism.”122
This study considers the creation and establishment of South Yemen as an 
independent state a process of “nation- and state-building” that was actively 
pursued from the inside by South Yemen’s political leaders, but also from the 
outside, by East Germany and its delegates on behalf of Moscow. Based on the 
findings of the preceding subchapter, “Determining a Yemeni Identity in the 
South,” the following section focuses on the milieu of the political epicenter Aden 
during the last two decades before independence. What are the reasons that the 
ideology of Marxism-Leninism finally prevailed against competing ideological 
concepts available and promoted at the time?
Two major concepts are identified as the dominant sources of inspiration and 
direction for the political actors in South Yemen: Arab nationalism and socialism/
Marxism. While the former originated in the region of the wider Middle East itself, 
the latter was a concept alien to the region. Though the two concepts commingled 
all over the Arab world, they emerged in very different shapes, by including various 
local nationalisms. How was it possible for two locally distinct and, content-wise, 
very different ideologies to coexist and even mix? What actor or actors made this 
connection in South Yemen? To understand the role of ideology in South Yemen’s 
early years of nation-building, and thus to be able to assess the impact of external 
ideological involvement by the GDR and Soviet Union on this process, the origins 
of the NLF/NF’s vague, mixed, and multi-layered ideological presumptions need 
a thorough exploration.
4.1  “Awake, O Arabs, and Arise!:”123  
“Arab Nationalism” as yet another Ideological Golem124
The origins of a specific Arab nationalism can be traced back to the Ottoman 
Empire. Universal demands for a unified Arab independence had not yet been 
made and opposition to Ottoman rule had not yet envisioned a post-Ottoman 
order. With the “Arab Revolt” against British rule and Jewish settlement in 
Palestine in 1920, the first notions of the Arab nation mutated gradually into an 
122 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 13.
123 | Al-Yazij ī, Ibrahim, 1868. Even though the poem was not being printed at that time 
it became one of the most powerful slogans of the self-declared movements of Arab 
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overarching concept and party that degenerated into what Mann considers the 
“perversion” of the idea of the nation: a legitimization for “aggressive action 
against other nations.”125 What followed was the “anti-imperialistic” phase of Arab 
nationalism. “Imperialism” was defined as the aftermath of colonialism and as “a 
form of indirect domination” which supposedly “serv[ed] no other purpose but to 
perpetuate the underdevelopment of newly independent states.”126
However, the shared attitude of “anti-imperialism” among the Arab states 
only lasted until they lost the war against the new Israeli state in 1948. After this 
defeat, it became more and more difficult to blame “imperialism” alone for the 
discord within the Arab world. Nonetheless, some advocates of Arab nationalism 
tried to reform the concept by incorporating socialist ideas. The anti-imperialist 
perspective of Arab nationalism and the political attitudes it generated among the 
urban population have to be considered one of Marxism-Leninism’s advantages in 
establishing itself as a political alternative. Arab nationalism grew into something 
revolutionary and somewhat international in a Marxist sense.127 In the following 
section, Arab nationalism is defined in such a way to distinguish its transformation 
toward Arab versions of socialism in Egypt and the Yemeni version of Marxism-
Leninism, and also to emphasize its role in “preparing the ground” for Marxism-
Leninism to eventually prevail in the traditional society of South Yemen.
Arabia – The Impossible Nation?
“No European nationalism has claimed a potential constituency as large, as 
far flung, or as fragmented.”128 This observation gets to the heart of analytical 
difficulties when approaching the notion of Arab nationalism, but also hints at 
the reasons for the concept’s durability. The demise of Arab nationalism has been 
proclaimed again and again in academia,129 and with a few exceptions, the concept 
vanished from the academic agenda about two decades ago.130 Nonetheless, it 
has persistently resurfaced from time to time in references to the Arab world as 
a political entity. During the Arab uprisings of 2011, analysts were surprised of 
its absence from slogans, while the uprisings themselves nonetheless had Arab 
connotations.131 More importantly, its core ideas have been kept alive in movements 
like Arab socialism/Nasserism, Ba’athism, and even Islamic fundamentalism.132 
With Anderson’s conception of the nation in mind,133 this relevance becomes 
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evident. According to Anderson’s approach, nations have to be imagined as a 
“community,” as ”sovereign,” and as “limited,” with other nations lying outside 
these boundaries. The latter prerequisite is closely linked to “membership”: Who 
is part of the nation, and who is not? Answering this question with regard to the 
“Arab nation” turns out to be an almost impossible task: Cultural, religious and 
even communicative characteristics of the Arab nation overlap and dissolve within 
societies one might at first identify as Arab. This is mainly due to two historic 
phenomena: First, the spread of Islam from the Muslim sanctuaries of Mecca 
and Medina in the late the 7th century had in fact been a military conquest.134 
Supported by the migration of Arab people to the conquered regions and their 
mixing with local populations, the conquest included vast territories in North and 
West Africa as well as Asia, spanning from Andalucía in the West to Pakistan in 
the East.135 Second, large parts of this former Arab realm had fallen under foreign 
rule at one time or the other, both Muslim and Christian. The dynasty of the 
Turco-Mongolian ruler Timor in the 14th century, the Ottomans a century later, 
and finally European colonial rule136 had brought their people to the conquered 
territories, but also displaced the local populations by force and attracted the 
conquered population to their own home lands. Hence, Arab nationalism can be 
described by Anderson’s “imagined community” in the literal sense of the word. 
Its “community” could not rely on a homogenous constituency and thus had 
to explicitly create, that is to imagine, its boundaries. Only after inventing and 
constructing this community, did it become possible to formulate the demands 
for Arab “sovereignty,” meaning external sovereignty delineating against outside 
interference.
Mostly due to the heterogeneity of its members, the “[v]ariations of Arab nationalism 
multiplied”137 right after the notion was created: the results of the concept’s 
impact on the different regions and countries of the Arab world differed widely. 
Hence, generalizations are difficult to make and usually oversimplified. Thus, the 
following analysis offers a means to substantiate “Arab nationalism” as a collective 
identity constructed based on the dimension of “membership.” “Membership” is 
created on the inside by “internal self-identification,” including a shared history, 
geography, and values, but also from the outside by “categorization” of an external 
agent. Colonial rule is considered the adversary on both the in- and outside against 
which the Arab community defined itself. The analysis relies on several major 
theorems of three authors: Anderson’s concept of “official nationalism,”138 Said’s 
134 | Hourani, 2003, 44-50.
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notion of “resistance,”139 and lastly Gellner’s basic definition of nationalism as 
political congruence.140
Occupation and Colonialism as Midwives of Arabian Identit y
The Ottoman Empire had been damaged severely by its Christian subjects’ demands 
for self-determination and finally independence.141 The Ottomans struggled hard to 
prevent its Arab subjects from following suit. One of the major turning points was 
Sultan Abdulhamid II’s attempt to cast a new Ottoman identity during the last third 
of the 19th century.142 Following the integrative state reforms of his predecessors,143 
Abdulhamid’s efforts significantly intensified in scope and penetration. Anderson’s 
concept of “official nationalism”144 offers an explanation for the correlation between 
the Sultan’s policy and the rise of Arab nationalism: The major integrative factor 
among the Turkish and the Arab population had always been the shared belief of 
Islam. Thus Abdulhamid utilized the notion of “pan-Islamism” for his own ends to 
affirm the identity of his dynasty and the nation. He invented a “political imagery 
of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, turning his personage in the process into a 
holy symbol of Islamic power and Ottoman invincibility.”145 Not much later, he 
complemented this notion by introducing Turkish as the official language of state 
at the expense of Arabic and other languages “to give the polyglot Empire more of 
the character of a European nation-state.”146 Before, the Empire had relied heavily 
on Arabic as its second lingua franca in administration as well as standardized 
primary education.147
Both of Abdulhamid’s policy measures triggered attempts to save the “Arab 
heritage” within the Ottoman Empire and to renew cultural Arab consciousness. 
The movement radiated from an “Arab literary revival” in Beirut at its center to 
Egypt, Greater Syria and Tunisia.148 “Cultural Arabism”149 became the intellectual 
home for the Arab-speaking elite of the Empire’s administration and military, but 
soon turned against the Empire’s structures that had promoted and accommodated 
this cultural identity: While the Ottoman army had played a highly integrative role 
among the various groups within the Empire for centuries, it could not withstand 
the separate nationalisms seeping into its ranks. Apart from unveiled competition 
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between Christians and Muslims within the state apparatus, “grievances of those 
[Arabs] passed over”150 during replacement periods for administrative positions 
furthered general dissatisfaction. Then, the final decades of the Empire saw an 
“Arab Revolt” against Ottoman rule, led by a local potentate of Mecca: Sharif 
Husayn.151
Initially, “cultural Arabism” created an “Arab community” under the “political 
umbrella”152 of the Ottoman Empire. But the change in Ottoman policies turned 
out to be a catalyst for the simmering discord within the state institutions, 
creating a new awareness of Arab identity in contrast to the “Ottoman Other.”153 
Naturally, the dynastic realms, when confronted by the “decline of automatic 
legitimacy”154 derived from divinity, felt increasingly threatened by the emerging 
national consciousness of its subjects. This is what Anderson considers the crucial 
moment of “official nationalism.” As a pre-emptive strike, the dynasties tried to 
“rewrite history” and establish their own “top-down” version of nationalism as a 
substitute for the popular “bottom-up” nationalisms155 that endangered their rule. 
But despite the propagandistic efforts of the Ottoman Sultan and his entourage, 
their occupation policy did not grow into a viable nationalism with the Sultan at 
its center. Rather, it facilitated the emergence of an Arab national identity among 
the population. “[W]hile the Ottoman Empire lasted, […] Arabism did not develop 
into full-fledged nationalism.”156 Kramer reasons that the image of the “Arab 
nation,” the ultimate goal of this nationalism, at the time was merely a belief of 
the supporters of the “Arab revolt.” To forge it into a mass ideology, it would have 
needed another theoretical basis, lending the “Arab nation” a legitimacy that could 
transcend people’s mundane existence. The solution was to abandon the French 
notion of the nation, which considered it a voluntary contract. Instead, the “Arab 
nation” was interpreted as a “sleeping-Beauty,” a destined community, “bound by 
the mystery of language and lore”157 that mingled with the growing militarism in 
the Empire.
George Antonius: Father of Arab Nationalism?
The transformation of Arab nationalism from a specific phenomenon within the 
Ottoman realm to a universalistic notion valid for all Arabs is associated with 
150 | Kramer, 1993, 175.
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one particular author. Born into a Christian Orthodox family in Lebanon, George 
Antonius, a Cambridge graduate, served in the British Mandate of Palestine.158 
The fact that he “adopt[ed] a secular form of Arab nationalism, rather than Pan-
Islamism”159 is usually explained by his liberal Western education. However, his 
concerns were initially purely political. His monograph “The Arab Awakening” of 
1938160 criticized the British policy in Palestine mostly in political terms.
“[T]he British government, seeking to retain its empire, declined to 
acknowledge openly, or act upon, his findings.”161 But Antonius was not very 
popular among other Arab patriots either, who criticized his “affinity with the 
West and loyalty to Great Britain.”162 Regardless, his work became one of the most 
influential translations of the Western conceptualization of nationalism in the 
Arab world. As Hobsbawm has pointed out for “traditions” in general, there had to 
exist some connection between the nation and the social structures preceding it 
to make its claim of being “pre-historic” plausible. Nationalism ”sometimes takes 
pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and 
often obliterates pre-existing cultures,”163 as Gellner summarizes. By borrowing 
from what had been there before, the new nation appeared more familiar to its 
new members.
This is exactly what Antonius did. He dated the first call for Arab self-
determination back to the publication of Ibrahim Al-Yaziji’s ode in 1868: “Awake, 
O Arabs, and arise!” and declared the following developments up to his own time 
as the “awakening” of the Arab nation. In so doing, he successfully connected the 
person of Al-Yaziji and other political authors and poets of the previous centuries 
with himself and the current political situation. Al-Yaziji’s poem already implies 
that there had existed a collective of the “Arabs” which could be addressed by it. 
Antonius sketches the Arab nation as a “sleeping beauty” that had to be awakened. 
Thus he successfully built his narrative of the Arab people on the “style by which 
one is defined by the nation, which in turn derives its authority from a supposedly 
unbroken tradition.”164 Antonius successfully created what Said called the “guiding 
imagination”165 for the independence movements promoted by Arab scholars, a 
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“cultural Arabism”166 based on a common language and the (re-)construction of a 
shared heritage.
Nationalism in the Arab world not only relied on revived Arab literature, 
but also on an even more significant element of the Arab culture. Even though 
Antonius’ thoughts had been explicitly secular, his concepts were flexible enough 
to transcend the religious divide. The shared codes and customs of Islam were 
transferred from the “pre-existing”167 to the new culture of nationalism. Arab 
nationalism in the beginning first and foremost had been a political concept 
that had emerged as a “critique of the state of the Ottoman Empire.”168 And even 
though Antonius’ secular notion of “Arab nationalism” was detached from Islamic 
thought, it did not question or diminish religion. Thus it was able to integrate Islam 
as a unifying factor and source of legitimacy. As a consequence, the role of religion 
in the formation of Arab nationalism has to be considered supportive in some 
cases and restrictive in others.169 When the main identity markers offered by this 
new nation resonated with people’s collective identities, they were incorporated 
into the identity of the Arab nation.
4.2  Arab Nationalism absorbs Soviet and Maoist Thought: A South 
Arabian Version of Mar xism-Leninism
Nasser’s Socialism: The Link between Arab Nationalism and Marxism?
Political setbacks and military debacles deprived Arab nationalism of its velocity 
as a universal ideology. Nonetheless, Arab nationalism as an idea evolved and was 
able to survive by mingling with other ideologies, notably socialism and Marxism-
Leninism. The most prominent and likely most influential case of reshaping 
Arab nationalism through socialism was Nasser’s construct of Arab socialism.170 
Increasing commercial, political, and cultural interconnectedness of governments 
and governed all over the world brought the ideas of “the Bolshevik revolution” and 
the “American notions of the right of self-determination” to the Near and Middle 
East where they fed indigenous national movements. As Said puts it, “a new global 
166 | Choueiri, 2000, 66.
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consciousness connect[ed] all the various local arenas of anti-imperial contest.”171 
Nasser’s Arab socialism “turned Arab nationalism [sic!] into an ideology based on 
a radical programme,”172  as written in his National Charter of 1962.
The Charter declared socialism the “inevitable result of a new revolutionary 
age of social change” realized by “popular progressive forces.” It painted Arab 
unity as the long-term goal preconditioned by socialism. It also named the 
adversaries of the Arab world in unmistakably leftist fashion: imperialism and 
local reactionaries. Nasser’s concept was able to trigger the feelings of “Arabism” 
which had hatched from “anti-Turkish opposition” and had been simmering all 
over the region since the first upheavals against Ottoman rule. Arab socialism 
explicitly included religion and derived its constitutive political values from Islam. 
It had transformed the Arab nationalism into something more attractive for people 
whose identity was mostly coded “universalistic” but still strongly connected 
to religion. And while the Middle East soon saw a considerable decline of Arab 
Socialism, the aftermath of both concepts, Arab nationalism and socialism, 
thrived in radicalized milieus of second-wave decolonizing countries.
So what is the link between these concepts and the future YSP-regime? A “mood 
of nationalism [was] sweeping the Arab world.”173 But in Yemen this mood not 
only took root in the two major cities of Aden and Sana’a. The idea of the Yemeni 
nation was beginning to spread all over the country, and by the 1950s these ideas 
had found a foothold even in the mountainous northwest of South Yemen.174  The 
major impact of “revolutionary writing” can be dated back to several copies of 
“The Nature of Oppression” by al-Qawakibi. 175 In 1944 they were smuggled into 
Sana’a and passed on to the south. Tribal affiliations of returning intellectuals who 
“trans-coded” the writings to their kinsmen skirted official channels, ignoring 
regulations and borders. The social structure of tribal Yemen, mostly considered 
a stumbling block for change, facilitated the distribution of ideas like no other. 
In the tribal hinterland, Yemen’s major threshold to social change, illiteracy, was 
bypassed by the new medium of radio broadcast176 and the strong family ties of 
intellectuals.
Countless political movements began to form across the country, most of 
them inspired by Nasser’s Arab socialism. Nasserism already used socialist 
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ideals as a possible “ideological core of nationalism and its true identity”177 for 
the newly independent states. According to Choueiri, this included “a socialist 
plan of [economic and political] reconstruction and regeneration”178 in each 
country, meaning a socialist plan of nation- and thus state-building. In the long 
run, all socialist Arab countries were to unite as one Arab nation under Egyptian 
leadership. Based on a network of personal and tribal allegiances,179 all movements 
in Yemen were either connected to Sana’a or the city of Aden, the future center 
of the South Yemeni liberation movement. Several of the early leading figures of 
the NLF, like Muhammad Saleh Yafa’I, had committed themselves to this version 
of Arab socialism.180 Among the many sympathizers was the forerunner of the 
future South Yemeni regime, the highly active Aden branch of the Movement of 
Arab Nationalists.181 
South Yemen and the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN)
Founded in Beirut by Palestinian students under George Habash’s leadership182 
in the early 1950s, the MAN’s first cell was established in Aden at the end of the 
decade. Burrowes comments on the importance of these early years for the future 
South Yemeni regime:
“The fact that the regime in the PDRY was the only one in the Arab world that 
could trace its ideological roots directly to the old [MAN], as well as to the 
Marxism-Leninism of the PFLP, helps explain the special relationship and sense 
of kinship that existed between [Habash] and the leaders of the YSP in the PDRY 
through the 1980s.”183
Over the coming years, both Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) and the NLF, formerly South Yemeni MAN, not only oriented itself toward 
but kept drawing from the development of Nasserism.  It also cultivated an 
extreme approach to “revenge” against the “usurpation of Palestine by Zionism.”184 
Nasser had included the ideas of Arab nationalism and Arab unity in his political 
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ideology to appeal to everyone identifying as “Arab.” Hence, the failure of political 
experiments in the name of Arab nationalism, namely the United Arab Republic,185 
and especially Nasser’s defeat in the Six-Day War, deprived Nasserism of its 
universalist appeal and left the Arab world disillusioned. Clearly, Nasser’s star 
was on the wane: Just like many other movements inspired by Nasser, the MAN 
turned away from his approach,186 gradually radicalized and disaggregated into 
Marxist cells, among them the notorious terrorist group of Wadī Haddad. 187 And 
while the majority of the MAN’s branches sank into insignificance, the Yemeni 
MAN not only survived, but reinvented itself as a revolutionary movement. In 
1963, the South Yemeni MAN had reformed itself as a merger of six groups under 
the new name National Liberation Front (NLF). The members of the NLF preferred 
“Guerrilla warfare, as developed in North Vietnam and Cuba”188 over Nasserist 
reform and thus adopted violence as a major tool to achieve their agenda. In the 
very same year, the NLF launched the Radfan Rebellion, the decisive spark toward 
revolutionary struggle against the British. The NLF and its successor, the Yemeni 
Socialist Party (YSP), would evoke images of these “heroic” years of struggle for 
political purposes on a regular basis.
Ideolog y and the Singularit y of the South Yemeni Case
In his comprehensive overview “The Communist Movement in the Arab World,” 
Ismael explores “the Communists’ inability to adapt Marxist-Leninist ideology 
to Arab societies and to traditional Arab cultural norms and traditions.”189 How 
was it possible for the NLF to overcome this apparent threshold of “traditional 
Arab cultural norms,” when no other regime in the Arab world had been willing 
and able to do so? The next section takes a closer look at Ismael’s arguments. 
Both concepts, Arab nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, in the long-run aimed 
to overcome national boundaries, while the revolutionaries of the liberation 
movements instead aspired to establish a nation-state:
“As fervent Yemeni nationalists, though, few of these young men were captive 
to the pan-Arabism of these ideologies. Instead, most of them were drawn to 
these ideologies by their goals of national strength and development, and by 
the strong state to achieve those goals. In short, they were statist ideologies, 
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and most of the young Yemenis became statists.”190 Thus, any ideology able to 
capture the support of the majority of young politicized Yemeni men at the time 
had to include the idea of a nation-state based on the image of “one Yemeni 
homeland.”191
How was the nation brought back into ideologies that had emphasized 
the international as the ultimate goal of their struggle, then? While Arab 
nationalism had already tried and failed to move beyond the stage of the 
nation-state,192 Marxism-Leninism offered a feasible solution for this dilemma 
based on Lenin’s writings and his theory of imperialism: The nation-state was 
redefined as the transitional stage on the way to “Internationalism” and declared 
the installation of an elitist national vanguard party was to lead the masses to 
acquire first socialism and then Marxism as the sine qua non for this transition. 
This vanguard party was supposed to induce the establishment of a socialist 
state as a remedy to “imperialism as the final stage of capitalism.” Here, Lenin 
introduced the notion of “neo-colonialism,” which included the idea of continued 
domination even “after a colonial nation had attained independence.”193 This 
notion of “neo-colonialism,” and its implicit critique of imperialism, is what the 
otherwise contradictory projects of Arab nationalism and Marxism-Leninism 
had in common: The opposition to external and hostile  forces. As a consequence, 
postcolonial liberation movements who full-heartedly had embraced the notion 
of “Arab nationalism” were now able to shift their allegiance to the Marxist-
Leninist idea of “anti-imperialism.”
In his argument Ismael also lists the lack of “objective conditions of indus-
trialization”194 in the Arab world as a reason for the minimal penetration of 
Marxist-Leninist notions there. This clearly was not the case for industrialized 
Aden in the 1940s and 1950s, thriving as it was on the mechanisms of capitalism. 
However, the creation of modern public space that accompanied the emergence of 
capitalism in Aden has to be considered the pivotal factor in connecting ideology 
to reality. It was the possibility to discuss the new reality of modern, industrialized 
life under capitalism that opened Adeni society for Marxist critiques of capitalism. 
In addition to that, British policy indirectly facilitated the spread of these notions 
190 | Burrowes, 2005, 171.
191 | Halliday, 2002 (1990), 99-139.
192 | “On February 1 1958, the unification of Syria and Egypt was heralded as the first 
step in the revival of the Arab nation. Less than four years later the union was torn asunder.” 
in: Palmer, 1966, 50. Also see: Seale, 1961.
193 | Ismael, 2005, 4f. Also see: On the notion of “neo-colonialism”; also see: Chapter 17. 
Moscow, East Berlin and the “Hawks of Hadramaut.”
194 | Ismael, 2005, 2.
CHAPTER 9. Forging a National Identity in Yemen’s South 
220
in written form. Anderson considers the combination of the capitalist system with 
the technology of print the main catalyst for the development of nations. 
According to Anderson, “print-capitalism” facilitates the transformation from 
a local community to what he describes as the abstract “imagined community,”195 
the nation. For Anderson, the written word is the basis for national consciousness, 
which has to unify members of the future nation who have never met and possibly 
will never meet. Only in combination with mass reproduction and a certain degree 
of literacy can it have any impact. In Aden all these conditions came together. 
Both literacy and “print-capitalism” were rendered possible by the British. Their 
schooling system granted the Adenis access to alternative ways of political 
organization and enabled them to share their opinions. Not surprisingly, it was a 
newspaper that initially reformulated ”south Arabia” “as culturally a single entity,” 
the Yemen.196
Apart from the prevalence of a vanguard party, other reasons for the emergence 
of the only Marxist state in Arabia can be found in the mutual enhancement of 
and reconciliation between the diverse ideological convictions of these leaders: 
Arab nationalism, socialism and Marxism-Leninism. In conclusion, three unique 
features of the Yemeni case relevant to this ideological merger can be detected. 
First, the South Yemeni emerged from the industrialized, cosmopolitan island of 
Aden, created by the colonial approach of the British that led to a distinct identity 
of “the urban Adeni.” The milieu of the “urban Adeni” appeared to be significantly 
more receptive to the Marxist critique of capitalism and imperialism than other 
urban centers of the Arab world, as both phenomena were part of the daily lives 
of the Adeni population and not just abstract ideas. Second, the forerunner of the 
revolutionary Yemeni party NLF, the MAN, considered itself first and foremost 
an academic elite – one of many possible reasons that its most radical members 
turned toward Lenin’s idea of the vanguard as “leader of the masses.” Third, 
change in what the British had defined as “tribal space” had begun. Far away in 
time and place from the urban center of Aden, the notion of “Arab nationalism” 
had considerable impact on peoples’ thinking there. This notion drew on the pre-
existing image of the “Yemeni homeland” stemming from pre-Islamic times.197 
This effect transformed into the modern idea of the “Yemeni nation” as one of 
the “finest Arab societies.” The internalization of nationalist notions has to be 
considered a necessary condition for the tribes’ interest in the developments in the 
“city space” of Aden and furthermore prepared the ground for the reconnection of 
the “cosmopolitan island” with the South Yemeni hinterland in the joint “struggle 
for independence” that was to follow.
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5.  SYNThE TIC POLITICS IN YEMEN’S SOuTh: A MAR XIST STATE 
FROM SCR ATCh
“The early leaders of the NLF planned not simply to bring about the withdrawal 
of the British presence, but to break down the entire tribal structure of the 
protectorates, destroy the Sultan system on which the South Arabian Federation 
was being constructed and create a classless, disciplined society out of the 
ashes. […] What they lacked in sophistication they made up for in ruthlessness 
and willingness to fight long, hard and if necessary dir ty.”198
The liberation movement in South Yemen was highly fragmented. Countless 
groups would fight together one day and against each other on the next. In the 
late 1950s, two groups had taken the lead as the two major political movements,199 
the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and the successor 
to the Aden MAN, the National Liberation Front (NLF). Outside Yemen, FLOSY 
had been considered the most influential and organized of the various movements 
– not only by the British, but also by Egypt and the Soviet Union. Not even by 
November 1967 had Moscow decided which fraction to support, FLOSY or NLF, 
and was holding back its support until the “winner” emerged.200
How and why did this most extremist group among the South Yemeni prevail 
in the internal struggle for political leadership and establish itself in one of the 
most traditional societies of the Arab world? Scholars of Yemen’s modern history 
present structural as well as descriptive approaches to this puzzle. While they 
agree on a complex set of reasons for the NLF’s successful seizure of power, the 
scholars apply different focuses in their analyses. Whereas Brehony emphasizes 
the failure of the British to modernize Aden’s hinterland and the NLF’s close ties 
to the tribes there,201 Gavin describes the military victories of the NLF against 
both the British and the FLOSY in minute detail.202 Dresch focuses on the loss 
of power of the local sheikhs.203 According to him, this was the main reason that 
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the NLF was able to link “country and city” by infiltrating all relevant political 
and tribal groups. Stookey complements these observations with the “enormous 
appeal of the principle of armed action […] among the masses.”204 The following 
analysis includes all of these explanatory factors, but centers them on the role of 
identity with regard to social change, an area that has been widely neglected by 
all authors.205
5.1  The NLF between the Escalation of Violence and Ideological 
Restraint
The two dominant groups of the South Yemeni “liberation struggle,” FLOSY and 
NLF, used very different strategies to realize their own political vision for a future 
South Yemeni state. On the one hand, FLOSY and its intellectual leaders seemed 
willing to make concessions with regard to the British Empire’s withdrawal and 
thus could focus on their fight against the NLF. The NLF on the other hand 
refused to cooperate with the colonial power and decided to fight not only the 
more moderate FLOSY, but any other competitor suspected of “collaboration” 
with the occupying force. Clearly, the NLF seemed to have opted for the less 
promising path: Strictly following their policy of “zero tolerance” on their way 
to power, the NLF and its leaders more or less eliminated their competitors for 
political leadership by force within only a few years. Among the most powerful 
social groups were the trade unions. Even though some of their leaders politically 
prevailed, their organization did not survive the NLF’s crusade: The most powerful 
union, the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC), was accused of being “an agent 
of the British.”206 Finally, ATUC literally was decapitated when NLF fighter and 
chief ideologue Abd Al-Fattah Ismail killed the ATUC leader in February 1966. 
Ali Husayn al-Qadi had been the major integrative figure between the working 
unions, Ba’athist and nationalist circles and his death erased any influence these 
groups might have had.207 In the same year, NLF and FLOSY were pushed by 
Cairo to merge. But due to their huge ideological and political differences, the NLF 
quickly left the joint venture and its new leader Abdullah al-Asnag behind, opting 
instead to fight them in the hills of the countryside and the streets of Aden. 208
However, the NLF had never been a homogeneous movement, either. In the late 
1960s the NLF was dominated by two major camps and it hadn’t been decided yet 
which political direction would prevail within movement. Until 1965, the leader of 
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the more pragmatic wing, Qahtan al-Sha’abi, had been the movement’s politically 
experienced father-figure who boasted a strong tribal background and pretty 
much shaped the public face of the NLF. He was opposed by a smaller group of 
utopian Marxists inspired by their main ideologue Abd al-Fattah Ismail. 209 As a 
consequence, any statement made by an NLF functionary at the time had to meet 
the lowest common denominator of the two fractions. Thus, the radical approach 
displayed in the NLF’s writings was not what dominated the NLF’s public image 
during the crucial years of power struggle. Instead, the movement relied heavily 
on nationalist and anti-colonial rhetoric which appealed to a significantly larger 
constituency. Marxist rhetoric was reduced to moderate clichés congruent with 
general notions of Arab Socialism of the time. Especially within the tribal realm, 
the NLF’s activities were undertaken with little to no communist influence and 
generally avoided interfering with tribal social structures.210 It seems unlikely 
that the NLF consciously opted for a pragmatic strategy with regard to their true 
political intentions so that they could appeal to a broader audience. Rather political 
restraint has to be regarded as a side effect of the small proportion of intellectuals 
within the NLF and the necessity to include the opposing factions within the 
movement. Nonetheless, this pragmatic restraint allowed for tribal and moderate 
forces to join the NLF’s fight.
From the very beginning it had been the explicit goal of the extreme fraction 
within the NLF to “transform […] existing social relations”211 by abolishing all pre-
existing social structures and replacing them with a new, classless society. Thus, 
it may be assumed that illiteracy of the tribes accidentally had helped the NLF: 
Their radical documents were not accessible to most of their tribal supporters. 
Calls for a united Yemen that was free from British rule were widely accepted by 
tribal Yemen – the abolishment of society as it had existed for centuries certainly 
was not. Indeed, the reason for the NLF’s prevalence may be found in their ability 
to include quite solid and thus low-responsive tribal identities. For this, in the 
following section three major reasons are identified: Ideological restraint in the 
early years, the appeal of the NLF’s violence to the tribes, and tribal affiliations 
among the NLF’s leading figures.
5.2  Tribal Affiliations: On Yemeni Pride and Independent Thinking
 “The poor region of high, jagged mountain peaks and deep, steep-sided, rock-
strewn ravines in South Yemen is where the [NLF] translated tribal dissidence 
into the star t of its guerrilla war against Great Britain in October 1963.”212
209 | Arabic: “Abd Al-Fattah Ismā” īl.
210 | Halliday, in: Braun, 1981, 44.
211 | NLF statement in Mukallā, in: Dresch, 2000, 120.
212 | Burrowes, 2010, 301.
CHAPTER 9. Forging a National Identity in Yemen’s South 
224
Mainly due to the first closure of the Suez Canal in 1956-57 and its resulting 
economic hardships, the late 1950s were characterized by upheaval and general 
political unrest in Aden and the hinterland. This is where resistance finally turned 
into violence. In October 1963 fighting broke out in the mountains of Radfan north 
of Aden against the local emir who was invested in and backed by the British. 
To this day, October 14 1963 is commemorated as the “Day of Independence.”213 
However, as Dresch rightly notes, the “Rebellion of Radfan” may neither easily be 
interpreted as a “class struggle,” nor as a fight against “colonialism.” The eruption 
of violence of 1963 and the following years was the result of crisscrossing political, 
economic, and also personal motivations of groups and individuals. However, 
while “fighting in the countryside […] could be taken for tribalism [by the British], 
events in Aden could not.”214 When fighting reached Aden and grew into an urban 
guerilla-war, the city became the focal point at which the simmering discontent of 
decades flowed into a political revolution – a revolution driven by a diffuse Adeni/
Yemeni identity with the common goal of national independence.
Arab nationalism and socialism had taken root among the workers and actors 
from the “provincial lower middle-class” emerged as their political leaders who 
tried to channel the city’s movement into the hinterland. But while no “translation” 
was necessary for the workers of Aden, modern ideas only took root among the 
tribes after being trans-coded by Arab nationalism and a moderate Arab socialism. 
And while print had brought the new concepts to the urban Adeni intellectuals, 
it was not before radio broadcast reached the tribal lands that a modern national 
consciousness began to emerge. The new technology did not rely on written but 
spoken standardized Arabic which was comparably close to the Arabic spoken by 
the Yemeni tribes. It was radio that linked the illiterate majority of the Yemeni 
population, including the tribes, with the cosmopolitan, intellectual leaders of 
the independence movement in Aden215 - by making the Yemeni people “aware 
of one’s self”216 as belonging to the same people. This was the common ground 
necessary to establish the shared national consciousness of a Yemeni identity and 
to bridge the very different identities of the two different worlds in the “city” and 
the “tribal space.”
Of Tribal Pride and Independence: Why Follow Mar xist Leaders?
Yemen’s tribal identity had turned out to be rather insusceptible to external 
influence at the time, while also refusing to internalize the “picture of their own 
inferiority” as the dominance and “misrecognition”217 of British colonial rule 
had suggested. Tribal communities are among the strongest forms of political 
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organization with regard to identification while characterized by a low “degree 
of responsiveness” to change. Maybe tribal identities in Yemen can even be 
considered immune to what Fanon describes as “resentment”218 caused by colonial 
oppression. As Adra convincingly observes, Yemenis
“maintained a pride in their own heritage and civilization that contrasted 
radically with the attitudes of colonized peoples. Not well informed about 
modern industrial and technological capabilities, rural Yemenis had very lit tle 
reason to question the validity of their own civilization.”219
Nonetheless, British presence had intensified, especially after World War I, with 
the aim of securing Aden’s trade routes over land and thus had given up its 
policy of “non-intervention” in the hinterland. The new ideas of Arab and Yemeni 
empowerment were communicated at a time when the British occupation started 
to be perceived as a potential threat to tribal lifestyle. Thus, while anti-colonial 
notions with socialist accents inspired the Adenis, nationalism united the tribes. 
The NLF profited from both the impact of Arab nationalism on tribal identities and 
the awakening resistance against the colonial power.
During the “revolutionary years,” the NLF’s ideology as a mobilizing force for 
political support had focused on the evolving national consciousness of the people 
to “integrate society” while keeping any extremist rhetoric out of the public eye. 
Yemeni society probably was ignorant of the looming ramifications of a future NLF 
regime. The NLF’s reluctance to any compromise with regard to the British pullout 
distracted attention away from their extremist political stance. Prone to violence but 
at the same time victorious, the NLF enjoyed tribal acknowledgment and respect 
due to their regional ties:
“The term “regionalism” means that a given regime, however ideologically 
uniform and institutionally centralized, nevertheless operates according to 
primordial, regional-tribal inclinations that govern both its main political 
groups and their leaders. […] [I]t was a combination of regional perceptions 
mingled with outlooks they developed on the job that shaped the revolutionary 
concepts of Aden’s leaders.”220
With this, Kostiner nicely sums up the revolutionary leader’s political identity 
in the NLF as an unlikely combination of Marxism-Leninist ideology and tribal 
regionalism. Tribal support and acceptance for the NLF’s version of Yemeni 
identity were carried by its nationalist aspect, which resonated well with some of 
218 | Fanon, 2004, 89.
219 | Adra, 2010, 65.
220 | Kostiner, 1990, 14 and 16.
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the core markers of tribal identity: Independence from foreign interference and 
the shared values of qabyalah.
5.3  Conclusion: How the Radical NLF and Its Ideolog y Prevailed
Without doubt the British Federation’s proposal of January 1954 finally “marked 
the turning of the tide in the Aden Protectorate”221 for the British colonial presence. 
However, this also became the turning point in the power struggle within the 
independence movement. The international esteem of FLOSY caused many 
observers to overlook the standing and power position of the NLF. FLOSY had 
recruited mostly from the new “provincial middle-class” with their leaders being 
drawn from what has been described as the highly educated “urban Adeni.” In 
contrast to this, only a few of the NLF’s leaders “had received a higher education.”222 
As a result, FLOSY’s supporters within the city exceeded the NLF’s followers by far. 
But what constituted FLOSY’s source of strength around the “Crater”223 turned out 
to be their major weakness in the hinterland and beyond. FLOSY “and its associates 
lacked both the NLF’s organization outside Aden and its ability to mount military 
and terrorist attacks.”224 And while FLOSY missed the opportunity to connect with 
the tribes, the NLF’s leaders enjoyed strong tribal affiliations.
In the end, FLOSY was neither able to benefit from the mobilizing effects of 
resistance nor the shared national consciousness. Their moderate approach to 
violence did nothing to improve their relationship with the tribes, who regularly 
preferred a quick and violent policy toward the British. Favoured by the international 
players and the occupational power itself, FLOSY lost standing and credibility 
among the radicalized masses in the city in the end. The NLF on the other hand 
successfully adopted the opposite strategy by rejecting any compromises with regard 
to the British pull-out. As soon as the British forces had withdrawn in the summer 
of 1967, the NLF overthrew those it considered to be “enemies” of the revolution, the 
supposedly “co-opted” sultans, sheikhs, and FLOSY.225 To the surprise of many at the 
time, the NLF was more than a lose assembly of fierce fighters: It was well-organized 
internally and able to draw from a widely interconnected network of supporters 
all over the Arab world who only revealed themselves during the independence 
negotiations with the British.
221 | Kostiner, 1990, 333.
222 | However, some of its later leading figures, among them Abd al-Fattah Ismail and Ali 
Nasir Mohammed, were well-educated. Brehony, 2011, 31.
223 | What is Aden downtown today used to be the main commercial area of the city. It 
is located in the crater of a dead volcano. See: Aden, Aden Colony and the Port of Aden, 
Burrowes, 2000, 10ff.
224 | Brehony, 2011, 20 and 25.
225 | Brehony, 2011, 27.
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All in all British presence had had a decisive impact on national Yemeni 
identity both in negative as well as in positive terms. The negative impact 
refers to the creation of boundaries against the British as “the other,” while the 
positive focuses on the establishment of new identity markers provided by British 
occupation policy. And while the British dual policy toward the “city” and the 
“tribal space” had affected the respective identities in very different ways, it had 
fostered the unification of an otherwise highly fragmented Yemeni society. Facing 
a common external threat, the tribal glorification of warfare in Yemen was used 
and politicized by political groups in a way that can be described by Said’s concept 
of “resistance.”226 As the shared reaction to dominance among people identifying 
themselves with the same “nation,” “resistance” became the unifying factor of 
otherwise fragmented and even competing revolutionary factions in Aden. Thus, 
and paradoxically, without British colonial rule there would not have been any 
identities in Yemen receptive to the rather intellectually extremist ideas promoted 
by the NLF.
At first, British colonial policy had prevented the emergence of a “national 
consciousness or a national opposition to the colonial rule,”227 as it fully controlled 
access to the city and even attempted to use existing conflicts and competition 
between sultans and hinterland sheikhs for its own ends. The British Crown had 
not reckoned with any significant resistance to their policy, as the British had 
won the allegiance of what they considered the major tribal rulers. The British 
had realized “Arab nationalism to be the most effective instrument of wrestling 
the eastern Arab world from Ottoman control.”228 When they tried to use this 
powerful notion for their own ends in Yemen’s south, Yemeni nationalism had 
already begun to engulf all of Yemeni territory under British control. Afterward, 
the Empire was not able to adapt its strategy and had to consider Aden a lost cause.
When British occupation was nearing its end, Yemenis began to incorporate 
traditional images of al-Yaman, its ancient pre-Islamic history, and also its role in 
the Arab world after the expansion of Islam, with new conceptualizations of the 
modern nation. As Said points out, the shared feeling of belonging to a “nation” 
usually is caused by the wish “to see the community’s history whole, coherently, 
integrally.”229 Regularly this includes a strong ideology that gives the community 
new meaning. Thus, it seems reasonable that the political group that appeared 
most likely to provide Yemeni society with an ideology capable of transporting this 
meaning while simultaneously being compatible with existing identity markers of 
the majority would be the most likely to succeed. Eder acknowledges the “steering 
226 | Said, 1993, xii.
227 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 13f.
228 | Choueiri, 2002, 654.
229 | Said, 1993, 215.
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effect,”230 that is, the speeches and actions of political leaders, might have helped 
the construction of collective identities. With regard to the masses in Aden on 
the one hand and the very different audience in the tribal areas on the other, this 
suggests the ability of the NLF’s political leaders to “translate” their vision of a 
Yemeni nation-state in a way that responded to the identities of both, the “urban 
Adeni” and the tribal fighters envisioning a Yemeni nation-state. However, it must 
be assumed that this was only possible due to the lack of clear communication of 
the NLF’s true intentions: The radical left of the NLF intended to create not only 
a new state and nation but also a brand new society, a vision of their very own 
interpretation of a Marxist state. 
230 | Eder et al., 2003, 105.
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CHAPTER 10. Methodological Prelude:  
Connecting the Case Study, the Foreign Policy Phase Analysis, 
and the State- and Nation-Building Approach
During the early 1950s, neither North nor South Yemen played a significant role 
in West German foreign policy. While Aden was little more than a port occupied 
by British forces, the North remained an unimportant player even on the regional 
level. The reasons why Bonn nevertheless engaged in the north of Yemen while 
East Germany became as the major partner of the South Yemeni regime are 
sketched out in this chapter. Accordingly, the two major analytical methods of this 
case study, foreign policy phase analysis and the dimensions of state-building, are 
introduced and related to the case itself.
1.  TWO GERMANYS, TWO YEMENS AND ThE COLD WAR: hOW E AST 
BERLIN “LOST” ThE NORTh AND “WON” ThE SOuTh
With regard to West German interests in North Yemen, Berggötz rightly 
summarizes:
“Taking into consideration the relevant criteria [of foreign policy], [North] Yemen 
without doubt ranked at the very bottom of potential partners for the Federal 
Republic in the Near East […]: Politically and socially even more backwards 
than Saudi Arabia, just as poor as Jordan, and located at a peripheral strategic 
position, it presented itself susceptible to offers from the Eastern Bloc – There 
did not exist many reasons to be interested in the country.”1
Nevertheless, the FRG engaged relatively early with the Yemeni Kingdom. By 
1960 Bonn had already opened an office in its capital Sana’a.2 In the context of 
West Germany’s limited resources and its major foreign policy goal at the time – to 
1 | Berggötz, 1998, 309f.
2 | Arabic: Ṣanʿā, in: Festschrif t, 1999, 4.
230
vindicate itself among the international community of states – this move seemed to 
be nothing short of odd. However, another foreign policy priority was at stake here. 
The East German state, regarded by Bonn as a non-state and unlawful competitor 
to the claim to the German nation, had opened a trade mission with consular 
rights there only four years prior. This was considered a threat to Bonn’s claim of 
exclusively representing the German people.
When reconsidering East Berlin’s foreign policy focus in the first two decades 
of its existence, the establishment of this trade mission in a traditional, supposedly 
“feudal” monarchy, must be considered just as unusual. The GDR’s focal countries 
of the time usually were potential “socialist” allies that boasted an active “liberation 
movement.” In Sana’a this clearly was not the case. For East Berlin’s early interest 
in North Yemen, other reasons existed: First, Arab nationalism and Nasserism 
had found their way to the isolated North of Yemen during the 1950s and there 
were plenty of personal ties between Cairo and the MAN. Clearly, East Berlin 
nourished the hope that Yemen would follow the revolutionaries in Egypt, Syria, 
and Iraq. Second, and maybe more importantly, North Yemen did not appear to 
be a top priority for West German foreign policy in the Middle East in the 1950s – 
reason enough for East Berlin to seize the opportunity.
1.1  Yemen: Place of Interest for the Superpowers?
Bonn’s sudden interest in the Yemeni Kingdom came as quite a surprise for East 
Berlin. But Bonn’s engagement in a place of such minor political and economic 
potential cannot simply be interpreted as a counter-policy to the East German 
presence. The answer can instead be found in the wider framework of the Cold 
War and its major players. South Yemen had started to slip from British grip, while 
Washington hadn’t fully established itself in the region yet. Accordingly, Moscow 
tentatively initiated the expansion of its influence in the Middle East.
In 1955, Imam Yahya renewed Yemen’s Trade Agreement with Moscow3 
and received considerable aid in return. Correspondingly, the GDR initiated its 
first contacts when the Crown Prince visited East Berlin in the following year4 
and opened a commercial agency in Taiz.5 The Soviet Union was dedicated to 
including Yemen’s north within its sphere of influence. Washington and London 
3 | The trade agreement between the two states had first been signed in 1928. Braun, 
1981, 35.
4 | Besuch des Kronprinzen des Königreichs Jemen 1956 in Ost-Berlin, in: Kronprinz des 
Königreichs Jemen, Emir Seif el-Islam Moahmmed el-Badr, vom 25. Juni bis 2. Juli 1956 
in Berlin, in: DzAPR-DDR III, 1956, 687 und Besuch des Ministers für Post-, Telegrafen- 
und Telefonwesen des Königreiches Jemen, Qadi Abdulla Ben Ahmend el Hagri, 1961, in: 
DzAPR-DDR IX, 1962, 452.
5 | Berggötz, 1998, 312.
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considered it was high time to act to secure the possible new ally for the West, as 
the American representative at the time remarked:
“[The] increasing Soviet infiltration in Yemen induced the British and U.S. 
American government to advice the Federal Government [of Germany] on the 
establishment of a representation in Yemen. The intention was an improvement 
of the Western position [in the region].“6
The political putsch of 1962, inspired by Egypt’s “Free Officers Movement,” 
endangered these hopes for a Western foothold in the north, as well as for Bonn’s 
Hallstein Doctrine. How much West Germany feared for the recognition of the 
GDR by this new Yemeni Republic is demonstrated by Bonn’s rather hasty move to 
recognize the Yemen Arab Republic as the first country from the Western sphere.7
1.2  Sana’a’s Seesaw Policy in the Cold War
The newly founded Arab Republic of Yemen followed Cairo’s seesaw policy 
towards East and West, remaining an unstable ally for both sides until the end of 
the Cold War.8 The downfall of the pro-Egypt regime of Abdallah al-Sallal in 19679 
did not change the ambiguous nature of the YAR in the bipolar conflict. However, 
it became clear that the north would neither become the close ally Moscow had 
hoped for, nor would it further the GDR’s international diplomatic recognition in 
the region:
“North Yemen, working closely with Egypt under President Sallal, had been a 
hot candidate for recognition, even more so when diplomatic relations were 
established with South Yemen in spring of 1969. Literally every day, we expected 
North Yemen to follow. In July 1969 the relations to the Federal Republic were 
reestablished. That was rather an unexpected blow.”10
Indeed the YAR’s move was unexpected, as this strategic decision of Sana’a 
threatened to isolate the country in the region. A majority of “progressive” Arab 
states had been boycotting West Germany’s political rapprochement with and 
support of Israel since the so-called “Near East Crisis” in West German-Arab 
6 | “Errichtung einer ständigen Vertretung im Jemen,” Aufzeichnungen Voigt (316) April 
21 1958 and Gesprächsprotokoll von Scherpenberg/Trimble (Amerikanischer Gesandter), 
February 28 1958, in: PA AA, Abt. 7, Bd. 1058b, quoted in: Berggötz, 1998, 312.
7 | Berggötz, 1998, 313.
8 | On Egypt’s seesaw policy: Blasius, 1998, 748f.
9 | Al-Sallal Regime and Era, Burrowes, 2010, 334
10 | Interview with Fritz Balke May 23 2011.
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relations of 1965.11 As such it was the YAR that “broke the boycott imposed on 
West Germany by the Arab states.”12
Regardless of the danger of Sana’a’s isolation in the region, Bonn’s economic 
support seemed worthwhile to Sana’a. Burrowes comments: “For years thereafter, 
West Germany was the biggest and perhaps most successful donor of aid to the 
YAR.” As a consequence, the YAR declined the Eastern Bloc’s advances and 
abstained from any further rapprochement with the GDR. When in October 1969 
the YAR weakly spoke of “amicable relations with the GDR,”13 East Berlin and 
Moscow had “lost” the YAR as the closest ally in the region. The GDR reacted 
accordingly: Balke vividly remembers the “period of neglect” by East Berlin 
toward North Yemen and the East German representation in Sana’a that followed 
– especially in comparison with East German engagement in Aden.14
1.3  Where the GDR’s Foreign Policy Thrived: The Benefits of West 
German Absence and Soviet Long-Term Commitment in South 
Yemen
“The Federal Republic [of Germany] didn’t play any role there [in South Yemen], 
not even for us.” 
Hans Bauer, East German HV A Resident to Aden
While North Yemen turned out to be a “lost cause” for East Germany’s “Policy of 
Recognition,” South Yemen was quite a different matter. At first Bonn pursued 
the same strategy as they did in North Yemen. Immediately after South Yemen 
declared independence, FRG President Heinrich Lübke sent a telegram to 
recognize the young state and its government – almost 24 hours before the East 
German telegram arrived, very much to Ulbricht’s displeasure.15 After the first 
GDR delegation visited South Yemen in June 1968,16 the South Yemeni Minister 
of Agriculture returned the favor by visiting East Berlin July.17 Bonn reacted 
11 | During the so-called “Near East Crisis” of West German Middle East policy, many 
Arab countries determined diplomatic relations to Bonn, in: Blasius, 1998; Nahostkrise. 
Schlußbilanz [sic!], in: Zeit, March 19 1965. YAR’s President Al-Iryani even tried to justify his 
move as “unharmful to the Palestinian cause,” in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, No.147, June 20 1969.
12 | Germany, in: Burrowes, 2010, 138.
13 | Süddeutsche Zeitung July 22 1969.
14 | Interview with Fritz Balke May 23 2011.
15 | Informationstelegr. Wildau to the MfAA, Oct 30 1968, in: PA AA C 1125/71, 118-120.
16 | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Ministers für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Genossen 
Otto Winzer, mit dem Minister für Landwir tschaft und Bodenreform der VRDJ, Ahmed Saleh 
As-Shari [sic!], June 25 968, in: PA AA MfAA C 1223/71, 21.
17 | Programm für den Besuch S.E. MfL der VDRJ Herrn Achmed Salem Ashair [sic!] am 12. 
Und 13. Juli 1968 in Berlin, in: PA AA MfAA C 753/73, 14-16.
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swiftly. According to South Yemeni President Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi,18 
“West German offers for financial aid exceeded everything any other party had 
offered so far.”19 On August 30 1968, the West German Foreign office signed an 
agreement with South Yemen’s secretary of state for Ministry of Agriculture to 
“send three agricultural experts” and the pledge of ten million German marks 
in financial aid.20 Just as well, East German recognition was high on Moscow’s 
political agenda at the time and Soviet support contributed greatly to the first 
diplomatic recognitions of the GDR, among them the radical South Yemeni 
regime.
Even though Aden was neither internationally nor regionally important enough 
to have a big impact on widespread international recognition of the GDR or the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, South Yemen was to play its part in further 
diminishing the deterring effect of the Hallstein Doctrine, which had started 
to deteriorate in the preceding years:21 “Federal Minister Brandt reports on the 
diplomatic recognition of the ‘GDR’ by the general command of South Yemen 
on June 30th. He suggested to close the [West] German embassy at once and to 
withdraw the diplomatic personnel. [According to him] there did not exist any 
[West] German interests warranting protection in South Yemen. The mutual 
economic relations were insignificant. […] The Federal Chancellor [Kurt-Georg 
Kiesinger] agreed to this approach while emphasizing that this decision was no 
precedent for other severe cases of ‘recognition’ by other Arab states. More severe 
cases would cause more severe actions taken.”22
Despite of Chancellor Kiesinger having declared that Bonn’s behavior towards 
Aden could not be considered a precedent for West Germany’s policy towards 
Arab states recognizing the GDR in general, it was only two more years until the 
“Grundlagenvertrag” between the two Germanys was signed and Bonn recognized 
the GDR as a de-facto state.
The moment Aden officially established relations with East Berlin, Bonn 
immediately suspended theirs with the potentially Marxist regime by the Red 
Sea23  and did not reestablish diplomatic relations with Aden until September 
18 | Arabic: Qaḥtān Muḥammad al-Shaˁābī (short: Qahtan).
19 | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Genossen Kiesewetter mit dem sowjetischen 
gesandten, genosse K.P. Kusnezow, June 11 1969, in: PA AA MfAA 1223/71, 64. 
20 | Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Nr. 112, September 
7 1968, in: PA AA MfAA C 753/73, 13. 
21 | Gerlach, 2006, 65ff.
22 | Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, Vol. 22, 1969, 172. Kabinettssitzung am 
Mittwoch dem 2.Juli 1969, außerordentlicher Tagesordnungspunkt [B].
23 | Lamm/Kupper, 1976, 59.
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1974.24 Nonetheless, a considerable volume of trade between Bonn and Aden 
developed, especially in comparison to the official trade with the GDR.25 However, 
these allowances have to be considered an arrangement with merely practical 
benefits for South Yemen. West German involvement and influence in the PDRY 
remained almost non-existent.26 Bonn’s lack of activity had opened up a new venue 
for East German foreign policy free of Bonn’s usual diplomatic presence. Here, in 
the comparatively diplomatic no man’s land of this young and minor player, East 
Berlin found an opportunity for active involvement and seized it.
1.4  Soviet Interests in South Yemen and its Impact on East German 
Engagement
All in all, West Germany has to be considered an indirect determinant of the 
GDR’s foreign policy towards the PDRY, as it still shaped the GDR’s general 
foreign policy. Thus, the Soviet Union remains the only direct determinant of East 
German engagement in South Yemen. Due to the lack of access to the relevant 
archival material, Soviet policy in the Middle East in general and in South Yemen 
in particular can only be assessed based on Soviet actions. Halliday’s suggestion 
to consider these actions as a “response to, and rivalry with”27 the U.S. policy in 
the region may serve as a first guideline. This approach has already been taken 
into consideration in the short account of Soviet engagement in the Middle 
East in Chapter 8. From the very beginning, the Soviet Union had a watchful 
eye on nascent state by the Red Sea, though the full extent of Soviet long-term 
engagement did not become clear before the mid-1970s. The mid-term benefits of 
the Soviet-Yemeni relationship for Moscow serve as an indicator for the Kremlin’s 
actual interest in South Yemen:
“[The] USSR has gained access to the fine natural harbor of Aden near the straits 
of Bab el-Mandeb [sic!] and overlooking the Red Sea [and] she has secured a 
base for operations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.”28
Clearly, the poor, unstable, and politically isolated South Yemen first and foremost 
was of geostrategic interest for the USSR.
24 | Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, 172. Kabinettssitzung am Mittwoch dem 
2.Juli 1969, Tagesordnungspunkt [B] und 50. Kabinettssitzung, am Mittwoch dem 13. 
Februar 1974, Tagesordnungspunkt [C].
25 | Regardless of the suspension of relations, Halliday estimates about three times the 
volume for the period 1969–1977, Halliday, 1990, 76.
26 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
27 | Halliday, 1990, 180.
28 | Chubin, Adelphi Paper No.157, 1980, in: The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (Ed.), 301.
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Analysts of the early 1980s diagnose the PDRY being “almost totally dependent 
on the USSR” due to Aden’s extremist internal politics, as well as its foreign policy 
towards its neighbors and Israel.29 Regardless of the value of this assessment, the 
impression the Soviet-Yemeni relationship made on the international stage was 
that of a tightly-woven alliance based on shared ideological principles. And even 
though it may be doubted that Aden fully embraced Marxist-Leninist ideology, the 
fundamental ideas served as a binding force, initiating and then intensifying the 
bilateral relationship between the USSR and the PDRY through a shared “feeling 
of sameness” which served as a common source of identification. Moreover, the 
shared dissociation from a common hostile “other,” the “imperialist West,” unified 
the two very different actors in a common cause. And last but not least, what also 
helped to overcome these differences, was the role of a smaller version of the USSR 
in size, population, and also actions: The GDR.
2.  PhASES OF ThE GDR’S INvOLvEMENT IN SOuTh YEMEN: 
INTERNAL DE vELOPMENTS DE TERMINE E X TERNAL FOREIGN 
POLICY ENGAGEMENT
The following analysis of the GDR’s involvement in South Yemen roughly follows 
the same policy phases as those of Soviet involvement. This is not a coincidence. 
While foreign policy engagement of Moscow and East Berlin during the early 
years of the PDRY differed widely, the “Corrective Move” of 1969 changed that 
quickly. For the next two decades, East German and Soviet policies cannot 
be analyzed separately, as they were directed by Moscow to complement one 
another, and must be considered accordingly. As a consequence, this study 
suggests congruent phases of foreign policy engagement for both the GDR and 
the USSR, even though their levels and fields of engagement do differ on first 
glance.
Halliday, the most distinguished analyst of Soviet-South Yemeni relations, 
suggests the four presidencies as a basis to describe the changes in Soviet foreign 
policy towards Aden.30 Clearly, the presidencies do not simply represent political 
power distribution in the country. But they do give an initial idea of the political 
changes and “reshuffles” taking place. In conclusion, the four phases this study 
suggests follow internal turning points of South Yemeni politics,31 which also 
29 | Ibid., 301.
30 | Halliday, 1990, 189.
31 | Burrowes suggests five major periods by counting Ismail’s presidency from 1978 to 
1980 as a phase of its own. in: Burrowes, 2010, 278f. Nonetheless, four phases appear to 
provide a more fitting analytical framework. First and most importantly, the replacement 
of Ismail by Ali Nasir had no significant impact with regard to East German or even Soviet 
foreign policy. Secondly, Ismail’s exile in 1980 has to be considered one of the most 
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qualify as turning points in Aden’s relations to Moscow and East Berlin. However, 
it is not the Presidencies, but catalyst events that define these phases:
Phase I: The Phase of Sampling, 1963-67 to 1970;
Phase II: The Phase of Establishment and Expansion, 1970 to 1978;
Phase III: The Phase of Continuity and Consolidation, 1978 to 1986;
and Phase IV: The Phase of Neglect, 1986 to 1990.
The phases end with German and Yemeni unification, both of which coincided 
with the dissolution of the USSR. As this classification suggests, phases II and III 
are characterized by a continuous intensification of the GDR’s level of engagement, 
but also a diversification of fields of engagement. The reasons for this are explored 
by pointing to several events that might have reversed approximation between 
the GDR and Aden, but in the end  promoted and strengthened relations instead. 
These may not be considered turning-points but rather catalysts which provide the 
division between the two phases.
3.  FACTIONISM, ALLIANCES, AND E XECuTIONS AS POLITICAL 
ME ANS: ThE uNSTABLE MILIEu OF SOuTh YEMENI POLITICS
The following introduction to the developments in South Yemen serves as a rough 
framework for the characterization of foreign policy phases. The complex power 
constellations and shifts in South Yemen will be explored in greater depth as part 
of the phase analysis chapters on East Berlin’s foreign policy in Aden.
The struggle for independence and the early formative years of South Yemen’s 
existence are characterized by internal power struggles that remain difficult for both 
insiders and outside observers to properly comprehend. Nevertheless, the founding of 
the South Yemeni state was realized by revolutionaries in the truest sense of the word. 
Beyond Aden and its vicinity, the British had refrained from significant occupation, 
meaning only modest transport and communications infrastructure existed. The 
“hinterland” appeared detached from the political developments around Aden. And 
while the Yemeni rulers enjoyed no actual authority over all of South Yemen’s territory, 
lack of recognition and influence was mutual. Apart from the tribal ties of some of 
the NF revolutionaries that might have had a certain impact, the “hinterland” did not 
have much say in the future of its country. After the NLF’s victory against FLOSY and 
the British, disputes and plots erupted in the “Glorious Corrective Move” of 1969. 
The “Corrective Move” must be considered the turning point that determined South 
Yemen’s future as a Socialist state. While veteran leader Qahtan had hesitated to shut 
significant causes for the eruption of violence in 1986 but was merely a minor internal 
turning point in comparison to the other three identified in 1969–70, 1978, and 1986.
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the door on the West, his successor was more determined with regard to his position 
toward the two adversaries of the Cold War and their proxies. In June 1969, President 
Qahtan, a moderate, was replaced by Salim Rubayyi Ali32 and in July, Salmin’s new 
regime, now called the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen,33 recognized the GDR 
and established diplomatic relations.
During Salmin’s presidency, Moscow and East Berlin intensified their 
engagement, though Salmin acted hesitantly with regard to Moscow’s wishes 
for the formation of a vanguard party and its support of the Ethiopian rebels. 
NF chief ideologue Abd al-Fattah Ismail,34 however, showed his colors early on. 
Ismail, secretary-general of the NF, travelled to Moscow and East Berlin on a 
regular basis.35 Salmin at the time “was concentrating power too much in his own 
hands for the comfort of [Ismail, Ali Antar, and Ali Nasir Muhammad].”36 After an 
affair over a political contract-killing and mounting criticism, Salmin was forced 
to resign. His apparent reaction to this was the launching of a rocket attack on 
the CC meeting room and the residencies of Ismail and Ali Nasir Muhammad.37 
Salmin and two of his closest supporters were sentenced to death.
Salmin’s demise cleared the road for two long-term “friends” of Moscow: 
After Salimin’s presidency from 1970 to 1978 a six-month interlude of Ali Nasir 
followed. Then, Ismail, a long-time ally of Moscow and East Berlin, took over the 
presidency from 1978 until 1980. During Ismail’s short “reign,” the NF reformed 
as a Leninist vanguard party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, in 1978, an event that 
served as the major catalyst during this period and culminated in the signing 
of Treaties of Friendship with Moscow and East Berlin. Thus, despite Ismail’s 
deposition and exile in 1980, the high times of Soviet- and East German-South 
Yemeni relations of the late 1970s continued and remained at this level of intensity 
until the turning point of the 1986 crisis. In the bloody massacre of January 1986, 
Ali Nasir Muhammad and his closest allies organized a “preemptive” strike 
against Ali Nasir’s political opponents, among them Ismail, recently returned 
from his exile in Moscow.
With this attack against the majority of established political actors in Aden, the 
Aden’s relationships with Moscow and East Berlin were disrupted profoundly. 
Both connections had lived off personal relationships between Yemenis, Soviets 
and East Germans. A noticeable policy change followed. On first glace there was 
32 | Arabic: Sālim Rubiˁā ˁAl ī. (short: Salmin)
33 | Arabic: Jumhūr īyat Al-Yaman Al-Dīmuqrāṭīya Al-Shaˁabīya. (short: PDRY)
34 | Arabic: ‘Abd al-Fattaḥ Ismā” īl. (short: Ismail)
35 | Ismail’s first official visit as secretary-general of the NF was in July-August 1972, while 
he had travelled to the GDR before. Volksdemokratische Republik Jemen, zur Entwicklung 
des Landes, 1973, in: BStU MfS Allg. S. Nr.332/73, 8.
36 | Dresch, 2000, 147.
37 | Arabic: ˁAl ī Nāṣīr Muḥammad al-Ḥassanī. (short: Ali Nasir)
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not much to gain in Aden anymore for either East Berlin or Moscow after the 
Soviet Union’s loyal allies were removed from power. However, after several days 
of uncertainty, Moscow surprisingly introduced a strategy to stabilize the new 
leadership, and with it, the country. This strategy aimed at renewing Soviet-Yemeni 
relations. While the Kremlin had sided quickly with the new regime in Aden, 
Honecker decided otherwise for the GDR. Engagement was almost terminated 
fully and it took several years until East Berlin followed Moscow’s lead in actively 
approaching the new Aden regime and restoring relations to their old strength.
4.  ThE MA jOR hYPOThESIS: ThE GDR’S FOREIGN POLICY AS A 
POLICY OF SOCIALIST STATE- AND NATION-BuILDING
The brief overview on the extremely unstable milieu of South Yemeni politics 
above suggests that the level of East Berlin’s engagement highly depended on 
the internal political developments in the PDRY. This already illustrates the 
necessity to include the receiving side of foreign policy as an independent 
variable that explains foreign policy and its changes. As indicated above, the 
analysis of East Berlin’s engagement in South Yemen rests on a chronological 
scheme of phases that is focused on the turning points and catalyst events. These 
represent the change of the political situation in the country and the possibilities 
for or limitations on external actors’ ability to react. Each chapter focuses on the 
turning point that begins the phase as well as relevant catalyst events. To support 
and illustrate the argument, the most prominent events and political challenges 
are analyzed in more depth to be able to characterize the GDR’s foreign policy 
in South Yemen.
Each phase takes into consideration East-Berlin’s fields and levels of engagement 
and connects them with the major meta-hypothesis of this study: After diplomatic 
relations between East Berlin and Aden were established, the SED developed a new 
comprehensive bilateral policy towards South Yemen that was pursued with other 
close allies, such as Ethiopia. On behalf of Moscow and at the request of the South 
Yemeni regime, the GDR’s foreign policy emerged as a “Policy of State- and Nation-
Building.”38 This hypothesis is concerned with the intention of East Germany’s 
foreign policy in Aden: East Berlin aimed to duplicate the East German process 
of the “planned development of socialism.”39 Clearly, this goal brings to mind the 
Soviet Union’s policy towards Europe, when Moscow had “import[ed] certain key 
elements of the Soviet system into every nation occupied by the Red Army” after 
the end of the Second World War.40
38 | Also see subchapter “Foreign Policy: Where the Nation State Ends” in Chapter 3, 
“Analytical Approach: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreign Policy” of this study.
39 | German: planmäßiger Aufbau des Sozialismus. Schroeder, 2013, 110ff. 
40 | Applebaum, 2013, Introduction. 
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The following subsection summarizes the most important features of the 
“development of socialism” as introduced in Chapter 7 of this study.41 These are 
related to Hippler’s approach of the three preconditions needed for “successful” 
state- and nation-building42 to create an analytical framework for the GDR’s 
approach in South Yemen. Following Hippler’s precondition triangle for “successful 
state- and nation-building,” East German policy measures are grouped according 
to first, the emergence of a functional state apparatus, second, the “integration of 
society,” and third, the communication and acceptance of an “integrative ideology.”
4.1 Integrative Ideolog y
The “planned development of socialism” approach relies on the integrating force of 
ideology. As such it is based on Lenin’s three “inseparable elements”43 of Marxism-
Leninism:44 dialectic and historic materialism, political economy of capitalism and 
socialism, and scientific socialism. From the very beginning, Marxist-Leninist ideology 
served as the umbrella to integrate state and society. The ideology offered theoretical 
reasoning for concrete political approach and measures, as well as the motivation 
and justification for action. The two major ideological notions of the approach were 
mutually dependent: The creation of a vanguard party and its establishment at the 
center of the political system was based on the principle of “democratic centralism,” 
which included a strict hierarchy of authority. To acquire a “socialist, centralist unitary 
state according to the Soviet example,”45 the two other dimensions of state- and nation-
building, the establishment of administrative and state structures and the “integration 
of society” had to intertwine closely with these two central notions.
4.2  A Socialist State Apparatus
The efficient and functional socialist state apparatus in the GDR was built through the 
enforcement of the principle of “democratic centralism.” The SED was created not only 
as the leading party of the state, but also as the ultimate decision-maker in the sense 
of the “primacy of the party.”46 “Democratic centralism” suspended the separation of 
powers of the constitution and resulted in parallel structures of party and state with 
the party overruling the state organs. This was ensured by careful cadre selection, but 
41 | Also see: Chapter 7 “The ‘Three Spheres of Foreign Policy Making’: Party, State, and 
Society”; Subchapter 1. On the Political System of the GDR and its Social Reality.
42 | Hippler, 2005, 6-14.
43 | Schroeder, 2013, 716.
44 | Official interpretations and recommendations with regard to Marxism-Leninism were 
centralized at the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the central committee of the SED“ 
(Ger.: Inst. für Marxismus-Leninismus beim  der SED). See also: Sindermann, 1980.
45 | Schroeder, 2013, 120.
46 | Schroeder, 1998, 421.
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also by the watchful eye of the security apparatus, which also only answered to the 
Politbüro as the highest Party organ.47 The party directed the state organs towards 
the overall objective of socialist state-building. This centralization of the political and 
the economic systems ensured full Party control. The first preparatory steps towards 
this centralization, however, had already been conducted before the founding of the 
state in the SOZ. This included economic planning and the socialization of all means of 
production: Production sites, machines, and land. In 1952, the “planned development 
of socialism” was declared the explicit policy goal and agriculture was gradually 
collectivized.48 In July of the same year, the “Länderreform” was implemented and 
federalism was abolished once more on German soil, at least in the East. This reform 
dissolved the provinces, connected them to the capital city in a centralist manner, and 
reorganized the state parallel to the new SED party structures.
4.3  Homogenization Instead of Integration of Societ y
Internal and external security organs were to play an indispensable role in the 
process of socialist state- and nation-building in the GDR and have to be considered 
the “backbone” of the policy.  The military, the police, and the secret service, all 
traditional state organs, only answered to the SED Politbüro. However, the GDR’s 
security apparatus not only supervised the establishment and prevalence of a state 
apparatus loyal to the party, but also ensured the loyalty of its population. The 
security organs, first and foremost the MfS, controlled the implementation of the 
socialist ideals that were fundamental to the process of homogenization of the 
future socialist society. The NVA, on the other hand, executed the SED’s strategy 
of consolidation by controlling the borders of the GDR – officially to defend the 
GDR against outside intruders, but in reality to prevent its citizens from leaving 
the country and enforce the de facto suspension of the freedom of movement.49 
This socialist approach to society may be considered an extreme and absolute 
interpretation of the “integration of society” of nation- and state-building.
The socialist integration of society was intended to be achieved by a centralization 
of political and social life on the one hand, and a homogenization of society on the 
other. Centralization of political and social life again was spearheaded by the creation 
of a vanguard party claiming the monopoly of power over public life and opinion. 
Thus, the party not only decided on the determinants of public life, but also on how 
this public life was perceived and interpreted. The strongest indicator for this is the 
expansion of full control of East German media and culture in general. After the 
47 | The judiciary, for example, was watched closely by the MfS. Engelmann et al. 2011, 
170-173; Schroeder, 2013, 123.
48 | Schroeder, 2013, 127.
49 | On the suspension of the freedom of movement and the possible effects on the 
population, see: Blickle, 2003, 214.
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goal of German reunification was given up and the German nation replaced by its 
socialist version, German culture was redefined as “socialist culture.”50
Homogenization of society was based on a twofold approach: through group 
integration and by actually changing the individual’s personality. Political 
and social factionalism was supposed to be molded into bloc parties and mass 
organizations controlled by the party. Other influential social actors were either 
destroyed or integrated. A prominent example of this was the policy of suppression 
and neutralization over the decades towards the churches and Christian belief.51 
On the level of the individual, the long-term goal was the creation of the “new 
human” which defined itself first and foremost as part of the “collective” and “free 
of egoism.”52 The “socialist personality”53 was to be formed at all ages, but the 
central focus of “reeducation” were children and young people, who played a highly 
political role in ensuring the next generation’s ideological loyalty and engagement. 
This approach was implemented by a comprehensive education policy.
The theoretical notion of the “planned development of socialism,” as it was enforced 
in the GDR, included various policy tools and measures and is considered to have 
been used as a “road map” by the Soviet occupiers and its SED henchmen to 
establish first a socialist and then a Marxist state. The following phase analysis of the 
GDR’s activities in South Yemen connects the characteristics of the East German 
“development of socialism,” that is, the East German experiences of the 1950s and 
1960s with regard to this model of state-building, to the GDR’s foreign policy of 
socialist state- and nation-building by in Yemen from the struggle for independence 
during the 1960s to the demise of both states about thirty years later.
50 | Honecker, 1980, 391.
51 | Neubert, in: Judt (ed.), 1998.
52 | Segert/Zierke, in: Judt (ed.), 1998, 171.
53 | Ibid., 177.
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FOREIGN POLICY PHASE ANALYSIS:  
THE GDR’s ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH YEMEN
The following chapters analyze East Berlin’s engagement in South Yemen 
according to a chronological scheme of phases that is focused on the turning points 
and catalyst events of the GDR’s policy. The analysis of each phase begins with a 
short account of the major turning point that is considered to be the beginning 
of the phase, setting in motion internal South Yemeni socio-political changes. 
Next, Soviet interests and policies during the phase are sketched briefly to allow 
for an assessment of Moscow’s major fields of engagement and, more importantly, 
Moscow’s level of engagement. This short account of Soviet engagement is 
followed by the analysis of the GDR’s foreign policy in South Yemen itself. The 
analysis draws extensively from the introductory outline of Moscow’s policy and 
South Yemen’s internal political developments, as they are considered the major 
determinants of the GDR’s activities on the ground.

CHAPTER 11. Phase I: The Phase of Sampling 
and Creation 
The GDR in Yemen from 1963 to 1970: A Constitutional Draf t and 
the Road to Recognition
As early as its first Party Congress in June 1965, the NLF expressed its intent to 
create not only a new state but also a new nation based on the ideology of Marxism 
and Leninism:1 The Yemeni actors clearly had their own vision of a Marxist state 
in South Yemen. The following chapter first explores the NLF/NF’s early steps on 
South Yemen’s radical political path toward becoming a Marxist state in Arabia 
and how the GDR gradually became more and more involved in the process. Soviet 
intentions and its hesitancy towards the new regime in Aden are used to highlight 
the individuality of East Berlin’s engagement during this phase.
1.  ThE RE vOLuTIONARY PhOENIX FROM ADEN’S AShES: OP TING 
FOR A SOCIALIST STATE
“[B]adu with long curly black hair wearing indigo tunics, peasants with 
multicolored fūṭahs wrapped around their waists […] students in shir t-sleeves, 
soldiers in khaki, surge around the avenues and public squares, which are 
heavily decorated with posters and huge banners [denouncing …] ‘reaction’ 
and ‘imperialism.’”2
(Rouleau’s travels in Yemen, published 1967 in Le Monde)
Another closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967 exacerbated the already tense 
economic situation in South Yemen and left the fledgling South Yemeni leadership 
with vast economic challenges. The rapid British pull-out significantly added 
1 | Reference to the first Congress, in: Stenografische Niederschrif t der Beratung mit 
der Delegation der NLF Südjemen am 2.11.1970 im Hause des ZKs, in: BArch SAPMO/DY 
30/11407, 11.
2 | Rouleau, in: Le Monde Diplomatique, December 1967.
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to the economic and political pressures, as this also meant the withdrawal of 
British and Indian civil servants, military and security personnel, businessmen, 
and British money.3 Despite their support for the NLF during their fight against 
FLOSY, the loyalties of the Yemeni military forces trained under British rule were 
uncertain, and the ranks of the NLF were anything but unified. Also, the NLF 
was far from being in control of the whole territory of their state and only few of 
the NLF’s leaders “had received any higher education and none had experience 
in government.”4 Seeking firm rules and guidance for the establishment of the 
independent South Yemen seems a logical reaction, and this guidance was offered 
by the ideological role-models of the partisan struggle for independence. Among 
the conglomeration of ideologies discussed, Marxism-Leninism soon prevailed as 
the major doctrine.5
1.1  NLF Factions – Qahtan’s “Right” and a Fragmented “Left”
Part of this tentative orientation toward socialist state- and nation-building was 
that the NLF openly prevented the formation of any new political organizations, 
while the staff of the NLF’s General Command, now renamed National Front 
(NF), swiftly formed a one-party government. However, differences between 
various factions of the progenitor organizations of the NLF/NF still persisted. 
After its official formation in 1963, it took more than 15 years until the movement 
had eliminated all shades and varieties of leftist attitudes.In the beginning, the 
major figurehead neither had the same approach to everyday politics nor did they 
put the same emphasis on ideology. While the whole movement was formed by 
leftist extremists of one kind or the other, the most important divide in the early 
1960s runs between a more moderate “right” under Qahtan’s leadership and the 
highly fragmented “left,” boasting figureheads like Ali Salem Al-Beidh,6 who had 
also come close to erecting a Maoist regime in Hadramawt.
The “left” was extremely fragmented as well. Two major groups can be 
identified that would determine South Yemen’s destiny after 1970: “ideologues” 
and “pragmatists.” The “ideologues,” on the one hand, were mostly Marxists of 
some sort who rallied around the NLF’s chief ideologue Ismail. They focused on 
the establishment of a Soviet-style vanguard party and entertained close ties to 
the communist People’s Democratic Union (PDU) and their leader, Abdallah Abd 
al-Razzaq Badheeb.7 Badheeb had been among the founding members of the first 
3 | The British withdrawal cut the number of ships using Aden by about 75%. The GNP 
dropped by at least 15% in 1968 and again in 1969, while unemployment drove up to 
200,000 people out of the city. Brehony, 2013, 31; Also see: Burrowes, 2010, 278.
4 | Brehony, 2013, 31.
5 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 26; 37.
6 | Arabic: ˁAl ī Sālim Al-B īḍ ; Also Al-Baydh, Al-Bid, Ali Salim, in: Burrowes, 2010, 53.
7 | Burrowes, 2010, 47; Kostiner, 1990, 19; Naumkin, 2004, 290f. 
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communist group in South Yemen in 1953, which he later reshaped as the PDU in 
1961.8 The unlikely alliance between PDU and NLF may not be considered a given, 
as the PDU rejected violence as a means to an end. But the PDU’s intellectual 
approach was not too far off from some of the ideas of the leftist “ideologues” of 
the NLF, and when the moderate Qahtan was dethroned in 1969, the previously 
suppressed communist party PDU joined the corridors of power. As a symbol 
of unity between the nationalist and violent NLF and the communists, the 
Higher School for Scientific Socialism of the 1970s was renamed after Badheeb, 
the “godfather of Yemeni communism.” The left’s “pragmatists” were a loose 
coalition that broke several times. Among them were Ali Nasir, Salmin, and the 
commander during the guerilla war against FLOSY in Aden, Ali Ahmad Nasir 
Antar (Ali Antar).9 Apart from these two major groups, the left consisted of neo-
Trotskyists and a motley assembly of tribal-affiliates siding with them out of 
opposition to Qahtan.
1.2  Unique Yemeni Leadership: Civilian Backgrounds of 
Revolutionar y Leaders
Despite these ideological discrepancies, the leaders united under their first 
president and father-figure, Qahtan. These initial leaders were held in high esteem 
throughout South Yemen’s short history and were to determine South Yemen’s 
destiny from its birth to its demise.10 This small circle of “revolutionary leaders” is 
critical to South Yemeni politics: To create a unified and efficient military, a loyal 
instrument for the new party-leadership, the “Liberation Army of the National 
Liberation Front was merged […] with the units inherited from the British colonial 
power to form [the] People’s Defense Forces [PDF].”11 However, the key members of 
the new leadership, though all of them veterans of the struggle for independence, 
were no army men:12
8 | Scheider, 1989, 259.
9 | Arabic: ˁ Alī Aḥmad Nāṣir ˁ Antar; Also see: Encyclopedia of Yemen (Arabic), Vol.3, 2003, 2119. 
10 | In the following no transliteration given: Muhammad Ali Haytham, Minister of Interior, 
Saif al-DhalaI, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Faysal al-Sha'bi, Minister for Economy, Trade and 
Planning, Ali Salim al-Beidh, Minister of Defense, Mahmud Abdullah Ushaysh, Minister of 
Finance, Abd al-Fattah Ismail, Minister for Culture, National Guidance and Yemeni Unity. Only 
the latter three could be considered members of the “left” of the NF.
11 | Burrowes, 2010, 36f.
12 | President-to-be Ali Nasir, for example, had been an elementary teacher previous to his 
career as a revolutionary leader. Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs 
des Zentralkomittees der Jemenitisch Sozialistischen Partei […] Ali Nasser Mohammed, 
November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 179.
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“Ruling parties in the radical Arab states were generally dominated either by 
the military in uniform or, more often, by former senior military officers now 
appearing as civilians, the situation in the PDRY was an exception. From the 
beginning, civilians had full control over the military.”13
Even though Yodfat’s final remark in this quote has to be differentiated, as 
“full control over the military” was never guaranteed, this is one of the decisive 
differences between South Yemen and other young independent states in the Arab 
world - a major factor which eased the way for socialist state- and nation-building 
along the lines of the East German model.
1.3  Planned Social Transformation: Mar xism-Leninism as a New 
“Religion”?
During the years of fighting, it had been the explicit goal of the NLF’s left to 
“transform […] existing social relations”14 by abolishing all pre-existing social 
structures, namely regional ties and tribal affiliations, and replace them with 
the vague idea of a new, classless society imbued with socialism. And they were 
serious.
“[T]he northern sayyids studied the Book of God, while the books of Marx and 
Lenin became the major reference for the Socialist Politbüro. Chief Politbüro 
exegete was Abdulfattah Ismai’l [sic!], an expert on Socialist doctrine who was 
known, wryly, as al-Faqih (literally, the scholar of holy writ).”15
Marxism-Leninism and its transcendent aspiration advanced as a religious 
substitute for many followers of the NLF. Less than a fortnight after independence 
on 17 December 1967, all sultans were declared to lose land and title. The first 
laws on agrarian reform followed soon thereafter.16 Furthermore, the PRSY 
regime abolished the traditional names of the provinces – Aden, Lahej, Abyan, 
Shabwa, Hadhramawt and Mahra. Just as it had happened with the GDR’s 
“Länder,” the South Yemeni provinces were now labelled with numbers – the First 
to Sixth Governorates.17 Tribal names and even the traditional Yemeni dagger, 
the “jambiyya,” were banned. In January 1968, the NF declared tribal conflict 
13 | Yodfat, 1983, 7.
14 | NLF statement in Mukallā, in: Dresch, 2002, 120.
15 | Mackintosh-Smith, 1997, 165.
16 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der JSP 
[…] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 139.
17 | Burrowes, 2010, 141; Sharabi, Al-Thaura journalist, PDRY, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 122571, 
110-123; Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 135.
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regulation and ruling invalid. On top of that, they decided on the suspension of 
tribal disputes, and tried to enforce this decision.18
However, the NF’s policies cannot be taken as unanimously supported as they 
appeared. Many of the measures taken were promoted by the “left” and connived 
by the “right” under Qahtan, who would regularly opt for a more practical 
path. During the fourth NF Congress, held just east of Aden in March 1968,19 
the inner cracks of NF leadership started to show. The “left” presented a kind 
of charter, the “National Democratic Liberation,” that was strongly influenced by 
the extremist Nayif Hawatma.20 After intense debates, the adapted and officially 
adopted document was a compromise between the “left” and “right,” including 
the core leftist demands, while leaving unanswered “how the principles would 
be implemented.”21 The most important point both wings agreed on was the 
transformation of the NF to a vanguard party, based on the principles of scientific 
socialism. This decision implicated most of the other fundamental provisions to 
change the state’s internal and external modes of action: First, the NF was supposed 
to merge with other revolutionary parties in the country, mainly al-Tali’a, the 
South Yemeni branch of the Ba’ath Party, and Badheeb’s PDU, to establish a one-
party system based on “democratic centralism.” This move clearly opted against 
Qahtan’s moderate but single-handed leadership, as he had officially prohibited 
any political activity outside the NLF.22 Second, the economic system was to be 
transformed into a socialist economy based on production and public planning. 
These two goals flanked the “integration,” or in socialist terms “homogenization,” 
of society. Third, and with regard to external implications, the NF was to pursue 
a foreign policy oriented towards the Eastern Bloc and its allies to “draw[...] on 
their experiences.”23 This commitment to international socialism also included 
the support of the “revolutionary” forces in the north of Yemen as well as the 
liberation movements in the region.
Compromise aside, the charter nonetheless remained a document proclaiming 
radical social transformation. Thus, the disputes revolving around the political 
18 | Dresch, 2000, 121.
19 | Ibid., 121.
20 | Arabic: Nāīf Ḥūātma; Movement of Arab Nationalists activist who worked with George 
Habbash, leader of the PFLP. Also see: Nayif Hawatma, in: Mattar, 2004; Even though the 
document was not fully approved of at the time, Hawatmah nonetheless played a significant 
role in radicalizing and thus unifying the left between 1967 and 1969. He remained a close 
ally of the YSP even after his secession from the PFLP with the more radical wing, the future 
“Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.” Brehony, 2013, 37f; Palestine and the 
Palestine Question, in: Burrowes, 2010, 276.
21 | Brehony, 2013, 38.
22 | Scheider, 1989, 260.
23 | Information über die Lage in der Volksrepublik Südjemen, 1969. in: BStU HV A 
Nr.151, 170.
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orientation appear to have been over minor political differences only. But by this 
time, an undeniable rift emerged, originating in personal backgrounds and their 
attitude toward ideology. Qahtan always had aimed for a more pragmatic approach. 
For example, he promoted the expansion of the British system of administration 
over the whole territory, “taking over the ministries, armed forces, and police […] 
and using them,”24 instead of establishing a new, more centralized system. Not 
able to enforce his more moderate course, he felt rather cornered by the provisions 
of the charter. To prevent a looming military coup, Qahtan removed the two most 
radical of his ministers, Ismail and Minister of Defense al-Beidh, as  the latter had 
intended to transform the army into a branch of the party.25 But it was too late to 
secure Qahtan’s political survival. While he had fostered a more and more autocratic 
style of politics and relied on his “elder” status26 among the young revolutionaries, 
the “left,” led by Salmin as chairman of a five-member presidential council, finally 
replaced him as president after the  “June 22 Corrective Move”27 in 1969. Four 
days later Ismail was back – as the secretary-general of the National Front. This 
also once and for all settled another topic at the center of discussions between 
Qahtan’s right and the new left: South Yemen’s positioning between the fronts 
of the Cold War in general and towards the new East German ally in particular. 
A publication on South Yemen by the GDR’s state publishing house emphasizes: 
“The decision of the PDRY’s government to establish diplomatic relations with the 
GDR on June 30th 1969 had been one of the first foreign policy decisions of the 
new regime.”28 South Yemen’s political bed for the next two decades was made.
2.  SOvIE T ENGAGEMENT IN SOuTh YEMEN: WhEN ADEN ShED ITS 
GEOSTR ATEGIC INvISIBILIT Y CLOAK
Not much can be said with regard to Moscow’s early contact with the NLF: “It is not 
clear how far direct links between [USSR and China] and the Front existed before 
independence.”29 But without doubt, divided Yemen did not come into focus as a 
major country of interest among the Arab states for Moscow before the mid-1960s. 
Even after the declaration of independence, Moscow did not get engaged right 
away: the USSR waited two full days before it recognized the new regime in Aden 
on December 2 1967. Nonetheless, it set up its embassy in less than a month and 
diplomatic representation assured continuous exchange. At the time, the Kremlin 
was occupied with other actors, primarily Egypt, the emerging regional power, 
24 | Brehony, 2013, 36.
25 | Ibid., 35.
26 | In the 1950s Qahtan used to be an agricultural officer of the British administration. 
27 | For a brief summary of the “resurrection” of the Left see: Brehony, 2013, 42-46.
28 | Gambke et al., 1974, 131f.
29 | Halliday, 1990, 178.
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in the region due to the war of June 1967. Soviet political restraint in this context 
mostly arose from the unpredictable appearance of the new revolutionary regime 
and its unpredictable behavior towards its neighbors. But due to Aden’s longing 
for security from British imposition, the new regime was looking for a powerful 
guardian. Hence, al-Beidh’s early visit in February 1968 to Moscow comes as no 
surprise – at least from the Yemeni point of view.
The strategic importance of the otherwise insignificant country obviously helped 
to diminish Soviet reservations. “[L]ocated at the junction of important military, 
strategic and commercial lines of communications, the military base in Aden had 
a special significance for British imperialism.”30 As a consequence and in spite 
of a certain political distrust toward the young radical regime, Moscow started to 
engage in the fishing industry and simultaneously began to use the Port of Aden 
and the waters in its vicinity to station its ships as early as 1968.31 In August 1968, 
the first military agreement was signed, followed by several agreements on trade, 
economic and technical assistance, culture and science, and support for the PRSY’s 
fishery in February 1969.32 Moscow’s political and financial restraint toward the 
NF regime continuously decreased after the “Glorious Corrective Move” of 1969:33 
South Yemen finally opted for some kind of socialist development. In addition to 
that, relations between Aden and Bonn, as well as Washington, were terminated, 
opening up considerable room for the USSR and its allies. In 1970, a visit paid 
by PDSY President Salmin to the USSR resulted in Moscow’s agreement to train 
South Yemeni personnel in Moscow and start a technical mission to further 
improve South Yemen’s fishing industry. In April 1970, on occasion of Lenin’s 
100th birthday, Ismail visited Moscow and two months later he officially confirmed 
extensive future support in party cadre training by the USSR and the GDR.34 Aden 
had shed its political invincibility cloak and became a potential political ally for 
Moscow in the region.
30 | Pozdnyakov, E., Narodnaya Respublika Yuzhnogo Iemena, 1968, in: Cigar, 1985, 776.
31 | Cigar, 1985, 776; Halliday, 1990, 203.
32 | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Genossen Kiesewetter mit dem sowjetischen 
Gesandten, Genosse K.P. Kusnezow, February 1969, sine diem, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 
1223/71, 30-34; Cigar, 1985, 776.
33 | Brehony, 2013, Chapter 3, 31-49 and 81.
34 | From 1972 political training was institutionalized at the College of Socialist Sciences 
in Aden, Halliday, 1990, 183.
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3.  ThE PhASE OF SAMPLING: FROM FIRST CONTACT TO SOCIALIST 
NATION- AND STATE-BuILDING 
Phase I of East German engagement in South Yemen is an example of the GDR’s 
efforts to pursue a foreign policy in its own right. In late 1967, shortly before 
independence, external actors in East and West alike expected the revolutionary 
group FLOSY led by Abdallah al-Asnaj to become the future leading force in South 
Yemen, while its competitor, the more radical NLF, was almost ignored. Even 
Moscow was quite uncertain about which of the two to support.35 The GDR, on the 
other hand, had entertained contacts with a wide range of different actors from 
South Yemen as early as 1961. East German functionaries had invited Yemeni 
media multiplicators to East Berlin36 and even met with one of ATUC’s leaders, 
Muhsin Ahmad Alaini,37 in late 1961 to offer the opportunity for two delegates to 
study at East Germany’s universities.38
3.1 Kindred Spirits: East Berlin as Aden’s Companion of the First Hour
“I consider the proclamation of the People‘s Republic of Southern Yemen to be 
yet another important step in the successful struggle of the peoples against 
imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.”39
(Letter Ulbricht to al-Shaabi, December 1 1967)
In July 1966, FLOSY leader al-Asnaj visited East Berlin.40 However, later that year 
the SED took hints about FLOSY being “bourgeois-conservative” seriously and East 
Berlin opted for a double-track policy towards the two major emerging political 
35 | Gespräch von Freimut Seidel am 15.November 1967 mit Rat in der Abteilung Naher 
Osten des MID (Außenministerium der Russischen Föderation), Serjogin Aufzeichnungen 
von Freimut Seidel, Konsul am Generalkonsulat der DDR in Kairo 1966/67, in: PA AA, MfAA, 
1224/71, 16-19.
36 | Einladung des Herausgebers und Chefredakteurs der Tageszeitung Al-Tariq 
Mohammed Nasser 1963 und 1966 nach Berlin, in: C 1126/71, 113; Vorbereitung der 
Einladung Al-Asnags in die DDR im Juni 1965, in: PA AA, MfAA, 1226/71, 131f; Kontakte der 
DDR-Institutionen ab 1965, PA AA, MfAA, 1224/71, 138f; Besuch einer FLOSY Delegation 
in der DDR 1966, in: PA AA, MfAA, 1224/71, 137. In 1966 Al-Asnag was affirmed to receive 
military equipment for FLOSY in Hodeidah. See: Gespräch Eggebrecht mit Al-Asnag am 
4.Juni 1966 in Kairo, in: PA AA, MfAA, 1224/71, 135f.
37 | Arabic: Muḥsin Aḫmad al-ˁAinī.
38 | Aktenvermerk über eine Gespräch mit Herrn Alaini, Ver treter der Aden-TUC im 
Allarabischen Gewerkschaftsbund (ICATU) am 4.Dezember 1961 in den Räumen des Büros 
des Bevollmächtigten der DDR in der VAR, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1224/71, 145-147.
39 | Ulbricht, Walter, in: PA AA, MfAA C 744/73, 51.
40 | Kostiner, 1984, 136.
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groups in Aden. Accordingly, GDR representatives held exploratory meetings with 
both groups in October 1967, FLOSY and NLF.41 When it was the NLF that prevailed 
after the British pullout, this was quite a surprise for external observers. However, 
the GDR’s diversified strategy gave them the advantage of personal contacts with the 
radical NLF. Despite its early and positive contacts with FLOSY, East Berlin was able 
to build on these contacts, especially with Ismail. Now, after several years during 
which East Berlin had followed its recognition policy in both Yemens, there was 
a new window of opportunity, as well as fresh perspectives on matters in South 
Yemen.42 Profiling itself as the advocate of the postcolonial world – as opposed to the 
“imperialist FRG”43 – East Berlin pursued its strategy of the honest broker towards 
the new regime in Aden. In November the same year, SED dispatched Klaus Gloede 
with the authority to “recognize South Arabia and to establish diplomatic relations 
with [the young South Yemeni] state.“44 This move was supported by East Germany’s 
hope for a swift recognition of the GDR in return.
In the end, East Berlin had to wait for another two years for this hope to be 
fulfilled. Until then, the GDR focused on its low-profile strategy as part of the 
GDR’s policy of recognition. For this major component of East Germany’s Middle 
East policy, relations between Berlin’s and Aden’s trade unions are an impressive 
example. In February 1965, a delegation of the Aden Trade Union Congress had its 
first meeting with the executive committee of the FDGB, the East German mass 
organization of trade unions.45 When in 1969 official relations between the newly 
founded Yemeni federation of trade unions and the FDGB were established,46 this 
clearly was due to the SED regime’s early contacts with the leaders of the trade 
unions in Aden. The early engagement of the GDR in the country had built up 
trust and personal relationships and is one of the major explanations for the swift 
succession of political steps that followed the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries in 1969.
41 | Unterredung in der Residenz der DDR mit Funktionären der NLF am 21. Oktober 1967, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, 1224/71, 88-94.
42 | On the GDR’s focus in South Yemen at the time see: Bericht Wildaus über ein Gespräch 
des Ministers für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR Genosse Otto Winzer mit der ersten 
Delegation der VRSJ in der DDR in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1223/71, 23ff.
43 | Public declaration by MfAA official on April 8 1967, DOK zur AP der DDR XV/2, 1970, 1026f.
44 | Direktive für die Dienstreise des Genossen Gloede vom 21. November 1967, PA AA, 
MfAA, C 1226/71, 96-98.  
45 | Aktennotiz über den Besuch der Delegation des Aden Trades Union Congress beim 
Bundesvorstand des FDGB, vom 24. Februar bis 1. März 1965, in: PA AA, MfAA C 1226/71, 
125-129.
46 | Gambke et al., 1974, 111.
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3.2  The GDR’s Policy of Recognition in South Yemen: The "Strateg y of 
Focus and Low Profile"
Despite East Berlin’s early contact with North Yemen, the GDR in the early 1960s 
rather had concentrated its efforts on the two major actors in the region, Egypt and 
Syria. After Ulbricht’s invitation on Nasser’s behalf in 1965, the GDR had to cope 
with the disappointed hope of recognition by its main and powerful partner in Cairo. 
It was East Berlin’s early and positive relations with the radical regime in Aden below 
the governmental level which pushed the GDR’s policy of recognition in the Arab 
world in a new direction. From 1963, personal and institutional contacts had been 
developed consistently and successfully and provided the perfect environment for 
East Berlin’s “low-profile strategy.”
Driven by the hope of swift diplomatic recognition, the GDR tried to 
accommodate Aden’s wishes as far as possible. Just one day after the declaration 
of South Yemeni independence in late 1967, East Berlin agreed to offer training 
for South Yemeni political cadres in the GDR.47 Half a year later, a South 
Yemeni delegation stayed for an extended visit in Berlin to intensify cooperation. 
The GDR’s state and party officials discussed the economic possibilities of 
developmental support for “structurally and politically interesting objects” and 
delegate Clausnitzer suggested to subsidize communications and electricity.48 
On this occasion Otto Winzer, minister of foreign affairs, reacted to the PRSY’s 
demand for “advisors on state and administrative affairs” and promised to send 
an advisory group as soon as possible.49 Two months later, the Ministerrat was 
assigned to review the conditions for a loan comparable to those that had been 
given to Tanzania, Zanzibar, and the YAR.50 The amount of US$3 million granted 
by the GDR in 1968 appears rather modest.51 But added to the costs and the effect 
of advisory support, East Berlin clearly intended to go the extra mile in supporting 
the new regime in South Yemen.
In February 1968, Qahtan and his regime still appeased Soviet inquiries 
about a possible recognition of the GDR by delaying it until an agreement of “all 
progressive and Arab countries”52 was reached. In the end, the NF regime offered 
47 | Kiesewetter an Gießmann, in: PA AA C 1226/71, 89f; Zusage Gießmanns am 
1.Dezember 1967, PA AA C 1226/71, 88.
48 | MAW Brief von Clausnitzer, Ministerium für Außenwir tschaft, Direktionsbereich 
Übersee, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 121971, 61.
49 | Brief Winzer an Minister für Landwir tschaft und Bodenreform Ahmed Saleh al-Shair, 
June 1968, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1226/71, 37.
50 | Brief Zscherpe an Winzer, August 21 1968, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1219/71, sine pagina.
51 | Beschlußvorlage [sic!] zur Konzeption Entwicklung der politischen, ökonomischen 
und kulturellen Beziehungen zur VDRJ 1968, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1219/71, 42.
52 | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Genossen Kiesewetter mit dem sowjetischen Gesandten, 
Genosse K.P. Kusnezow, February 1969, sine diem, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1223/71, 33.
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a consular agreement between Aden and East Berlin.53 Consul Wildau, as well 
as SED functionaries who met with actors from South Yemen, considered West 
Germany’s presence and policies one of the major reasons for Aden’s caution: 
“[T]he West German Embassy does everything to keep up sole representation [in 
Aden] and to limit [our] room for maneuver.”54 They were not too far off from 
reality.
The GDR’s position in South Yemen by no means was secured. In October 1968, 
consul Wildau reported back from Aden:
“The GDR is well-known and liked by the masses due to its consequential 
support of the Arab peoples, especially in Aden with its strong working class. 
[…] Simple people asked when the GDR would open a diplomatic representation 
and expressed that the West German Consulate, which already had existed 
under British occupation, had to be closed. Officially though there have been no 
statements made with regard to the ‘German Question’ […]. In the same month, 
A.F. Ismail acknowledged the GDR’s attitude towards South Yemen in a personal 
meeting with correspondents of Radio DDR and the ADN.”55
During a delegation visit in June earlier that year, however, South Yemen’s 
minister of agriculture had summarized the PRSY’s position:
“Concerning the credit, we are aware that the GDR cannot offer money, but might 
help with consumer goods. […] We highly appreciate the GDR’s position towards 
the Arab countries. And we took this into consideration, by visiting the GDR and 
not West Germany. We hope that […] these steps take will be appreciated [by 
the GDR].”56
Aden clearly was gambling on profiting from the inner-German dispute. In 
December 1968, the GDR’s Karl Wildau and Wolfgang Hunger joined an official 
trip for the political missions in Aden - along with the Soviet ambassador, 
the charge d’affairs of the United States, and British, French and Indian 
representatives.57 East German diplomatic equality with the other states of the 
53 | VDRJ, zur Entwicklung des Landes, 1973, in: BStU MfS Allg. S. Nr.332/73, 9.
54 | Brief Wildau an Kämpf January 23 1969, in: PA AA C 1125/71, 63-65.
55 | Informationstelegramm Wildau to the MfAA October 30 1968, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 
1125/71, 118-120.
56 | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Ministers für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, genossen 
Otto Winzer mit dem Minister für Landwir tschaft und Bodenreform der VRSJ, Ahmed Saleh 
As-Shair [sic!], June 25 1968, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1223/71, 27.
57 | Bericht ueber eine Reise der Genossen Karl Wildau und Wolfgang Unger auf Einladung 
des MfAA in die 5.Provinz der VSRY, Aden, December 4 1968, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 122571, 69.
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international community seemed to be within reach – at least in South Yemen. 
In March 1969, an agreement over a long-term credit was finally signed and 
East Berlin added a donation of medical supplies and equipment to express its 
goodwill.58 After the diplomatic recognition by Cambodia, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria, 
all occurring between April 30th and June 6th,59 Aden was meant to follow suit. In 
early June 1969, Soviet representative Kusnetzov60 informed Kiesewetter about 
a discussion with PRSY President Qahtan, who openly told Kusnetzov about the 
support offered by West Germany “exceeding everything South Yemen had been 
offered so far.” According to Kusnetzov:
“West Germany is putting pressure on the Afro-Asian states to prevent a chain 
reaction of normalization of relations with the GDR. Bonn especially is using 
economic measures, promises high credits, increases technical assistance, 
etc. and special emissaries are foremost sent to those countries considered 
‘weak links in the chain.’ [But] if extensive help were suggested [by Moscow and 
EastBerlin] the question of recognition [of the GDR] was decided.”61
Kusnetzov recommended an immediate visit by a GDR delegation to Aden to 
hamper talks between Bonn and South Yemen. Only days later, the first official 
high-ranking political delegation from East Berlin arrived at the Red Sea.
After the “Corrective Move” of 1969, one of the first official actions taken by the 
new regime was the recognition of the GDR, an explicit expression of the political 
attitude of the new leadership. On July 22, the first East German ambassador was 
accredited in Aden, the first South Yemeni ambassador to the GDR arrived in 
East Berlin in August 1970.62 Bonn reacted swiftly and froze its relations and its 
financial aid accordingly.63 East Germany aimed to substitute these losses for Aden 
at once. Only a few days after the recognition, a governmental delegation from East 
Berlin travelled to Aden to sign a first mutual communiqué, the agreement on the 
establishment of relations as well as a protocol on future economic and cultural 
cooperation.64 In September 1969, more solidarity donations, medical devices, 
medication and other material support arrived.65 Other agreements followed, 
58 | Quartalsbericht I/69 der Vertretung Aden, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 744/73, 24.
59 | Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Bahr, July 1 1969, in: AzAP-BRD 1969 Vol.1, 751f.
60 | The Source does not specify whether this was Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Wasilij 
Wasiljewitch Kusnezow or not.
61 | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Genossen Kiesewetter mit dem sowjetischen 
Gesandten, Genosse K.P. Kusnezow, June 11 1969, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1223/71, 64-71.
62 | Gambke et al., 1974, 132.
63 | Wippel, 1996, 22; Halliday, 1990, 76.
64 | Quartalsbericht III/69, Volksrepublik Südjemen, Abt. Arabische Staaten, sine anno, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, C 744/73, 23.
65 | Ibid., 22.
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such as the agreements on air and maritime traffic, which were somewhat more 
beneficial for the GDR.66
Right after Aden recognized the GDR and Sana’a had reestablished its relations 
with Bonn, the role of North Yemen in East German foreign policy significantly 
declined, while the PDRY’s star was on the rise. As a consequence, the Aden 
embassy became the major East German representation in the region. The GDR’s 
personnel in the YAR travelled frequently between the two Yemeni capitals, as the 
embassy in the YAR fully depended on Aden’s communication network and for 
consumer goods and supplies for the GDR’s citizens.67
3.3 Writing a Mar xist State in Southern Arabia: East-German E xperts 
and the First Constitution of Independent Aden
“Based on Scientific Socialism, [the National Front] leads the political 
activities of the masses and the mass organizations, to fur ther the society’s 
non-capitalist path.”68
(Constitution of the PDRY, November 30 1970)
“The German Democratic Republic is a Socialist state based on the German 
nation. [The GDR] is the political organization of urban and rural workers 
who jointly realize Socialism led by the working class and its Marxist-Leninist 
Party.“69
(Article 1, Constitution of the GDR, April 6 1968)
In 1971 even West German academic discourse recognized the close kinship 
between the PDRY’s new constitution of 1970 and the GDR’s major political 
document in its 1968 version. And indeed the 1968 Constitution of East Germany 
may be considered the long-term model for South Yemen’s constitutional genesis. 
From April to June 1970, the GDR initiated what was to become its major tool 
of foreign policy in South Yemen: To support the NF with the “drafting of a 
66 | Quartalsbericht IV/69, Volksrepublik Südjemen, Abt. Arabische Staaten, January 20 
1970, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 744/73.
67 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
68 | German original: [A]uf der Basis des wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus [führt 
die Nationale Front] die politischen Aktivitäten unter den Massen und innerhalb der 
Massenorganisationen […], um die Gesellschaft auf dem nichtkapitalistische Weg […] 
voranzubringen, in: Gambke/Jacob/Mätzig, 1974, 98.
69 | German original: “Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist ein sozialistischer Staat 
deutscher Nation. Sie ist die politische Organisation der Werktätigen in Stadt und Land, die 
gemeinsam unter Führung der Arbeiterklasse und ihrer marxistisch-leninistischen Partei 
den Sozialismus verwirklichen.” Ar t. 1, Ver fassung der DDR vom 6. April 1968.
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new Constitution of the PRSY and the organization of the state and juridical 
apparatus,”70 the SED delegated their first advisory group to South Yemen.71
The East German constitution undeniably had been South Yemen’s blueprint in 
many different ways.72 While the constitutions resemble each other in structure, 
content and language, the inclusion of the Leninist principle of the “democratic 
centralism“73 has to be considered the most relevant similarity – both politically and 
ideologically. The new constitution of 1970 was intended to promote “the transition 
from a capitalist and pre-capitalist structure to a Socialist structure of society.”74 
This indicated that the GDR’s advisors didn’t consider it possible to simply adopt 
the GDR’s political system wholesale at the time. Rather, South Yemen had to 
create certain prerequisites to further the state’s development toward becoming a 
socialist state. From the advisor’s ideological point of view, socialist state-building 
indicated the first steps to “restructure” society and, most importantly, it required 
the formation of a vanguard party to foster these social changes.
Much like its East German equivalent, the PDRY’s constitution on first glance 
heralded democratic values and institutions. The document included an extensive 
catalogue of political and social rights and entitlements. A number of today’s 
researchers and political advocates of the former South Yemeni state regularly 
quote significant improvements in this respect,75 especially in comparison to 
the initial years of “travail” after the declaration of independence. At that time 
dissidents were imprisoned, executed, or simply disappeared without due process.76 
Even Brehony, the British author, politician, and certainly not a Marxist, stresses 
the regime’s positive intentions and achievements with regard to people’s rights.
70 | Quartalsbericht II/70, Abteilung Arabische Staaten (Quarterly Report II/70, Section 
Arab States), in: PA AA, MfAA, C 744/73, Jahres- und Quartalsberichte der AV in Südjemen 
1966-1970, 16f.
71 | Oswald Unger was part of the delegation. In 1971 he summarized the East German 
contribution to the new Constitution of South Yemen: Unger, Oswald, Die Verfassung für 
die national-demokratische Entwicklungsetappe der VDRJ, in: Staat und Recht, Nr.20, 
2/1971, 1162.
72 | Even single provisions like the “obligation to work,” Ar t.35 of the Constitution of the 
PDYR of 30 November 1967, in: Hachicho, 1976, 97.
73 | Comp. Ar t.47, Constitution of the GDR, April 6 1968; Ar t.11 Constitution of the GDR, 
November 30 1967, in: Hachicho, 1976, 99.
74 | Hachicho, 1976, 94.
75 | Brehony, 2013, 55 and 63; Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.
76 | Security Services, in: Burrowes, 2010, 346.
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“The constitution was a comprehensive document guaranteeing citizens a wide 
range of rights and entitlements, though it took some years before the regime 
was in a position to implement many of them.”77
However, Brehony and others often neglect the regime’s political intentions, 
the wider political framework, and constitutional reality. In any case these 
optimistic praises of the achievement of socialism in South Yemen not only 
have to be modified, but questioned, as they simply do not reflect social reality. 
To acquire a more complete perspective, several aspects have to be taken into 
consideration: First, almost any form of self-governance would have provided a 
certain improvement of political rights in comparison to the conditions during 
colonial occupation in Aden. Second, South Yemen never approached the living 
and education standards of its industrialized model states in the Eastern Bloc, 
especially those of the GDR. Improvements of living conditions were achieved, but 
these were modest and limited to the urban areas. Lastly, one has to reconsider the 
standard of comparison: Political freedoms in the Eastern Bloc.
The states under Soviet influence fall far short of the Western approaches to political 
liberty or juridical security. While social rights with an economic dimension on 
the one hand mostly could not be achieved due to economic inability in Yemen, the 
guarantee of political rights on the other hand was always subordinate to possible 
“progress” toward communism under Marxist-Leninist ideology. Citizens’ rights 
could be overruled by the decisions of the vanguard party at any time. From the 
outset, the political system introduced by the constitution, including the provided 
civil rights, were designed to accommodate the establishment and advancement 
of this party. Based on the principle of “democratic centralism,”78 the party 
was supposed to lead the masses toward a “non-capitalist state” and later on to 
socialism based on party structures not just paralleling but also overruling state 
structures. Thus, today’s praises of “democratization” in former South Yemen 
made by former YSP and SED functionaries, as well as by the current secessionist 
movement, rather glorify a political past as it never existed. These statements 
simply have to be handled with caution, as more often than not they remain within 
the logic of socialist state- and nation-building ideology.
Unger, the leader of the GDR’s advisory delegation, described the political 
system of South Yemen as “democratic”: “The political fundamental of power 
exertion by the working people are the Peoples’ Councils which are formed 
through free, general, equal and immediate elections.”79 Even though Yemenis in 
1970 gave the preference to the term “democratic” over “socialist,” in constitutional 
77 | Brehony, 2013, 55.
78 | The first Party Congress of the SED in January 1949, Avantgardeanspruch und 
innerparteiliche Diktatur Januar 1949, in: Judt, 1998, 46f.
79 | Unger, 1971, 1170.
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reality the meaning of the two terms did not differ. According to Unger, the leader 
of the GDR delegation, elections for this Supreme People’s Council (SPC) were 
scheduled for October 31 1971.80 However, the first SPC simply was appointed. “[T]
he first elections for the 111-member [SPC] were not held until 1978.”81
On paper, the SPC was the PDRY’s legislative body, and it also elected members 
of the Presidential Council and the Council of Ministers.82 In reality though, the 
SPC was constructed as a mere acclamation organ right from the start, wielding 
no political power, just like the East German Volkskammer. While the Council of 
Ministers as the executive and administrative organ also pretty much mirrored 
the role of its East German equivalent, in Aden it was the Presidential Council 
that decided on all central questions and policies. These were then confirmed by 
the SPC and implemented by the Council of Ministers. To improve the inclusion 
of the country’s periphery in the system, the SPC was complemented by Local 
People’s Councils. These LPCs
“were to be elected for two-and-a-half year terms to manage […] affairs on the 
local level under the supervision of the central government and in cooperation 
with the mass organizations and the state farms.”83
Clearly, the LPCs did less to empower the periphery and more to control it and 
achieve centralization. This political structure was designed to transform into a 
political system led by a socialist vanguard party, just as it had taken place in the 
GDR. Party structures of the NF at the time already offered a connection between 
party and state that was gradually expanded in practice until the 1978 constitution 
came into effect. The new version repeated: “The organization of the state power 
and its administration are subject to the principle of democratic centralization”84 
and from 1978 the YSP officially was at the center of all political decision-making:
“The Yemeni Socialist Party, armed with the Scientific Socialism theory, is 
the leader and guide of the society and the state. It shall define the general 
horizon for the development of the society and the line of the state’s internal 
and external policy.”85
80 | Unger, 1971, 1173.
81 | Elections, PDRY, in: Burrowes, 2010, 110.
82 | Der Staatsaufbau der VDRJ entsprechend der Verfassung vom 30. November 1970, 
in: Gambke et al, 1974, 102.
83 | Burrowes, 2010, 226.
84 | Constitution of the PDRY of October 31st 1978, published by the Foreign Ministry of 
the PDRY, 14 October Corporation Aden, 1981.
85 | German Translation: “Bewaffnet mit der Theorie des Wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus 
ist die Jemenitische Sozialistische Partei Führer der Gesellschaft und des Staates. […Sie] 
führt den Kampf des Volkes und seiner Massenorganisationen an, […] um schließlich den 
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The GDR’s advisors intended to take into consideration the cultural and social 
characteristics of South Yemen.86 But the resulting constitution indeed rather 
mirrored the ideological ideal, not the possible need of South Yemen for a political 
system including the existing social structures. South Yemen’s constitution was 
nothing less than a copy of the East German constitution of 1968:87 the basic 
principles of political organization and of Marxist-Leninist ideology were merely 
complemented by few specific cultural characteristics of South Yemen. Even the 
attempts to justify radical political measures by referring to religious sources of 
legitimacy and the inclusion of Islam as the official religion in Art. 4688 by the 
NF was less attributable to the leader’s preference for cultural specifics, and more 
to East German advice: “East German […] leaders had advised the NF to harness 
Islam for its cause. […] Islam could be adapted to the regime’s ideology in what was 
called ‘liberation theology.’”89 
4. CONCLuSION: E AST BERLIN’S NE W ALLY BY ThE RED SE A
Even though the regime in Aden and its insignificant state appear rather powerless 
with regard to the acceleration of the GDR’s international diplomatic recognition, 
East Berlin considered it another small, but no less important step in their ”Low-
Profile Policy” towards recognition. Aden emerged as the most fervent advocate for 
the acceptance of the GDR as a full-fledged member of the United Nations General 
Assembly.90 After the initial years of insecurity, East Germany had secured the 
loyalty of an ally not shy of forceful words and saber-rattling on the Red Sea.
Moscow’s policy during the first three years of South Yemen’s existence 
is characterized by oscillation between restraint and open support. Similar to 
other external powers like the British,91 the Kremlin was not sure whether the 
regime would be able to stay in power. This first phase of Soviet engagement was 
characterized by a low level of intensity and solely focused on fields of engagement 
Aufbau des Sozialismus zu erreichen.” Ar t.2, Constitution of the PDRY of October 31st 
1978, published by the Foreign Ministry of the PDRY, 14 October Corporation Aden, 1981.
86 | The GDR advisors initiated interviews and discussions with Yemenis to become 
acquainted with Yemeni society, in: Hachicho, 1976, 98.
87 | Schwarzenbach, 1971, 1157.
88 | For example the drafting of a new Family Law in 1976 was justified by “research[…] 
in the old books of hadith,” in: Dahlgren, 2000, 7; Constitution of the PDRY of 31 October 
1978, published by the Foreign Ministry of the PDYR, 14 October Corporation Aden, 1981.
89 | Abd al-Fattah Ismail at the 1972 Party Congress, in: Brehony, 2013, 70f.
90 | Quartalsbericht IV/69, Volksrepublik Südjemen, Abt. Arabische Staaten, January 20 
1970, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 744/73, 20; Südjemen fordert UN-Mitgliedschaft der DDR, Neues 
Deutschland, October 1969, 7.
91 | The British ambassador to the PRSY in January 1970, quoted in: Brehony, 2013, 48.
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that were first and foremost beneficial for the Kremlin and its immediate interests: 
Securing another safe haven to station its naval forces in the region. Engagement 
was exclusively related to military and ideological matters, while involvement 
in civil matters of state was almost non-existent. Nonetheless, 1969 must be 
considered the turning point for Soviet-South Yemeni relations. Aden openly 
committed itself to a socialist path of development and Moscow opted for an active 
course of support, as will be shown in Phase II.
While Moscow’s engagement during the first years of South Yemeni existence 
as a state can be considered minimal, the GDR had engaged more actively right 
from the beginning. This is an impressive example of East Berlin’s attempts to 
implement a foreign policy of its own within the narrow scope of action between 
Soviet and West German interests. First of all, this first phase of East German 
involvement is characterized by a high number of unknown factors for the SED 
regime and thus resulted in a hesitant stance towards the new and radical regime 
in South Yemen. One of these unknowns was Aden’s attitude toward the West 
in general, and the German question in particular. At this time it was not clear 
where Aden would position itself and whether it would be possible for East Berlin 
to become active in South Yemen at all. But even though Phase I of East German 
engagement provided a political environment of high insecurity, South Yemen 
is an excellent case example for the GDR’s policy of recognition and the major 
strategies of the GDR’s policy in the Middle East at the time, “low-profile” and 
the “honest broker” strategies. Furthermore, a major East German foreign policy 
tool used widely in the Global South was established during this phase, which 
also became crucial for GDR-PDRY relations during the 1970s and early 1980s: 
Political engagement through “advisory groups.”
This tool played a big part in easing the way from first contact to socialist 
nation- and state-building during the Phase of Sampling. Involvement was 
expanded steadily. But regardless of this new cooperation on the state level, the 
third sphere of GDR’s foreign policy making also continued to play its part in 
further intensifying East Berlin’s presence in Aden, closely supervised by the 
SED. Right after the recognition by the PDRY, the GDR’s foreign media service, 
the ADN, argued for a swift establishment of a media center for the region, as the 
recognition by North Yemen
“was only a matter of time and thus international coverage had to be 
concentrated in one hand. According to the MfAA the establishment of ADN 
offices in Aden and Khartoum were imperative to be prepared for the expected 
recognition of the GDR [in the region].”92
92 | Mittwoch, Korrespondentenbüro/Ausland an Direktion Genosse Wieland, Berlin, July 
9 1969, in: BArch 900/537, sine pagina.
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Even though this appeal by the ADN was not granted right away, it paved the way 
for the first GDR media presence in Aden: a local journalist supported by an East 
German official.93
This is a clear indicator of East Germany’s intent to stay and get involved in 
the day-to-day politics of this young state by the Red Sea. East Germany’s early 
engagement in Aden initially had been motivated by the possibility of a swift 
establishment of diplomatic relations, and thus lacked a comprehensive foreign 
policy approach. But the political measures taken by East Berlin to further the 
goal of recognition soon developed a dynamic of its own. During this period, East 
Berlin acquired the first samples for a possible future cooperation. East German 
willingness to offer support coincided with the new Yemeni regime’s commitment 
to a radical transformation of Yemeni society: The traditional administrative 
structures were dissolved, the sultans expropriated and land newly distributed. 
In addition to that, the NF prevented the formation of new political organizations. 
The Charter of 1968 assured East Berlin that Aden was leaning towards a 
socialist path, including the introduction of a socialist economy and a political 
system based on the principle of “democratic centralism.” When East Germany 
assisted the drafting of a new South Yemeni constitution, it became involved with 
the whole process of state- and nation-building that was to follow. Based on the 
principle of “democratic centralism,” the constitution laid the foundations for the 
parallel structures of party and state that were common among states patterned 
on the Soviet system.
East German fields of engagement, even in this first phase of foreign policy activity, 
were considerably diverse. East Berlin’s intensity of engagement clearly suggests 
that the GDR wanted more than a mere “diplomatic exchange,” as the SED regime 
did everything to prepare a “close working relationship” and to lift its presence in 
Aden from foreign policy “influence” to “involvement.” First advances had been 
made in the fields of legal affairs and the cooperation of mass organizations. With 
its activities during the drafting of the constitution, East Germany already arrived 
at the brink of “intervention.” While the recognition of South Yemen as a state in 
its own right by East Berlin marks the beginning of East Germany’s first phase 
of engagement in Yemen, the publication of South Yemen’s first constitution has 
to be considered both the culmination of relations between East Berlin and Aden 
until then and the decisive catalyst with regard to the GDR’s future foreign policy 
approach: Its policy of socialist state- and nation-building.
93 | Redaktion für Auslandssendungen an Korr-Büro Ausland, HA Kader/Bildung, Betr. 
ADN-Mitarbeiterin in der Volksrepublik Südjemen, August 21 1970; Der außerordentliche 
und bevollmächtigte Botschafter der DDR in der Volksrepublik Südjemen Wildau an 
Generaldirektor des Allgemeinen Deutschen Nachrichtendienstes Genossin Deba Wieland, 
March 9 1970, in: BArch DC 900/410, sine pagina.
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CHAPTER 12. Phase II:  
The Phase of Establishment and Expansion 1969 to 1978 
Incorporating Mar xism-Leninism into a Tribal Society
In 1969-70, the radical Aden regime appeared as one of the most promising 
partners for East Germany in the Middle East. The turning point of the “Corrective 
Move” in June 1969, the launching of the new constitution in late 1970, and the 
fifth Party Congress in 1972 initiated a phase in South Yemen that built toward 
the formation of a Soviet-style vanguard party. However, the actual realization 
was not a guaranteed outcome and thus Soviet and East German engagement 
first and foremost supported advocates for the Marxist-Leninist cause among the 
leadership in Aden.
1.  INTERNAL DE vELOPMENTS: ThE FIRST STEPS TOWARD A 
SOCIALIST STATE 
«C’est cette pâte humaine que le gouvernement révolutionnaire est en train 
de travailler pour construire le socialisme. Un million et demi d’hommes qui 
tirent leurs revenus de la terre, de la mer... et du désert, et vivent à la limite du 
dénuement le plus absolu.»1
1.1  Setting the Stage for a Yemeni Vanguard Part y
South Yemenis and international socialists shared their enthusiasm over the 
intentions of the “revolutionary government” to “develop socialism” out of the 
“human clay”2 of South Yemen. Brehony clearly sympathizes with the positive 
attitude of those years. He considers the “Glorious Corrective Move” of June 22 
1969 the “most decisive event in the early history of independent South Yemen,” 
1 | Deffarge and Troeller, 1971, 6.
2 | Translation of “pâte humaine,” in: Deffarge and Troeller, 1971, 6.
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as it “marked the emergence of the PRSY as a truly revolutionary state.”3 The 
new power constellation propelled the implementation of the leftists’ charter 
of “National Democratic Liberation,” whereas the majority of its provisions was 
included in the new constitution released on November 30 1970. Henceforth, 
the People’s Republic of South Yemen was known as the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen.
After South Yemen’s new constitution was launched in 1970, the early decision to 
expand the British administrative system all over the country served as a solid base 
of state-building with regard to the consolidation of the PDRY’s state territory.4 
With regard to the socialist nature of this state- and nation-building policy, the 
process was intended to be mostly driven by ideological means and justifications:
“The NF leaders turned to the provinces to […] foster the revolutionary spirit that 
they thought was essential to get through the period of state-building and the 
hardships that were necessary.”5
The “leaders” of these initial moves were influenced by theoretical anti-colonial 
writings like the works of Frantz Fanon.6 But when it came to the more concrete 
activity of creating state institutions, the NF relied on strategies used by communist 
regimes of the Eastern Bloc. Mass organizations were intended to mobilize 
the “masses” for the cause of the NF and to communicate the party’s policies 
and ideology to the people. The army was completely restructured based on a 
“revolutionary concept,” meaning subordinate to the party: The Popular Defence 
Forces (PDF) were meant to be “a shield in protecting the country internally and 
externally.”7 By establishing a socialist economy, the NF regime hoped for a swift 
transition: From its own condition of “underdevelopment” to a level of welfare 
similar to the GDR’s. The YSP regime deliberately replaced Fanon’s emancipatory 
approach of anti-colonialism with Marxist-Leninist ideology. In doing so, the 
regime not only denied the Yemeni “masses” the ability to emancipate themselves, 
but ascribed this right and ability to a political vanguard – itself.
The “Corrective Move” had set the political course for the years until the 
demise of South Yemen and guided the political leadership until the coup of 1986. 
Salmin had become chairman of the five-member Presidential Council, which 
also included chief ideologue Ismail and the military man Ali Antar.8 The Council 
3 | Brehony, 2013, 45.
4 | On the role of administration in the state-building process see: Giddens, 1983.
5 | Brehony, 2013, 59.
6 | Fanon would warn of the dif ficulties waiting for the newly independent states after 
“wind of revolution los[t] its velocity,” in: Fanon, 2004, 90.
7 | Naumkin, Red Wolves of Yemen, 323; Brehony, 2013, 62.
8 | Brehony, 2013, 45; Lackner, 1985, 64; Burrowes, 2010, 160.
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was reduced to three shortly thereafter, and in the following year Ali Nasir forced 
his way into the council: The three major figures of political life in South Yemen, 
Salmin, Ismail, and Ali Nasir, had risen to power. The fifth NF Congress followed 
suit in spring 1972.9 Its closing document spelled out the central provisions of the 
constitution, the commitment to “scientific socialism,” “democratic centralism,” 
“collective leadership,” and to the “struggle against imperialism, Zionism 
and reaction.”10 The NF was renamed National Front Political Organization 
(NFPO) and a future merger with the Ba’ath and the PDU was in the air. The 
former General Command was replaced by a Central Committee, the Executive 
Committee was transformed into a Politbüro. The Congress decided to form a 
secretariat subdivided into bureaus occupied with all relevant areas of internal 
and external policy. Gradually, the Politbüro replaced the Presidential Council as 
the center of political power in South Yemen. In 1972 the two institutions were 
comprised of almost the same figureheads.11 Clearly, the redesigning of the NF/
NFPO as a Soviet-style vanguard party was under way.
1.2  Internal Frictions: Between “Individual” and “Collective” 
Leadership
The “Corrective Move” of 1969 had set the agenda for foreign policy as well – 
toward Moscow and the Eastern Bloc, though the intensity of this relationship 
hadn’t fully been settled yet. The following eight years were characterized by a 
political tug-of-war between two factions defined by their ideological orientation 
and their attitude toward Moscow. Salmin’s faction opted to uphold reservations 
toward the Eastern Bloc to maintain more maneuvering room on the global scene. 
Also, Salmin favored his very own interpretation of Maoism. This included a 
revolutionary approach that was to be initiated at the lowest social level. According 
to Salmin, leadership was supposed to respond to the action of the masses rather 
than the other way around. The creation of a vanguard party simply contradicted 
his political belief in the “autonomy and power of the masses.” Still, it may be 
doubted that these ideological deliberations were the only reason for him opposing 
further empowerment of the NF, as this is what the conversion to a vanguard party 
in fact meant at this point. In practice, Salmin’s style of politics clearly favored him 
as an individual political leader.
As a consequence, Salmin emerged as the immediate opponent of Moscow-
friendly Ismail. Ismail’s main goal was the erection of a “truly” socialist state led 
by a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. Accordingly, he criticized Salmin on any 
possible occasion:
9 | Burrowes, 2010, 256.
10 | Ar ticles 1-4 of the new by-laws of the party, in: Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 36.
11 | Salmin, Ismail, Ali Nasir, Ali Saleh Ubad Muqbil (Muqbil), Saleh Musleh, al-Beidh and 
Muhammad Saleh Muti’a.
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“No individual, whatever his qualities of leadership, his genius or feeling for the 
masses, can ever be a substitute for the collective […]. Everything done by the  
individual ends with the individual.”12
This quote by Ismail from the late 1970s not only reveals his rejection of Salmin 
and his style of leadership, but also the reason why Ismail was popular among 
the younger revolutionaries and intellectuals but less so among the Yemeni 
population. Ismail’s admiration for the Soviet system did not leave room for 
Salmin’s individual charismatic leadership, despite the prominence and popularity 
of this traditional concept in traditional Yemeni society. However, the concept of 
“collective leadership” does not necessarily mean a more democratic way ruling. 
According to Löwenthal, the concept as it was introduced in Moscow after Stalin’s 
reign did not change anything about the distribution of power in the state. Rather, 
“collective leadership” in the Soviet Union meant the inclusion of advisors in the 
secretary-general’s decision-making process, the “transition from despotic reign 
of arbitrariness to […] a relatively enlightened absolutism.”13 Ismail, however, had 
the tendency to take official statements and writings literally and seemed to believe 
in the concept of “collective leadership” himself.
The internal struggles around Salmin finally erupted in the “June 1978 Crisis.” 
In September 1977, the NF, rebranded the Unified Political Organization of the 
National Front (UNFPO) at the Congress of Unification in 1975,14 finally overruled 
Salmin’s wishes and voted for the creation of a vanguard party in the second half 
of 1978.15 Despite the UNFPO’s resolution, Salmin openly and aggressively tried 
to prevent realization of the project. His adversaries rallied behind Ismail and 
Ali Nasir. Regional politics came into play. Relations between North and South 
Yemen had been tense throughout the 1970s and fighting had repeatedly occurred 
on the border. In the middle of promising negotiations between the North Yemeni 
state and the northern branch of the al-Ahmar tribal confederation, President 
Ibrahim Muhammad al-Hamdi supposedly was killed on orders from Ahamad 
Husayn al-Ghashmi.16 As a reaction Al-Ghashmi, the new president of the north, 
was killed by a PDRY emissary, probably on behalf of Salmin.17 In retrospect, these 
events of 1977 have to be considered if not the cause then the opportunity for 
Salmin’s downfall. From within the party, Salmin already had been challenged 
12 | Embassy of the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen in London. Present and 
Future, in: Brehony, 2013, 89.
13 | Löwenthal, Jenseits des Stalinismus, in: Schmeitzner (Ed.), 2009, 396.
14 | Burrowes, 2010, 256; Lackner, 1985, 70-73.
15 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der 
JSP […] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 140.
16 | Burrowes, 2010, 141 and 154; Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, in: Chelkowski/
Pranger (Ed.), 1988, 236.
17 | Yodfat, 1983, 53.
A Spectre is Haunting Arabia – How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen
269
due to his reluctance toward Moscow: He had refused to support Ethiopia by 
sending troops in January 1978. At the time, external forces seemed to agree that 
Salmin was “against the relations with the socialist countries and formed separate 
[foreign] relations, not through the Foreign Ministry”18 which produced a popular 
conspiracy theory circulating until today. According to this interpretation of 
events, either the extreme left of the NLF19 or even the Soviet Union in cooperation 
with East Germany had staged al-Ghashmi’s assassination to get rid of Salmin.20 
Regardless of these recriminations, the active engagement of Salmin’s opponents 
working toward his disempowerment cannot be denied, nor can his death be 
denied as being convenient for Moscow and East-Berlin. Still, Soviet involvement 
in the matter remains speculative.
To fulfill Moscow’s wishes, Ismail had ignored Salmin’s decision to refuse South 
Yemeni participation in Ethiopia and over the next six months he took other 
steps to weaken Salmin. The Politbüro simply seized the opportunity to force 
Salmin out of office, officially to prevent an escalation of North-South Yemeni 
relations. After an attempted coup to save his position, Salmin was arrested and 
executed.21 During Salmin’s “reign” the regime and political system had been 
consolidated and profound social and economic changes had been introduced. 
Justifiably, Lackner considers Salmin “the most important figure of the first 
decade of independence.”22 When Ali Nasir took over Salmin’s post, he got a short 
but impressive taste of power: The competition and conflict between the veteran 
leaders that awaited him in retrospect appears predetermined. After an interim 
presidency of only six months, Ismail, the chief ideologue, succeeded Ali Nasir as 
president – right on time for the Founding Congress of the Yemeni Socialist Party 
in October of the same year.
18 | Mutia, Muhammad Saleh (member of the NLF’s Politbüro and of the Presidential 
Council, as well as foreign minister at the time), in: Beirut weekly "al-Houriya,” July 24 
1978, in: Ein-Gil, 1981 (2004).
19 | Ein-Gil, 1981 (2004), sine pagina.
20 | Brehony, 2013, 99.
21 | Dresch, 2000, 147.
22 | Lackner, 1985, 78.
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2.  SOvIE T INTERESTS AND FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT: FROM 
SuSPICION TO “BEST FRIENDS FORE vER”
“Yemen was of great geostrategic importance for the Soviet Union. Thus, I 
assume that [the USSR] told our people: Do something there. And that’s how 
the whole policy in Yemen came about.”23
After the “Corrective Move” of 1969, Moscow gradually gave up its reservations 
toward the Aden regime, bilaterally and internationally. In the same year, the Kremlin 
started its “long-term” involvement and henceforth, bilateral relations continuously 
intensified. In October 1971, Ali Nasir praised Soviet support and the “firm friendship” 
of South Yemen with the “socialist camp” as a major factor in South Yemen’s 
transformation.24 East German ambassador Scharfenberg reports on Ali Nasir’s 
“almost religious esteem toward the advisors from socialist countries.”25 The decisions 
of the NF’s Fifth Congress of 1972 led away from marginal extremist currents within 
the former liberation movement, such as Maoism, that had contradicted Marxist-
Leninist ideology. In addition to that, the distance between Aden and Peking seemed 
to grow and to a certain degree assured Moscow of Aden’s future course.
The restructuring of the NF toward a vanguard party was under way, while 
East German functionaries served as appreciated and established advisors among 
the highest ranks of state and administration. In a communiqué from November 
1972, the Soviet Union openly sided with the National Front and its “progressive” 
policies26 and a mere two years later the Kremlin declared “unfailing support” 
during South Yemen’s transformation process27 – as long as this process evolved 
along socialist “progressive” lines. But even though the NF regularly exchanged 
delegations with the CPSU, SED, and other Communist parties of the Eastern 
Bloc, some of the NF’s policies were considered extremist by both Moscow and 
East Berlin. Especially with regard to South Yemen’s foreign policy, Soviet and 
East-German advisors aimed to “generate a more realistic perspective among the 
leaders of the PRSY.”28
2.1  Engagement in Aden and Soviet Strateg y in the Middle East
Internationally, Moscow’s engagement in Aden has to be considered part of the 
USSR’s wider strategy in the Middle East in general and in the Horn of Africa 
in particular, combining geostrategic and ideological considerations. The strategy 
23 | 
24 | Ali Nasser Mohammed, in: Halliday, 1990, 187.
25 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 24.
26 | Halliday, 1990, 187.
27 | Ibid. 188.
28 | Brief Lugenheim an Scharfenberg, April 29 1973, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1555/76, 3. 
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included ongoing exchange with and support of other potential allies in South 
Yemen’s vicinity to prevent a “strategy of encirclement” by Washington.29 To the 
Kremlin’s displeasure, its strategic allies in the region one by one turned away and 
were lost to “Moscow’s cause”. What followed was a phase of Soviet reorientation 
in the region. It was accompanied by the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975 
and the British withdrawal from the Middle East.30 London’s departure left some 
political space to be filled by external powers. The few years before the increase of 
U.S. involvement after 1979 were the high times of Soviet influence in the Middle 
East.
The two cases of “lost Soviet allies” most relevant for Soviet-South Yemeni 
relations were Egypt and Somalia. Both had required much financial and political 
maintenance and their loss as a close political partner freed considerable resources 
for Moscow. Shortly after the Kremlin had given up its military base in Egypt, Chief 
of the Soviet Navy Admiral Gorshkov paid his first visit to Aden in 1974. He came 
back only a few years later after Somali leader Muhammad Siad Barré had forced 
the Soviet naval pullout from Somalia and turned to the United States in 1977.31 
Obviously, a new safe and reliable Soviet naval base in the region was needed. 
Intensive engagement by the USSR, GDR, and Cuba in Ethiopia,32 the People’s 
Republic of Congo, Angola, and Mozambique, was now complemented by the 
establishment of a new foothold at the Bab al-Mandab in Aden. As a consequence, 
the PDRY became Moscow’s major ally at this strategically important position: 
During the Somali-Ethiopian war, South Yemen served as Moscow’s main shipping 
center for arms, men, and equipment headed for Addis Abeba. Understandably, 
Somalia “broke up” with the Soviet Union: it declared the termination of their 
mutual Treaty of Friendship on November 13 1977.33 Soviet advisors and personnel 
were expelled and the main Soviet naval base in the region was gone for good. The 
relocation of the base from Somalia’s port of Berbera to Aden coincided with the 
consolidation of Moscow’s position in Ethiopia.34 The Kremlin invested significant 
sums in Aden’s port by expanding the former British facilities.
On May 23 1978, a new agreement on military cooperation between Moscow 
and Aden was reached and Ali Antar, minister of defense of the PDRY, travelled to 
East Berlin to meet General Heinz Hoffman and then to Moscow to meet the Soviet 
29 | Storckmann, 2012, 309.
30 | Cigar, 1985, 776.
31 | Halliday, 1990, 194.
32 | See Storckmann’s detailed account on Soviet engagement and the role of the GDR in 
Ethiopia and on the Horn of Africa, Storckmann, 2012, 304-312.
33 | Yodfat, 1983, 46.
34 | Treaty of Friendship signed in January 1979, Halliday, 1990, 193 and Chubin, 1980, 
in: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (Ed.), 303. 
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Minister of Defense Dmitri Ustinov.35 On August 19, “a unit of Soviet warships 
[arrived] on an official friendly visit to the port of Aden”36 and three months later 
“Soviet combat aircraft”37 were positioned on South Yemeni territory. From now on 
South Yemen served as a training ground for maneuvers, as well as for naval and 
amphibious landing exercises. There is no evidence that Moscow ever entertained an 
official military base in South Yemen in the strict sense of a territory granting extra-
territorial privileges to the Soviets. However, Moscow had a fully-equipped naval, air, 
and artillery base at its disposal without the political burden of calling it such.
2.2  Object of Political Speculations and Militar y Debate: The Island 
of Socotra
This opens an extremely interesting chapter of Soviet geostrategic engagement in the 
region: The island of Socotra. The secluded tropical island in the Arabian Sea guards 
the Gulf of Aden and has long been part of Yemeni territory. International geostrategic 
interest in the island at the time was high.38 In combination with the natural harbor 
of Aden, the island is positioned to provide swift naval reaction to any incidents in 
the region as well as a quick and safe retreat to Aden. Contemporary witnesses like 
Vladimir Agafinov, a Soviet military interpreter and orientalist, insist that the island 
of Socotra has never been used as an unofficial naval, air force, or rocket base by the 
Soviet Union and  that Moscow had used it as a major military bluff for Western 
Secret Services.39  But even though the island had not much to offer in terms of a port 
or even a moorage, Moscow indeed had started to use the waters around Socotra to 
anchor its ships around 1970, if not earlier.40 Hence, the transfer of the Soviet moorage 
from Berbera, Somalia to the port of Aden in 1977 seems an elusive move. With the 
moorage came a tracker station, a tactical missile warehouse, a big fuel storage and 
accommodation facilities for about one thousand people. Thus, it is more than likely 
that the late 1970s indeed witnessed the installation of “mooring buoys off the island 
of Socotra”41 that would counter Agafinov’s statements.
2.3  Moscow Commits: Domestic Politics and New Part y Ties 
Regardless of the extent of military facilities on Socotra, a stable and loyal South 
Yemen was of highest priority for Soviet strategy in the Horn of Africa after 1977. The 
35 | ADN, June 2 1978, in: Yodfat, 1983.
36 | FBIS, USSR, July 11 1978, F3 and San Diego Union, December 1 1978, both quoted 
in: Yodfat, 1983, 55.
37 | Ibid., in: Yodfat, 1983, 55; Cigar, 1985, 781.
38 | On the strategic relevance of Socotra at the time see: Elie, 2006, 151ff.
39 | Agafinov visited Socotra several times (1976 –1980), Agafinov, 2008; Elie, 2006, 152.
40 | Yodfat, 1983, 6; 110; Agafinov, 2008.
41 | Halliday, 1990, 203.
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increased Soviet presence had a significant impact on the internal developments that 
mostly served Ismail and his faction,42 and thus the NF’s emergence as a communist 
vanguard party in 1978. In this regard, the change of leadership from Salmin to Ali 
Nasser and Ismail was not to the disadvantage of Moscow and East Berlin. Moscow 
denied any “Arab and Western media reports of Soviet, Cuban, and East German 
involvement.”43 Nonetheless, Halliday hints at a certain Soviet involvement during 
the internal crisis of June 1978.44 This not only appears possible but also highly 
plausible with regard to Moscow’s previous naval activities in the area. Furthermore, 
Scharfenberg reports of a meeting with the secretary-general of the Communist 
Party of Lebanon, Nicolas Chaoui, in June 1977, who shared Ismail’s position on the 
matter of the formation of a vanguard with Scharfenberg:
“The socialist states had to acknowledge [the fact that any Western support 
for the PDRY would be terminated as soon as the UNFPO was reformed as a 
vanguard party]. Ismail explained to [Chaoui] that the formation of a vanguard 
party depended on the Soviet Union.”45
However, the Soviet Union clearly had no interest in an escalation of violence within 
or outside its new Socialist model state, such as between the two Yemens, as this 
most certainly would have led to further involvement of other powers in the region 
where Moscow preferred to be left alone. Without doubt, both new presidents, Ali 
Nasir and Ismail, were more convenient allies for the Kremlin than Salmin had ever 
been and Soviet-South Yemeni relations intensified accordingly: Shortly before the 
NF completed its metamorphosis into a Soviet-type vanguard party in 1978, official 
party ties were established between the CPSU and the future YSP.46
As a consequence of the PDRY’s engagement in Ethiopia, Aden was finally 
granted a dear wish that its leadership had expressed in 1973:47 The PDRY was 
invited as an observer to the Comecon annual meeting in Moscow in June 1979.48 
In that year, the Soviet-Yemeni relations clearly reached a new level: Only three 
months after the meeting, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Aden, and in 
October Ismail once more met Brezhnev in Moscow. Apart from a renewal of 
economic and technical assistance and an agreement on future collaboration on 
the party level between the YSP and the CPSU, Moscow and Aden signed the 
42 | Yodfat, 1983, 51 and 52.
43 | Ibid., 53.
44 | Halliday, 1990, 191.
45 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 50.
46 | Yodfat, 2011 (1983), 56.
47 | Brief Scharfenberg an Willerding, July 25 1973, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1555/76, 52.
48 | At this point, Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam already were full members of the Comecon, 
while the PDRY shared an observer status with Angola, Afghanistan, Laos, Mozambique, 
and Ethiopia, in: Halliday, 1990, 192.
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first “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.”49 The treaty was followed by similar 
agreements with the GDR and ČSSR in November. Yodfat, one of the few academic 
commentators on the treaty, hints at the possible similarity of the treaty’s Article 
2 with what became known as the “Brezhnev Doctrine”: The signatories agreed 
that they would aim “for the safeguarding and further development of the socio-
economic gains of their peoples.”50 Yodfat’s comment however, appears exaggerated 
and manipulated by the atmosphere of the Cold War. Though comparable to the 
bilateral agreements forming the Warsaw Pact, all Soviet treaties with states from 
the “Global South” excluded any guarantees of mutual assistance in case of attack.
Nonetheless, the Treaties of Friendship outside the Comecon had a significant 
symbolic political meaning. The signatory states declared their close relationship 
with the Eastern Bloc and committed themselves to a common foreign policy 
position. Furthermore, Halliday notes several characteristics of this specific Treaty 
that, according to him, were “noticeable.”51 While Article 1 of the treaty assured 
Aden of the “unbreakable friendship of the two countries,” Article 5 emphasized 
that military cooperation would continue to strengthen Aden’s defense capacity – 
to secure Moscow’s new naval “base” in the region. In addition to that, the treaty 
raised rumors about “secret clauses”. Again, these may be speculations. But at 
the time, these theoretical considerations created suspicion among other regional 
actors and the USSR’s adversaries, which in turn could have led to very concrete 
and real political consequences. On top of that, Moscow did not do much to deny 
the rumors: By October 1979, when about two brigades of Soviet troops were 
airlifted from southern Russia to the PDRY and Ethiopia,52 the Kremlin’s claim to 
its new strategic base was more or less common knowledge.
All in all, the “Treaties of Friendship” were part of the wider framework of Moscow’s 
new policy of commitment that included noticeable endeavors of its closest allies. 
For instance, official relations between the East German and South Yemeni army 
were established as complementary support for the intensive Soviet and Cuban 
engagement in the military.53 Secondly, the “Treaties” were the preliminary stage 
49 | Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam enjoyed treaties including mutual assistance. Treaties 
comparable to the South Yemen Treaty of Friendship had been signed with Egypt and India 
in 1971, followed by Treaties with Iraq, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan. 
Earlier in 1979, Moscow had signed a similar Treaty in Ethiopia and in the following year 
with Syria. See: Halliday, 1990, 193. On the Soviet bilateral Treaties of Friendship also see 
Chapter 4. Squeezed between Bonn and Moscow: The GDR’s Foreign Policy – An Overview.
50 | Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen, October 25 1979, in: Pravda, September 26 1979; Also see: Yodfat, 
1983, 109.
51 | Halliday, 1990, 194.
52 | Ibid. 195.
53 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 86.
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for possible further integration into the Soviet sphere of influence. Lastly, the 
“Treaties” were of high symbolic value for the PDRY, which had further isolated 
itself in the region. After the establishment of a Soviet-style vanguard party, they 
were a keystone of South Yemen’s long-term alignment with the Eastern Bloc.
3.  ThE PhASE OF E XPANSION: ThE GDR AS ThE DIRECTOR OF 
“CIvILIAN MAT TERS” OF SOCIALIST NATION- AND STATE-
BuILDING IN SOuTh AR ABIA 
“It was assumed that after […] independence the PRSY would mostly need 
political-ideological help and advice on fundamental questions about the 
economy and the state apparatus.” 54
(Embassy of the GDR in Aden on the activities of East German advisors, 1972)
After the hesitant attitude of the 1960s, Moscow began to explicitly back East 
Germany’s interest and engagement in South Yemen and finally even directed 
East Berlin with regard to the extent of the SED’s duties in the PDRY. For Ethiopia, 
Dagne mentions the division of labor between Moscow and East Berlin with 
regard to the security apparatus.55 According to him, the USSR focused on military 
support in Ethiopia, while the GDR was occupied with the field of internal security.
For the PDRY, this concept was also applied, and even expanded: While Heinz-
Dieter Winter considers a “division of labor” between the civil and the military 
sphere in South Yemen at least a possibility, Fritz Balke emphasizes the exclusive 
Soviet engagement in the field of the military. Hans Bauer’s interpretation of East 
German presence even relies on the fact that an agreement between Moscow 
and East Berlin on a “division of labor” had existed. According to him, the GDR 
was responsible for the “inner stability” of the country,56 while the Soviet Union, 
alongside with Cuba, contributed the “military” part.57 When Moscow opted for 
Aden as its new unofficial base in the region, East Germany was then included in 
54 | Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit 
Schlußfolgerungen für das weitere Vorgehen auf diesem Gebiet in der VDRJ, June 27 1972, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, C 156276, 33.
55 | Dagne, 2006, 35.
56 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011; Interview with Hans Bauer on June 20 
2011; Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2013; “With regard to the military, the PDRY 
for the biggest part was supported by the Soviet Union.” in: Scharfenberg, 2012, 86. 
57 | “In [South] Yemen, with the assistance of a small number of specialists, we helped 
to organize the militia”. Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael, Conference of Deputy Chairman of the 
State Council of Cuba, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig, in Mexico, 23 November 1981, “Year of the 20th Anniversary of Victory at Playa 
Giron,” in: Russian & East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-78, Cold War 
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the military sphere,58 probably due to East Berlin’s good standing among the Yemeni 
leadership and the mounting material demands of the regime. As a consequence, 
East Berlin emerged as the director of “civilian” matters of state-building, which was 
inseparably mixed with matters of ideology and the integration of society when 
applying the concept of socialist state- and nation-building. 
3.1  Bilateral Rapprochement and the Major Tool of East Germany’s 
State-Building Policy: The GDR’s Policy of Consultancy
 “The GDR supported [South Yemen] in various central fields, mostly by sharing 
its experiences during the period of the establishment of an anti-fascist-
democratic order.”59 
(Results of the GDR’s governmental advisor groups in South Yemen, 1972)
Actors from all three spheres of East German foreign policy making shared with 
each other their experiences during the decisive years of South Yemeni state- 
and nation-building. Apart from security issues, the whole process was mostly 
coordinated by the embassy, from 1972 to 1978 under its ambassador, Günther 
Scharfenberg. However, bilateral rapprochement following the establishment of 
diplomatic relations was mostly driven by the SED party and its organs:60 Exchange 
of delegations on all levels became a major tool in East Berlin’s policy, whereas 
each high-ranking delegation was accompanied by at least one party official. The 
first visit at the party level was even performed before the new constitution was 
launched, in early November 1970 under Ismail’s leadership. Ismail returned to 
East Berlin one and a half years later, and the Yemenis received the East German 
party delegation in February 1974. On the East German side all three meetings 
were coordinated by Gerhard Grünberg.61 Shortly thereafter, delegation visits 
attained a new level of importance. In September 1976. Willi Stoph visited Aden 
International History Project Bulletin Issues 9-10, 210; Also see: Cuba, in: Burrowes, 2010, 
83; Scharfenberg, 2012, 65.
58 | A protocol for the support of the PDRY’s military by the GDR was signed in June 1978, 
in: Scharfenberg, 2012, 86.
59 | Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit 
Schlußfolgerungen für das weitere Vorgehen auf diesem Gebiet in der VDRJ, June 27 1972, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, C 156276, 39.
60 | Stenografische Niederschrif t der Beratung mit der Delegation der NLF Südjemen am 
2.11.1970 im Hause des ZKs, in: BArch SAPMO/DY 30/11407, 5-71. Informationsmappe 
für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 
1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 167.
61 | Grünberg, member of the Politbüro since 1966 and mostly occupied with question of 
agriculture, was assigned to enter tain relations with the PDRY at the highest Party level. 
Scharfenberg, 2012, 52.
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as a high-ranking representative.62 In June 1977, a “Party and governmental 
delegation” under Werner Lamberz renewed the party agreement between the 
UNFPO and the SED until 1979.63
In the heyday, there were more than 2,000 East German experts delegated to 
the PDRY.64 By that time, East Germany appears to have had a full-fledged state-
building policy in mind. By sending the constitutional advisory group, the GDR 
had signaled its full support for the establishment of a functional socialist state 
apparatus. Apart from juridical advice, the economy was at the forefront of GDR 
consultancy. While the advisory group may be considered the first foreign policy 
tool used in East Germany’s support of socialist state- and nation-building, the 
first agreement represents its immediate follow-up: The Agreement of Scientific-
Technical Cooperation65 (WTZ). The WTZ Agreement sent some thirty advisors 
to Aden. The majority of these delegates were assigned as governmental advisors 
in all fields relevant for state-building, while another five other advisors were sent 
under the Kulturarbeitsplan, the “Cultural Working Plan” of 1970-71.66 These 
five were supported by 20 more experts, among them three teachers.The GDR’s 
engagement under the provisions of the “Working Plan” was initiated in October 
1969 and was transformed into a long-term mission in 1971.67 Active involvement 
during those early years was demonstrated in the fields of economy and finance, 
agriculture, youth, education, communication, and the media: In 1972. East 
German advisors introduced the basic principles of planning and socialist economy, 
directing the first steps toward agrarian reform and socialization, including the 
formation of agrarian collectives and agricultural mass organization.68 This 
62 | Stoph visited Aden just one month before Honecker took over his post as 
Staatsratsvorsitzender and thus international representative of the GDR. Scharfenberg, 
2012, 56.
63 | Communiqué on the occasion of a visit by an NFPO delegation in East-Berlin in 
February 1974, Agreement on the cooperation between the SED and the UNFPO, June 13 
1977, in: Jemen (Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen der DDR; 1987, 140; 
140-1; Scharfenberg, 2012, 59.
64 | Panecke, Volker, Vorwort, in: Scharfenberg, 2012, 7.
65 | German: Wissenschaftlich-technische Zusammenarbeit (WTZ). Wissenschaftlich-
technische Zusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und der VDRJ und wissenschaftlich-
technische Hilfeleistung der DDR gegenüber der VDRJ in Form des Einsatzes von DDR-
Beratern in zentralen Staatsorganen und im Bereich der Wir tschaft der VDRJ 1971-1974 
[Abschlussbericht], in: PA AA, MfAA, C 156276, 1-32.
66 | The Kulturarbeitsplan for a period of one to two years was renewed regularly. The next 
followed in February 1973, in: Scharfenberg, 2012, 47. 
67 | Ibid., 33.
68 | Ibid., 38-41.
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“Policy of Consultancy” was translated into the first economic five-year plan in 
South Yemen in April 1974.69
Another important area of consultation was the field of foreign policy. According 
to Scharfenberg, Aden itself had requested support, and in September 1974, a joint 
delegation of the CC International Relations Section and the MfAA visited the 
PDRY.70 The topics discussed reveal the potential explosiveness of this advisory 
mission: The possible establishment of relations between the PDRY, the USA, 
and the FRG were to be reconsidered. These consultations have to be considered 
one of the few occasions when East Germany was able to distinguish itself as a 
proactive actor in international relations: East Berlin claimed agency for a matter 
concerned with the “other Germany” in the West. The consultations resulted in 
the reestablishment of relations between Aden and Bonn on September 16 1974. 
The FRG’s representative, Alexander Mühlen, arrived soon thereafter.71 In May 
1976, East German foreign policy consultancy was institutionalized by Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Willerding.72
The MR Groups: An Open Secret of Stasi Presence in Aden
Bauer concedes: “For sure it was no secret that any advisory mission [abroad] was 
a political mission.”73 The most notorious advisory groups in this respect were 
and are the so-called “MR Groups.”74 Not without reason, Scharfenberg considers 
these groups “the most important pillar of political consultancy,”75 as they were 
delegated by the GDR’s Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of State Security. 
Most of them were sent to Aden to support the state-building process in the PDRY. 
The members of these groups who could rely on expertise in their assigned field 
were either sent directly by the MfS, or joined the ranks of the Secret Service right 
before their mission abroad. Comprised of several experts and an executive of the 
group, the MR Groups officially were placed as advisors at the highest governmental 
levels and regularly consulted with several of the PDRY’s ministers.76 Thus, only 
the most loyal cadres were selected to serve as these kind of consultants, as they 
advised Yemeni personnel up to the rank of the PDRY’s government and thus 
party officials. According to Hans Bauer, the former GDR resident in Aden, the 
69 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der 
JSP […] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 140.
70 | Among the delegation was Peter Rabenhorst, at the time member of the ZK 
International Relations Section. Scharfenberg, 2012, 48.
71 | Botschafter Held, Sanaa, an das Auswärtige Amt, June 3 1976, in: AzAP der BRD, 
1976, Vol.1, 1. Januar bis 30. Juni, FN 1 and 2, 807; Scharfenberg, 2012, 69.
72 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 49.
73 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.
74 | Abbreviation for German Ministerratsgruppe. English: Groups of the Council of Ministers.
75 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 34.
76 | Ibid., 38.
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MR Groups worked closely with both the “partner country” and the “embassy” 
on the ground, though contemporary witnesses report of regular conflicts over 
responsibilities between the ambassador and MfS delegates. Scharfenberg, for 
example, remembers the independent modus operandi of the MR Group at his 
arrival in 1972 and how he tried to clarify questions of responsibilities in Aden.77 
According to him, the head of the MR Group in Aden consulted with him on a 
weekly basis, and with the heads of the other advisory groups on a monthly basis 
or according to need.
The conflict of jurisdiction between the embassy and consultants is a telling 
example for the conflicts inherent in the GDR’s political system, especially the 
competition between party and state institutions. While there usually was not 
much room for discussion for the state institutions within the borders of the GDR, 
this was a very different matter abroad. Even though the MfS was “sword and 
shield of the Party,” and, according to the principle of “democratic centralism,” 
ranked above state institutions in the hierarchy, it was the East German embassies 
that entertained personal contacts and were able to accumulate insider knowledge 
about the country. This was even more the case in a remote state like South Yemen, 
where only few political actors spoke anything but Arabic.
3.2  Integration of Societ y: Training, (Re-)Education and the 
Formation of a New Public 
As part of its “low-profile” strategy, East Germany had sought contacts below the 
governmental level among the “mass organizations” early on, mostly to promote 
the establishment of diplomatic relations. After relations between the GDR and 
South Yemen were established, the major goal was to direct the process of “the 
integration of society” of socialist state-building, that is, the homogenization 
and centralization of mass organizations.78 Lenin had described “integration of 
society” through political and social mass organizations, including the media. 
According to him, they were to serve as a “Transmissionsriemen,” a transmission 
belt, translating Marxist-Leninist ideology and party policies to society.
Apart from the first treaties initiated by the party at the state level, a significant 
number of other actors became active in South Yemen. Especially at the level 
of foreign policy making, all actors outside the state and Party apparatus had 
been highly active in the PDRY in the early years of East German-South Yemeni 
relations. The central concept for the establishment of relations between mass 
organizations was the concept of “solidarity.”
77 | Ibid., 2012, 36.
78 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 56.
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“Realizing the National-Democratic Development”:79 Integration of the Media
The two major fields of East German economic engagement in the Third World 
had been the infrastructure of telecommunications and print industry80 – and not 
without reason. Similar to the centralized direction and control of East German 
media, South Yemeni media was embedded in the PDRY’s political system. East 
German media actors had become active early on to support the GDR’s state- and 
nation-building assistance, foremost for the “integration of society.” In the late 
1960s the SED’s international media service ADN81 had relied on a local journalist, 
but finally established its office in Aden under leadership of Deba Wienand. This 
was based on a cooperation agreement between the ADN and the Aden News 
Agency (ANA) which included free exchange of content as well as six free college 
placements in Berlin and Prague.82 Also, ANA received a loaned radio unit under 
the obligation to broadcast the Arab programs of the ADN. Without doubt, the 
GDR aimed to have Yemeni media in its grip.
On July 28 1971, a governmental agreement on postal and communication 
services was signed.83 Only a few months later, Scharfenberg reports on a meeting 
of the NF’s Politbüro, CC, and the media on the “intensification of the political-
ideological impact of mass media.”84 This confirms the official report on the work 
of East German governmental advisors in 1972: “Advisors [on communication 
focused on] the efficient realization of the national-democratic development 
through mass media.”85 Shortly thereafter a commission on ideology at the CC 
was founded with its main function being “the enforcement and coordination of 
ideological work in the country […] while especially focusing on mass media.”86 
The political process of media integration was sealed by an agreement on 
79 | Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit 
Schlußfolgerungen für das weitere Vorgehen auf diesem Gebiet in der VDRJ, June 27 1972, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, C 156276, 43.
80 | A printing house from Leipzig was active in Aden, in: Interview with Hans Bauer June 
20 2011. 
81 | Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst; English: General German News Service.
82 | Vertrag zwischen dem Allg. Deutschen Nachrichtendienst, der Nachrichtenagentur 
der DDR, und der Aden News Agency, der Nachrichtenagentur der Volksrepublik Südjemen, 
über Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet des Nachrichtenwesens, in: BArch DC 900/920.
83 | Regierungsabkommen über Post- und Fernmeldewesen, July 28 1971, in: Jemen 
(Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen der DDR, 1987, 139.
84 | Informationen zu einigen inneren und äußeren Problemen der VDRJ, Aden, February 6 
1973, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1555/76, 100.
85 | Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit 
Schlußfolgerungen für das weitere Vorgehen auf diesem Gebiet in der VDRJ, June 27 1972, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, C 156276, 43.
86 | Gambke et al., 1974, 106.
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cooperation between a newly created television committee in South Yemen with 
its East German counterpart in June 1972.87
Another important reason for the GDR’s interest in South Yemen’s media was its 
intention to control the image of East Germany abroad. During Honecker’s official 
visit to South Yemen in 1979, GDR media was instructed by the Agitation Section 
to provide South Yemeni media with features about the GDR and publications 
written and designed for the region.88 East German journalists and advisors in the 
field remained active in South Yemen throughout the GDR’s existence, while their 
role as the “Transmissionsriemen” of Marxist-Leninist ideology and East German 
interests toward the South Yemeni people never changed. All of the media actors 
had to abide by “party and state discipline”89 – just like any other East German 
actor abroad.
Organizing the Masses: Unifying and Controlling Workers, Women, and Youth
Cooperation with mass organizations was performed quite extensively, whereas 
the GDR got quickly involved with the workers union, women’s union, and the 
youth organization. The General Union of Yemeni Women, for example, had 
been founded in February 1968 and in 1971 the society’s leader, Aida Yafa’i, 
visited the GDR.90 Relations between the workers and trade unions and the FDGB 
had been established as early as 1961. Immediately following independence, the 
self-directed ATUC was replaced by the General Union of Workers, which was 
modelled on socialist mass organizations. Relations between the FDGB and 
this new centralized federation were made official in 1969.91 While the Yemeni 
trade unions once had been one of the major revolutionary driving forces, the 
organizations had lost their influence and credibility during the revolutionary 
fighting while the NLF actively homogenized what was left of the trade unions: 
“The Soviet and East German advisors […] did everything to eradicate [the trade 
unions’] independence and to create an organization supportive of the regime 
87 | Vereinbarung über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Staatlichen Komitee für 
Fernsehen beim Ministerrat der DDR und dem Fernsehen der VDRJ, June 2 1972, in: Jemen 
(Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen der DDR, 1987, 140.
88 | Vorschläge für auslandsinformatorische Maßnahmen anlässlich des Besuchs einer 
hochrangigen Delegation der DDR im Sozialistischen Äthiopien und in der VDRJ vom 
11. Oktober 1979 der Abteilung Auslandsinformation, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 4959, 1-6.
89 | Report on a journalist’s dismissal after the events of the “1986 crisis” in Aden. 
Stellungnahme zum politischen Fehlverhalten des Genossen [geschwärzt], March 17 
1986, Verband der Journalisten der DDR, in: BStU MfS HA XX Nr.13169, 179f.
90 | Dahlgren, 1998; Halliday, 1974, 241; Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 59f; Scheider, 1989, 263.
91 | Aktenvermerk über eine Gespräch mit Herrn Alaini, Ver treter der Aden-TUC im 
Allarabischen Gewerkschaftsbund (ICATU) am 4.Dezember 1961 in den Räumen des Büros 
des Bevollmächtigten der DDR in der VAR, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1224/71, 145-147; Gambke 
et al., 1974, 111; Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 57f.
CHAPTER 12. Phase II: The Phase of Establishment and Expansion from 1969 to 1978
282
according to the real-socialist model.”92 In May 1971, and following East German 
advice,93 the independent leadership of the trade unions was terminated by force, 
and in early 1972 an Institute for Trade Union Studies led by Soviet and East 
German lecturers was established.
But workers and women were only of secondary interest for the GDR, as the former 
represented merely a marginal part of the population and the latter remained 
politically insignificant.94 To change South Yemen’s society in the long run, it was 
the youth who had to be converted to Marxist-Leninist ideology and the directed 
toward a socialist political system.
“In many ways, Asheed is the most important mass organization in the PDRY. 
Part of the reason for this is purely demographic: approximately one-quarter of 
South Yemen’s young population are between the ages of 16 and 28. […] Above 
and beyond this, however, the YSP has found the youth of the country most open 
to ideas of social reform and change.”95
From the first days of diplomatic relations until the end of the GDR, the East 
German youth organization FDJ96 was actively involved in South Yemen,97 first 
and foremost with a brigade of about 25 delegates “training young Yemeni cadres 
in technical vocations”98 in the present-day governorate of Abyan. The first 
agreements between the FDJ and Asheed were signed in November 1971 in East 
Berlin99 and cooperation was expanded significantly over the following years. 
Further activities of the group were coordinated by a member of the Stasi-based 
MR Group, Manfred Weigandt. Weigandt was assigned to be the advisor for state 
media, but was also closely involved in the preparation of the Xth World Festival of 
92 | Scheider, 1989, 262.
93 | Unger, DDR-Erfahrungen gefragt, in: Horizont 23/71, 1971, 28-29.
94 | Dahlgren, 1998.
95 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 59.
96 | FDJ – Freie Deutsche Jugend; English: Free German Youth.
97 | The “FDJ Friendship Brigades” were organized by the “Solidary Committee,” and thus any 
aid provided by the FDJ was also part of so-called “solidarity spending”. in: Howell, 1994, 313.
98 | See: Zusammenarbeit mit Jugend- und Studentenorganisationen in der VDRJ 1969-
1990, in: BArch DY 24/22196, 21884, 22197, 21886, and 22198; Informationsmappe für 
den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 
1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 176; Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011; 
Scharfenberg, 2012, 44.
99 | See: Vereinbarungen und Kommuniques zur Zusammenarbeit des Zentralrates der FDJ 
mit den Zentralkomitees von Jugendorganisationen der VDR Jemen, in: BArch SAPMO/DY 
24/21884 Vol.2; Interview with Faruq Mustafa, member of the CC of the Democratic Youth 
Organization of Yemen, in: Neues Deutschland, November 30 1972.
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Youth and Students.100 In January 1973, the PDRY established a National Festival 
Committee (NFC) to prepare for the World Festival. The GDR’s “Red Woodstock”101 
still has to be considered part of East Berlin’s long-term “policy of recognition” 
and the event clearly followed the “strategy of the honest broker” toward the 
Global South, as the Festival’s slogan indicates: The GDR was to incorporate “anti-
imperialist solidarity, peace, and friendship.”102 The supposedly “better Germany” 
propagated a relationship with the Global South based on “equality.”103
East Berlin clearly hoped to direct as much of the process as possible: 
“Comments by the GDR embassy toward the Festival Committee were in principle 
included in [the preparatory] plans.”104 Among the activities during the preparation 
were joint events of the South Yemeni Youth and the Soviet and East German 
embassies. Most importantly, the Committee induced the founding of the NF 
youth group in this context in February 1973,105 the Yemeni Union of Democratic 
Youth (YUDY). The YUDY established relations with the FDJ right away and also 
organized itself among the South Yemeni students in the GDR. Particularly with 
the Yemeni youth, the YSP and SED appeared to have cooperated successfully: 
In the early 1980s, contemporaries considered YUDY the “best organized, most 
dynamic and progressive mass organization in the PDRY […], being recognized in 
the party constitution as the YSP’s main reserve and assistant.”106 In conclusion, 
despite the considerable impact of trade unions, it was the youth, and relations 
between the youth organizations in particular, that opened the door for East 
German engagement.
(Re-)Educating South Yemeni Societ y
Apart from mass organizations, the major avenue for GDR engagement to further 
the “integration of society” in the socialist sense was the field of education. In 
March 1976, a delegation of the Academy of Pedagogy of the GDR travelled to 
Aden107 and a protocol on scientific-technical cooperation was signed in September 
1976. This was followed by an agreement on the mutual recognition of academic 
degrees and transcripts in April 1979, paving the way for the intensification of 
100 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 39.
101 | Comp. Blog – The GDR Objectified. The Red Woodstock: 10th World festival of Youth 
and Students East Berlin, no author.
102 | VDRJ, zur Entwicklung des Landes, 1973, in: BStU MfS Allg. S. Nr.332/73, 16.
103 | Howell, 1994, 306.
104 | Volksdemokratische Republik Jemen, zur Entwicklung des Landes, 1973, in: BStU 
MfS Allg. S. Nr.332/73, 12.
105 | Informationen zu einigen inneren und äußeren Problemen der VDRJ, Aden, February 
6 1973, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1555/76, 101.
106 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 59.
107 | Grünberg, 2012, 52.
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future exchange.108 To be able to influence education in the new state, however, a 
different strategy was needed.
For the SED leadership, “integration of society” meant the “homogenization 
of society” and they thus aimed at applying strategies in South Yemen similar 
to those used in the GDR. Schools, technical training centers, and even Aden 
University, which had opened in 1975, were designed as centers of ideological 
multiplication and propaganda. The East German “collective” of authors who 
wrote a highly ideological state publication on South Yemen summarizes the 
GDR’s role in this process and emphasizes the importance of the “measures to 
ideologically stabilize”109 the central party in Aden. Also, they minutely describe 
all the steps taken by East Germany to support this process, most prominently 
the establishment of a College of Political Sciences in Aden in 1971.110  Teachers 
of Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism were delegated by the “CPSU, the 
SED and other Communist parties”111 to teach about their vision for South Yemen.
The ideological education at the College of Aden was complemented by programs 
abroad. In December 1973, the NF itself had asked for the extension of the “program of 
NF-leading functionaries in the GDR which was readily granted.112 In 1971, the South 
Yemeni minister of economy and industry113 himself trained there and later on aimed 
for the inclusion of economics and finances in the program. Furthermore, a high 
number of other high-ranking South Yemeni party functionaries were educated in 
Moscow and East Berlin, while vacation packages were granted regularly to the most 
important cadres and their families.114 The GDR clearly presented itself as the “shop 
window of socialism,”115 selling their concept of socialist state- and nation-building to 
the South Yemenis.
However, neither cadre training “on the job” nor at the party school can be considered 
the central focus of East German engagement in the field: “Youth education is 
108 | Abkommen über die gegenseitige Anerkennung von akademischen Graden und 
Zeugnissen der Bildung, April 18 1979, in: Jemen (Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche 
Vereinbarungen der DDR, 1987, 140-1.
109 | Gambke et al., 1974, 104.
110 | German: Hochschule für politische Wissenschaften.
111 | Gambke et al., 1974, 105; 112. The first lecturer groups consisted of three instructors 
on ideology and two translators, in: Scharfenberg, 2012, 41.
112 | Scharfenberg himself openly advocated for it. Brief Scharfenberg an Rost, December 
20 1973, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1555/76, 116f.
113 | No transliteration given: Abd Al-Azziz Abd al-Walli (al-Walli).
114 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
115 | German: Schaufenster des Sozialismus. For the Soviet union East Germany served 
as their “shop window of Socialism” toward the West, in: Wentker, 2007, 6.
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political education”116 was the slogan for East German engagement in this policy 
field. In the GDR, youth had always played a highly political role for the “planned 
development of socialism” to ensure the next generation’s ideological loyalty and 
engagement. This goal was pursued by “educating the socialist personality.”117 The 
creation of the “new human” regularly was considered the most effective during 
childhood and adolescence. By organizing courses for South Yemeni teachers, the 
teaching philosophy was transferred to the PDRY, while the “Soviet experiences” 
served as the East German and thus South Yemeni role model.118
The GDR’s multifaceted strategy to transfer the East German educational 
approach to South Yemen unfolded continuously over the 1970s. Not only 
did it aim at determining the pedagogical approach and ideological basis for 
schooling, pre-schooling, and vocational training of youth, but also at directing 
the concrete implementation of the new system by educating disseminators and 
teachers in South Yemen and socialist countries by creating teaching materials 
and supervising the process. The placement of two advisors to the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Sports and Youth was greeted enthusiastically in the 
GDR’s evaluation report from 1972.119 According to this report, the East German 
advisor had significantly influenced the new law on education and contributed 
to all central documents on education, including the curricula for all schools 
and the creation of a separate ministry unit occupied with political-ideological 
strategies in education.120 Throughout the 1970s, East German lecturers and 
instructors taught the fundamental principles of the GDR school system under 
labels like: “Principles of socialist School [education] policy in the GDR,” “Selected 
Problems of the Development of Marxist-Leninist Pedagogy,” and “Theory and 
Praxis of Collective Education in the GDR.”121 These presentations and workshops 
116 | Direktive für die Reise einer Delegation des Ministeriums für Volksbildung in VDR 
Jemen [March 1 to April 24 1977], in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1874, 49-51.
117 | Segert/Zierke, in: Judt (ed.), 1998, 177.
118 | Direktive für die Reise einer Delegation des Ministeriums für Volksbildung in VDR 
Jemen [March 1 to April 24 1977], in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1874, 49-51.
119 | Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit 
Schlußfolgerungen fürdas weitere Vorgehen auf diesem Gebiet in der VDRJ, June 27 1972, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, C 156276, 43.
120 | These early advisors had been assigned under the Kulturarbeitsplan 1970-71, which 
was regularly renewed, in: Brief Bollmann (Botschaft Aden) an Sittig, October 31 1971, in: 
PA AA, MfAA, C 1874, 141. Also see: Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-
Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit Schlußfolgerungen für das weitere Vorgehen auf diesem 
Gebiet in der VDRJ, June 27 1972, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 156276, 43.
121 | Anlage: Themen der Vorträge von Prof. Dr. Wilms und Teilnehmerkreis, in: PA AA, 
MfAA, C 1874, 40-42.
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were designed for to be replicated in South Yemeni education.122 In 1975, the First 
Pedagogic Congress of the PDRY had decided on the establishment of eight-grade 
comprehensive schools following the GDR model. East German curricula were 
introduced123 and in 1977 the last cohort sixth graders from the former English 
school system was to be examined.
Until then no standardized procedure of teacher training had existed in South 
Yemen. As such, “a high number of qualification courses [for multiplicators] 
was the solution at the time.”124 New books and materials for the new system 
were to be formulated by the recently founded Pedagogic Center supported by 
East German, Soviet, and UNESCO experts.125 But teacher training first of all 
meant ideological training. After several visits by Marxist-Leninist lecturers, a 
permanent lecturer was delegated in 1977 to educate multiplicators of the Ministry 
of Education.126 He was supported by at least two more GDR experts on education 
in late 1978.127 Finally, East Germany’s engagement in the field of education was 
complemented by the establishment of a permanent German lectorate in Aden 
in 1978.128 Instructions from December 1978 continued the line of action of the 
years prior: The delegation was supposed to “impart the GDP’s experiences on 
political-ideological education in science classes” and to explain “what knowledge, 
perceptions, abilities, and convictions their students are supposed to acquire in 
biology, chemistry in physics.”129
A report on the work of the GDR’s experts in 1978 highlights the actual level 
of intensity of East German engagement in the education sector by formulating 
concrete objectives for the following years: Gathering information on the training 
of teachers at all levels, identifying possible obstacles for the PDRY Ministry of 
122 | Bericht über eine Dienstreise in die VDRJ vom 22.3. bis 3.4.1977 by Scheidig, in: PA 
AA, MfAA, C 1874, 60-74.
123 | Bericht über eine Dienstreise in die VDRJ vom 22.3. bis 3.4.1977 by Scheidig, in: PA 
AA, MfAA, C 1874, 60; Karuse, 2009, 206.
124 | Bericht über eine Dienstreise in die VDRJ vom 22.3. bis 3.4.1977 by Scheidig, in: PA 
AA, MfAA, C 1874, 61.
125 | All East German educational advisors worked closely with Soviet advisors in the late 
1970s, in: Bericht über eine Dienstreise in die VDRJ vom 22.3. bis 3.4.1977 by Scheidig, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1874, 65; Also see: Delegational visit by Vice-President of the GDR’s 
Academy of Pedagogic Sciences Günter Wilms in Macrh 1976, in: Scharfenberg, 2012, 52; 
Bericht über eine Dienstreise in die VDRJ vom 22.3. bis 3.4.1977 by Scheidig, in: PA AA, 
MfAA, C 1874, 60.
126 | Bericht über eine Dienstreise in die VDRJ vom 22.3. bis 3.4.1977 by Scheidig, in: PA 
AA, MfAA, C 1874, 87.
127 | Brief Bollmann an Sittig, December 4 1978, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1874, 143.
128 | Protokoll über die Einrichtung eines Deutschlektorats in Aden, April 1978, in: Jemen 
(Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen der DDR, 1987, 140-1.
129 | Brief Bollmann an Sittig, December 4 1978, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1874, 143.
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Education to the implementation of the eight-grade comprehensive school, and 
“orientation toward fields of the GDR system of education where concrete help and 
support can be offered as a communication of experiences.”130 East German efforts 
in the schooling system were complemented by the work of an East German 
advisor who accompanied the establishment of a kindergarten system in the early 
1980s.131
The high priority of education in East Germany’s policy of socialist state- 
and nation-building for example is expressed by a visit paid in 1982 by Margot 
Honecker, the minister of education and wife of the secretary-general.132 
Meanwhile, the PDRY minister of education, Hassan al-Salami (al-Salami),133 
at the time was pursuing his East German doctorate in education as a distance 
learner.134 Two years after Margot Honecker’s trip to Aden, al-Salami travelled to 
Berlin for a return visit and attended the GDR’s 35th Anniversary. His personal 
friendship with the Honecker couple135 turned out to be a decisive factor for the 
evolution of the character of East German-Yemeni relations.
3.3  The Backbone of Socialist State-Building: The Internal and 
E xternal Securit y Apparatus136
“It was extremely dif ficult […] to build up a security apparatus in South Yemen. 
Our decision was guided by the world strategic position of Aden. And very 
dif ferent from the majority of the countries of the Near East, [in Aden] we were 
welcomed with open arms.”137
(Markus Wolf, Head of the HV A of the MfS)
130 | Vorgaben für die Berichterstattung zum Studien- bzw. Schuljahresabschluß [sic!] 
1977/78 der Kader des Ministeriums für Volksbildung der DDR in der VDR Jemen (Anlage), 
1978, sine diem, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1874.
131 | Brief Bollmann der HA IV Abt.II and Kopp, October 17 1977, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1874, 
94; October 14th, daily South Yemeni newspaper, June 4 1982.
132 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der 
JSP […] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 170.
133 | Arabic: Ḥassan Al-Salāmī.
134 | Bericht über eine Dienstreise in die VDRJ vom 22.3. bis 3.4.1977 by Scheidig, in: PA 
AA, MfAA, C 1874, 72.
135 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
136 | For an introduction to archival material on military and MfS’ activites in South Yemen 
see: Ch 2. On Archival Research, Technicalities, and the State of Research, 1. State of 
Research: The Selection of Secondary Sources for an Interdisciplinary Undertaking.
137 | Wolf, 1997, 376.
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“The citizen in South Yemen lived under police surveillance all day, from the 
moment he left the house to his return. […]”138
(South Yemeni contemporary witness, 1993)
According to Arab diplomatic observers of the time, “the survival of the current 
regime of the PDRY highly depends on the behavior of the police and the 
military.”139 Thus, the new regime focused on the reform of the military, the 
police, and the establishment of a security apparatus right away, aided by extensive 
support from the Eastern Bloc. While the Soviet Union and Cuba provided for the 
“hard facts” of the security apparatus, that is, military equipment and training, 
East Berlin held back with material deliveries and rather covered the “civil” side of 
security by promoting the connection between the party and security apparatus, 
the state, and society.
The Kremlin acknowledged the new regime’s need for military efficiency and 
support early on and ushered the reform of South Yemen’s army, the Popular 
Defence Forces (PDF), to finally wrestle the military forces from the “tribal” grip 
and bring them under the NF’s control. While the army system more and more 
resembled the Soviet model, Cuba actively trained new military personnel. From 
1972 to 1978, the total numbers in the country were raised from 14,000 to 24,000 
trained soldiers. The GDR’s contribution in material has to be considered modest, 
and in firepower even insignificant. This followed the idea of a “division of labor” 
between Moscow and the GDR, between the military and the civil side of state-
building. However, as part of the establishment of a state security apparatus and 
the equipping of its armed forces, mutual visits of high-ranking military personnel 
and a certain volume of equipment deliveries by the GDR at times played a highly 
symbolic part in the Soviet and East German policy of communist state-building.
In May 1972, the PDRY’s Minister of the the Interior Mutia140 visited East Berlin 
and met with the GDR’s inner circle of the security apparatus.141 Even though 
the Ministry of the  Interior and the MfS agreed that they were neither willing 
nor able to “satisfy [all of] Minister Mutia’s wishes,” GDR Minister of Defense 
Hoffmann was asked to decide whether to supply the PDRY with air defense, 
land mines and ammunition for “weapons already delivered to the PDRY.”142 The 
first delivery of fire arms, ammunition, vehicles, as well as related equipment 
138 | Al-Adhal, Husayn Sulayman, 1993, 408, in: Dresch, 2000, 146.
139 | Information über die Lage in der Volksrepublik Südjemen, September 4 1969, in: 
BStU HV A Nr.151, 175.
140 | Muhammad Saleh Yafi Muti’a.
141 | Aktenvermerk Treffen Genosse Minister Mielke mit Genosse Minister Armeegenereal 
Hoffmann, in: BStU MfS HV A Nr.778, 1-2.
142 | In detail, the delivery included about 100 GAZ-69 (light Soviet army trucks), 1800 
9 mm pistols, 150 7,62 mm MG RPK and 1000 AK-47 as well as sixteen 14,5 mm Fla-
Lafetten (anti-air gun carriage); exact designations: LMG 7,62mm; SMG 7,62 mm, FlaMG 
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was ordered in July 1971. This shipment had been decided on behalf of Moscow 
as part of a significant Soviet delivery.143 This indicates that Moscow had been 
showing at least some interest in South Yemen significantly earlier than 1977. 
This first relevant arms delivery in 1972 by East Germany included light Soviet 
army trucks, 1,800 pistols, 150 machine guns for air defense, 1,000 AK-47 rifles, 
and 16 anti-air gun carriages.144 The majority of this kind of arms export in the 
sense of “military aid” was provided by the GDR’s Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of State Security. An MfS IM, positioned in the Ministry of the Interior 
in the GDR, reports about 57 Valuta Marks worth of arms supply in the period 
between 1970 and October 1979. According to IM “Dieter Gerlach,” South Yemen 
received the biggest share of arms by the Ministry of the Interior among all other 
recipient states. He lists 719 heavy weapons, 26,730 handguns, and about 90,000 
grenades145 sent to the PDRY until 1980.
The GDR’s Militar y Contributions: Worth More Than Just Its Numbers
Even though East Berlin’s involvement in the security sector provided only some 
training and deliveries of mostly basic and sometimes outdated equipment, there 
was more to these efforts than their sheer numbers. First, they have to be interpreted 
in the context of Moscow’s military and state-building policy in South Yemen and 
second, as part of the GDR’s wider strategy toward South Yemen’s security, including 
legal affairs, jurisdiction, and the establishment of both a regular and a secret police. 
The first major steps in state-building for security matters were made in legal affairs. 
In 1971, GDR Minister of Justice Kurt Wünsche invited his South Yemeni colleague146 
and the two states agreed on long-term judicial cooperation, including a Treaty on 
Juridical Assistance that remained in force throughout the GDR’s existence.147 
Furthermore, Aden itself had asked East Berlin for support with the establishment 
of its police force, including training and equipment.148 As part of the establishment 
for the Committee of State Security of the PDRY (KfS), East Berlin organized and 
implemented the education and preparatory training of the KfS personnel. Thus all 
in all, East German material support for the PDRY has to be considered a political 
14,5 mm, Pak 57, RPG 7, no quantity, in: Aktenvermerk Treffen Genosse Minister Mielke mit 
Genosse Minister Armeegenereal Hoffmann, in: BStU MfS HV A Nr.778, 2.
143 | Lieferungen von Waffen und Ausrüstungen in die Demokratisch Volksrepublik Jemen, 
in: BStU MfS Sekretariat des Ministers 668, 6.
144 | Ibid., 7.
145 | IM “Dieter Gerlach,” in: BStU MfS HA VII 5012, 4ff.
146 | Brief Geibel an Süß, Februrary 23 1971, in: MfAA C 3858, 1.
147 | Bericht über den Aufenthalt der Studiendelegation des Ministeriums der Justiz in der 
VDR Jemen in der Zeit vom 14.–25.2.1988 [sic!], February 26 1988, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr.234, 
Teil 1 von 2, 195; Treaty on Juridical Assistance April 1st 1971, in: BStU MfS HA IX Nr. 13694.
148 | Brief Winzer an Dickel, December 1968, sine diem, Beziehungen zur Polizei und 
innerer Organe der Volksrepublik Südjemen, PA AA, MfAA, C 76073, 15ff.
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symbol of respect toward the South Yemen security apparatus and to build up trust 
and personal friendships. As a consequence, the military deliveries described above 
have to be interpreted within the context of East Berlin’s wider strategy on the civilian 
side of state-building with its focus on the establishment of comprehensive security 
apparatus stretching into society, similar to the GDR.
Cooperation between the Stasi and Its South Yemeni Counterpart
Interestingly, the Stasi had become involved even before the South Yemeni 
constitution was launched. The first agreement between the East German MfS 
and its South Yemeni counterpart KfS149 was already signed on November 6 
1970,150 whereas the first MfS officer had been active in South Yemen starting 
in February 1970.151 These early contacts had been initiated by South Yemen and 
its minister of the Interior Mohammad Saleh Yafa’i. The first meeting between 
him and high-ranking officials of the GDR’s security apparatus, including Mielke 
himself, had taken place in late 1969 in Berlin.152 The first shipment of technical 
equipment for telecommunication for the KfS was delivered in 1974.153
Relations between the two interior ministries developed in parallel to the relations 
between the two security services, including a significant number of advisors 
and regular mutual visits of delegations.154 This kind of “state-building synergy” 
probably saved a considerable amount of money and personnel. Nonetheless, the 
whole process of establishing a security apparatus, including its armed forces, 
demanded a significant quantity of equipment and financial aid. Reliable numbers 
for the money spent on “deliveries” for this sector during the building phase from 
1971 to 1977 are available. Putting these numbers in relation to the GDR’s overall 
spending on financial, material, and personnel support for “young nation states” 
between the years of 1967 and 1976 clearly shows East German preferences: While 
the full spending of this decade adds up to about 105 million East German Marks, 
149 | The Section Revolutionary Security Service. German: Revolutionärer 
Sicherheitsdienst (RSD), Zur Lage des MfS der VDR Jemen, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, 
Part 1 of 2, 96.
150 | “To develop and deepen the cooperation established with the agreement of November 6 
1970,” in: Vereinbarung über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem MfS der DDR und dem Komitee 
für Staatssicherheit der VDRJ, November 25 1980, in: BStU MfS Abt. X 1789, 1.
151 | Zu den Beziehungen des MfS der VDRJ mit dem MfS der DDR und mit 
Sicherheitsorganen anderer Länder, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 102.
152 | Ibid., 329f.
153 | Maßnahmen zur solidarischen Unterstützung der Sicherheitsorgane der VDR Jemen, 
May 2 1988, in: BStU Sekretariat Schwanitz 24, 5.
154 | Zur Lage des MfS der VDR Jemen; Kadersituation des MfS der VDR Jemen  in: BStU 
MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 104.
A Spectre is Haunting Arabia – How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen
291
including about six million Valuta Marks,155 the GDR’s MfS used more than half of 
this amount for South Yemen.156 1971-72 were the years of highest MfS spending 
in Aden of the period under review.157 Of this, the two biggest spending categories, 
with almost half of the amount spent on were vehicles, arms and ammunition. 
Another quarter was spent on communications technology. East Germany mostly 
delivered equipment for special forces from their BCD Section,158 the  Armament 
and Chemical Service Section. Between 1971-1977, the deliveries from this section 
equaled nearly six million VM,159  and another eight million VM were planned for 
the period from 1977 to 1980, demonstrating that the material engagement was 
kept up even beyond the early years of the establishment of the South Yemeni KfS.
In 1972 the Revolutionary Security Service Section was formed in the KfS 
and Muhammad Said Abdallah Muhsin (Muhsin)160 became its minister. He 
served in this post until 1979 and thus was able to accompany and direct the 
whole establishment process of South Yemen’s Secret Service. Mushin, a close 
acquaintance of Ismail throughout his career, greeted the material support by the 
MfS and worked closely with East German State Security and its advisors. During 
Muhsin’s reign, the PDRY’s security apparatus was expanded successively and 
gradually entered into the civilian sphere.
An example for Muhsin’s policies that mirrored East German measures was 
a new law banning any unauthorized contact with foreigners. In 1975, this law 
was mostly directed at Western diplomats. In a letter from Sana’a, West German 
ambassador Günter Held reports on behalf of the West German charge d’affaires 
in Aden, Alexander Mühlen, about the “restrictions of individual liberties in the 
PDRY”:
“a) Directed by the GDR, the omnipresent KfS ‘interviews’ every local who has been 
seen sitting at the table with foreigners. b) Local visitors of foreign representations 
only have access on the grounds of an official pass issued by the Foreign Ministry 
[…]; this is also the case for the local domestic workers. Thus unofficially employed 
workers had to be replaced by governmentally accredited ones. c) This policy is 
155 | ”The foreign exchange component of the GDR’s aid was calculated in ‘Valuta Marks.’ 
One VM corresponded to the amount of GDR Marks that would be needed to obtain one 
unit of convertible currency through the export of GDR goods,” in: Howell, 1994, FN 7, 307.
156 | Hilfeleistungen gegenüber jungen Nationalstaaten auf nichtzivilem Gebiet. Übersicht 
über Ausgaben […] von 1967 bis 1976, Abt. Finanzen an HV A/III, 26.April 1977, in: BStU 
MfS Abt. Finanzen Nr. 1393, 152 and 164. This high percentage is reached despite rather 
modest spending on the PDRY between 1967 and 1970.
157 | Ibid., 166.
158 | BCD - Abteilung Bewaffnung und Chemischer Dienst.
159 | Wertmäßige Übersicht über Lieferungen in die VDR Jemen 1971-1977, Berlin, 
November 2 1977, in: BStU MfS BCD Nr.2854, 134.
160 | Arabic: Muḥammad Sayyd ‘Abdallāh Muḥsin.
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expressed in the new Penal Code of the PDRY. It dedicates one full chapter of its 
Special Section161 (Art. 110-120, 126) to contacts with foreigners. It introduces 
‘private contact with foreigners (Art.113),’ sharing of economic information 
with foreigners (Art.115), and the acceptance of tips from foreigners as criminal 
offences with a minimum penalty of one year imprisonment, being extended to up 
to five years, if espionage or treason cannot be proven (Art.120).”162
Clearly, the intention behind these laws was to eliminate the political opposition 
by prosecuting as many of them as possible on the grounds of “espionage” and 
“treason.” The law was complemented by more concrete measures like a wall 
around the embassies and the diplomatic quarter163 which also aimed to isolate 
Westerners from the population.164
But the South Yemeni KfS did not settle for mere observance and the exertion 
of control. Muhsin’s years as minister of the KfS even “earned him the title of 
‘the butcher’ and references to arbitrary imprisonments and executions by the 
PDRY’s Secret Service usually refer to his period of service.”165 In the late 1970s, 
the Aden regime agreed to end Muhsin’s excesses for the time being and he was 
removed from office on the occasion of Salmin’s downfall.166 During Salmin’s 
presidency, one of the main venues of power struggles within the leadership was 
located at the intersection of state security and the military, more precisely around 
the person of Muhsin himself. Brehony claims that before Muhsin was sacked 
he was responsible for the execution of about 250 of Salmin’s followers, all of 
them military officers, but without due process or the CC’s knowledge. In the end 
Muhsin, a confidant of Ismail, was held responsible and forced to resign.
After Muhsin was removed, his extreme legislation was revised and actual 
terror of the security apparatus in South Yemen somewhat decreased. However, 
this did neither decelerate the expansion of the apparatus nor reduce its power. 
The heyday of Aden’s Secret Service as a secret police were yet to come: Over 
the 1970s, both the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of the interior 
had steadily increased their influence and power, not least due to East Berlin’s 
intensive advice and assistance during the process of their creation.
161 | German: Besonderer Teil; The PDRY’s Penal Code followed the East (and also West) 
German model of dividing the Penal Code in a General and a Special Section.
162 | Botschafter Held, Sanaa, an das Auswärtige Amt, June 3 1976, in: AzAP der BRD, 
1976, Vol.1, 1.Januar bis 30.Juni, FN 3, 807.
163 | In the beginning, the wall even affected the East German embassy, though this was 
quickly remedied, in: Botschafter Held, Sanaa, an das Auswärtige Amt, June 3 1976, in: 
AzAP der BRD, 1976, Vol.1, 1.Januar bis 30.Juni, 807; Scharfenberg, 2012.
164 | Kutschera, 1982, 22; Brehony, 2013, 63.
165 | Security Services, in: Burrowes, 2010, 346; also see: Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 67.
166 | Ismail/Ismail, 1985, 67f.
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4.  CONCLuSION: SOuTh YEMEN AS ThE MODEL CASE OF A 
POSSIBLE E AST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The second phase of Soviet engagement was characterized by an increasing level of 
intensity, while the focus on the two major fields of engagement, the military and 
ideology, was upheld. Clearly, it was not only the beginning, but also the “high times” 
of Soviet-South Yemeni relations. In less than a decade, the USSR had become the 
most important political, economic, and ideological ally for the isolated PDRY. But 
Aden also could claim a value for Moscow beyond its political importance, such as 
the unofficial military and naval base on the Horn of Africa. “Neither the Soviets 
nor the South Yemenis gave much publicity to [their] military cooperation, but they 
loudly played up the economic and technical [assistance].”167 While the former type 
of cooperation clearly aimed to support the Moscow-friendly regime – both to keep it 
in place and forge it into yet another Soviet ally – the latter served no other purpose. 
Support for the fishing industry, maintenance and expansion of the naval facilities, 
and education with an ideological focus: During the 1970s, Moscow’s intentions did 
not have much to do with South Yemen’s needs.
In tune with both Moscow’s awakening interest in South Yemen as a potential 
military partner in the region and with Aden’s clear commitment to Marxism-
Leninism, the second phase of East German engagement has to be considered 
the most comprehensive with regard to the extent of socialist state- and nation-
building. The fifth NF Party Congress of 1972 interpreted the new constitution 
in a way that assured East Berlin of the Aden’s willingness to go all the way in 
becoming socialist state and, from the GDR’s point of view, go beyond the lip-
service of many other Arab regimes evoking socialist rhetoric. Even a future 
merger of the few remaining political organizations with the NF, now called 
UNFPO, was a possibility. The Aden regime seemed to fully agree with the East 
German interpretation of the “integration of society” as “homogenization” and 
the GDR offered its advice and expertise on how to bring Aden’s diverse media 
landscape under tight party control. With East German help, the control of the 
press and public opinion was ensured by the network of South Yemen’s Ministry 
for State Security, growing denser and denser throughout the 1970s.
All in all, the numbers of advisors and experts remained constant over several years168 
and even increased later in the decade after the founding of the YSP. Therefore, Phase 
II is characterized by a continuous intensification of the GDR’s level of engagement, 
but also a diversification of fields of engagement. An extraordinary example of this 
is the field of foreign policy. Though not a field of engagement directly associated 
167 | Yodfat, 1983, 112.
168 | Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit 
Schlußfolgerungen für das weitere Vorgehen auf diesem Gebiet in der VDRJ, June 27 1972, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, C 156276, 46.
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with the concept of state- and nation-building, which on first glance is focused on 
change within a country’s borders, foreign policy is an important field at least in 
socialist state- and nation-building. Marxist-Leninist ideology, as propagated by 
Andrei Zhdanov’s “Two-Camp Theory,”169 is based on a dual weltbild of capitalist/
imperialist and socialist/anti-imperialist states. As a consequence of the Cold War 
and its Marxist-Leninist interpretation, a state’s political stance in international 
relations serves two purposes with regard to its internal process of state- and nation-
building. First, the identity of the state’s population in the sense of a national identity 
may be forged as the righteous socialist “self” against the malicious “capitalist” or 
“reactionary” “other”. Second, a feeling of belonging is created among the state’s 
population as members of a bigger community, the community of socialist states. 
The founding of the YSP and the regime’s commitment to the Soviet Bloc had sealed 
the PDRY’s isolation in the region and the Arab world, depriving South Yemen of 
other options in the international sphere. Thus, asking for East German foreign 
policy guidance shows South Yemeni desire for security and its wish to be accepted 
in the Socialist community of states. For the GDR, however, granting this wish has 
to be considered an important building block of socialist state- and nation-building 
in Yemen.
The GDR’s high level of engagement during this time in almost every social 
and political field was promoted by two dynamics that seemed to oppose each 
other, but rather were mutually dependent. On the one hand, the PDRY had 
clearly turned to the socialist camp. West Germany had withdrawn from South 
Yemen and Moscow signaled not only its approval of East German activities, but 
even developed some interest of its own in the location.170 On the other hand, 
new state and non-state actors perceived as “imperialist” by the socialist camp 
became involved in South Yemeni affairs, including United Nations advisors and 
experts from Western countries, as well as representatives from the International 
Monetary Fund. East Berlin ascertained: “[O]ur advisors and their thoughts and 
ideas have to prevail [against Western orientations].”171 This motivation of fending 
off “imperialist advancements” tied in neatly with East Berlin’s strategy of the 
“honest broker” and clearly goaded East German engagement in socialist state- 
and nation-building. 
An impressive number of East German actors were engaged in South Yemen 
early on: The embassy; the party and its mass organizations like the East German 
169 | Zhdanov, Andrei, party secretary of the CPSU, in September 1947, Zhdanov answers 
Harry S. Truman at the Conference of Communist Party of Europe, Speech in: Lautemann/
Schlenke (Ed.) 1980, 156 f.
170 | Letter Scharfenberg and Grünheid, Ministry of Planning, January 1 1974, in: PA AA, 
MfAA, 166276, 79.
171 | Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit 
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Trade Union (FDGB) and the youth organization FDJ; advisor groups and experts; 
and the members of the East German-Arab Society of Friendship and the PDRY-
GDR Society of Friendship, who officially connected in 1974.172 Throughout the 
1970s, the actors in South Yemen demanded even more qualified cadres and 
experts for advice on nation- and state-building. Most of these requests were 
granted to as far an extent as possible.173 This also exemplifies the supposedly high 
priority of the GDR’s involvement. All of them were part of a highly diversified 
structure of control, directed from East Berlin, coordinated by the embassy in 
Aden and watched closely by Stasi officers and IMs. Considering that the Soviet 
KfS did not add any material support and training until 1974,174 the East German 
MfS undeniably performed pioneer work. With the benefit of hindsight, this 
second phase of East German engagement may be considered the heart and 
heydays of East German socialist state- and nation-building, as it enhanced the 
Aden regime’s endeavors and culminated in the founding of the South Yemeni 
vanguard party, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), in 1978.
172 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 42.
173 | Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen DDR-Regierungsberater tätigkeit mit 
Schlußfolgerungen für das weitere Vorgehen auf diesem Gebiet in der VDRJ, June 27 1972; 
WTZ-Protokoll 74/75 by HA F TZ Entwicklungsländer HA-Leiter Sachse, November 6 1974, 
in: PA AA, MfAA, C 156276.
174 | Zur Lage des MfS der VDR Jemen, Kadersituation des MfS der VDR Jemen, in: BStU 
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Interlude. South Yemen:  
 A “Rough State” in the Region and in the World
During the Cold War, the Horn of Africa was of much geostrategic interest and 
relevance. This importance was closely connected to free sailing through the 
Bab al-Mandab and the question of access to Aden port for both superpowers, 
but also regional actors. Extreme poverty, regular news about terrorist training 
and erupting violence, as well as the ideological saber-rattling of Arabia’s one and 
only Marxist state all fostered more attention for South Yemen than its political 
relevance might have justified. In the 1970s the PDRY forged an alliance across 
the Red Sea with the other two radical regimes in Africa: Ethiopia and Libya. 
Clearly, the fledgling South Yemen emerged as a constant factor contributing to 
the political insecurity in the region and was, due to Soviet military support, a 
military threat to its neighbors. The following interlude chapter aims to clarify 
Aden’s position in the region and illuminate the state’s course in Cold War reality 
to support the reasoning on Moscow’s and East Germany’s interests. The PDRY’s 
policy and role in the region can be divided into three subject areas: The PDRY 
and its neighbors, its geostrategic position on the Horn of Africa, and the regime’s 
extremist tendencies.
1.  ADEN: ACTOR AND PAWN IN ThE COLD WAR GAME
The regime’s radical path isolated the new state in the region right from the start, 
and the provisions of the Fourth Congress of the NF did not do much to improve 
that. At least at the party level, Aden was able to bond with other “progressive” 
regimes in the region, but even these regimes criticized South Yemen for its 
closeness to Moscow and East Berlin, condemning Aden and its policies as a 
betrayal of Islam and Arabism.1 Naturally, the conservative monarchies of the 
gulf considered the PRSY/PDRY an imminent threat to their rule and their 
1 | Wildau und Serauky zur Reise der VDRJ Delegation in arabische Länder 1972, in: PA AA 
MfAA C 1555/76, 176.
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state’s stability.  Saudi Arabia, bordering South Yemen in the east, and Egypt, the 
aspiring regional power, had supported the disempowered sultans and their ally, 
FLOSY, from early on. After their hopes for a moderate regime had been dashed, 
Riyadh as well as Cairo tried to find common ground with Aden, in one way or 
the other. Speculations about newly found oil in the border region between Saudi 
Arabia, North Yemen, and South Yemen2 offered simple reasons for distrust and 
fueled conspiracy theories. As a consequence, this perceived external threat served 
to unify the divided ranks of the NF. 
1.1  Brotherly Love and Hate: North and South Yemen at War
When the Aden regime eliminated the qualifier “South” in the name of 
its republic in 1970, this not only referred to Yemeni unity, but undeniably 
expressed the regime’s political claim to all of Yemen.3 The tensions between 
North and South had continuously been building up for quite some time and 
the final outbreak of violence was no surprise. The border war between the 
two Yemens in 1972, however, was merely a short one. The peace agreement 
reached between al-Aini, foreign minister of the YAR, and Aden’s Ali Nasir 
in Cairo even formulated Yemeni unification as a common goal4 – though it 
turned out to be one of long-term character. It took more than two decades 
before actual peace between North and South was achieved. In the meantime, 
the “Cairo Agreements on Unification” of 1972 were followed by new fighting 
along the border in 1979, while “the PDRY-supported National Democratic 
Front (NDF) rebellion in the borderlands of the YAR”5 kept conf lict between 
North and South quite alive well into the 1980s.
Saudi Arabia’s support for the YAR in these conflicts and Moscow’s role in 
these regional disputes illustrate the regional relevance of the conflict. While 
the Kremlin displayed political restraint when fighting erupted between Saudi 
Arabia and the PDRY in 1969, it still blamed Saudi Arabia for “fanning all kinds 
of discord between the [YAR] and the [PDRY]” in 1972.6 In doing so, Moscow 
positioned itself against Riyadh as well as Washington in the region. Due to its 
realistic perspective on South Yemen’s capabilities, Moscow clearly had no interest 
in a unified Yemen in this period, as long as an expansion of the South Yemeni 
system to the North was not guaranteed. Rather, the Kremlin had a smaller but 
stable and loyal Marxist-Leninist regime for South Yemen in mind. This clearly 
2 | Information über die politisch-militärische Lage der VDRJ (VDRJ), 1972, in: BStU MfS 
HV A 388, 278.
3 | Brehony, 2013, 55; Burrowes, 2010, 263; Unger, 1971, 1172.
4 | Burrowes, 2010, 67.
5 | Borders and border disputes, wars and agreements, in: Burrowes, 2010, 59.
6 | Izvestia, August 1972, in: Halliday, 1990, 185.
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did not correspond with South Yemen’s interests at the time. Aden aimed for a 
fast unification under its Marxist leadership. Scharfenberg, the GDR ambassador, 
considered this a possibility. After the peace negotiations in Cairo and Tripoli 
between the YAR and the PDRY under Soviet leadership, he reports to Berlin 
about “national enthusiasm” among the public and party officials and perceptions 
that “Yemen unity could be swiftly achieved.”7 In retrospect this was not about to 
happen too quickly.
The creation of South Yemen’s vanguard party in 1978 also led to the official 
inclusion of the socialists in the YAR. “The YSP is convinced that nothing but a 
broad-based popular movement backed by all popular forces can achieve unity for 
the Yemeni homeland.”8 This meant nothing less than an immediate attack on the 
northern leadership. Furthermore, the YSP never made it a secret that it intended 
to expand its version of Marxism-Leninism to the north.9 Understandably, this led 
to increased distrust of the newly installed regime in Sana’a under the leadership 
of young Ali Abdallah Saleh. Fighting between the two Yemens erupted once 
more shortly thereafter and it was not until another civil war in the early 1990s 
that the two Yemens finally unified.
1.2  Regional Ties, New Friendships, and Rivalries of the 1970s
Meanwhile, Moscow was still hoping to improve relations with Saudi Arabia 
in the mid- 1970s and Aden’s saber-rattling became more of a nuisance than a 
help for Soviet interests in the region. The Kremlin urged Aden to improve the 
situation and Salmin’s pragmatic policies eased the way to the establishment 
of relations between the PDRY and Saudi Arabia.10 But other events overruled 
these considerations. Fighting erupted between Somalia and Ethiopia and caused 
significant turmoil in the region. Aden became renowned as a political meeting 
point of the regional powers involved and the allies of the Eastern Bloc.11 Cuban 
leader Fidel Castro pointedly describes the Soviet dilemma to Honecker: “If the 
Socialist countries help Ethiopia, they will lose Somali Siad Barré’s friendship. If 
they don’t, the Ethiopian revolution will founder.”12 In February 1977, after several 
failed mediation attempts between Somalia and Ethiopia moderated by South 
7 | Brief Scharfenberg an Scholz, December 5 1972, in: PA AA MfAA C 1556/6.
8 | Lackner, 1985, 85.
9 | Abd al-Fattah Ismail, in: Grünberg, 2012, 60f.
10 | Yodfat, 1983, 51.
11 | Additions to February 2 1977 Report by Third African Department, Soviet Foreign 
Ministry, on “Somalia’s Territorial Disagreements with Ethiopia and the Position of the USSR,” 
apparently in late May-early June 1977, 63, in: Russian & East German Documents on the 
Horn of Africa, 1977-78, in: Cold War International History Project Bulletin Issues 9-10.
12 | Castro, Fidel, in: Abebe, 1996, 43.
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Yemen, Cuba, and the GDR,13 Mengistu Haile Mariam seized power and Moscow 
took the opportunity to side with Addis Abeba against Riyadh-backed Mogadishu. 
Werner Lamberz, “SED Politbüro member and Erich Honecker’s troubleshooter 
for Africa,”14 and thus a confidant of Soviet diplomats, had been visiting Addis 
Abeba at the time and readily ensured Mengistu of the support of the Eastern 
Bloc. Half a year later, the Soviet ambassador to Ethiopia, A.P. Ratanov, reported 
to Moscow:
“On September 10, together with the heads of the diplomatic missions of 
Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, PDRY, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, [North 
Korea], Cuba, and Yugoslavia, I was invited to visit Mengistu Haile Mariam.[…]
There, I was informed about] the discovery […] of an imperialist plot against the 
Ethiopian revolution [by] the USA (the initiator of the plot), Sudan, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Kenya, and Somalia.”15
As this report summarizes, alliances in the confrontation were clear and 
characterized the tendencies of political and military cooperation of the time: 
In the dispute, the USSR demanded South Yemeni loyalty and support, despite 
the danger of isolating Aden once more. Against Salmin’s wishes, Ismail opened 
up Aden’s port   for shipping arms and Cuban troops to support Ethiopia. As 
a consequence of the dispute, Moscow lost Berbera, its naval base in Somalia, 
and Aden its fragile relationship with Riyadh. Instead, Aden became Moscow’s 
unofficial substitute for lost Berbera.
Ethiopia’s move to the extreme left and the PDRY’s support during Addis 
Abeba’s conflict with Somalia made the two radical regimes natural allies in 
the region, especially as both were very close not only to Moscow, but also to its 
junior partner the GDR. In 1981, the new friendship culminated in the Tripartite 
Agreement among Ethiopia, Libya, and the PDRY.16 The new coalitions forged 
during the confrontation in the Horn were quite unsettling for the Western powers 
and the conservative neighboring states.17 Hitherto, the USSR was considered not 
13 | Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Information Report on Somali-
Ethiopian Territorial Disputes,  February 2 1977, 53 and Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU 
CC International Department, Background Report on the  Somali-Ethiopian Conflict, 3 April 
1978, 92-94, both in: Russian & East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-78, 
Cold War International History Project Bulletin Issues 9-10.
14 | Ostermann, 1996, 48.
15 | Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov, Memorandum of Meeting with Mengistu, 
10 September 1977, 78f, in: Russian & East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 
1977-78, Cold War International History Project Bulletin Issues 9-10; On the GDR’s 
involvement in the peace talks see: Dagne, 2006, 18.
16 | Burrowes, 2010, 121.
17 | Moskauer Strafexpedition am Horn von Afrika, in: Der Spiegel, No. 7, 1978.
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only a major player in the region, but also able to control access to the Red Sea 
and thus the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates 
jointly offered assistance and support to the “people of South Yemen” in return 
for “good behavior,” that is, restraint with regard to PFLOAG and general political 
moderation.18 This policy also aimed to curb Soviet influence in the PDRY: In a 
meeting with the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the Saudi Arabian 
Crown Prince Fahd declared Saudi Arabia’s intention to offer an “alternative” to 
the people of South Yemen. The destabilized situation in South Yemen 
“may serve to improve the Soviet position in the country. South Yemen disposes 
of weapons like tanks and planes it does not need for its defense, that’s the 
danger. The country’s army doesn’t have the opportunity or ability to use these 
weapons. Thus one has to ask what they are there for. This military power indeed 
can only be used against countries like Somalia, Sudan or the Gulf states.”19 
Aden repeatedly labelled Riyadh’s policy as hostile and in June 1972 Salmin explicitly 
announced that the PDRY would work toward the “extinction of the regime [in 
Riyadh] and the establishment of a republic.”20 This attitude toward Saudi Arabia was 
not about to change before Ali Nasir established himself as unchallenged leader in 
1980. The PDRY’s military forces, however, clearly were no match for Riadh, and 
comments by contemporary analysts and today’s historians alike consider Soviet 
military support for the PDRY rather “unimpressive.”21 However, the PDRY’s 
dedication to its military forces was not to be denied: A standing army of about 
27,500 regulars was entertained by one of the poorest countries in the world with 
a population of about three million people. Due to Soviet and Cuban training 
and Soviet arms deliveries, the PDRY’s army noticeably exceeded the equipment, 
training, and discipline of its immediate neighbours, the YAR and Oman.22 In 
addition to that, the new leader Ismail gradually drifted away from Salmin’s 
moderate pragmatism and back to the PDRY’s policy of “revolution export” to the 
north and east.23 Saud’s open worry about the extent of military equipment in the 
PDRY and possible “unrest” in its near vicinity, as well as Washington’s decision 
to substantially engage in the Yemen Arab Republic during the second Yemeni 
War in 1979,24 clearly show that the PDRY was perceived as a serious threat in the 
18 | Chubin, 1980, in: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (Ed.), 303.
19 | Dialogue of Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Fahd with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on 
April 27 1981, in: AzAP-BRD 1981, FN 18, 652.
20 | Der Generalsekretär Robaya Ali, June 22 1971, in: PA AA MfAA C 1555/76, 169.
21 | Chubin, 1980, in: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (Ed.), 303.
22 | Burrowes, 2010, 39; Halliday, 1990, 202f.
23 | Katz, 1986, 8.
24 | In February 1979, the USA finally gave in to persistent Saudi requests and agreed to 
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region. Thus, even though the total amount of Soviet military support in South 
Yemen had been decisively smaller than in Iraq or Syria, its political impact has 
to be considered significantly higher. This was due to geostrategic reasons, but 
also to the fact that South Yemen was perceived as an unpredictable actor in in the 
region, thus capable of producing much instability. Aden’s close ties to Moscow 
and the YSP’s open striving for a leadership role among the communist parties in 
the Arab world, as well as the PDRY’s habit to harbor terrorists, certainly did not 
improve South Yemen’s reputation either.25
2. BE T WEEN CONSPIR ACY ThEORIES AND SECuRIT Y POLICY: E AST 
BERLIN, ADEN AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
The results of the archival work undertaken within the research for this study 
undeniably point at a certain exchange between East Germany and South Yemen 
on international terrorism and possible cooperation in the field. Thus, the topic 
cannot be left out when analyzing the GDR’s foreign policy in the PDRY. However, 
due to a research gap compounded by a lack of sources for verification, current 
publications hover between spy novels and conspiracy theories. As a consequence, 
this chapter is not grouped under one of the analytical phases and rather presented 
as an excursus.
The 1970s also have to be considered the high times of South Yemen’s support 
for what the PDRY called “national liberation movements”. While some of the 
supported groups and individuals pursued the goal of liberation, many of them 
not only agreed with Aden that they had “a right to struggle by “all means,” they 
also acted on this principle. South Yemen “became a center for revolutionaries, 
opposition forces and rebels,”26 some of them straightforward terrorist groups. 
In Aden and its hinterland, movements such as the PFLOAG in Oman,27 the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), Naif Hawatmah’s Popular Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), and George Habash’s Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), set up their offices, training centers, and meeting 
points. During the 1970s, the PDRY became notorious as a training ground and 
safe haven for terrorists.
Institute for Strategic Studies (Ed.), 322; Halliday mentions about “$400 million worth of 
US arms to the YAR” as well as the development of naval forces in the gulf to deter South 
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Even though the South Yemeni leaders always denied these activities, clues and 
events are just too pressing to deny the PDRY’s engagement with and support for 
international terrorist groups and individuals. The MfS reports: “In context of […] 
reconnaissance of terrorist groups and forces, it was concluded repeatedly that the 
PDRY serves as a country of transit and residence […].” 28 International terrorist 
Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, also known as “Carlos the Jackal,” boasted two South 
Yemeni passports, one of them a diplomatic document. His girlfriend “Lilly” also 
used a PDRY passport.29 He and his groups received extensive consular support by 
South Yemeni embassies worldwide and were able to use the PDRY as a training 
and home base.30
Some MfS documents suggest that Carlos aimed to extend his status there,by 
acquiring a “Party over Governmental decision” on the cooperation with his 
group.31 Speculations about institutionalized cooperation between Carlos’ group 
and the PDYR may find at least some support in the MfS files as well: “The 
unofficial source informed [us] that President Ali Nasser is not responsible for 
the Ministry of State Security anymore. Thus, the contacts for the Carlos group 
have changed as well.”32 Another document of the South Yemeni KfS may be 
considered more resilient. There, the KfS is asking for the MfS’ advice with regard 
to the handling of Carlos and his supporters:
“1. May the group around Carlos be trained in the PDRY? (The import of weapons 
to the PDRY will be possible) 2. May the PDRY be used as a base for the group? 3. 
Is there agreement [of the MfS] with regard to a possible issuance of passports 
for the members of the group by the PDRY?”33
28 | The report names a South Yemeni liaison officer of the KfS as source. Konzeption für 
ein Gespräch mit dem Vorsitzenden des MfS der VDR Jemen zur Fragen des Terrorismus, 
November 12 1980, in: BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.20004, 51.
29 | Bericht "Carlos", January 10 1980, in: BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.11, 239; 252; 
Gesprächskonzeption über die am 16.8. – 17.8.1979 durchzuführende Beratung mit 
Vertretern der ČSSR-Sicherheitsorgane in der ČSSR-Hauptstadt – Prag, August 14 1979, 
BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.20004, 11
30 | Bericht "Carlos", January 10 1980, in: BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.11, 239; Report on Carlos‘ 
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This document, which is dated before the two South Yemeni passports were issued 
for Carlos,34 suggests that the East German MfS usually knew about South Yemen’s 
contacts in this regard and maybe even had a say in the PDRY’s decisions. However, 
political cooperation with international terrorist groups had not been too profitable 
for the PDRY, neither politically nor economically. In the end, and despite several 
years of close cooperation between the PDYR and Carlos the Jackal, “relations 
[somewhat] cooled down” in 1981. In accordance with the quoted “top secret” 
MfS report, Carlos had begun moving arms and equipment from Aden to Syria 
due to the remote position of the country.35 In addition to the GDR’s knowledge of 
South Yemen’s contacts with terrorist groups, East Berlin undeniably followed its 
own interests in this regard. According to Kowalczuck, the GDR’s MfS “not only 
entertained contacts to the PLO, but also to Arab terrorist groups. Hundreds of these 
fighters […] had been trained by officers of the MfS.”36 Carlos and his closest partners 
were able to move freely between several states of the Eastern Bloc and certain “safe 
harbor states” like the PDRY:
“[Carlos] lef t Bagdad in January 1979 because of fear of reprisal and has been 
residing mostly in the Socialist countries GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria and the ČSSR. 
Exemptions are short visits to the PDRY, Libya, Lebanon and Syria.”37
The “Carlos” Group or “Organization of International Revolutionaries,”38 as 
the group members called themselves, officially supported national liberation 
movements against “Imperialism, Fascism, Zionism, Racism, and Colonialism.”39 
Major allies in this fight were the socialist countries, as an MfS report of 1980 
suggests: “Out of strategic considerations friendly relations are to be established 
and maintained [with the Carlos Group].”40 Despite the GDR’s refusal to offer full 
support to the Group as a “safe harbor state,” the report mentions that “visa for 
entry and transit to the GDR” had been issued and that the leading figures of the 
group received accommodation.”41 Carlos and his supporters repeatedly visited East 
Berlin between 1979 and 1982 as a “guest of the embassy of South Yemen.”42 There 
they received substantive support by Arab and East German citizens in the GDR, 
34 | Bericht über die Tätigkeit terroristischer Organisationen, unter besonderer Beachtung 
der “Organisation Internationale Revolutionäre,” die vom bekannten Terroristen “CARLOS“ 
geleitet wird, Februar 10 1981, BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.20004, 42.
35 | Ibid., 39.
36 | Kowalczuck, 2011, 262.
37 | Bericht "Carlos", January 10 1980, in: BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.11, 231f.
38 | Ibid., 234.
39 | Bericht "Carlos", January 10 1980, 
40 | Ibid., 235.
41 | Ibid., 237.
42 | Wolf, 1997, 383.
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including long-term accommodation.43 Also according to the report, the “Carlos 
Group” had declared that it was willing to “execute operations on behalf or in the 
interest of Socialist states against imperialist targets and individuals.”44 During a 
certain period, the GDR verifiably provided home and shelter for the Carlos Group 
in Central Europe. There they were able to meet with other international terrorists 
as well as representatives of secret services, such as during Carlos’ visit to the GDR 
in July 1979.45
However, the affiliation of the GDR with terrorist individuals like “Carlos” 
backfired soon enough, as can be seen in a document summarizing the “dangers 
and security threats resulting from the [activities] of the ‘Carlos Group’ for the 
Socialist countries.”46 Despite the group’s assurance not to interfere with internal 
and external Socialist politics, neither the MfS nor other secret services of the 
Eastern Bloc trusted these promises.47 And while the political acceptance of the 
Carlos Group in the GDR was upheld during the 1980s,48 the MfS watched the 
group’s movements closely. By helping him to reestablish his relations with Iraq 
and arranging a meeting with a member of the Iraqi Secret Service,49 the MfS 
clearly hoped to finally getting rid of Carlos.
East German support for Carlos had been especially delicate with regard 
to relations to Western Germany. The 1970s in West Germany sometimes are 
referred to as the “German Fall,” “Deutscher Herbst”.50 This was the heyday of a 
West German terrorist group, the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), and its affiliates 
who entertained contacts with other terrorist groups worldwide, especially in the 
Arab world, and profited from their experience and training, among them the 
PLO, the “Abu Nidal Group,” and the “Carlos Group”.51 In the end, cooperation 
with Carlos all in all must have become considerably less advantageous for the 
GDR.
43 | Bericht "Carlos", January 10 1980, in: BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.11, 268.
44 | Ibid., 238.
45 | Ibid., 244; Bericht "Carlos", Februar 10 1981, BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.20004, 32.
46 |Bericht "Carlos", January 10 1980, in: BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.11, 231; 271ff.
47 | Ibid., 232; 246; Bericht "Carlos", March 10 1980, in: BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.20004; 
Bericht "Carlos", Februar 10 1981, BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.20004, 28-40.
48 | Bericht "Carlos", January 10 1980, in: BStU MfS HA XXII Nr.11, 274.
49 | Ibid., in: BStu MfS HA XXII Nr.11, 247; Bericht "Carlos", March 10 1980, in: BStU MfS 
HA XXII Nr.20004, 1-6.
50 | On the controversies about this term see: Jesse, in: Jesse, 2007, 15.
51 | Wunschik, 2007, 25f.
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CHAPTER 13. Phase III: The Phase of Continuity 
and Consolidation 
The GDR in Yemen from 1978 to 1986: German Guidance and 
Yemeni Emancipation
The second phase of East German foreign policy in the 1970s established the GDR 
as a reliable supporter of the state- and nation-building process in Aden. Internal 
developments in the PDRY during the 1970s culminated in one particular event: 
The founding of the YSP and installation of Ismail as its secretary-general concluded 
the development of the former revolutionary movement NLF to a Marxist-Leninist 
vanguard party. The founding Congress of the YSP has to be regarded as the final 
catalyst for the intensification of South Yemeni relations with the Eastern Bloc in 
general and East Germany in particular, as engagement between the states reached a 
new level in the early 1980s. The following chapter captures the major contributions 
of the GDR to the state-building process in South Arabia with a focus on the party-
centered political system, economic aid, the media, and the security apparatus.
1. ADEN hOvERING BE T WEEN ThE PE AK AND ABYSS OF ITS 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DE vELOPMENT
1.1 The Left Prevails and then falls Apart: The New Vanguard 
between “Individualism” and “Collective Leadership”
“The Yemeni Socialist Party is the vanguard of the Yemeni working-class […].”
(Party Program of the YSP, 1978)
The internal struggles between Salmin’s followers and his opposition finally 
erupted in a political and military crisis in June 1978. The establishment of a 
Soviet-style vanguard party and thus the long-term alignment of the PDRY with 
the Eastern Bloc had by no means been an unchallenged development. After 
1 | JSP – Avantgarde des jemenitischen Volkes. Auszüge aus dem Programm der JSP (I) 
und (II), in: horizont No.50/51 1978, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.27368, 4-11.
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Salmin’s execution and Ali Nasir’s six-month presidency, Ismail, the party’s chief 
ideologue, succeeded him as president to direct the “Founding Congress of the 
Yemeni Socialist Party” from 11-13 October, 1978, in Aden.2 All in all, the event may 
be considered an act of consolidation of the “former left” and the keystone of the 
implementation of “democratic centralism”3 as the fundamental principle of the 
political system. Ismail opened the Congress with a speech clearly declaring the 
YSP a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party with close ties to Moscow.4 
However, this clear commitment came at a cost to Aden. Scharfenberg quotes 
Nicolas Chaoui, former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party, on the matter:
“Abdel Fattah Ismail explained to him, Chaoui that it would depend on the 
[financial and political support of the Soviet Union and its Socialist brother 
states], whether the vanguard party was to be founded or not.”5
Explicit South Yemeni demands for compensation for actual and perceived loss 
due to the opting for the “progressive path” emerged as an important argument 
within Aden’s policy towards the Eastern Bloc and remained a central feature until 
the very end of the PDRY’s existence.
From 1978 onward, Ismail, Ali Nasir and Minister of State Security Muhsin 
advanced as the state’s leading figures. Now the former “left” was firmly established 
as the leading faction. But the political differences within the regime already 
began to show and a new rift emerged between idealistic Ismail and pragmatic Ali 
Nasir, who only reluctantly had left his presidency to Ismail. First, Ali Nasir was by 
far more popular with the Yemeni youth. Compared to Ismail, Ali Nasir regularly 
is described as an appealing public speaker:
“His speeches contrast sharply with those of Ismail and Salmin. They are 
expressed in simple and direct language, and discuss how policies should be 
applied, rather than ideas and ideology”6.
However, during the locking of horns which followed, it was tribal ties that 
decided the outcome. Ever since South Yemen’s declaration of independence, 
political mobilization, and thus power, gradually had shifted from Aden and 
Aden Colony to its hinterland. In 1979, Ali Nasir “made moves […] to win over 
2 | The creation of the YSP included a merger of the NF, or NFPO as it was called at the time, 
and the other lef tist forces in the country, namely the PDU and the Ba’athists, Gambke et 
al., 1974, 103; Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 37.
3 | JSP – Avantgarde des jemenitischen Volkes. Auszüge aus dem Programm der JSP (I) und (II), 
in: horizont No.50/51 1978, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.27368, 10.
4 | Grünberg, 2012, 60. On the party structures of the YSP see: Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 38ff.
5 | 
6 | Brehony, 2013, 122.
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Salmin’s remaining supporters,”7 while he could rely on wide support from his 
home region Abyan. Even the powerful Governor of Abyan, Muhammad Ali 
Ahmad, was counted among his supporters. Ismail had migrated from Yemen’s 
north and had never been able to establish a home base and constituency in the 
south. Coinciding with intensifying social pressure due to economic hardships, 
the struggle soon was decided. Ismail’s opponents blamed the economic problems 
and political isolation on Ismail’s overly theoretical approach to politics. Support 
for him gradually deteriorated. On the occasion of an extraordinary Party Congress 
in April 1980, later on named the “Second Congress of the YSP,” Ismail finally was 
forced to resign. He was sent off to exile in Moscow and Ali Nasir took over: As 
president, prime minister and secretary general of the YSP. 8
Even though Ali Nasir did not much to change the existing state structures, 
he “operated them differently [than Ismail].”9 Under his presidency, the idea of 
“collective leadership” faded into the background. While Ali Nasir made his mark 
as a charismatic leading figure, he seemed to aim at disempowering the former 
revolutionaries in the leadership by drawing from Salmin’s former supporters.10 
MfS documents describe the Second YSP Congress of 1980 as a generational 
change in the YSP in general and the Central Committee in particular. According 
to this document, the new leadership mostly relied on younger cadres “educated 
in the USSR and other [socialist] countries […], some of them [even had] received 
profound Marxist-Leninist instructions.”11 Of the “old guard” only Ali Nasir and 
Ali Ahmad Nasir al-Antar (Ali Antar)12 remained in the YSP’s inner circle.
In the meantime, the rift that had appeared within the YSP between the 
pragmatic Ali Nasir and the ideologue Ismail progressed regardless of Ismail’s 
absence, even though he had received unexpected support from al-Beidh and Ali 
Antar. Although the latter had played a significant part in Ismail’s removal from 
his posts in 1980, he sided with Ali Nasir’s opponents, and thus with his former 
adversary Ismail, soon after. As a consequence, Ali Antar, at the time minister 
of defense as well, had to leave the country in 1981 and was suspended soon 
thereafter. From then on, he had to content himself with a minor post. Finally 
al-Beidh, firmly rooted in and supported by his home base Hadhramawt13 and 
Ali Antar’s constituency in Lahj, began to form a new alliance in 1982. Copying 
the criticism against Salmin, al-Beidh and Ali Antar both demanded Ali Nasir to 
yield some of his powers. According to them, Nasir was ignoring the principles of 
7 | Ibid., 110.
8 | Burrowes, 2010, 27f; Dresch, 2000, 151.
9 | Brehony, 2013, 122.
10 | Halliday, 2002, 46.
11 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 149.
12 | Arabic: ˁAl ī Aḥmad Nāṣir ˁAntar.
13 | Arabic: Ḥaḍramawt.
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“democratic centralism” and “collective leadership.” In addition to that, one may 
speculate that Muhsin, former minister of state security, kept contact with Ismail 
in Moscow from his post as South Yemeni ambassador in Budapest, so that the 
Kremlin might have had a hand in the rehabilitation of Ismail’s standing.14 In 
the end, the chief ideologue of the YSP was allowed to return. However, conflict 
was far from over. Disagreement and competition between the factions kept 
smoldering, until a fierce, full-fledged civil war erupted in January 1986.
1.2  Economy and Public Welfare in the mid-1980s: South Yemen’s 
Golden Years or Struggle for Sur vival?
Even before the “1986 crisis,” South Yemen’s economy was weak, with the PDRY 
ranking among the poorest countries in the world. Living conditions nonetheless 
had somewhat improved in the early 1980s.15 National GDP and household 
consumption expenditures both had risen steadily, the latter from about $55 
Million in 1972 to almost $300 Million in 1982.16 At least in Aden, these years 
usually are remembered as a time of political stability and general public welfare 
by Yemenis and foreigners alike who were living in the Yemeni capital. In his short 
account of the South Yemeni state of development, Lewis summarizes: “During 
the 1970s, national industrial production rose fivefold as a result of the opening of 
factories.”17 The majority of industrialization was subsidized with money from the 
Eastern Bloc. But economic growth was not about to last. 
Soon enough the PDRY arrived at its limits of expansion. The factories again 
drew immigrant workers and by the end of the decade, population and industrial 
growth had exceeded the capacity of South Yemeni infrastructure. Concentrated 
in the two most developed areas, Aden and Mukhalla,18 average industrial 
productivity and efficiency for South Yemen remained low. This was not about 
to change easily due to a lack of natural resources, inadequate infrastructure,19 a 
low level of education, and poor quality of equipment. Despite a modest growth 
of industrial production, agriculture remained the main economic sector with the 
14 | Brehony, 2013, 131f; Also see below.
15 | On economic reforms and central planning in the PDRY see: Lackner, 1985, 149-169.
16 | UN Data, Former Democratic Yemen.
17 | Fivefold in comparison to production right after the British had left which 
equaled almost zero [comment: author], in: Lewis, 1987, 362.
18 | Lewis gives estimates of the urban population of South Yemen’s biggest cities in 1987: 
Aden (350,000), Mukhalla (50,000), Seiyun (22,000), Tarim (21,000), in: Lewis, 1987, 362. 
19 | The 1st governorate (Aden), the southern parts of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th governorate 
and parts of the 5th governorate were connected with main roads, and a paved road 
connected Aden and Sana’a. The Aden airport offered direct flights to Moscow, Addis 
Abeba, Kuwait, Beirut, Jeddah, Bombay (Mumbai) and Sana’a.
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Soviet-financed fishery providing the biggest share of exports.20 More than half 
of the total of about 350,000 to 400,000 South Yemeni adults worked in fishery 
and agriculture.21 Especially after a disastrous flood in 1982 that caused damage of 
more than $1 billion,22 agricultural production could not keep up with population 
growth, creating the most pressing problem for the South Yemeni economy: To 
feed its own population, massive imports were needed.23
East German reports offer quite a detailed picture of the condition of infrastructure, 
housing and the economy in general,24 even though they also impose a Socialist 
perspective on the reader. According to East German analysts, South Yemeni 
society in the mid-1980s was still far from fulfilling socialist ideals, especially 
with regard to Marxist-Leninist requirements for the emergence of a revolutionary 
proletariat. Right after the declaration of independence, the Adeni working class 
“numbered only a few thousand.”25 About fifteen years later, the situation had not 
changed much. By including state employees, the YSP considered about 150,000 
people “working class.” The SED, however, appeared to have been more strict with 
its socialist approach and merely counted a modest 35,000 to 40,000 as “wage-
working proletariat.”26
Unfortunately, East German reports judge the fundamental changes 
enforced by the NF/YSP in terms of the East German understanding of “planned 
development of socialism,”27 while the actual economic outcome and efficiency 
remain secondary. An example of this is the extremely positive view of the 
increasing socialization of industry, while the disastrous “economic and financial 
situation” is described as merely “strained.”28 This must be considered a massive 
understatement. Despite some economic progress, South Yemen’s economy in 
20 | About 40 per cent, in: Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des 
ZK der JSP […] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 162.
21 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 160.
22 | Burrowes, 2010, 258; Lewis, 1987, 362.
23 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 161.
24 | Ibid., 136.
25 | Na’ana, Hamida, The Homeland, Garnet, Reading, 1988, in: Dresch, 2000, 120.
26 | In addition to the apparent lack of “workers” in the sense of the word, the biggest part 
of the work force was not to be found in the country anyway. Just like today, a considerable 
part of Yemeni employees at the time, about 250,000, worked abroad, sending home the 
PDRY’s lion’s share of foreign currency and somewhat keeping alive the economy.
27 | Schroeder, 1999, 119ff; Schroeder, 2013, 110ff.
28 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 159.
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the early 1980s was built on the unsteady ground of a debt of $1.2 billion.29 State 
survival depended on further financial credits, the two biggest lenders being 
Moscow with about a quarter of the funding and the World Bank with about a 
tenth. On top of that, the ever prevailing hope to find oil to save the economy was 
not to be fulfilled before 1986.30 The discoveries simply happened too late to buffer 
the humanitarian and economic catastrophes of the “1986 January crisis” and 
severe flooding that occurred afterwards.31
2. ADEN: A SOvIE T “FIRST-PRIORIT Y GOAL” IN ThE AR AB WORLD
“[Soviet assistance should be reserved only for] our most important, justified 
and first-priority goals. It […] should go first of all to the state with the explicit 
and consistent socialist orientation. I have in mind such states as the People‘s 
Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan and some others.”32
(Leonid Brezhnev, November 1978)
During the 1970s, the South Yemeni leadership repeatedly stressed that the aid and 
assistance they received were insufficient. The leadership made it known that their 
future steps towards the Eastern Bloc highly depended on a possible improvement 
of their situation.33 By 1976, the PDRY had not received any assistance from the 
ČSSR yet, while Poland and Hungary had merely sent delegations under a UN 
mandate.34 But despite Aden’s complaints, not much happened until the YSP 
was formed. Salmin’s execution finally freed the way for the establishment of 
the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, boosting South Yemen’s relations with the 
Eastern Bloc in general and Moscow and East Berlin in particular. Without doubt, 
the creation of the YSP was a Soviet interest, and Soviet advisors and functionaries 
had done their share to express this wish.35
With the installation of a rather dependent and thus loyal vanguard party at 
the center of South Yemen’s political system, the inherently unpredictable PDRY 
transformed into a somewhat more reliable ally for Moscow. The Kremlin clearly 
29 | National debt of 1980, in: Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des 
ZK der JSP […] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 165.
30 | Burrowes, 2010, 280.
31 | Ibid., 258.
32 | Brezhnev, Leonid, November 22 1978, Opening the session of the Political Advisory 
Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, The Intervention in Afghanistan and the fall 
of Détente – A Chronology, in: The Carter-Brezhnev-Project, The National Security Archive.
33 | Information über einige innen- und außenpolitische Entwicklungstendenzen in der 
VDR Jemen, September 14 1976, in: BStU MfS HV A Nr. 125, 22.
34 | Ibid. 22.
35 | Cigar, 1985, 780.
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signaled its wish to keep the YSP regime in power by backing it with a more 
efficient and loyal military. Soviet military aid doubled between 1978-79 to about 
$250 million,36 while the first “young officers educated in [Bulgaria, Cuba, GDR 
the ČSSR and Romania] were about to report for duty.”37 By the mid-1980s, South 
Yemeni military had shed its British skin and reformed “along Soviet lines,” 
including close party ties and Soviet control by integration of party officials.38
“All military forces [of the PDRY] are equipped with modern, mostly Soviet, 
engineering. The comprehensive deliveries of arms by the Soviet Union are 
either granted on the basis of long-term credits or without any financial 
payment in return. The USSR provides the lion’s share of the political, material, 
and financial support of the PDRY’s armed forces.”39
An estimate of about 1,000 Soviet advisors in the state and party apparatus were 
supported by another 500 Cuban experts who trained South Yemeni militia and 
police, while East Germany’s delegates from the defense, interior and security 
ministries were active in the establishment of the security and judicial apparatus.
2.1  Intention to Stay: Stable Relations Between Moscow and Aden
Before his death, one of the last international visits Brezhnev made was his trip to 
Aden in May 1982. It was followed by a communiqué in September that praised 
the PDRY’s advancement on “the road of socialist orientation.”40 Regardless of 
Moscow’s policy change toward the YAR and possible Yemeni unity, the signed 
communiqué clearly illustrates the stability of USSR-PDRY relations during this 
period, demarcated by the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and the crisis of 
1986. In this phase, bilateral relations were consolidated and the Soviets intended 
to stay: In early 1985, the USSR officially established a “link [from South Yemen] 
to the Soviet Intersputnik satellite communications network,” 41 which meant 
installing a direct hotline between Aden and Moscow. In context of the HV A 
project “Netzwerk 3,” the installation of an East German radio surveillance base 
starting in 1983, this engagement has to be interpreted as a long-term commitment 
36 | Brehony, 2013, 115.
37 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 166.
38 | Cigar, 1985, 778.
39 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 166.
40 | Halliday, 1990, 197.
41 | Dienstreisebericht der HA III, 15 February 1984 (Aktion “Netzwerk 3“), in: BStU MfS 
HA III 8873. At the time US$1 and 1 Rubel were of about the same worth in the world 
economy.
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to South Yemen. Also, Soviet financial and economic commitments increased 
significantly. In 1984, the GDR reported about a secret increase of Soviet aid to 
the PDRY “of another 2 billion rubles.”42 This quote suggests that there had been 
a comparable amount of aid prior to this second secret loan. Soviet support for the 
YSP regime in this phase clearly was clearly much more than the official loan in 
1985 of about 384 million rubles.43
The secret loan clearly fits the shift of Soviet economic policy towards Aden: 
The Kremlin had begun to include South Yemeni economy in its Comecon plans.44 
As a reaction, the YSP officially opted to decrease imports from “imperialist 
countries.”45 The actual decline of Aden’s non-socialist foreign trade from 70 
percent to about 56 percent in 198346 underlines the mutual agreement between 
the USSR and the PDRY to draw Aden closer to the Eastern Bloc economically. So 
far, the support of South Yemen merely served geostrategic purposes. But Moscow 
and East Berlin both were hoping for more concrete economic benefits from their 
engagement. “Encouraging signs near Shabwah,”47 as well as rumors about an 
actual oil find by Italy,48 were cause for new hope for more concrete benefits for 
the Eastern Bloc from its engagement in South Yemen. Supported by the GDR 
and ČSSR, Soviet companies increased their efforts in their search for oil, a line 
of action that was to be continued even after Moscow’s change of leadership to 
Gorbachev.49
2.2  Why the Kremlin let go of Its Ally Ismail: Moscow’s Support for Ali Nasir
In 1980, the Soviet Union at first apparently attempted to save its ally, Ismail, who had 
just received the Soviet Order of Friendship among Peoples the year before.50 But soon 
enough it became obvious that Ismail lacked the necessary support for leadership 
among his own peers. As a consequence, the Kremlin accepted Ismail’s removal 
from office and Moscow explicitly supported Ali Nasir’s leadership. When taking a 
closer look at Moscow’s interests at the time, this move does follow a certain logic. 
Ali Nasir was not unknown to the USSR and he was fully aware of the importance of 
a healthy South Yemeni-Soviet relationship for the PDRY. Furthermore, this change 
42 | Ibid.
43 | Cigar, 1985, 778.
44 | Ibid., 778.
45 | Information über die Entwicklung in der VDR Jemen, in: BStU MfS HV A 81, August 
1978, Part I of I, Nr. 35/78, 110ff.
46 | Cigar, 1985, 778.
47 | Dresch, 2000, 161.
48 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 163.
49 | Brehony, 2013, 145. 
50 | Ibid. 120. 
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at the top of the YSP might even have been of a certain political convenience for the 
Kremlin. After the Camp David Accords, power in the region again was shifting 
towards Washington and its allies. Moscow needed to improve its relations with its 
former enemies. During this phase, the USSR performed a noticeable policy change 
in the region, including its first advances towards Saudi Arabia, something Ismail 
never supported. Furthermore, Moscow sent the first significant arms supplies to 
Sana’a, and Ali Abdallah Saleh, who was close to Ali Nasir, visited Moscow. 
Apart from Moscow’s overtures to Saudi Arabia and the Kremlin’s hope for 
a more “progressive” leadership in the YAR, the additional major cause for this 
policy change might be found in the current socio-political condition of the PDRY: 
After a decade of consolidation, the Kremlin considered South Yemen’s political 
system politically stabilized, that is, ruled by a vanguard party of Marxist-Leninist 
orientation.51 Ali Nasir must have appeared as the more predictable alternative to 
the extremist Ismail: Ali Nasir advocated for moderation towards the neighboring 
states and with regard to the Palestinian case. This clearly was in Moscow’s 
interest. However, Ali Nasir did not appear to be a Marxist at heart, unlike Ismail. 
In 1983, Moscow even had to remind Ali Nasir to focus on “the consolidation of 
[the YSP”s] ideological, political, and organizational unity.”52 Nonetheless, the 
Kremlin was sure of Ali Nasir’s loyalty and he was not expected to depart from the 
course of the Marxist-Leninist state.
According to an internal document of the GDR’s Ministry of Defense, the 
PDRY’s foreign policy under Ali Nasir’s leadership in the early 1980s followed 
three major premises:53 First, the promotion of close cooperation with Ethiopia; 
second, the normalization of relations with the YAR, as opposed to Ismail who 
repeatedly had been preaching the expansion of the YSP to the north;54 and third, 
the improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia. Clearly, Ali Nasir’s approach 
coincided with Moscow’s endeavors to keep close ties to Addis Abeba and to win 
the Saleh regime from Washington for the Eastern Bloc. Furthermore, the PDRY 
under Ismail’s leadership had been far from negotiating, let alone cooperating, 
with Riyadh or Sana;a. To sum it up, all three of these goals fit in neatly with 
Moscow’s wider strategy for the Horn of Africa after Mengistu’s violent coup 
of 1977.55  Thus, the change of leadership from Ismail to Ali Nasir has to be 
considered at least convenient for both Moscow and East Berlin alike – at least 
51 | After two Northern leaders were killed in 1977 and 1978, the comparably unknown 
Major Al ī Abdallah Sāleḥ had stepped forward to take over presidency. Dresch, 2000, 143 
and 147. Saleh remained president even after unification until he was forced to resign in 
the course of the so-called Arab Uprisings in early 2012.
52 | Pravda, November 14 1983, in: Cigar, 1985, 789.
53 | Angaben zur Außen- und Militärpolitik sowie zur Entwicklung der Streitkräfte der VDR 
Jemen, January 17 1981, in: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.5905, 1-6.
54 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 61.
55 | Westad, 2005, 271.
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when it happened in 1980. In an MfS document from 1984, the vote for Ismail’s 
resignation is considered “the correction of the adventurous course by the […] the 
YSP in 1979.”56
3.  CONSOLIDATION AND CONTINuIT Y OF E AST GERMAN STATE-
BuILDING: hOW ThE GDR’S FOREIGN POLICY TIED IN WITh ThE 
YSP’S APPROACh
3.1  The Founding of the YSP: The Keystone of Socialist Nation- and 
State-Building?
“The visit of the Party and state delegation under leadership of Secretary-
General Erich Honecker to the PDRY [in November 1979] and the signing of 
the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation preluded a new stage of bilateral 
relations. […] The close cooperation between the SED and the YSP is taking 
center stage in the process.”57
In the formation process of the Soviet-style vanguard party, Aden relied heavily 
on the support of its closest allies, the USSR and GDR. In 1976, PDRY Foreign 
Minister Mohammed Saleh Mutia58 attended the SED’s IX. Party Congress in 
East Berlin,59 and East German advisors accompanied the preparations for the 
founding congress of the YSP.
“The German Democratic Republic is a Socialist state based on the German  
nation. She is the political organization of urban and rural workers who jointly 
realize Socialism led by the working class and its Marxist-Leninist Party.”
(Article 1, Constitution of the GDR, April 6th 1968)
“The YSP, armed with the theory of Scientific Socialism, is the leader and guide 
of society and the state. […The Party] leads the struggle of the people and their 
mass organizations to […] finally realize Socialism.” 60
(Ar ticle 2, Constitution of the PDRY, October 31st 1978)
56 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 142.
57 | Ibid.175.
58 | Arabic: Muḥammad Saleḥ Mutiˁa.
59 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 168.
60 | German Translation: “Bewaffnet mit der Theorie des Wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus 
ist die Jemenitische Sozialistische Partei Führer der Gesellschaft und des Staates. […Sie] 
führt den Kampf des Volkes und seiner Massenorganisationen an, […] um schließlich den 
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These two excerpts present the mid- and long-term impact of South Yemen’s 
cooperation with East Germany on the development of the PDRY’s political 
system. With the founding of the YSP, the existing constitution was amended in a 
fashion undeniably reminiscent of East Germany’s constitutional genesis between 
1949 and 1968. The YSP’s party program of the same year stated:
“[The YSP] is considered the logic conclusion of the [NF]. […] Fundamental 
economic, social and political changes […] created the prerequisites to transform 
the political vanguard represented by the [NF] into a new type of party.”61
From then on, the South Yemeni vanguard party officially claimed to be the 
highest authority in a centralized state in South Yemeni territory.62 Without 
doubt, the GDR’s influence on the PDRY’s constitution and legal system is not 
restricted to the first drafts and early years, as it is also relevant to the further 
constitutional and legal genesis. Throughout the 1970s, state structures had 
gradually been remolded into East German-style party-state parallelism. Similar 
to the GDR’s Constitution of 1968, the “primacy of the party”63 was elevated to 
the highest organizational state principle. The following elections were “fixed,” 
as “people voted for candidates from approved lists”64 comparable to the GDR. 
Thus, the “elected” Yemeni Parliament, the SPC, was kept under the tight control 
of the Politbüro, similar to the “Volkskammer” of the GDR. The institution of the 
presidium elected by the SPC remained, while all members in personal union 
also were members of the YSP Central Committee. At the intersection between 
party and state in South Yemen, a “Council of Ministers” could be found just as in 
the GDR.65 In addition to that, the YSP pledged to carefully select cadre members 
“on the basis of the working class ideology.”66 Moscow and East Berlin actively 
supported this process through their intense involvement in the field of education: 
Throughout the schools’ existence, East Germans taught at the “Abdallah Badheeb 
School for Scientific Socialism” as well as at Aden’s police academy.67
Aufbau des Sozialismus zu erreichen.” Ar t. 2, Constitution of the PDRY of October 31 1978, 
pub. by the Foreign Ministry of the PDRY, 14 October Corporation Aden, 1981.
61 | JSP – Avantgarde des jemenitischen Volkes. Auszüge aus dem Programm der JSP (I) 
und (II), in: horizont No.50/51 1978, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.27368, 6f.
62 | On the interconnection of state and Party after launching the constitution see: Ismail/
Ismail, 1986, 42-55.
63 | Schroeder, 1999, 421; Schroeder, 2013, 483-486.
64 | Brehony, 2013, 108.
65 | Ismail/Ismail, 1986, 52f.
66 | JSP – Avantgarde des jemenitischen Volkes. Auszüge aus dem Programm der JSP (I) 
und (II), in: horizont No.50/51 1978, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.27368, 7.
67 | Cigar, 1985, 778.
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Due to close cooperation of Soviet and East German advisors, but also due to the 
GDR’s function as a role model, the newborn vanguard party explicitly continued 
and even intensified its close ties with the Eastern Bloc: Based on the “principle of 
Proletarian Internationalism,”68 the YSP declared the “continuous strengthening 
of the alliances with the Socialist state community under Soviet leadership”69 one 
of its priority goals and the East Germans readily worked towards this objective. The 
first party communiqué after the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the SED and the UNFPO was followed by another agreement in June 1977, which 
preceded the “YSP Founding Congress” that further expanded cooperation.70 This 
line was continued with a more comprehensive agreement in 1981.
“[The] cooperation agreement [of 198171] between the SED and the YSP for the 
period of 1982 to 1987 now [in 1984] already has contributed significantly by 
imparting experiences.”72
Before the “1986 crisis,” the SED clearly planned for a long-term commitment in 
the PDRY that even exceeded involvement of the Soviet CPSU.73
3.2  Pushing Development: The Impact of the Founding of the YSP on 
Socialist State-Building
The GDR’s efforts to promote the establishment of a socialist state in South 
Yemen corresponded well with the YSP’s intentions. The party program of the 
YSP was even more explicit than the new constitution with regard to the Party’s 
plans of the “development of Socialism” as a long-term goal. According to this 
document, society had to change as a whole to achieve socialism. The leadership 
of the vanguard party was to promote a “change of the relation of classes within 
society” to ensure “the dictatorship of the proletariat.”74 Mass organizations 
led by the YSP were to contribute to the process by “organizing and educating 
68 | JSP – Avantgarde des jemenitischen Volkes. Auszüge aus dem Programm der JSP (I) 
und (II), in: horizont No.50/51 1978, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.27368, 8.
69 | Ibid. 4; 8.
70 | Communiqué on the occasion of a visit by an NFPO delegation in East Berlin in 
February 1974, Agreement on the cooperation between the SED and the UNFPO, June 13 
1977, in: Jemen (Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen der DDR; 1987, 140; 
140-1.
71 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 178.
72 | Ibid., 176.
73 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
74 | JSP – Avantgarde des jemenitischen Volkes. Auszüge aus dem Programm der JSP (I) 
und (II), in: horizont No.50/51 1978, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.27368, 5.
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the masses as well as developing their class consciousness and strengthen the 
connection between Party and people.”75 This formulation unmistakably reminds 
one of Lenin’s approach to society: “Integration of society” in the new Yemen also 
meant “homogenization of society.” The language of the new party program now 
resembled less the predecessor’s mixture of vague revolutionary thoughts and 
Marxist phrases and more the East German ideological jargon of the time.
During the 1970s, the USSR supported East Berlin’s activities in the “civil 
sphere” not only with personnel but also with technical equipment. This was 
especially the case for communications and the media, realms in which East 
Berlin had been active since the late 1960s. The Soviet construction of a station 
for receiving satellite signals in South Yemen enabled Moscow and East Berlin 
to directly broadcast to Aden. This complemented the East German news agency 
ADN’s deal with Aden News Agency (ANA) in 1970 in which ANA had agreed 
to broadcast East German features. East Berlin clearly had expected that this 
policy would pay off and further increase influence on the national South Yemeni 
media. Another agreement on the cooperation of the journalist federations of both 
countries for the period between 1983 and 1987 was signed in September 1983.76 
East German influence without doubt showed itself more and more in political 
practice and legislation. The program of the YSP of 1978 is just one of many 
indicators here:
“The Party especially focuses on the development of mass media – press, radio 
and TV broadcasting – as it is considered an effective political and ideological 
weapon to fulfill the tasks of the national-democratic revolution and to 
education the working masses.”77
At the end of the decade, the once flourishing media landscape of British-occupied 
Aden also had to yield to the YSP’s drive for socialist one-party rule and its full 
control of the public.
The GDR’s promotion of ties between actors of the “society sphere” was continued, 
not only with regard to the media, but in all fields of engagement. Cultural, 
economic, industrial, and technical cooperation were all renewed or expanded.78 
75 | Ibid., 5.
76 | Vereinbarung über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Journalistenverbänden der 
DDR und der VDR Jemen für die Jahre 1983 bis 1987, September 5 1983, in: Jemen 
(Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen der DDR, 1987, 140-3.
77 | JSP – Avantgarde des jemenitischen Volkes. Auszüge aus dem Programm der JSP (I) 
und (II), in: horizont No.50/51 1978, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.27368, 6.
78 | Unterzeichnung eines Abkommens über kulturelle und wissenschaftlich-technische 
Zusammenarbeit, April 7 1981; Unterzeichnung eines Abkommens über wir tschaftliche, 
industrielle und technische Zusammenarbeit sowie über ein Abkommen auf dem Gebiet 
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The “Agreement on Health Cooperation” of 1982 even preceded the Soviet-South 
Yemeni equivalent of 1987. One of the major fields of engagement remained the 
education sector, in which East German influence even increased: an overwhelming 
majority of 217 of the 258 PDRY citizens residing in the GDR in 1979 were 
students.79 Apart from the presence of education advisors at all levels of South 
Yemeni politics, the opportunities for Yemeni students to come to East Germany 
steadily increased during the 1980s, especially after the official “Agreement on 
Student Exchange” was signed in December 1983.80 Stipends usually included 
flights and accommodation.81 South Yemeni youth delegations regularly visited 
the GDR and were complemented by engagement in the mentioned policy fields. 
In January 1982, for example, an FDJ delegation visited Aden to celebrate the first 
Anniversary of the “Days of Friendship” between East German and South Yemeni 
youth, a visit which was returned by the South Yemeni youth organization Asheed 
in March 1983.82 
Other indications of the intensification of engagement after the founding of 
the YSP are financial aid, investments, and trade: Despite East Germany’s own 
financial problems, the SED remained rather generous with its credit conditions. 
The third and fourth governmental credits loaned to the Aden regime in 1978 and 
1980 were accompanied by a consumption credit for the period of 1979 to 1983.83 
Furthermore, the repayments of the first three governmental credits of 1969, 
1974, and 1978 were “deferred at the PDRY’s request.”84 However, trade relations 
intensified as well. East Germany benefited immediately from Aden’s decision to 
increase its trade volume with the Eastern Bloc at the expense of trade with the 
“imperialist states.” “GDR export to the PDRY rose from 4,8 illion VM in 1974, to 
an estimate of 10,3 Million in 1980 and about 24 Million VM in 1983.”85
Finally, a brief look at the development of the major East German strategy in 
socialist state- and nation-building during this phase is necessary. The work of 
the advisor groups had been continued throughout the 1970s and in some fields 
des Gesundheitswesens, in: Jemen (Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen der 
DDR, 1987, 140-3f.
79 | Sofortinformation AG Ausländer an HA II, February 26 1979, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 
27850, 46.
80 | Vereinbarung über ein Abkommen über den Studentenaustausch zwischen den beiden 
Staaten, December 7 1983, in: Jemen (Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen 
der DDR, 1987, 140-3.
81 | Planvorschlag 1986 und Plankorrektur 1985, Ministerrat der DDR an MfS Leiter der 
Abteilung Finanzen, July 18 1985, in: BStU MfS Abt. Finanzen Nr.3492, 45.
82 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 170f.
83 | Ibid., 177.
84 | Ibid., 178.
85 | Ibid., 178.
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even expanded after the establishment of the YSP. One example of this is the legal 
apparatus. While the GDR had been highly active in consulting on constitutional 
law since 1969, East Berlin decided to become involved in the more concrete design 
of the PDRY’s legal system later on. The PDRY’s attorney general had visited the 
GDR in 1980 and asked for consultancy support from East Berlin. His request was 
granted two years later. Hans Bauer was delegated as an official Party-Secretary 
of the Department of the Attorney General in 1982.86 According to Bauer, the 
PDRY had expressed their preference to follow the model of East Germany as the 
socialist “Musterländle,” the model state: “The Yemenis were interested in the 
GDR because it was comparable. The Governorates were similar to our ‘Bezirke,’ 
the Districts to our Counties. Not all could be converted, but a lot was similar.”87 
All in all, Bauer considers East German engagement in this sector alone of the 
most decisive external factors of significant impact on the juridical system of the 
PDRY.
3.3  A Beneficial Investment? Scope and Intensit y of East-German 
Cooperation with the South Yemeni Militar y and Securit y 
Apparatus
“Apparently there existed important cooperation in the field of security in 
South Yemen, though I didn’t have any information about this in my area of 
responsibility in the Ministry.”88
Heinz-Dieter Winter, GDR Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1986-1990
After the merger of all relevant political groups and parties and the Founding 
Congress of the YSP, the GDR’s policy of socialist state- and nation-building 
transformed smoothly from “establishment” to “consolidation and continuity” 
with regard to all three dimensions of state- and nation-building. Just as in the 
1970s, Moscow left the civil sectors and security apparatus as part of Socialist 
nation-building to East Germany. In Addition to that, East German engagement 
now was expanded to the military sphere to support the USSR policy.89 During 
the “Phase of Continuity and Consolidation,” engagement usually was either 
continued on the same level of intensity or even increased. This was especially the 
case for the support of the security apparatus and military cooperation, which was 
coordinated in great secrecy. 
86 | Vermerk über die Einstellung der inoffiziellen Zusammenarbeit mit dem GMS 
“Leonhardt“ Reg. Nr. XV 3481/1982, October 11 1988, in: BStU MfS AP Nr.36630-92.
87 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011. On the GDR’s “model character” for the 
developing countries, also see: Howell, 1994, 328.
88 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
89 | Möller, 2004, 54.
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Contributions to the PDRY’s Military as Part of Moscow’s Strategic Policy
The involvement of the NVA in the PDRY remained quite modest, though this was 
rather owed to the NVA’s insignificant contribution of military equipment in the 
developing world in combination with Soviet dominance in the field. In 1972, Minister 
of Defense Heinz Hoffmann acquired the permission to train military personnel in 
the developing countries by the Warsaw Pact leadership,90 but it was not before 1978 
that the first military protocol was signed between the two countries.91 Throughout its 
existence, the SED had been extremely secretive about its military cooperation with 
the states of the Third World: While the party organ “Neues Deutschland” regularly 
and freely reported about any protocol signed with states outside the Eastern Bloc, 
agreements on military or security issues regularly were left out.92
Thus, it was not until the end of the 1970s that the intensity of engagement 
became internationally public and thus relevant in international relations: the 
West German weekly magazine “Der Spiegel,” for example, reported about East 
German support for revolutionary and potentially aggressive regimes of the Third 
World. In 1980, a feature warned of a looming revolution in North Yemen, the 
former “bastion of the West between Saudi Arabia and leftist South Yemen,” 
exported from Aden.93 Rumors about Soviet and East German engagement 
usually exceeded the actual presence and cooperation by far and thus increased 
insecurities for any neighboring state siding with the other player in the Cold War.
However, East German engagement in the military and security apparatus 
indeed was expanded in scope and intensity and could not be kept a secret any 
longer.94 Despite the comparably late start of official military training in South 
Yemen, the PDRY ranks second only to Vietnam in numbers of officers trained 
by the GDR between 1973 and 1989.95 Furthermore, the GDR’s Ministry of the 
Interior repeatedly granted “emergency” demands. But this was not restricted to 
provisioning South Yemeni troops or civilians:96 The GDR’s Ministry of the Interior 
quickly and non-bureaucratically processed the demand for 4,000 grenades for 
the recoilless gun B-10.97 On the one hand this big share of a small contribution to 
90 | Engelhardt, 1993, in: Möller, 2004, 30.
91 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 86.
92 | See: Jemen (Demokratischer), Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen der DDR, Mostly 
based on publications of “Neues Deutschland,” 1987.
93 | Feuer der Revolution nicht zu löschen, in: Der Spiegel, No.10, 1980.
94 | For example sixty South Yemeni officers at the Offiziershochschule Otto Winzer in the 
GDR were granted a course of three years, see: Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der 
DDR und der Regierung der VDRJ über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern der Streitkräfte der 
VDRJ in der DDR vom 11.6.1981, in: BArch, DVW 1/54328.
95 | Möller, 2004, 54.
96 | Vermerk über Hilfsleistungen, July 18 1978, in: BStU MfS AGM Nr.430, 1. 
97 | Letter to Dickel, July 12 1978, in: BStU MfS AGM Nr.430, 63.
A Spectre is Haunting Arabia – How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen
323
the military in the developing partner countries may be interpreted as part of the 
GDR’s interest in maintaining good relations with the PDRY. On the other hand, 
it has to be considered an indication of the integration of the GDR into Moscow’s 
policy toward South Yemen.
Cooperation between Two Secret Ser vices – The GDR’s Major Field of 
Action in the PDRY
Archival material on the Stasi’s engagement in Aden during the 1980s is rich and 
plentiful, as divisions other than the HV A became involved during that period. 
Relations especially between the two security services undeniably were close 
and East Berlin went to great lengths to strengthen the South Yemeni version of 
itself. The Stasi supplied the PDRY’s KfS with the equipment and training needed 
and tried to fulfill their partners’ wishes as much as possible.98 After the first 
agreement between the GDR’s Stasi and the PDRY’s KfS, signed in November 
1970, a new agreement was signed in November 198099 that included and spelled 
out the provisions of the two protocols of November 1979 between the two organs 
in greater detail.100 They affirmed the modus operandi and significantly intensified 
cooperation. New protocols were to be signed in November each year and secret 
information exchanged in quarterly intervals.101 The agreement of 1980 included a 
five-year period for which it would remain in force unless new regulations deemed 
otherwise.102 Similar to other policy fields, the GDR offered training for KfS cadres 
in the GDR, but also pledged material supplies. All in all, these added up to 8 
million East German Marks, including arms worth 3.6 million and an additional 
2.6 million to upgrade the surveillance network. An additional 1,800 firearms 
were sent as a “gift” to the KfS in May 1980.103 These did not include any costs 
98 | In the protocol of 1979, the KfS for example asked for another 5,000 machine guns 
and 500 pistols. Protokoll über die vorgesehenen Maßnahmen der Zusammenarbeit 
zwischen dem MfS der DDR und dem KfS der VDRJ im Jahre 1980, November 17 1979, 
Ar ticle 15, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 1767.
99 | “to develop and deepen the cooperation established with the agreement of November 
6 1970,” in: Vereinbarung über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem MfS der DDR und dem 
KfS der VDRJ, November 25 1980, in: BStU MfS Abt. X 1789, 1.
100 | Protokoll zwischen dem MfS der DDR und dem KfS der VDRJ vom November 17 
1979, in: BStU MfS Abt X Nr.1763; Protokoll über die vorgesehenen Maßnahmen der 
Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem MfS der DDR und dem KfS der VDRJ im Jahre 1980, 
November 17 1979, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 1767.
101 | Vereinbarung über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem MfS der DDR und dem KfS der 
VDRJ, November 25 1980, Ar ticle 13, in: BStU MfS Abt. X 1789.
102 | Ibid.
103 | Oberst Fiedler HV A III an MfS Abt.X Geberalmajor Damm, May 13 1980, in: BStU MfS 
Abt.X Nr.234 Teil 1 von 2, 392. 
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for personnel and training.104 The Stasi even coordinated the construction of the 
KfS building and sent seven permanent Stasi advisors to the KfS who were to be 
positioned in the operational service of the KfS, the Defense Forces, the KfS cadre 
school, bodyguard services, and surveillance.105
Based on coded notes of Section BCD, the PDRY at times ranked the highest among 
all partners with regard to internal security support. File BCD No. 2802 includes 
an overview of the main material deliveries by the HV A to Third World countries 
in 1980. Equipment worth 6.85 million VM was delivered to the top three countries 
in terms of spending: “-030-“ (South Yemen), “-020-“ (Mozambique), and “-120-“ 
(PLO). The share spent on South Yemen totals about 5 million.106 Though 1980 
had been the year of highest solidarity spending in the history of the HV A,107 the 
share spent on the PDRY nonetheless is by far the greatest, which was also the 
case for most of the years of this period: During the three years between 1980-82, 
about 6.3 million of the total 15.8 million of equipment and arms deliveries by 
the HV A to the closest political allies was sent to Aden. Apart from arms, guns, 
and ammunition, the GDR supposedly delivered chemical warfare substances as 
well.108 All in all, deliveries worth about 6 million GDR Marks were sent by the 
BCD alone within only two years. Taking everything into consideration, it may be 
assumed that actual spending of the MfS in South Yemen probably even exceeded 
the numbers provided in the available files.
The Stasi’s Most Ambitious Project in Aden: The Rise and Fall of “Network 3”
However, East German support was not given without very concrete political and 
economic motives. While the biggest share of money spent on the KfS was for 
training and special forces equipment, the Stasi established a surveillance outpost 
by the Red Sea that fully depended on East German instruction and money as 
part of the Warsaw Pact surveillance network. Under the code name “Netzwerk 
3,” or “Network 3,” the project was coordinated jointly by the Section HA III 
104 | Protokoll über die vorgesehenen Maßnahmen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem 
MfS der DDR und dem KfS der VDRJ im Jahre 1980, November 17 1979, Annex 1, in: BStU 
MfS Abt. X Nr. 1767.
105 | Protokoll über die vorgesehenen Maßnahmen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem 
MfS der DDR und dem KfS der VDRJ im Jahre 1980, November 17 1979, in: BStU MfS Abt. 
X Nr. 1767, Ar ticle 6.
106 | Lieferungen 1980: Gesamt [handwritten], 1980, in: BStU MfS BCD Nr.20802, 73.
107 | For example in 1981, only about 0.75 million of the full 5.2 million Valuta Marks were 
spent on the PDRY and in 1982 only about 0.5 million of a total 3.1 million Valuta Marks. 
Also see: Sendungen 1965-1982, in: BStU MfS BCD Nr.20802, 93.
108 | Even though there is no detailed listing about the concrete amounts, a coding list 
for the dif ferent kinds and amounts of these substances can be found in file BCD 2854. 
Zif fern-Code, GVS MfS 031-944/76, 1976, BStU MfS BCD Nr.2854, 114-116.
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and the H VA.109 Gieseke describes the HA III as a “cross-section unit”110 that 
analyzed radio traffic inside the GDR and also between the territory of the GDR 
and West Germany. In addition to that, HA III had been active abroad. The project 
“Network 3” clearly was part of Moscow’s wider surveillance strategy in the region 
rather than just an East German initiative.111 The station at this geostrategically 
decisive position between Africa and Asia at the time was the only one outside 
East Germany’s vicinity112 and the expansion of East German radar activities was 
ordered by the Soviet Ministry of State Security itself. The establishment of a 
military radio station in South Yemen was intended to “skim [the enemy’s] secret 
communication [by the HA III] which is only possible in this area.”113 With regard 
to the exchange of information, very concise instructions can be found: 
“Both sides exchange information on a regular basis on the following topics: 
[…] The politics of the U.S.A., France, Great Britain and the FRG and their allies 
[…] aiming to disturb cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Socialist 
states with [the countries of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa],” including 
the activities of their secret services.114
The two cooperation protocols of 1979 pledged a “half stationary radio station”115 
to Aden, worth more than 1 million East German Marks. With these protocols, 
East Germany handed over any “demand for certain information” to the fS 
and vice versa, while the KfS guaranteed to supply the GDR with information 
109 | Schmidt, 2010, 245.
110 | “Querschnitsseinheit,” Gieseke, in: Kaminski/Persak/Gieseke, 2009, 220.
111 | Schmidt, 2010, 20f; Schreiben Horst Männchen Abt. III an den 1. Stellver treter des 
Ministers, Generalleutnant Bruno Beater, Meldung zur Aktion “Netzwerk 3,” November 3 
1978, in: BStU, MfS, HA III 680, 29.
112 | Apart from the station in the PDRY, the GDR enter tained three stations in the ČSSR, 
four in the FRG, two in Austria and one in Belgium. in: Schmidt, 2010, 21. Station “Windrose“ 
in Ethiopia and “Netzwerk 4“ in Mozambique followed in 1979 and 1980. Schmidt, 2010, 
106; Schreiben Horst Männchen an Stellver treter des Ministers, Bruno Beater: Konzeption 
zum Aufbau einer Funkabwehr in Äthiopien und Jemen (VDRJ), February 23 1978; BStU, 
MfS, HA III 11787, 312–314; Stellver treter Operativ: Konzeption zur Vorbereitung und 
Durchführung der Aktion »Netzwerk 4« in der Abt. III in Zusammenarbeit mit der HV A, March 
31 1980, in: BStU, MfS, HA III 11787, 371–389. 
113 | “Abschöpfung der Nachrichtenverbindungen [des Gegners durch die HA III des MfS, 
Anm. Autorin], die nur in diesem territorialen Raum möglich sind“; On the establishment of 
Netzwerk III“: Neiber an Mielke, April 25 1984, in: HA III 11099, 121. 
114 | Protokoll über Maßnahmen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem MfS der DDR und 
dem KfS der VDRJ für das Jahr 1983, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 1811, 2.
115 | Protokoll zwischen dem MfS der DDR und dem KfS der VDRJ vom November 17 1979, 
in: BStU MfS Abt X Nr.1763, Ar ticle 1.
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relevant for “the specific interests of the MfS”116 and mutual reports in quarterly 
periods.117 Furthermore, East Germany and South Yemen agreed to jointly “create 
the foundations to process [sic!] the agency of the Bundesnachrichtendienst [West 
German secret service] on the territories of the YAR and the PDRY.”118 To train 
and support the KfS personnel responsible for the station, the MfS guaranteed 
to send not only a support delegation, but also a “long-term” expert in 1980. This 
permanent advisor, together with loyal IMs among the South Yemeni KfS, made 
sure that no relevant information was withheld from the Stasi.119
4.  CONCLuSION: E AST-GERMAN ENGAGEMENT SWINGS FROM 
ENThuSIASM TO DISILLuSION
Apart from its unique geostrategic position, the PDRY proved to be also of political 
use for the USSR, as long as it moved within its given room of maneuver to 
accommodate Soviet foreign policy goals. When the former NLF finally merged 
with the remaining other political organizations in the country to form an actual 
“Yemeni vanguard party,” the Soviet Union as well as the GDR could hope for 
possible long-term cooperation in their interest. As the YSP vanguard was modelled 
on the CPSU, and even though the result widely differed from the efficiency of Soviet 
party discipline, the “Treaties of Friendship” with Moscow and its most important 
henchmen in the Soviet Bloc, the GDR,120 left no doubt that Moscow intended to 
closely connect with the YSP: On Soviet accord, Erich Honecker had travelled to 
Aden to personally sign the “Treaty of Friendship.”121 Internal documents also 
support this assumption: One of the most politically remarkable features of the 
protocols and agreements signed between the MfS and the KfS for example, is the 
inclusion of the PDRY in the sphere of the states of the Eastern Bloc, as opposed 
to the “imperialist forces,” simply presupposing a congruence of interests between 
116 | Ibid., Ar ticle 2 and 3.
117 | Protokoll über die vorgesehenen Maßnahmen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem 
MfS der DDR und dem KfS der VDRJ im Jahre 1980, November 17 1979, in: BStU MfS Abt. 
X Nr. 1767, Ar ticle 3.
118 | Protokoll über Maßnahmen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem MfS der DDR und 
dem KfS der VDRJ für das Jahr 1983, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 1811, 3.
119 | E.g. Brief an HA I Kommando Landstreitkräfte Unterabteilung Stab, November 
28 1984, in: BStU MfS HA I 13551, 26; Protokoll über die vorgesehenen Maßnahmen 
der Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem MfS der DDR und dem KfS der VDRJ im Jahre 1980, 
November 17 1979, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 1767, Ar ticle 6.
120 | Vertrag über Freundschaft und Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und der VDRJ, November 17 1979, in: Jemen (Demokratischer), 
Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen der DDR, 1987, 140-1.
121 | Scharfenberg, 2012, 93.
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South Yemen, the Soviet Union, and East Germany. Another strong indication is the 
presence of several Soviet long-term advisors to the president of the PDRY, especially 
during Ali Nasir Mohammed’s tenure.122
Still, both historical and current commentary on Soviet involvement in the 
PDRY regularly emphasizes Moscow’s modest economic and financial support 
in Aden: Economic assistance between 1967 and 1980 added up to only around 
$152 million.123 However,  analysts tend to overlook the fact that Soviet aid grew 
continuously after the installation of Moscow’s new naval base and the signing 
of the Treaty of Friendship in 1979124 and of course do not take into consideration 
several secret loans granted to the PDRY. Nonetheless, the growth of support 
cannot camouflage its purpose. Throughout the 1970s, Soviet engagement 
focused first and foremost on military development tied to ideological training, 
mostly delivered by Cuban and East German experts. The long-term objective was 
the stabilization of the most loyal country and regime in the region.
Soviet engagement during the third phase of East German foreign policy in 
the PDRY was characterized by a continuously high level of intensity, while the 
two major fields of engagement, the military and ideology, were complemented by 
technical assistance. The GDR, however, upheld its engagement in various policy 
fields. This especially was the case in the crucial civil fields of law, economics, 
education, and the media, where the Yemeni side repeatedly asked for more 
assistance. In addition to that, the intensity of East German engagement, especially 
toward the security apparatus, continuously increased until the “1986 crisis.” 
Investments by the Stasi in the establishment of the Marxist-Leninist regime 
in South Yemen reached an all-time high of 10.6 million East German Marks 
in 1978, almost two-thirds of the full East German spending on “young nation 
states” of internal security’s “Planteil III,”125 which included the Stasi’s spending 
on the ten closest partners in cooperation with secret services. Furthermore, the 
GDR finally became involved in the training of military personnel. The former 
annual routine of high-ranking delegation exchanges noticeably changed its pace 
after 1979, with an average of six mutual visits at the state and party level every 
122 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.
123 | Halliday, 1990, 199.
124 | Aid increased by about a third from 1976 to 1978 and tripled until 1983: Soviet 
gross aid disbarments by recipients ($m.)1976 – 1983; PDRY absolute numbers in $ million 
1976: 6,6; 1978: 8,8; 1983, 21. 
125 | The PDRY tops a list of ten countries: PDRY, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
Libya, Somalia, Syria, Bissau, Angola and Cape Verde, in: Zusammenstellung des MfS für 
Hilfeleistungen an junge Nationalstaaten 1978, December 15 1978, in: BStU MfS Abt. 
Finanzen Nr.1393, 149.
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year.126 The dominance of the party sphere in bilateral relations is undeniable, as 
the term “party and state delegation”127 suggests. Also, after the founding of the 
YSP, each and every delegation visiting from both sides was accompanied by a 
high-ranking party member.128 This routine was upheld until the “1986 crisis” 
and supported by the installation of a “Joint Yemeni-German Commission” that 
held its first meeting in May 1980 in Berlin and congregated annually to discuss 
political matters of mutual interest.129 
But regardless of this increased engagement from both the USSR and the 
GDR, discontent with the actual results of their engagement was growing in 
the early 1980s. The hopes to find oil had not been fulfilled. Evaluation of its 
performance indicated that South Yemen’s secret service was still inefficient and 
not producing any valuable information. The same was the case for other state 
institutions. According to Hans Bauer, a trusted advisor to the attorney general of 
the PDRY from 1982 to 1985, not all ministries were working efficiently.130 Despite 
the establishment of the YSP as the central power organ, the decisive step towards 
the realization of “democratic centralism,” socialist state- and nation-building 
was still far from being realized. As a consequence, East Germany seemed to 
concentrate more on ensuring a beneficial outcome for itself at the end of Phase 
III than it had during the intense years of state- and nation-building of the 1970s. 
While ideology and “anti-imperialist” solidarity had been the major focus of East 
Germany during that decade of optimism, its interest appeared to have shifted 
more toward military engagement now. And in case Moscow and East Berlin had 
hoped for a fully controllable socialist homunculus by the Red Sea, these hopes 
were not fulfilled, either. Aden over time appeared to develop a mind of its own 
about the character and degree of external involvement in South Yemen. At the end 
of Phase III, the external powers’ policy goal of a stable, loyal socialist ally more 
and more receded into the distance until the events of 1986 finally challenged the 
regime’s survival and thus the future of Eastern Bloc involvement in the country.
126 | Six mutual delegation visits at the state and party level/sphere in 1980, five in 1981 and 
another six in 1982. Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP 
[…] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 167-174.
127 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 168.
128 | Interview with Wolfgang Bator May 27 2011. 
129 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 169.
130 | Operative Einschätzung des GMS “Leonhardt“ – Vorg.-Nr.XV 3481/82, August 28 
1986, HV A/III/AG/018, in: BStU MfS AGMS Nr. 10208-88, 67; Interview with Hans Bauer 
June 20 2011.
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CHAPTER 14. Phase IV: The Phase of Neglect – 
The GDR in Yemen from 1986 to 1990:  
The “Ice Age” of Relations and the End of Socialist State-Building
“For both the GDR’s policy and the PDRY, there seemed to 
exist only one direction – towards steady success.”1
gdr embAssY couNselor iN AdeN iN 1988 commeNTiNg iN 2012
The former Yemeni comrades in arms against British colonialism were at war 
with each other. The conflict left Ismail dead and Ali Nasir in exile. The events 
of the “January crisis” fundamentally disturbed East German trust in Aden, the 
YSP, and the unquestioned success of socialist state- and nation-building. Even 
though relations somewhat recovered over the years that followed, they never 
regenerated fully before the GDR joined the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
West: the coup of January 1986 not only has to be considered another turning 
point of South Yemeni-East German relations, but marks the beginning of the 
end of the first and only Marxist state in Arabia.
1 | Panecke, Volker, Vorwort, in: Scharfenberg, 2012, 6.
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1.  INTERNAL DE vELOPMENTS: ThE L AST ThROES OF A WOuNDED 
AND DYING STATE
1.1  The “Januar y Crisis” of 1986: “When Do You People Stop Killing 
Each Other?”2 
“Monday, January 13th 1986 – […] I feel that hard times are lying ahead. In the 
late afternoon there are shootings […] in all quarters of the city. […] I live about 
two km from the airport. LMGs, tanks and A.A. guns are shelling the airport. 
Following my intuition, I’m leaping from one corner of the apartment to the other 
and believe it to be the safest. […]
Tuesday, January 14th 1986 – I believe that now you cannot speak of a putsch 
or a putsch attempt anymore. A cruel, hard, and bestial civil war has erupted. 
The airport is attacked with heavy guns. […] There is a hell of a noise all around 
me. […] Tanks are rolling through the streets. There is fighting the whole day.[…]
Wednesday January 15th 1986 – […] Now all hell broke loose. The biggest 
ammunition storehouse of the PDRY exploded a mere two and a half kilometers 
away from my apartment. […] The people in [the quarter] Khormaskar3 panicked 
and fled in our direction, away from the blaze. Children, women, the old ones, 
and pregnant women were trampled down. […]”4
(East German ideological advisor and IMK5 Duff t on his experiences
during the 1986 crisis in Aden)
On January 13 1986, Ali Nasir Mohammed launched a “preemptive strike” against 
internal rivals, as he himself would justify it later on. In the fighting that followed, 
an estimated 10,000 people died.6 Apart from a few military advisors, the PDRY’s 
allies and other foreign countries present in Aden evacuated their citizens 
immediately. The Soviet Union, the United Nations and a remarkably active PLO 
worked out a short ceasefire and started evacuating children and women aboard 
2 | Castro, Fidel, about the “1986 crisis” in Aden on occasion of the 27th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party, in: Halliday, 2002, 45.
3 | A suburb of the old city closest to the “Crater” near the intl. airport. Burrowes, 2010, 11.
4 | Informationsbericht über die Lage in der VDRJ, January 25 1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG 
Nr.6725, 239f.
5 | IMK – Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter zur Sicherung der Konspiration und des 
Verbindungswesens. English: Unofficial employee to uphold conspirative communication 
and exchange, in: Engelmann et al., 2011, 162. 
6 | The number was mostly cited by Western media at the time. Estimates today reach up 
to 25,000 victims, in: Kifner, 1986a and 1986b.
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Soviet, French, and British ships on the January 17.7 The majority of foreign 
citizens had to wait another four days until they could board the last evacuation 
ship, the East German Müggelsee.8 Surprisingly, the “1986 crisis” had initiated 
close cooperation between ideological adversaries. The British ship Britannia 
evacuated East Germans, while the GDR’s Müggelsee saved three West Germans a 
few days later. Not even the state of emergency did much to change internal GDR 
policies. According to a report of events, the East German embassy even held on 
to their citizens’ passports in the middle of fighting on the January 21, and in the 
end, half of the East German builders and engineers were evacuated without their 
legal documents.9
In the first days after the coup, national and international media repeatedly 
contradicted themselves, as circumstances proved to be extremely confusing. 
A few months after the incident, Katz summarizes: “Reports claiming that the 
leaders of each side had been killed alternated in quick succession with reports 
stating the leaders of each to be alive and victorious.”10 Ali Nasir had realized that 
he politically wouldn’t survive the dawning reelection on the three major posts 
he was holding at that time. He convinced others that  a putsch against him was 
being prepared by his adversaries. Thus, he decided to prevent his downfall by 
setting up a trap on the occasion of a planned meeting,11 which the majority of 
academics today interpret as a “preemptive strike” to prevent Ali Nasir’s looming 
dethronement.12 In the course of events, four key members of the Politbüro were 
assassinated,13 among them longtime Minister of Defense Ali Antar.14 The only 
high-ranking member of the meeting who in the end was able to escape was 
al-Beidh, as Ismail was killed in the fighting and thus joined the victims of the 
“preemptive counter-coup” a few days later.
7 | Telegramm Krauße, Aden an König, Sieber, Bunkert, Winter, Jaunary 17 1986, in: in: 
BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6725, 159; Informationsbericht über die Lage in der VDRJ, January 25 
1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6725, 242.
8 | The ship also picked up an East German construction team and several West German 
and Filipino citizens at Aden. On January 23, and thir ty miles away from Aden, the last GDR 
citizens came aboard the Müggelsee: the FDJ Brigade. Bericht über die Ereignisse auf der 
Auslandsbaustelle “Bridges Reconstruction in Aden“ im Januar 1986, January 29 1986, in: 
BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6725, 247.
9 | Bericht über die Ereignisse auf der Auslandsbaustelle “Bridges Reconstruction in 
Aden“ im Januar 1986, January 29 1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6725, 245-250.
10 | Katz, 1986, 7.
11 | Yahia, Hassan Anis, in: Information über die Entwicklung in der VDRJ und internationale 
Reaktionen, Februar 1986, BStU MfS HV A Nr. 40, Part 1 of 2, 179. 
12 | Burrowes, Rober t D., Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani [1939–], in: Mattar (Ed.), 
2004, 143.
13 | Day, 2012, 73.
14 | Freedman, Rabinovich/Shaked, 1988, 35.
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And fighting there was. Over the course of one week, violent clashes erupted 
all over Aden and its vicinity, usually fought with heavy weapons: A.A. guns, 
tanks and RPGs. Armed forces were quickly rallied for a counter-attack against 
Ali Nasir Mohammed and his allies. These troops had been readied as early as late 
December and gradually moved closer to Aden.15 Regardless of the official reasons 
for these military preparations, the maneuver came in quite handy for the “new 
left” that had been attacked by Ali Nasir in the Politbüro meeting. To Ali Nasir’s 
allies’ surprise, the army did not fully support him then, as the middle-ranking 
officers were still loyal to former the ministers of defense and state security, Ali 
Antar and Muhsin. Ali Nasir’s troops were scattered and had to withdraw to the 
north, while the naval forces fled to Ethiopia. At the time, Ali Nasir “had no options 
at his disposal to reclaim his leadership position without external support.”16 The 
two former leaders of the PDRY, Ali Nasir and Ismail, had left the political stage 
of the PDRY for good.
A final conclusion on the actual circumstances and events of the “1986 crisis” 
still must leave important questions unanswered due to contradictory reports, 
murky alliances, and the complex network of personal loyalties in the circle of 
leadership at the time. Tensions had been building up ever since Ismail’s return 
from Moscow in May the year before. Supported by Ali Antar and Saleh Musleh 
Qasim,17 the minister of defense at the time, this “new left” demanded that Ali 
Nasir share his power and even intensify cooperation with the Eastern Bloc. In 
early 1986, Ali Nasir’s power was disintegrating.18 An MfS report on the events 
refers to a statement of Hassan al-Salami,19 who claims that “he had been warned 
of an imminent putsch on January 13th 1986 against Ali Nasir Mohammed by a 
member of the Politbüro.”20 Regardless of several reports like this, the MfS draws 
a profoundly different conclusion on the situation:
“The fact that the cadres of leadership killed on January 13th 1986 exclusively 
have to be considered opponents of Ali Nasser [sic!] Mohammed, suggests that 
Nasir’s opponents were unprepared for a move like this.”21
15 | Brehony, 2013, 155; Halliday, 2002, 45.
16 | Information über die Entwicklung in der VDRJ und internationale Reaktionen, Februar 
1986, BStU MfS HV A Nr. 40, Part 1 of 2, 184.
17 | Arabic: Saleḥ Musleḥ Qasim
18 | Informationsbericht über die Lage in der VDRJ, January 25 1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG 
Nr.6725, 238f.
19 | This clearly marks him as a follower of Ali Nasir Mohammed. Arabic: Ḥassan Al-Salāmī.
20 | Information über die Entwicklung in der VDRJ und internationale Reaktionen, Februar 
1986, BStU MfS HV A Nr. 40, Part 1 of 2, 179.
21 | Information über die Entwicklung in der VDRJ und internationale Reaktionen, Februar 
1986, BStU MfS HV A Nr. 40, Part 1 of 2, 180.
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While the “new left” around Ismail and Ali Antar obviously had expected Ali 
Nasir’s resistance against reelection, they clearly were not prepared for being 
slaughtered during this exact meeting. Corresponding with the overwhelming 
majority of personal accounts by South Yemenis and foreigners who had witnessed 
the events, the conclusion of the MfS report appears to be the most plausible.
1.2  Reconstruction and Deterioration: The New Leadership and the 
Final Years of the Only Mar xist State in Arabia
What followed the final battle of the “comrades in arms of the first hour” in 
January 1986 were the last throes of a wounded and dying state. On the January 
24, the remaining members of the CC of the YSP gathered to decide on a new 
leadership.22 A new government was formed, based on the new generation of 
leaders who had been educated abroad or within the PDRY’s post-dependence 
system of party education. There were not many possible choices. About “three 
quarters of the [CC] of the YSP were gone,”23 either dead, in northern exile, or 
awaiting their trial in prison. The security forces were significantly decimated. For 
example, the whole leadership of the police in the Third and Fourth Governorate 
had fled to the YAR.24 Over the following weeks, only few of the cadres of the YSP 
could reclaim pivotal posts in the state apparatus:25 The technocrat and former 
minister of fisheries Yassin Said Nu’man26 became the new prime minister. 
Said Saleh Salem,27 who had been a minor actor among the revolutionaries and 
a generally politically modest man, became minister of state security,28 and Abd 
Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (Hadi) was appointed new deputy chief of staff. Almost 
22 | Zur Lage in der VDRJ – Stand vom 24.1.1986, January 25 1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG 
Nr.6744, 45-50.
23 | Brehony, 2013, 157.
24 | Bericht Besuch des IM “Klaus Winter,” 1989, in: MfS HA VII 7054, 54-58. According 
to former OibE Rudolf Nitsche his code-name had been “Winter.” Taking into consideration 
Nitsche’s service in a GDR mission in an Arab country in 1966, it seems likely that the 
author of the information provided by IM “Klaus Winter” had been Rudolf Nitsche himself, 
in: Nitsche, 1994. On the role of the HV A also see Ch 7. The “Three Spheres of Foreign 
Policy Making”: Party, State, and Society, 3. Foreign Policy Actors, Competencies and the 
Decision-Making Process.
25 | Al-Beidh, al-Attas, al-Dhali, Salem Saleh Mohammad and Saleh Munasir al-Siyeli, 
in:  Information über die Entwicklung in der VDRJ und internationale Reaktionen, Februar 
1986, BStU MfS HV A Nr. 40, Part 1 of 2, 181.
26 | Burrowes, 2010, 264.
27 | Arabic: Sa”īd Saleḥ Sālem.
28 | Mitglieder der Delegation, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 von 2, 85f.
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thirty years later, Hadi was to step into the international spotlight as unified 
Yemen’s new leader in 2012.29
In the two years after the coup, al-Beidh was able to somehow integrate the 
heterogeneous new leadership, but he was not able to emerge as the dominant 
leading figure. In summer 1987, he aimed at disposing of the majority of the 
new leading figures, some of whom he considered incapable, others he simply 
considered a danger to his leadership role in party and state.30 In a meeting with 
the Soviet ambassador, al-Beidh suggested dismissing a majority of his ministers, 
among them al-Dhali. Several members of the PDRY’s Politbüro were less than 
happy “with al-Beidh’s […] style of leadership.”31 MfS reports repeatedly suggest 
that they were not alone in this. The Kremlin clearly disapproved of abrupt political 
moves like this, as well as al-Beidh’s plan and decisions in general.32 However, 
none of the changes in leadership personnel prepared by al-Beidh were realized. 
The relevant individuals expressed their refusal during the CC conference in 1987, 
as they were well aware of the Soviet and East German support.
All in all, al-Beidh upheld an extreme course of socialist renewal and constantly 
feared losing his position. After his partly defeat at the CC conference of 1987, 
al-Beidh tried to obtain his power through pragmatic concessions. Nonetheless, 
his leadership appeared indecisive and hesitant. The opposition under Ali Nasir 
operated from Sana’a, constantly threatening the new regime in Aden, which was 
planning for Ali Nasir’s return as the head of state and secretary-general of the 
YSP.33 On top of that, the final years of the PDRY were characterized by even more 
severe economic hardships. The civil war of January 1986 not only had destroyed 
much of Aden’s infrastructure, central buildings, and factories, but also created 
instability that repelled any foreign investors who might have had interests in the 
PDRY. According to East German IM information, Seidel summarized in early 
29 | Hadi had been vice-president of unified Yemen from 1994-2012 and was appointed 
president of Yemen after Saleh’s downfall in 2012.
30 | Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Feststellungen und Gespräche während des 
Aufenthaltes in der VDRJ am 02. und 03.09.1987, Fiedler HV A III, September 14 1987,  in: 
BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 von 2, 228ff.
31 | According to Salem Saleh, Mohammed Al-Beidh’s style of leadership was of “anarchic” 
character. Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Feststellungen und Gespräche während des 
Aufenthaltes in der VDRJ am 02. und 03.09.1987, Fiedler HV A III, September 14 1987,  in: 
BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 von 2, 229; 232.
32 | For example his plan to “merge the [PDRY‘s] KfS and Ministry of Interior.” 
Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Feststellungen und Gespräche während des 
Aufenthaltes in der VDRJ am 02. und 03.09.1987, Fiedler HV A III, September 14 1987,  in: 
BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 von 2, 229.
33 | Brief Ali Nasir Mohammed an Erich Honecker, March 16 1987, BStU MfS HA II 
Nr.28714, 182-188.
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1989: “Practically, the state [is] bankrupt.”34 The newly discovered oil reserves 
close to the Saudi and the North Yemeni border did not offer significant economic 
relief, as extraction only developed slowly,35 but rather fueled conflict between the 
PDRY and its neighbors.36 In this environment of hopelessness, the idea of unity 
was now gaining speed and offered a supposedly easy way out. There was not 
much the new leadership could do to prevent the demise of the only “Marxist” 
state in Arabia.
2.  “SOvIE T DILEMMA AT ThE GATE OF TE ARS”:37 BE T WEEN 
INFLuENCE, IMPOSITION AND L ACK OF CONTROL
 “Life is what happens to you while you are busy making other plans.”
(John Lennon, Darling Boy, 1982)
2.1  Moscow’s Role in the Events of 1986: A Comment on Conspiracy 
Theories
After Ismail’s return from Moscow in 1985, conflict was in the air. Brehony refers to 
an unnamed member of the Politbüro claiming to have sought for Soviet support 
in convincing Ali Nasir to give up one of his three posts, but Moscow apparently 
remained inert.38 This at first appears rather surprising, as the disagreement 
between the factions was not only about Ali Nasir’s plentitude of power, but also 
about his relationship with the Eastern Bloc. Nonetheless, Moscow at this point 
did not interfere, at least not openly. After the “1986 crisis,” international media 
had been speculating about possible Soviet interference to replace Ali Nasir 
Mohammed and to “install a less independent mind.”39 But the Kremlin clearly 
had had no interest in replacing Ali Nasir at the time, regardless of Ismail’s return 
and even though Ali Nasir aimed for more independence from Moscow and the 
socialist states. Certainly things were more complex and might be illuminated by 
asking the right questions.
34 | Abschrif t einer IM-Information der HA VII, Abt.1, February 28 1990, in: BStU MfS HA 
VII 7054, 51.
35 | Information Nr. 70/IV Erdölförderung in der VDRJ, MfAA, June 13 1988, in: BStU MfS 
HA II Nr.28714, 267.
36 | Zusammenfassender Bericht über die Dienstreise nach der VDRJ vom 25.2. bis 
11.3.1988, March 18 1988, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 165; Information Nr. 
70/IV Erdölförderung in der VDRJ, MfAA, June 13 1988, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.28714, 267.
37 | Landwehr, Andreas, Suedjemen. Das Sowjetische Dilemma am “Tor der Traenen,” 
Januar 1986, in: BStU MfS HA III Nr.5922, 14.
38 | Brehony, 2013, 133.
39 | Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 1986, in: Katz, 1986, 11.
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First: Was Moscow actively involved in the “1986 crisis” by supporting one of the 
factions?
Ali Nasir had developed the profile of a pragmatist and began to open South 
Yemen up to Western investments and “encouraged Western oil companies” to 
search for oil. Moscow sensed the danger of its ally steering away from Soviet 
influence.40 This coincided with calls for Ismail’s return from exile in Moscow in 
1983, and while Moscow did not actively promote Ismail, the Kremlin hadn’t done 
much to keep him from preparing his return either. In 1985, Ismail presented 
himself in public again and was allowed to meet with high-ranking Arab officials 
during their visits to Moscow.41 The very same year Ismail returned to Aden, 
right on time to chair the preparation committee for the YSP Conference in late 
1985. The “new left,” now strengthened due to Ismail’s return, insisted on again 
intensifying relations with the Eastern Bloc to finally qualify as a “Socialist 
state” and become eligible for more economic and military assistance.
The “new left” around Ismail, however, aimed to return to the former policy of 
“revolution export” to their neighbors and propagated unification of both Yemens 
under socialist terms as soon as possible by overthrowing Saleh’s rule. Ali Nasir, 
on the other hand, was renowned for his friendly relationship with Ali Abdallah 
Saleh and a policy of pragmatic cooperation with Sana’a.42 One may agree with 
Katz that the Kremlin sent “Ismail home to join the Politbüro [as a warning to 
Ali Nasir] that he could be overthrown if he went too far on a path towards the 
West by allowing Western corporations into South Yemen.”43 Thus, it is highly 
unlikely that Moscow had tried to get rid of either of the two figureheads. Rather, 
the Kremlin apparently had aimed to keep both Ismail and Ali Nasir in power and 
to counterbalance the two competing wings of the YSP leadership and follow its 
very own agenda in Aden.
Second: How actively involved did Moscow get after the incident?
Even though the Kremlin was likely not involved beforehand, the escalation in 
the end could not have been a surprise to the Kremlin. In the fall of 1985, Cigar, 
a US Ministry of Defense officer, predicted: “The jockeying for power [between 
Ali Nasir and Ismail] is likely to intensify as the Congress [of the YSP in October] 
approaches.”44 Clearly, Moscow must have been aware of the brewing conflict, 
though hoping that it would not escalate. Thus, the Soviet Union was able to 
40 | Katz, 1986, 9.
41 | Cigar, 1985, 792.
42 | Brehony, 2013, 140ff; Burrowes, 2010, 28.
43 | Katz, 1986, 12.
44 | Cigar, 1985, 790.
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decide quickly on how to react to the “1986 crisis” at the time to suit their best 
interest. Brehony presents the official version of Soviet non-intervention, which 
without doubt has to be amended:45 At the instigation of the Soviets, delegates 
of the opposing Yemeni factions met at the Soviet embassy in Aden as early as 
January 14, though not much was achieved, as the representatives “lacked the 
power to implement a cease-fire.”46
Within two weeks, Moscow had decided with whom to side. Ali Nasir had 
retreated to North Yemen and went to Addis Abeba later on to ask for Mengistu’s 
support. On January 28, the GDR embassy in Addis Abeba reported information 
from the Soviet embassy: “[A]ccording to Soviet assessments immediate danger 
of Ethiopian interference averted for now. Soviet ambassador will have talks with 
Mengistu today.”47 In the end, Ethiopia refrained from intervention – according 
to MfS reports, this was due to Soviet efforts and personal engagement by 
Gorbachev.48 Furthermore, Moscow appears to have appealed to Syria’s Hafez al-
Assad to “change its original position” and support the new government “to assure 
the USSR’s influence and the influence of progressive Arab forces.”49 The Kremlin 
had opted to support the survivors of the coup to stabilize its most important ally 
in the region and “restore the Marxist order”50 as soon as possible.
All in all, uncertainty over Moscow’s part in the power struggle before the 
“1986 crisis,” as well as over the Kremlin’s true intentions, remains. However, 
speculations about Soviet intervention towards the replacement of Ali Nasir are 
nothing more than that. First of all, a violent putsch resulting in a civil war which 
endangered the stability and existence of the USSR’s closest ally in the region 
clearly could not have been in Moscow’s interest. Furthermore, it has to be doubted 
that the Kremlin originally wanted to get rid of Ali Nasir. Reconsidering some 
of the events prior to the coup rather support the argument that the leadership 
personnel did not matter too much for the Kremlin – as long as the vanguard YSP 
stayed in power.
45 | Brehony, for instance, quotes Yemeni sources that the Soviet ambassador himself 
on the 15th of January was instructed to inform Saleh in Sana’a that Moscow would not 
intervene, in: Brehony, 2013, 154. 
46 | Information über die Entwicklung in der VDRJ und internationale Reaktionen, January 
1986, No.29/86, BStU MfS HV A Nr. 40, Part 1 of 2, 343.
47 | Telegramm Jagenow Addis Abeba an Axen, Fischer, Sieber ZK IV, König, January 28 
1986, In: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6725, 8.
48 | Zur Lage in der VDRJ – Stand 27.1.1986 – 22,00 Uhr, January 28 1986, in: BStU MfS 
ZAIG Nr.6744, 56; Abschrif t zur Entwicklung in der VDR Jemen, HA II/14, March 13 1986, 
in: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6725, 84. 
49 | Zur Lage in der VDRJ – Stand vom 29.1.1986, January 30 1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr. 
6744, 60f.
50 | Katz, 1986, 12.
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2.2  Pushing for a Swift Recover y: Moscow holds on to its Failed 
Socialist Showcase
“[N]o matter which pro-Soviet faction defeated the other, the USSR would 
retain its influence in South Yemen.”51
(Contemporary Comment on the January 1986 events by Mark Katz)
At first glace, there was not much to gain anymore in Aden after the Soviet Union’s 
loyal allies were removed from power in one way or the other. The showcase 
example among the closest Soviet allies in the developing world had failed – for 
now.52 However, after several days of uncertainty, Moscow launched a strategy to 
stabilize the new leadership and with it socialism in the country: several years 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow displayed a policy change towards 
the Global South but also the states of the Warsaw Pact. As part of an approximation 
to its Cold War adversary in Washington, the Kremlin under Mikhail Gorbachev 
introduced an empowering policy that aimed to create the impression that Moscow 
was loosening its grip on its dependent allies. And indeed, the Kremlin seemed 
to grant more maneuvering room and aimed at stimulating more internal and 
international self-reliance within the respective regimes. In Aden, this policy 
change could already be felt before the Kremlin reacted to the events of January 
13 1986,53 with the crisis causing a “rollback” of this policy towards more direct 
control over the YSP regime.
In February 1986, the members of the new government prepared to attend the 
Party Congress of the CPSU.54 On month later, the Stasi notes that “the USSR is 
cooperating with the new leadership” and that Moscow intended to send back their 
evacuated personnel to Aden as soon as possible.55 All in all, the USSR continued 
all of its projects of economic and technical assistance rather soon after the crisis.56 
51 | Katz, 1986, 7.
52 | Ibid., 12.
53 | McFaul, 2002, 39.
54 | Vermerk, February 18 1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6744, 85f. 
55 | Soviet military advisors hadn’t been called back to the Soviet Union at all, while some 
reports claim that even the majority of technical experts had remained in the PDRY during 
the crisis. This may be doubted. An East German engineer even reports that on January 20, 
all Soviet colleagues already had been evacuated while he and his delegation were lef t 
behind at the construction site in Little Aden. Abschrif t zur Entwicklung in der VDR Jemen, 
HA II/14, March 13 1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6725, 85; Bericht über die Ereignisse 
auf der Auslandsbaustelle “Bridges Reconstruction in Aden“ im Januar 1986, January 29 
1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6725, 246.
56 | Abschrif t zur Entwicklung in der VDR Jemen, HA II/14, March 13. 1986, in: BStU MfS 
ZAIG Nr.6725, 85.
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This clearly aimed at a renewal of Soviet-Yemeni relations. In February 1987, the 
new leader al-Beidh was invited to Moscow. During the extensive consultations, 
held in the presence of the East German ambassador, al-Beidh repeatedly was 
“assured of comprehensive support for the current political course” and new 
agreements on culture and the cooperation between the foreign ministries of the 
USSR and PDRY were signed.57
As a short-term response to the crisis, the Soviet leadership tried to neutralize 
the opposing factions so that the regime would be able to survive and thus the 
“Marxist” state could re-emerge as a stable ally once more. The long-term response, 
however, has to be considered a reversal of the new empowerment tendencies in 
Soviet foreign policy mentioned above. Moscow obviously intended to uphold 
their “unbreakable friendship” with Aden, while drawing the PDRY closer again 
and intensifying “control over the policies of the junior ally [in the region],”58 a 
status Aden clearly had gained by then. Halliday considers the replacement of 
the Soviet ambassador Vladislav Zhukov, a trained diplomat, by Albert Rachov, 
a party functionary, a telling indicator for this policy change – or rather policy 
rollback – towards the PDRY.59 The replacement of personnel on the ground was 
complemented by more regular visits of party delegations and security advisors. 
Moscow’s efforts to further integrate South Yemen into the Comecon fits into the 
picture. By offering trade advantages for the PDRY,60 Aden on the long run was 
to increase the share of its total trade and economic cooperation with and thus 
dependency on the states of the Eastern Bloc.
Regardless of the swift recovery of relations, official Soviet statements on South Yemen’s 
policies suggest a new mistrust toward the PDRY and a certain dislike of the new 
leadership. This included open critique and the Kremlin’s reluctance to further display 
“expressions of friendship,” such as inviting the leaders of the YSP to speak on the 
occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. But the feelings somewhat 
seemed to be mutual, at least with regard to al-Beidh. Moscow upheld its plan to open 
its institute for training and education of the PDRY’s KfS cadres in October 198761 - 
57 | Telegramm (Blitz) Botschaft Moskau an Sieber, Krolokowski, Winter, Steinhofer, 
Neumann, Betreff: NO-Verwaltung MID zu Besuch Al-Beidh February 9 to 11, February 10 
1987, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.28714, 159f.
58 | Halliday, 1990, 203.
59 | Halliday considers this replacement policy as a repeated phenomenon, as it had 
happened in Afghanistan in 1979 and Ethiopia in 1980, Halliday, 1990, 209.
60 | Stellungnahme zur Vorlage für das Politbüro des ZK der SED. “Entwicklung der 
mehrseitigen Zusammenarbeit der RGW-Länder mit der VDR Jemen,” August 18 1986, In: 
BStU MfS AG BKK Nr.1850 Bd.2, 57.
61 | Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Feststellungen und Gespräche während des 
Aufenthaltes in der VDRJ am 02. und 03.09.1987, Fiedler HV A III, September 14 1987, in: 
BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 von 2, 227-243.
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even though al-Beidh considered the Soviet advisors “supervisors” exerting control. 
According to Salem Saleh Muhammad, al-Beidh simply detested their presence.62
However, the harsher tone was not accompanied by a decline of Soviet engagement. 
Even though Brehony speaks of a “subtle downgrade of relations,”63 in praxis this 
was not the case.64 The Stasi summarizes the Soviet position in March 1986:
“The PDRY will remain a country of strategic importance in the future. To maintain 
[the PDRY”s] socialist orientation is of outmost importance for the distribution 
of power in the region. To counter all attempts by reactionary circles to stray the 
PDRY from its progressive path of development, the prevailing conditions in the 
PDRY have to be obtained and cooperation continued.”65
To save its supposedly “failed experiment,” the USSR had quickly sided with the 
new regime and agreed to support Aden against the ploys of Ali Nasir and his 
adherents to overthrow the new leadership.66 In pursuit of this goal, the Kremlin 
extended its engagement in the field of state security, which was coordinated 
with the MfS of the GDR. In particular, the increase in financial contributions 
demonstrates the Soviet Union’s continued interest and engagement. Moscow 
even sent money for new buildings and restoration in Aden.67 The new Soviet 
agenda in South Yemen had “stabilization” on top of its list due to the “significance 
of the PDRY for the socialist camp.”68
62 | German: Kontrolleure, Salem Saleh Mohammed would urge Soviet and East German 
advisors to be careful and keep a close watch over al-Beidh and his policies and relations to 
the YAR, in: Zusf. der wichtigsten Feststellungen und Gespräche während des Aufenthaltes 
in der VDRJ am 02. und 03.09.1987, Fiedler HV A III, September 14 1987, in: BStU MfS 
Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 von 2, 232
63 | Brehony, 2013, 169.
64 | In 1988, for example, an Agreement on Health Cooperation and a new Protocol on 
Economic Cooperation were signed, in: Yemen news items 1988.
65 | Abschrift zur Entwicklung in der VDR Jemen, HA II/14, March 13 1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG 
Nr.6725, 85.
66 | Geheim. Übersetzung aus dem Russischen. Auskunft über die Reaktion des Ministeriums 
für Staatsicherheit der VDRJ auf die Tätigkeit der Anhänger von A.N. Muhammed [sic!] in den 
sozialistischen Ländern, 1987, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 22860, 151-155.
67 | Brehony, 2013, 166 and 169.
68 | Vorlage zum Stand und zur weiteren Gestaltung der Zusammenarbeit mit dem MfS der 
VDRJ und zu dessen Unterstützung, Januar 25 1988, by Oberst Fiedler, signed by Mielke, 
HV A III, Jemen, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 135.
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3.  ThE CAESuR A OF 1986 AND ITS AF TERMATh: SED STATE 
POLICY OR hONECKER-CENTERED POLICY?
The GDR’s high level of engagement in socialist nation- and state-building 
in South Yemen had survived three more or less violent regime changes since 
Qahtan.69 But the incident of 1986 finally shattered East German belief in the 
South Yemenis, or at least the idea of modelling a revolutionary state on East 
German socialism in Aden. The death and exile of the two most prominent 
figures of the former NLF liberation movement and long-term allies of Moscow 
and East Berlin, Ismail and Ali Nasir, had corrupted relations and thus the GDR’s 
policy beyond repair: The time of the SED regime was up before relations could 
fully recover. As a consequence, the last phase of East German engagement in the 
PDRY became the “Ice Age” of relations between formerly “best friends.”70
3.1  Best Friends do not Part: Honecker keeps Faith with Ali Nasir
Once fighting in Aden had ceased, functionaries of the new PDRY leadership 
approached the remaining diplomatic GDR personnel: “The partners expressed 
their wish for continuity of the bilateral relations – especially with regard to the 
security organs.”71 Statements by East German diplomatic personnel and Stasi 
reports agree that Ali Nasir had been responsible for the assassination of the 
Politbüro members on January 13,72 and thus the survivors of the coup remaining 
in the PDRY were considered the rightful leadership. Meanwhile in East Berlin, 
the MfAA, namely Vice-Minister Winter, supported by the former ambassador 
to the PDRY, Freimut Seidel, had even established a crisis group immediately to 
consult on the events in South Yemen and on future action:
“We concluded that we could not apply the criteria of ‘socialist orientation’ 
or the distinction between progressive/reactionary to these opposing groups 
[in South Yemen]. These simply were power struggles […] and one could not 
support Ali Nasir simply because he symbolized progress.” 73
The crisis group identified the East German engagement as an imposition not 
necessarily fitting to the country and its social realities – regardless of the explicit 
69 | Arabic: Qaḥtān Muḥammad al-Shaˁābī.
70 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
71 | Zur Lage in der VDRJ – Stand 27.1.1986 – 22,00 Uhr, January 28 1986, in: BStU MfS ZAIG 
Nr.6744, 55.
72 | Ibid. Another report refers to an internal report of Syria’s Ba’ath Party which concludes 
that Ali Nasir had organized the liquidation of his opponents himself, in: Zur Lage in der 
VDRJ – Stand vom 30.01.1986, January 31 1986, BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6744, 62f.
73 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
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backs on Ali Nasir and to cooperate with the new regime right away. In addition 
to the MfS and the MfAA, Moscow also advised Honecker to reconnect with 
Aden. These instructions confirm the USSR’s persisting interest in the country 
beyond personal or ideological considerations. Aden clearly remained a vital 
part of Moscow’s political strategy in the region. The more surprising response 
appears the East German reaction: Ignoring internal recommendations, as well as 
South Yemeni and Soviet wishes, Honecker and the SED hesitated to reestablish 
cooperation with Aden after the escalation of 1986.
Over the years, Honecker had developed a personal friendship with both 
the theorist Ismail and the more pragmatic Ali Nasir, as well as several other 
ministers. These friendships had grown in numerous meetings after the 
downfall of Salmin.74 Confronted with Ismail’s exile in 1980, the secretary-
general of the SED had to focus on Ali Nasir and the personal relations between 
the two – more or less – sole rulers in their states of “democratic centralism” had 
even become closer. Demonstrably, Honecker upheld his hopes for Ali Nasir to 
be reestablished as leader of the YSP until 1987. These personal preferences of 
Honecker were the major cause for the “Ice Age” of GDR-PDRY relations which 
then followed: Ignoring Soviet instructions, the majority of experts remained in 
the GDR after their evacuation during the crisis and the new ambassador Freimut 
Seidel did not get permission to travel to Aden until half a year later.75 It took 
more than two years until the GDR sent a new advisor group to Aden,76 the FDJ 
Brigade terminated its activities, and the agreements of 1985 were put on hold. 
Apart from security and military cooperation, East German engagement was 
“frozen” for the time being.77 On top of that, East Berlin expressed its opposition 
to further integration of the PDRY in the Eastern Bloc as frankly as possible 
under Soviet control. Even the Koko expressed only restrained enthusiasm for 
the Kremlin’s plan. Though the GDR “[did] not raise any objections to a mixed 
Comecon Commission – PDRY,” it clearly signaled its preference for “bilateral 
agreements”78 and made clear that “the GDR [would] neither commit to nor 
74 | After Ismail had been exiled, Ali Nasser and Honecker had met on an almost annual 
basis. Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 175; Interview with 
Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
75 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
76 | Telegramm Seidel an Ost-Berlin, February 8 1988, handwritten notes by Seidel in: 
BStU MfS HA VII 7054, 92.
77 | Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Feststellungen und Gespräche während des 
Aufenthaltes in der VDRJ am 02. und 03.09.1987, Fiedler HV A III, September 14 1987, in: 
BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 von 2, 237.
78 | Stellungnahme zur Vorlage für das Politbüro des ZK der SED. “Entwicklung der 
mehrseitigen Zusammenarbeit der RGW-Länder mit der VDR Jemen,” August 12 1986, In: 
A Spectre is Haunting Arabia – How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen
BStU MfS HA XVIII 21008, 57.
343
participate in this Comecon framework.”79 The East German attitude, that is, 
Honecker’s attitude toward the new South Yemeni leadership, was clear.
3.2  Badheeb’s Asylum and Al-Salami’s Amnest y: Honecker’s Loyalt y 
brings forth Strange Blossoms
One of the concrete obstacles on the East German side to a normalization 
of relations between the two states had been the persecutions and extreme 
punishments of Ali Nasir’s followers. For East Germany these crystallized around 
two cases: Badheeb,80 a confidant of Ali Nasir, and al-Salami, the former minister 
of education. Badheeb had visited the GDR on several occasions, such as in May 
1980 when he met with Hermann Axen.81 According to the HV A, Badheeb was 
“second on the list after Ali Nasser [sic!] Mohammed to be prosecuted,” as he 
was considered “one of the major culprits of the bloody events.”82 After the failed 
coup of 1986, Badheeb asked for asylum in the GDR. Backed by the “socialist state 
community,” Badheeb was received as an honored guest “under the condition to 
abstain from any political activities”83 in the GDR. Coming from Damascus, he 
arrived in East Berlin in July 1986.84 The move had been “ordered by Honecker 
and with the objective to prevent the […] forces of Ali Nasser [sic!] Mohammed 
to unitedly change sides to the reactive Arab and imperialist states.”85 Thus, 
Badheeb’s asylum on the one hand appears to have been in the interest of Moscow 
and its allies. Al-Salami’s case, on the other hand, was quite a different matter.
Personal friendships had developed over the years between al-Salami and 
several leaders of the SED, first and foremost Honecker himself and his wife 
Margot.86 Al-Salami, the former minister of education, had also been the long-
79 | Vorlage für das Politbüro des ZK der SED. Betreff: Entwicklung der mehrseitigen 
Zusammenarbeit der RGW-Länder mit der VDR Jemen, August 18 1986, In: BStU MfS HA 
XVIII 21008, 56.
80 | Arabic: ʿAbdallāh al-Razzaq Badhīb.
81 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 168.
82 | Vermerk zur Asylgewährung für […] Badheeb, HV A/III/AG, August 5 1986, in: BStU HA 
II Nr. 27366, 2.
83 | Information zum ehemaligen führenden Funktionär der JSP der VDR Jemen, […] Badheeb, 
January 14 1987 (?), in: BSTU MfS HA II Nr. 28714, 131.
84 | Vermerk zur Asylgewährung für […] Badheeb, HV A/III/AG, August 5 1986, in: BStU HA 
II Nr. 27366, 2-5.
85 | Ibid., 3.
86 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
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time chairman of the East German-Yemeni Society of Friendship.87 After the 
“1986 crisis,” he was arrested as traitor who was considered actively involved 
in the “1986 massacre.”88 With regard to South Yemeni practices, his execution 
seemed to be inevitable. However, East Berlin not only demanded al-Salami’s 
swift release, but also his amnesty. At first, the new Vice-Secretary-General of 
the YSP, Salem Saleh Mohammed, merely guaranteed Al-Salami’s safety on the 
occasion of the CC meeting in early February. Al-Salami himself remained in 
prison, waiting for his trial.89
In September 1986, a Stasi MfS delegation travelled to Aden to prepare al-
Salami‘s safe departure to East-Berlin. At first, the YSP leadership considered the 
GDR’s wish to release al-Salami an “interference in the PDRY’s domestic affairs” 
and that “the PDRY would not accept the GDR attaching Dr. Hassan al-Salami’s 
fate to the cooperation between [the YSP and the SED] and the two countries.”90 
The relevant MfS report does not go into detail about how the delegation finally 
achieved the YSP’s promise to free al-Salami. But during the five weeks of their 
stay, the Stasi had contacted the KfS of the USSR and in the end received full 
support.91 Considering Moscow’s initially hesitant stance in the matter,92 East 
Germany’s success appears rather surprising. It seems as if the delegation was 
authorized to even threaten the termination of relations: “For this decision of the 
[YSP] Politbüro, the PDRY’s interest in the normalization and development of 
relations with the GDR was decisive.”93 The report mentions “hard discussions” 
on the topic of al-Salami and the asylum of Badheeb in the GDR, but assures that
“cooperation remained constructive and never lost its character of friendship 
[…] The method to act on the level of long-term personal relations below the 
official levels [again] proved successful.”94
However, not successful enough at the time. Al-Salami remained imprisoned 
regardless of the promises given and of considerable improvements in the 
87 | Abschrif t zur Entwicklung in der VDR Jemen, HA II/14, March 13 1986, in: BStU MfS 
ZAIG Nr.6725, 83-85.
88 | Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Feststellungen und Gespräche während des 
Aufenthaltes in der VDRJ am 02. und 03.09.1987, Fiedler HV A III, September 14 1987,  in: 
BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 von 2, 238.
89 | Vermerk, February 7 1986, BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.6744, 73.
90 | Bericht über die Dienstreise in die VDRJ vom 1.9. bis 3.10.1986, October 10 1986, in: 
BStU MfS Abt. X Nr.234, Part 1 of 2, 284.
91 | Ibid., 283.
92 | Vermerk Genosse Oberst Fiedler, HV A III, September 5 1986, in: BStU MfS Abt. X 
Nr.234, Part 1 of 2, 281f.
93 | Ibid. 285.
94 | Ibid. 285f.
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relations between the countries.95 The issue remained top priority on East 
Germany’s agenda. Fritz Balke reports of two meetings between Honecker and 
al-Beidh on the occasion of the CPSU Party Congress and the 70th anniversary 
of the Soviet revolution in Moscow that he had witnessed as a translator. 
“Twice, it was tough bargaining.”96 According to Balke, Honecker at the time 
even considered terminating relations altogether. Shortly after the CPSU Party 
Congress, however, al-Salami was released. And while Balke himself did not 
have an explanation for it, the whole process can be reconstructed with the 
files of the MfS. A draft on Mielke’s line of argumentation for a meeting with 
the PDRY’s minister of state security mentions “the unsolved problems in the 
relations between our countries (Sallami] [sic!].”97 Even in February 1989, the 
topic of the “1986 traitors” was still pressing. Due to Honecker’s, wish it was 
East Berlin’s declared goal to achieve an exemption from punishment for al-
Salami, so that he would be able to live in Aden again. The YSP regime kept 
raising their demands to grant this wish,98 but in March 1989 finally gave in. 
Al-Salami was released and allowed to reintegrate into society. Without doubt 
this was the Stasi’s doing on Honecker’s orders: Minister of the Interior Saleh 
Munasser al-Siyeli explicitly added that with freeing al-Salami “he [al-Siyeli] had 
kept his personal promise to Genosse Minister Mielke.”99 In a meeting between 
al-Salami and an MfS delegate to the PDRY, Oberst Winkler, al-Salami assured 
Winkler “that he knew about Honecker’s share in his [amnesty]” and thanked 
him repeatedly for the GDR’s role in his release.
3.3  Before and After Al-Salami’s Release: Was there an “Ice Age” of 
Relations in all fields of Cooperation?
After the “1986 crisis,” the majority of new agreements or the renewal of old ones 
had either been put on hold, or had their provisions pared back. This was even 
the case for military relations. In 1987, the PDRY’s Ministry of Defense had asked 
for the continuation of South Yemeni military training for another 50 officers 
in the GDR.100 And even though this request was granted, no further steps to 
95 | For example an SED delegation attended the YSP Party Congress in 1987 in Aden, 
Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
96 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
97 | Hinweise für das persönliche Gespräch mit dem Minister für Staatssicherheit der VDR 
Jemen, Saeed Saleh Salem 25.5.1988, in: BStU MfS ZAIG Nr.5119, 6.
98 | Abschrif t einer IM-Information der HA VII, Abt.1, February 28 1990, in: BStU MfS HA 
VII 7054, 52.
99 | Vermerk Entlassung von Dr. Hassan as-Sallami, March 6 1989, HV A III, in: BStU MfS 
Abt.X Nr.234 Teil 1 von 2, 53.
100 | Estimated costs for the training: 4 million GDR Marks and about 76,000 VM. MfNV 
(Ministry of National Defence), Minister of Defense Keßler to Honecker, May 18 1987; 
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extend the cooperation were launched. But again this changed in late March 
1989:101 Ambassador Seidel reports in a blitz telegram after a meeting with al-
Dhali: “Pleasant circumstances, after obstacles for [relations] have been overcome, 
steps for revival or continuation [are launched].”102 Relations between Aden and 
East Berlin seemed to be back on track: East Germany finally approved of a new 
agreement on future military training.103
East German non-engagement in the PDRY during this very last phase 
of foreign policy delivers an outstanding example of East Germany’s capacity 
for double standards in international activities concerning foreign policy and 
economic interests. On the one hand, the GDR had held back any further political, 
cultural, or security commitments until al-Salami’s release, while economic and 
security matters were pursued in secrecy nonetheless. The KoKo and IMES, the 
major tools of the GDR’s secret economic policy, were busy doing business with 
Aden. During the “Ice Age” of relations, their delegations regularly travelled to sell 
East German and Soviet arms and weapons. East-Berlin presumed South Yemen 
to dispose of “credit and Valuta from Saudi-Arabia.”104 And Aden  was more than 
willing to spend these assets on East German arms.
After a visit by the BKK working group, Habenicht reports:
“It’s a fact that the North Yemenis dispose of about 600 to 800 T-55 [tanks], 
an unreal huge amount – and the South probably does not stand back. So both 
[sides] have no money, but for arms and ammunition they always have money.” 105
101 | Vermerk über ein Gespräch mit Dr. Hassan as-Sallami [sic!], 1989, in: BStU MfS 
Abt.X Nr.234 Teil 1 von 2, 53.
102 | Blitz Telegramm Seidel an MfAA über eine ausführliches Gespräch mit Ad-dali [sic!], 
March 20 1989, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr.234 Teil 1 von 2, 60.
103 | The two states agreed to extend the time of training to five years and to include 
military doctors as well, in: Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung 
der VDRJ über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern der Streitkräfte der VDRJ in der DDR vom 
1.6.1989, in: BArch, DVW 1/43671, Bl. 171ff.
104 | Bericht über die ADR nach Nord- und Südjemen, Arbeitsgruppe BKK, January 30 
1989, in: BStU MfS BKK Nr.95 Teil 1 von 2, 33.
105 | The actual motivation of the visit was to sell a new caliber gun (5.56 mm) produced in 
the GDR, “System Wieger,” the automatic rifle 940 put together in Wiesa to possibly “establish 
business with third countries,” in: Bericht über die durchgeführte Dienstreise nach Sanaa vom 
9.1.-11.1.1989, in: BStU MfS Ag BKK NR.95 Teil 1 von 2, 80; Telegramm Aden an Schalck-
Golodkowski August 15 1988, in: BStU MfS AG BKK Nr.1661 Bd.2, 125; Erzeugnis 940 – 
Sturmgewehr, August 23 1988, Habenicht, BStU MfS AG BKK Nr.98, 226-229; Telegramm 
Sanaa an Schlack-Golodkowski, January 2 1989, in: BStU MfS AG BKK Nr.174, 106.
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According to Habenicht, South Yemen “aim[ed] to acquire Soviet T-72 [tanks] and 
heavy machine guns from Poland” and that he, Habenicht, had “agreed to provide 
these T-72s, though [the GDR’s interest was] to offer used T-55s.”106 At the time, 
the BKK working group planned to expand the IMES trade in the Middle East 
as “there [was] a lot of money to be made.” Habenicht even asked for supporting 
personnel for the region as he “could not manage the focus areas of West Africa, 
Yemeni peninsula, and India all by himself.”107 Clearly, the BKK and IMES were 
instructed to raise foreign currency in any possible way – even though the trades 
without doubt violated the GDR’s pledge for international peace and their former 
vows of friendship toward Aden, which was entangled in permanent conflict with 
the YAR. Even more surprising, these arms deals simply contradicted the current 
foreign non-policy towards South Yemen. With the IMES trades being the only 
exemption, East Berlin had terminated its engagement in all fields, including the 
military.
The security apparatus was another exemption from the rule. Even before 
al-Salami’s release, relations between the secret services improved significantly. 
Seidel mentions the planned steps by the GDR’s Ministry of the Interior and the 
HV A of February 1988 to send a delegation of the GDR’s security apparatus in 
his telegrams.108 Major Wolf and Oberst Fiedler travelled to Aden.109 In March, 
Seidel “inform[s] […] the PDRY’s Minister of the Interior and Vice-President al-
Siyeli about the principal possibility of assistance.” According to Seidel, al-Siyeli 
considered these decisions a “decisive step to overcome the problems in relations 
after 1986.”110 Shortly thereafter, the PDRY’s KfS and the Stasi again renewed and 
even extended their cooperation.111 The operational group of about ten advisors 
and two translators from the MfS was to remain in Aden,112 whereas another 
group for “operative control” of the MfS, as well as several experts on intelligence, 
surveillance equipment, and vehicles were delegated. Furthermore, the newly 
106 | Bericht über die ADR nach Nord- und Südjemen, Arbeitsgruppe BKK, January 30 
1989, in: BStU MfS BKK Nr.95 Teil 1 von 2, 33.
107 | Ibid. 33.
108 | A series of telegrams that was submitted to the “Party leadership and Minister Dickel 
[of theInterior],” in: Telegramm Seidel an Ost-Berlin, February 8 1988, handwritten notes 
by Seidel in: BStU MfS HA VII 7054, 92.
109 | Zusammenfassender Bericht über die Dienstreise nach der VDRJ vom 25.2. bis 
11.3.1988, March 18 1988, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 163-170.
110 | Telegramm Seidel an Ost-Berlin, March 9 1988, in: BStU MfS HA VII 7054, 93.
111 | Protokoll über die Maßnahmen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Ministerium für 
Staatssicherhit der DDR und dem MfS der VDRJ für die Jahre 1988/1989; Zur Lage des MfS 
der VDR Jemen, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr.234 Teil 1 von 2, 10-16 and 96.
112 | Zu den Beziehungen des MfS der VDRJ mit dem MfS der DDR und mit 
Sicherheitsorganen anderer Länder, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 101.
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signed protocol granted another delivery of new equipment for surveillance worth 
3.5 million East German Marks.113
In May, Vice-Minister of the MfS Schwanitz sent a delegation to inspect the 
condition of the East German telecommunication equipment and new shipments 
were planned for 1994-95.114 In June 1988, the first “delivery of solidarity” since 
1986 arrived in Aden.115 Half a year later, in January 1989, a new protocol between 
the two ministries of the interior amended the agreement of 1980.116 Five new 
experts were promised to be delegated to South Yemen, the head of the delegation 
and one for the “criminal police, (operative) headquarters, supply services and 
surveillance” each. Obviously, the GDR’s double standard not only included the 
economy, but also the cooperation on the field of inner security. The protocols of 
the security and interior ministries, as well as the engagement of the East German 
security apparatus before al-Salami’s release, clearly indicate the GDR’s intention 
to continue its proactive engagement and further guide South Yemen’s socialist 
state- and nation-building.
3.4  A Fiction of Cooperation: Indicators for Future GDR Engagement
Speculations about possible different outcomes in history cannot add to final 
conclusions on the matter. But one may find traces hinting at the possible future 
behavior of an actor had events turned out differently. Thus in the following 
section, some of these traces are meant to offer a tentative glimpse at the possible 
development of relations between German real socialism and Yemeni Marxism 
after their expiration date. What could have been East German intentions with 
regard to the PDRY beyond 1990? An extremely interesting case can be found by 
reviewing the Stasi reports on East German investments in the South Yemeni 
security apparatus.
Regardless of East Germany’s early and intensive engagement in the 
establishment of the PDRY’s security apparatus, the capability and efficiency of 
the PDRY’s KfS did not meet East German expectations. After the “1986 crisis,” 
only about half the cadres of the KfS remained.117 Without clear responsibilities 
113 | Protokoll über die Maßnahmen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem MfS der DDR und 
dem MfS der VDRJ für die Jahre 1988/1989, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr.234 Teil 1 von 2, 12ff.
114 | Maßnahmen zur solidarischen Unterstützung der Sicherheitsorgane der VDR Jemen, 
May 2 1988, in: BStU Sekretariat Schwanitz 24, 5.
115 | Telegramm Seidel an Ost-Berlin, June 20 1988, in: BStU MfS HA VII 7054, 90.
116 | Protokoll zur Vereinbarung über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Ministerium des 
Innern der DDR und dem MdI der VDRJ für den Zeitraum 1989 bis 1991, January 1989, in: 
BStU MfS HA VII Nr.1094, 12-16.
117 | Zur Lage des MfS der VDR Jemen; Kadersituation des MfS der VDRJ in: BStU MfS Abt. 
X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 99.
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and the ever-present danger of “deconspiration,” that is discovery of clandestine 
activies, the cooperation between Sections and Units was considered insufficient. 
Cadres appeared to be underqualified, including the new minister of state 
security himself,118 and the PDRY’s KfS could not rely on an extensive net of 
IMs. As a consequence,
“[t]he operative information and materials […] handed over by the Yemeni 
partners were almost non-utilizable (not sophisticated, lack of preconditions to 
fur ther analyze the material, low level of the Yemeni partners).”119
To improve the situation, the MfS emphasized the need to extend the “authority 
of the MfS as an instrument of the Party to secure and strengthen the Party’s 
leadership role.”120 Both the GDR’s MfS and the Soviet KfS significantly extended 
their material and cadre support after 1986.121 The East German MfS concluded: 
“Without the technical and cadre support by the [USSR”s] KfS and the MfS of the 
GDR [the PDRY’s KfS] is not functional.”122 However, the East German security 
service upheld its goal “to establish a cadre base of the GDR’s MfS in the PDRY”123 
to facilitate operative cooperation under all circumstances.
Similar observations and decisions were made with regard to East Germany’s 
long-term surveillance project. Regardless of the “Ice Age” of bilateral relations, 
“Network 3”124 had been continued, though not expanded. This was remedied 
right after al-Salami’s release. In February 1989, Oberst Fischer, deputy 
head of HA III and Oberstleutnant Tronicke, head of Subsection 9 of HA III, 
travelled to Aden to assess the condition of the radio station and to hand over 
118 | Ibid., 96ff.
119 | Zu den Beziehungen des MfS der VDRJ mit dem MfS der DDR und mit 
Sicherheitsorganen anderer Länder, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 103.
120 | Zur Lage des MfS der VDR Jemen; Kadersituation des MfS der VDRJ, in: BStU MfS 
Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 97.
121 | Zu den Beziehungen des MfS der VDRJ mit dem MfS der DDR und mit 
Sicherheitsorganen anderer Länder, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 105.
122 | Zur Lage des MfS der VDR Jemen; Kadersituation des MfS der VDRJ, in: BStU MfS 
Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 98.
123 | Vorlage zum Stand und zur weiteren Gestaltung der Zusammenarbeit mit dem MfS 
der VDRJ und zu dessen Unterstützung, Januar 25 1988, by Oberst Fiedler, signed by 
Mielke, HV A III, Jemen, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 134f.
124 | German: Aktion Netzwerk 3. In the early 1980s, the MfS had signaled its interest in 
the PDRY’s radio surveillance and established a military radio station in 1984, Also See: 
Ch 13.  Phase III: The Phase of Continuity and Consolidation, The GDR in Yemen from 1978 
to 1986: German Guidance and Yemeni Emancipation.
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new equipment.125 As opposed to the radio surveillance of the South Yemeni’s 
Defense Forces, the MfS radio station was well-equipped with personnel and 
material. 
“The material-technical equipment of the radio surveillance station, financed 
almost exclusively by East German solidarity allowances, is fully operational 
and functioning.”126
But Fischer and Tronicke clearly were not satisfied with the condition of the 
radio surveillance in Aden after “eight years of continuous advice by the [HA 
III]:”127 the radio station so far had had “no immediate value for the MfS of the 
GDR.”128 The two delegates insisted that this had to change over the period of 
the next “4 to 5 [sic!] years.”129 Despite the inefficiency of the station, this decision 
suggests that the GDR’s project was to be continued, just like the MfS’ overall 
engagement in the PDRY and in doing so, to even go beyond the assistance of 
the 1970s and early 1980s.
Furthermore, one can find other indicators for the East German intention 
to fully rebuild relations: On the occasion of the inauguration of the new 
ambassador in March 1989, Honecker promised that the FDJ Brigade, evacuated 
in 1986, would return to the PDRY.130 Balke reports about the renewal of the party 
agreement in June 1989 when he travelled with the high-ranking delegation 
leader, Head of the CC International Relations Section Günter Sieber. Then 
Balke remembers al-Beidh as the “last foreign guest received by Honecker” in 
Berlin on the occasion of the GDR’s 40th anniversary.131 Nonetheless, time was 
running out for both the PDRY and the SED regime. The process of Yemeni 
unification gained speed, while in East Berlin foreign policy issues beyond the 
German question clearly were pushed from the GDR’s agenda of survival. Any 
other conclusion on East Germany’s foreign policy plans for the PDRY thus 
remains speculation.
125 | Reisebericht über eine Dienstreise im Rahmen der Maßnahme “Netzwerk III,” in: 
BStU MfS Abt.X Nr.234 Teil 1 von 2, 26-32.
126 | Ibid., 26.
127 | Ibid., 29.
128 | Ibid., 32.
129 | Ibid., 29.
130 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012
131 | Interview with Fritz Balke May 23 2011.
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4.  CONCLuSION: BEL ATED AND uNFORTuNATE SELF-CONFIDENCE: 
E AST-BERLIN WANDERS OFF ThE SOvIE T COuRSE
As a consequence of the “1986 crisis,” Moscow’s and East Berlin’s closest allies 
within the Aden regime had been forced out of power. The events of 1986 are 
an indicator that neither Moscow nor its East German henchman were able to 
fully control their supposedly homunculus regimes in the Global South. One 
might reason, though, that these two states drew quite different conclusions. 
During this last phase of East Germany’s engagement in Aden, the GDR moved 
away from ideologically inspired nation- and state-building to focus on more 
commensurable benefits, opting for a significant shift in the fields of engagement: 
The comprehensive state-building approach before had somewhat balanced civil 
and security measures. Now civil engagement was simply terminated. Over 
the following years it regenerated at a slow pace, while support for the security 
apparatus was picked up with considerable speed after 1987.
Moscow on the other hand upheld its high level of engagement in the country 
to remain the most important partner of South Yemen, with or without Ali 
Nasir. Though the Marxist experiment “PDRY” appeared to have turned from an 
“ideological victory”132 for the USSR to an “ideological Waterloo,” the Soviet Union 
did not end its engagement, but rather changed its policy to a more comprehensive 
approach: Economic aid and assistance became new fields of engagement in an 
attempt to stabilize the regime and thus the state. This policy change towards 
Aden has to be considered part of Moscow’s wider regional strategy and the high 
level of engagement did not wane before the Soviet Union itself began to fall apart.
The GDR and the Kremlin: New Self-Esteem?
The GDR clearly aimed to decrease its political dependence from Moscow and to 
prove this not only within the Eastern Bloc, but also on the international stage. 
Even though the GDR was not able to move beyond the room for action granted by 
the Soviet Union, it clearly did not fully act in the USSR’s best interest anymore by 
refusing to reconnect with the old ally South Yemen and their new regime after 
the “1986 crisis.” While the Kremlin had sided quickly with the new regime in 
Aden, Honecker had decided otherwise for the GDR. East German engagement 
with South Yemen was kept at a political minimum to avoid terminating relations 
with Aden and thus aggrieving Moscow. Furthermore, Honecker’s behavior of 
individual-centered foreign policy in the “al-Salami issue” clearly brings to mind 
the bigger picture of his final years as leader of the SED state, when he openly 
opposed the new course of the Soviet Union and propagated a “Socialism in the 
colors of the GDR.”133 Moscow had demanded the GDR reengage in the PDRY and 
132 | Cigar, 1985, 782.
133 | Honecker, Erich, Report of the Politbüro to the VII. Conference of the Central 
Committee, in: Neues Deutschland December 2 1988.
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even the MfAA’s findings were pointing in this direction. But Honecker clung to 
the guidelines of socialist foreign policy and his personal preferences, supporting 
the former revolutionary Ali Nasir. Clearly, this did not improve al-Beidh’s weak 
political standing among the new YSP leadership either.
Socialist Foreign Policy: Doomed to “Walk the Talk”
According to Winter, the “Ice Age” of relations had not thawed before a discussion 
between himself and the PDRY’s Foreign Minister al-Dhali in December 1989.134 
But as the MfS documents show, the thaw had been underway half a year earlier. 
Significant investments had been made by the MfS to obtain the release of al-
Salami in March 1989. Thus, it had been the relations between the two security 
apparatuses and the active engagement of the MfS that were able to clear the air 
in the end. This turned out to be one of the few channels of communication that 
were upheld throughout this “Ice Age” between East Germany and South Yemen. 
It was also the foundation upon which relations were rebuilt.
After the “al-Salami issue” was settled, East Germany’s policy in the end 
somewhat returned to the inflexible tracks of Socialist state- and nation-building, 
though with significantly less intensity. East German engagement appears to have 
taken quite a pragmatic turn after the tentative regeneration of relations between 
Aden and East Berlin. While East-Berlin refused to reactivate its former high level 
of engagement in various fields, it rather focused on topics more of interest to 
the GDR itself. For example, the station “Netzwerk 3” at first had been part of the 
Soviet strategy in the region, but turned out to be inefficient. Nonetheless, East 
Germany upheld investments in the station, despite Moscow’s retreat from the 
engagement. Beyond Soviet interest, rumors of huge oil reserves might have kept 
the GDR on board,135 while East Berlin sensed lucrative opportunities for arms 
deals136 and seemed to hope for its very own MfS base in the Middle East. 
During the short period after al-Salami’s release and before the GDR and the 
PDRY disappeared from the map, relations seemed to be on their way of recovery. 
Taking into consideration the high number of renewed agreements and mutual 
visits of the two states, one may even speculate about further intensification of East 
German engagement, if German reunification had not got in the way. On the one 
hand, the last four years of East German-South Yemeni relations after the “1986 
crisis” ended the history of cooperation between the two states. However, it has to 
be regarded a path-dependent outcome of the GDR’s foreign policy on the other. 
134 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
135 | Despite other agreements, such as with France, the USSR signed the first agreement 
on oil exploitation in June 1988. In 1990, the Kremlin continued its planned extension of oil 
production, in: Abschrif t einer IM-Information der HA VII, Abt.1, February 28 1990, in: BStU 
MfS HA VII 7054, 51; Yemen news items 1987.
136 | Bericht über die ADR nach Nord- und Südjemen, Arbeitsgruppe BKK, January 30 
1989, in: BStU MfS BKK Nr.95 Teil 1 von 2, 30-36.
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Honecker’s extreme reaction contradicted any sensible foreign policy cooperation. 
Even though he would evoke ideological arguments, such as “solidarity for the 
revolutionaries,” in reality it was his personal preferences that determined his 
behavior.137 To accommodate Honecker’s single-handed style of leadership working 
even against his foreign policy apparatus, a centralized political system like the 
GDR’s was a conditio sine qua non.
All in all, the PDRY too was running out of breath in the end. The decline of Soviet 
and East German support was a decisive blow for the unstable and insolvent PDRY. 
However, this withdrawal of the Eastern Bloc was not due to a lack of interest, but 
rather to a lack of ability to uphold cooperation on this intense level. Moscow’s priority 
was to keep its foothold in Aden – the actual circumstances were merely secondary. 
Both major YSP leading figures had disappeared from the scene in January 1986 and 
the few competent cadres remaining were not able to heal South Yemen’s political and 
actual wounds to hold the country together. Just like East Germany, South Yemen 
was not able to adapt to the changing framework in international relations and drifted 
into unification as the considerably weaker “half” of Yemen: In newly unified Yemen, 
the few remnants of the former south bit by bit disappeared under the pressure of the 
politically and socially dominant north. The experiment of the only Marxist state in 
Arabia had failed and with it the GDR’s “policy of state- and nation-building.”
137 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23rd, 2011.
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Section c. FinDinGS
The concluding section approaches the central problem of this study on the 
“limits of foreign policy” in three chapters and revisits the major hypotheses of 
the analysis. The first concluding chapter summarizes the empirical, concrete 
limits, both internal and external, of East German foreign policy in general to 
clarify in what ways the GDR had been subject to internal and external limitations 
in International Relations in general. The second chapter is occupied with the 
empirical, that is, the concrete limits of East German foreign policy resources and 
abilities in the particular case of South Yemen. These two concluding chapters 
serve as the framework to answer whether the major hypothesis of the study can 
be upheld: Can the case of South Yemen be considered as both an exceptional case 
and a model suggesting a Weberian ideal-type of East German foreign policy? 
Finally, the last “Findings” chapter reconsiders the normative limits of East 
German foreign policy with regard to the autonomy of the host country South 
Yemen, while reflecting on the ability of societies to change based on the “degree 
of responsiveness” of collective identities.
CHAPTER 15. On the External and Internal 
Empirical “Limits” of East German Foreign 
Policy
1.  E X TERNAL DE TERMINANTS OF E AST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The GDR’s existence can be considered a by-product of the Cold War. Naturally, 
the continuation of its existence highly depended on the changes in conflicts, 
alliances, and dependencies, that is, the changes throughout the period of the 
Cold War. First of all, this meant a significant impact of the relationship between 
the USSR and the USA on any party involved in the conflict, especially in places 
home to competing systems, such as divided Germany. As a consequence, the 
GDR was highly susceptible to the policies and actions of the Soviet Union 
and Western Germany, the two major determinants of its international scope 
of action. It was the bilateral relations to these two actors that determined the 
GDR’s relations to all other state actors and alliances. And while Moscow exerted 
an active role and has thus to be considered a directive determinant, Bonn, on the 
other hand, remained without direct diplomatic contacts to East Berlin: West 
Germany, though highly influential on the SED’s foreign policy decision-making, 
upheld its of passive character as a reactive determinant. Due to the limiting nature 
of these two determinants, the GDR regularly has been denied the quality of an 
autonomous actor in the international realm and thus a self-directed foreign policy 
by contemporaries and academia alike – especially when consulting sources from 
the Western hemisphere. This study now claims that East Berlin was able to find 
alternative ways within this narrow scope of action to promote its interests, which 
is the major precondition for the emergence of a state’s foreign policy.1 Just like 
Bonn, East Berlin did not merely move within but actively worked with the “limits 
of its foreign policy.”
1 | E.g. during the first phase of the CSCE Process in Geneva and Helsinki in the early 
1970s, in: Müller, in: DA 4/2010, 610.
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Throughout the GDR’s history, any other policy goal was subordinated to the 
overarching interest of securing its existence as a state while upholding the SED’s 
political autocracy. The SED’s strategy to achieve this goal was to create a positive 
image of the anti-imperialist and “democratic” peace-state of the GDR, as opposed 
to the imperialist West Germany within the Cold War rivalry. This context 
threatened the existence of the GDR, the necessity of an “alternative Germany” 
in the sense of the “discourses of danger.” As the SED successfully tied the GDR’s 
state survival to its reign, opposition to the SED was equated to opposition to the 
GDR and treason. Thus, the East German foreign policy actors had internalized 
loyalty to the regime itself, as a conditio sine qua non for the state’s survival and 
thus their own.
1.1  E xternal Limits I: On the Kremlin’s “Short Leash”2
Apart from defining East Berlin’s boundaries of foreign policy maneuvering room 
– the concreate “limits of foreign policy” – Moscow also provided the GDR with a 
promise: To guarantee its existence as a state coupled with the survival of the SED 
and the continuation of its leadership.
Phase I of East German Foreign Policy: Benefits for East Berlin 
Despite Full Soviet Control 
During Phase I of the GDR’s foreign policy, Moscow laid bare that it would not shy 
away from direct military control to uphold the SED regime with force – directly 
when it ended the “June Uprising” in 1953 in the GDR, and indirectly when the 
SED supported Moscow’s intervention in the ČSSR to stifle the reform movement 
of the “Prague Spring” in 1968. This “guarantee of existence” was combined with 
an extremely high level of economic and political assistance to uphold a persistent 
level of control over this new “Socialist Germany.” Nonetheless, this control 
changed over time in intensity and form, from high-intensity direct control to 
low-intensity indirect control. Also, until its international recognition in the early 
1970s, the GDR needed the Soviet Union’s active support as a foreign policy proxy 
for the GDR, as the East German state, not yet internationally recognized, was not 
able to act for itself.3
While East Berlin’s foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s mostly “copied” 
Soviet foreign policy,4 the GDR began to advance as an “active junior partner”5 of 
the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. In the developing world, the GDR navigated 
time and space within the Soviet foreign policy framework, but without doubt 
pursued a policy quite different from Moscow: Moscow neither had the interest 
2 | Malycha/Winters, 2009, 184.
3 | Judt, 2008, 501.
4 | Möller, 2004, 330f.
5 | Wentker, 2007, 537.
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nor the capacity to engage with the same intensity everywhere within its own 
sphere of influence. East Berlin first reacted with a “Fill-in Policy” where the Soviet 
Union neglected certain policy fields or even states and secondly with a “Policy 
of Enhancement” where it was initiated or tolerated by Moscow. One concrete 
example for the latter is East Germany’s engagement during the Ethiopian-Somali 
conflict in 1977, when East Berlin acted on behalf of the Soviet Union to support 
Addis Abeba. Furthermore, the GDR’s engagement in the PDRY as a whole may 
be grouped under this kind of policy.
Phase II of East German Foreign Policy: From Satellite to  
Junior Partner?
The state’s survival was always the top priority of the GDR’s foreign policy. Thus, 
it remained a means to an end for internal and external consolidation while 
increasing East Germany’s international prestige and influence. Despite the de 
facto recognition by West Germany and the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with a majority of influential states in the early 1970s, the GDR’s existence still 
fully depended on the goodwill of Moscow. As a consequence, the SED aimed 
to emerge as an indispensable ally and maybe even partner for Moscow. In the 
words of Egon Bahr: “Being just a satellite probably isn’t the most pleasurable 
condition.”6 With the “Prague Spring,” the GDR finally was able to prove its loyalty 
and began to establish itself as Moscow’s “junior partner.”7 Also, within less than 
two decades, the GDR had been able to ascend as the second industrial power after 
Moscow, and developed a new self-confidence.8
“For sure, in the end [usually] we gave in. Nonetheless one has to say Honecker 
pushed through the interest of the GDR as early as 1974/75 – even against 
interventions by Moscow […]. Sometimes we did not inform Moscow at all – or at 
least only in rather general terms. Several times [the Soviets] complained. […]. 
Sometimes we merely informed them after it was done.”9
In the mid-1970s the mechanisms of consultations between the SED and CPSU 
had achieved a sufficient level of routine. After Moscow had replaced its former 
champion Ulbricht with the more loyal Honecker, the Kremlin appeared to have 
settled for observation of the GDR’s activities and considerate “advice” if necessary 
rather than active intervention. This attitude however, should not be mistaken 
for Soviet weakness. Rather, it was in the Kremlin’s best interest to “steer” East 
Germany with the least effort possible.
6 | Interview with Egon Bahr February 3 2009, in: Müller, 2009.
7 | Gasteyger, 1976, 38.
8 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 23.
9 | Seidel, 1999, 1.
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New Ways in the Global South End with the International “Wind of 
Change”10
While the GDR’s narrow scope of action within the framework of the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy did not expand considerably, East Berlin’s willingness and ability to 
become active within this framework increased significantly after the mid-1960s. 
Over time, a congruency of interests of Soviet and East German foreign policy, 
especially in the Global South, had emerged. Thus, given limits might not have 
appeared as restrictive for East-Berlin:
“[Our position] corresponded [with the Kremlin’s] in most situations like 
developmental policies. Not due to the feeling we had to defer Moscow, but due 
to an identical ideological perspective on the ‘Third World’ as ‘anti-imperialist’ 
allies.”11
Also, the clear “limits of foreign policy” had a rather beneficial side effect for East 
Berlin: Their inclusion as an important factor of Soviet foreign and security policy 
offered East Berlin other options to expand its international position.12 With the 
blessing of the Soviet Union,13 the GDR became considerably active in certain states 
in the Global South and within the framework of international organizations and 
conferences, such as the sub-organizations of the United Nations Organization or 
the CSCE Process, by acting as the “honest broker.”
Moscow’s comparably modest reaction to the reformist movement in Poland in 
1980 signaled the rise of a new international climate. And even though the GDR 
kept strictly in line with all questions of Soviet security and armament policies 
during the 1980s, the inflexible regime in East-Berlin was not able to follow the 
political changes taking place in the Soviet Union at high speed. Instead, the SED 
leadership obstinately held on to the ideological truths of Marxism-Leninism and 
the Cold War. The expansion and increased flexibility of East Germany’s “limits of 
foreign policy” staked out by Moscow overexerted not only its foreign policy in the 
end, but also its sclerotic state and regime.
1.2  E xternal Limits II: Competition is Good for Business or how Bonn 
justified the E xistence of a “Socialist Germany”
Apart from its dependency on Moscow’s goodwill, East Germany grew into 
the role of West Germany’s immediate competitor: For political and economic 
success, international reputation, and especially the German population’s support. 
However, West Germany’s economic head start, in combination with better 
10 | The Scorpions, Album “Crazy World,” Lyrics “Wind of Change” in English and Russian.
11 | Winter Heinz-Dieter, in: DDR-Außenpolitik aus heutiger Sicht, 1994.
12 | Muth, 2001, 24.
13 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 35.
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conditions for reparation payments14 and a more flexible economic system, made 
certain that the venture to beat the competitor through economic success would 
fail. In addition to that, Bonn hoped to position West Germany as the “shop window 
of the West”15 to draw the GDR’s population, especially the young and qualified, 
across the border and in doing so, destabilize the GDR’s political system. After 
the national uprising on the June 17 1953, the success of this “Magnet-Theory”16 
became more and more a harsh reality for the SED regime. Ulbricht tried to react 
with his theory of a uniquely socialist way of economic development. The GDR was 
supposed to follow a supposedly more social, humane and, in the long run, more 
economically successful path of development. But Ulbricht‘s famous formula to 
“outdistance [the FRG] without catching up”17 of 1958 never became reality.18 The 
West’s economic growth and liberties coincided with mounting pressure on the 
political opposition and the urge of the disaffected in the GDR to leave.
However, direct competition did not end with direct comparison of the two 
systems. While the GDR at first aimed for a unified Socialist Germany, Bonn 
considered itself the only legitimate German government, offering citizenship to 
all Germans, East and West. With this, Bonn denied East Berlin the recognition 
as an equal member of the international community of states. As a consequence, 
it had been the SED’s foremost interest to achieve the international recognition of 
their state to at least internationally legitimize their claim to power. Accordingly, 
this was the major goal of the GDR’s foreign policy endeavors until the early 1970s. 
In the international sphere, Bonn’s claim to exclusive representation was translated 
into the so-called “Hallstein Doctrine” of 1955: Bonn threatened to cut diplomatic 
ties with any state which established relations of this kind with the GDR. For more 
than 15 years, the “Doctrine” barred regular diplomacy for the GDR.
Establishing Itself as a State in Its Own Right
Even though East Berlin did not have anything at its disposal that could compete 
with Bonn’s financial, economic, or technical resources, the GDR nonetheless 
was able to emerge as a rising industrial nation in the mid-1960s. Especially in 
the fields of consulting for the governments of the “partner countries,” education, 
and vocational training, East Germany was able to offer support on a considerably 
high level. Furthermore, East Berlin successfully marketed their own educational 
system and created an image of “East German culture.”19 As a consequence, the 
14 | Wehler, 2008, 467.
15 | German: Schaufenster des Westens, in: Haftendorn, 2001, 50 and Alisch, in: 
Timmermann (ed.), 2012, 249.
16 | German: Magnettheorie, West German interpretation in: Abelshauser, 2005, 402; 
Scholtyseck, 2003, 13; East German interpretation in: Stöver, 2007, 311.
17 | “überholen ohne [sie] einzuholen,” in: Schroeder, 2006, 95. 
18 | The est. productivity before 1961 was about half of the FRG’s, Scholtyseck, 2003, 23.
19 | Das Gupta, in: Wengst/Wentker, 2008, 119.
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GDR was ready and able to emerge as a “normal” international player after the “wave 
of recognition.” Thus on the first glace the de facto recognition by Bonn finally had 
freed the way for East German foreign policy. But recognition also brought new 
challenges with it. The second phase of the GDR’s foreign policy was predominantly 
characterized by East Berlin’s permanent effort to balance its “rapprochement” to 
Bonn while keeping the necessary distance from “imperialist Germany”20 so that 
the GDR’s existence as the “better Germany” could still be justified.
Changing Relations, Changing Challenges
Apart from its “de facto recognition” by Bonn, the most important outcome of 
the “Grundlagenvertrag” for East Berlin had been the installation of the “direct 
line”21 between the two Germanys. Until then, any contact between them had been 
mediated by Moscow and “in accordance with [the Kremlin’s own] interests.”22 
From then on, the GDR at least tried to realize its own policy without the Soviet’s 
permission for every move. Economic relations with the West in general and the 
FRG in particular steadily intensified: Between 1970 and 1975, foreign trade with 
the “capitalist states” doubled and the “West Mark” advanced as the second if not 
the most important currency.23 Not surprisingly, this special treatment of East 
Germany significantly affected relations with Moscow and the Eastern Bloc. 
In this early days of political exchange between the two Germanys, the GDR’s 
dilemma had become obvious: At first international détente, and thus Moscow, 
had demanded rapprochement with the unloved sibling state; later on it was the 
SED’s economic need that demanded it. Regardless, any relaxation of relations 
between the blocs, and thus between the GDR and FRG, somewhat questioned the 
GDR’s justification for its existence.
State without People?
“What kind of state is this which has a territory, people living in it, which has 
borders but not a state population of its own? “24
(Siegfried Bock, former chief-diplomat of the GDR)
When it had become clear that the GDR wouldn’t be able to realize its goal of a 
unified socialist Germany, East Berlin changed its approach to the German nation 
and began to propagate the “socialist nation” of the GDR. Two important parts of 
this policy of “establishment of two German nations” were the abolishment of 
the “unified German citizenship“ advocated by Bonn and the recognition of GDR 
20 | Scholtyseck, 2003, 33.
21 | Wentker, 2007, 371ff and 413ff.
22 | Bahr, in: Die zweite gesamtdeutsche Demokratie, 2001, 192.
23 | Haftendorn, 2001, 162.
24 | Interview with Siegfried Bock Sep 18 2008, in: Müller, 2010.
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citizenship. But citizenship was not the only nor the most acute issue questioning 
facing the GDR’s national sovereignty: To finally claim full sovereignty over its 
territory, East Germany needed to include West Berlin, the West German enclave 
surrounded by the German Democratic Republic. Securing its existence and 
liberty on the outside, that is, external sovereignty, remained the major priorities 
of the GDR’s foreign policy. The de facto recognition by the Federal Republic of 
Germany did not do much to change this: The GDR never had been able to fully 
acquire all three fundamental prerequisites of a sovereign state introduced by 
Jellinek.25
Even though the SED had erected and secured an undisputable Staatsmacht, its 
Staatsvolk remained undefined as GDR citizenship was contested by Bonn and 
its Staatsgebiet appeared to be fragmented with the island of West Berlin in the 
middle. Thus, while the SED regime was able to establish and uphold state power, 
it constantly was being questioned – by the government in Bonn, but also by 
dissidents and opposition from within the GDR. Even though disagreement on 
power distribution exists in any state of the world, the SED considered it necessary 
to eliminate any dissident voices and install one of the most intensive systems of 
state control in Western history over its citizens. One may interpret this policy as 
the attempt to compensate for the imperfection of the other two characteristics of 
Jellinek’s definition of the state: A state’s territory and a state’s people.
2.  INTERNAL LIMITS OF FOREIGN POLICY: BE T WEEN ECONOMIC 
E XhAuSTION, “DOuBLE STANDARDS” AND POLITICAL FRICTION
Compared to Western democracies, the internal structures of the GDR did not 
only form a very different background for foreign policy activities, but also played 
quite a different role for foreign policy generation itself.
2.1  Economic E xhaustion beyond Mar xist-Leninist Principles: The 
“Double Standard” of East German Foreign Policy
“Considering its limited resources, the GDR had to distribute its support for the 
developing countries very wisely.”26
(Hans Bauer, MfS resident in Aden in the early 1980s)
Economic welfare in the GDR rather was a secondary foreign policy goal rather 
than a foreign policy priority: Both the internal economy and foreign trade were 
policy fields subordinate to the major goal of the SED’s internal and external 
25 | The three prerequisites are territory, power, and citizens, in: Jellinek, 1900, 393 and 426.
26 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.
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policies: Securing the state’s existence and thus the SED’s survival. The 1970s 
had witnessed an economic but illusory boom and major mistakes in economic 
policies produced an economic crisis in the early 1980s.27   Without doubt, the 
economic bottlenecks had a significant impact on East Germany’s foreign policy, 
especially in the “developing countries.” First, aid and technical assistance from 
the GDR turned out to be less and less reliable due to supply shortages and a simple 
lack of money. Thus, East Berlin oftentimes was not able to keep its foreign policy 
promises and technical projects in particular suffered from parts shortages in the 
GDR.28 As a result, East Germany was not able to compete with other economic 
actors regardless of its political standing and prestige.
Second, economic need led to the open dismissal of ideological ideals. The need 
for foreign currency and oil became highly pressing during the 1980s and created 
a detectable “double standard” in East German international behavior. While the 
GDR’s foreign policy officially was based on ideological principles, pragmatic 
reasoning regularly overruled Marxist-Leninist ideals if it was considered 
beneficial for the GDR: The SED opted for “Realpolitik” whenever it was deemed 
suitable. The KoKo and its dummy companies acquired the foreign currency 
desperately needed to keep the GDR and its economy afloat and alive. One of the 
most striking examples of this “double standard” was the arms trade with both 
sides of the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s. According to East German Vice-Minister 
of Foreign Policy, Heinz-Dieter Winter:
“[The arms deliveries to Iraq and Iran] fully contradicted our neutrality and our 
advocacy for the termination of the war. Nonetheless, I was informed that these 
deliveries existed.”29
But as opposed to other contemporary commentators’ versions of  events, this was 
not a singular case. A similar decision was made with regard to the two Yemens 
in the late 1980s, as was shown in the respective analytical chapter. Furthermore, 
the “peace state” GDR delivered arms and weapons to terrorist groups like the 
“Abu-Nidal Group”, well aware of who they sold their products to.30 This “double 
standard” was an inherent part of East German foreign policy. Economic need 
dictated foreign policy action to secure the SED’s survival as the leading vanguard 
of a one-party system. This undeniably demystifies the prevailing notions of East 
Germany as an advocator for the “small nations,” a “peace state,” its solidarity with 
the oppressed, and thus its foreign policy strategy of the “honest broker.”
27 | Schroeder, 1999, 199.
28 | See e.g.: Scharfenberg, 2012, 45; Interview with Wolfgang Bator May 27 2011.
29 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012; On the GDR’s arms deals with Iraq and 
Iran also see: Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), 1994, 191ff.
30 | Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), 1994, 206f.
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In the end, and mostly due to economic reasons, the SED regime had to open 
the GDR to the world – and with it, to ideas of social alternatives and hopes for 
political change. To assure the survival of an SED-led GDR, the party reacted 
with increased internal control to curb oppositional forces. Whether the SED 
leadership had been informed of the looming danger by the MfS but did not 
have the time to act,31 or in reality did not believe in the “inherent dynamics” 
of the CSCE process32 and “rapprochement” with West Germany is of not 
much importance here. The crucial point is that the SED regime was neither 
able to shield its society from these influences, nor to react in a flexible way by 
integrating them. The regime was not able to adjust to political change, not even 
to prevent its own downfall.
2.2  Assessment of Friction Losses between Foreign Policy, Ideolog y, 
and the Political System
To be able to reach a final conclusion with regard to East German foreign policy 
making, the actors of the field have to be taken into consideration. The division 
of competencies in the field of foreign policy between party and state, and also 
between political reality and the foreign policy ideals of Marxism-Leninism, 
caused considerable friction. Muth locates the process of the establishment and 
consolidation of the GDR’s foreign policy apparatus, the evolution and settling 
down of the system, as well as the recruitment and education strategy for its 
personnel, in the period from 1949 to about 197233 - a time period that coincides 
with the two phases of foreign policy of the GDR due to the internal and external 
consolidation of the GDR. The division of responsibilities in the field of foreign 
policy changed considerably over time due to two factors: First, the development 
of the efficiency of the complex relation between party and state and second, the 
personality and power network of foreign policy functionaries. Based on these 
two factors, three phases of responsibilities in foreign policy making can be 
identified: The first “Phase of Collective Improvisation,” from the founding of 
the GDR to 1961, the second “Phase of Consolidation and Professionalization,” 
until international recognition in 1971-72, and the third and last “Phase of 
Establishment Administration,” until 1989, when the state, its political system, 
and the ruling elite were able to act from an established position.
31 | Hanisch, 2012, 20.
32 | Müller, 2010, 612.
33 | Muth, 2001, 11.
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From State to Part y, from Bottom to Top: Centralization of 
Responsibilities and the “Second Version” of Foreign Policy
Over time, and just as in other fields, responsibilities in the field of foreign policy were 
either withdrawn from constitutional state organs or had not been left with them in 
the first place. The centralization process of responsibilities and authorities in the 
field of foreign policy did not stop at the party level, however, but expanded into the 
party apparatus itself. Over time, the Central Committee of the SED lost authority 
to the smaller, more elitist circle of the Politbüro. While some individuals were able 
to overcome the centralized structures of foreign policy making, the reasons for this 
can be found in a combination of personalities and connections to the “inner circle,” 
and sometimes also within the responsibilities of the organ or institution itself. As 
a popular means of assuring the functioning of “democratic centralism,” this often 
led people holding similar posts in both the party’s CC and the government. Also, 
the superiority of the party toward the specialized ministries and its technocrats and 
experts led to the most absurd friction losses of expertise: “The political leadership 
[of the SED] evaluated the credibility of [foreign policy] analysis less based on their 
content, but rather on ideological criteria.”34 In the MfAA, this regularly led to the 
production of the “second version” of reports and analyses for the SED leadership 
that was apparently ignorant of political realities.
When Honecker replaced Ulbricht, he furthered this centralization process 
from state to party, from bottom to top, and actively drew foreign policy authority 
toward himself. Storckmann even goes so far to consider all party organs 
irrelevant during Honecker’s reign.35 However, Honecker was still part of and 
thus dependent on the party apparatus and the logic of “democratic centralism.” 
Despite his undeniable plentitude of power, one has to recognize the existing 
limits of human capacity, as he could not be everywhere at the same time, and also 
had to balance the inherent competition between the various organs included in 
the process of foreign policy making. In addition, after Honecker had taken power 
and his confident Fischer was installed at the top of the MfAA, the distribution 
of responsibilities remained quite stable. Apart from minor changes, the power 
constellations within the foreign policy apparatus remained surprisingly constant 
over the years. This continuity in personnel and thus in policy style not only in 
the field of foreign policy but almost all other fields significantly added to the 
almost proverbial image of the SED leadership in the late 1980s as “overaged and 
overcome.” To carve out the more complex layers of foreign policy making below 
the centralized “primacy of the party” and Honecker’s “rule of the Sun King,” 
further research on these structures is needed. For now, one may settle for the 
image of “party meritrocrats” who, under their “maestro” Honecker, divided the 
responsibilities for foreign policy making among their small and powerful circle.
34 | Muth, 2001, 22. Muth refers to several diplomats and foreign policy personnel of the GDR. 
35 | Storckmann, 2012, 80.
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The Fragmentation of East German Foreign Policy Making
Clearly, the intertwined foreign policy responsibilities did cause a certain 
fragmentation of the GDR’s foreign policy making.36 Even though decision-making 
itself can be considered quite efficient, as it did not include a democratic process, 
the ruling party still had to rely on the state apparatus and its functionaries to 
further elaborate the party’s directives and execute them while still constantly 
demanding full control of the process. In addition to that, the field of foreign policy 
within the state was not an exclusive matter for the MfAA, so that competition 
and miscommunication lead to additional friction losses. This setup led to an 
extremely slow and long-winded process of policy-making. Based on his analysis, 
Möller concludes that in the field of foreign policy and international relations in 
particular, the SED’s claim to absolute power could not be upheld due to actors’ 
and institutions’ self-interests on the one hand, and the incalculable impact of the 
international environment and its actors on the other.37 Without doubt, these two 
dynamics had a volatile effect on East German policy-making that more often than 
not opened additional room for maneuver for certain foreign policy actors.
36 | Wippel, 1996, 16.
37 | Möller, 2004, 327.
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CHAPTER 16. South Yemen as the Model Case of 
a Possible East German Foreign Policy
“As opposed to the Soviet Union, [the GDR] was a 
small country, comparable [to South Yemen in size and 
population.[…] And small countries clearly preferred to 
follow the example of other small countries.”1
hANs bAuer, eAsT germAN Advisor To The YemeNi goverNmeNT
After the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War, the Middle East and its major conflict, 
the Arab-Israeli dispute, were fully included into the wider frame work of Cold War 
rivalry. The founding of an independent South Yemeni state in 1967 coincided 
with the first tentative steps taken by the GDR toward a full-fledged foreign policy. 
This foreign policy included a variety of strategies, such as those of “focus and 
low-profile,” “socialist orientation” and the “strategy of the honest broker.” Not 
entirely coincidental, all of this happened in the middle of the phase of Soviet 
expansion in the region:2 Moscow’s policy demanded coordinated action of the 
Warsaw Pact states under Soviet supervision.3 East Berlin readily filled this role, 
while it had to live with the restraints produced by its dependence on the Kremlin 
and West German policies. As a consequence, the GDR’s policy in the Middle 
East can be characterized as a “fill-in policy” between its two major foreign policy 
determinants, Moscow and Bonn. But this policy can nonetheless be considered 
a very creative one.
The following chapter embeds the findings on East German policy in South 
Yemen into the wider framework of Soviet and East German engagement in the 
Middle East with regard to the empirical limits of the GDR’s policy in Yemen. 
1 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.
2 | Halliday, 2005, 99.
3 | Storckmann rightly decries a lack of sound archival findings on the coordination between 
Moscow and its political orbit of Warsaw Pact states due to lack of access to the relevant 
archives in Moscow: Storckmann, 2012, 38. Nevertheless, archival documents of the GDR 
allow for some insights into the processes and thus general conclusions to a certain extent. 
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Based on these findings, the chapter concludes with the question: Can the case of 
South Yemen be considered both an exceptional case and a model pointing toward 
a Weberian ideal type of East German foreign policy?
1.  BEST FRIENDS WITh BENEFITS: SOvIE T AND E AST GERMAN 
ENGAGEMENT IN SOuTh YEMEN AS PART OF A REGIONAL 
STR ATEGY IN ThE REGION
“Now Socialism has taken root on three continents.”4
(Fritz Balke quoting a member of the SED Politbüro)
In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union had opted to join forces with “progressive”5 
regimes in the Middle East and increased the intensity of its engagement 
successively from “influence” to “involvement” and “intervention.” At the time, 
Moscow did not hide its claim to political and military control over the Arab states. 
Especially during the period between the Suez Crisis and the decrease of Soviet 
involvement in the mid-eighties,6 the Soviet Union aimed to present itself as a 
major, if not the dominant, external actor in the region. Motivated by geopolitical 
considerations of national security, Moscow nonetheless had begun to include 
ideological justification, such as the concept of “socialist orientation,” in its Middle 
East policy. While Soviet engagement gradually intensified, the rules of the Cold 
War changed in a way that demanded more restraint with regard to obvious 
intervention in other’s countries affairs.
This change in “Cold War conventions” coincided with the consolidation of 
the relationship among the allies within the Western and the Eastern Bloc. In case 
of the Soviet Union, this included the increase of competition among its satellite 
states for missions and for Moscow’s benevolence.7 The financial and material 
support coming from the Warsaw Pact states not only eased the economic pressure 
from engagement in the Middle East for the Soviet Union. Most importantly it 
eased pent-up political pressure due to the change in “Cold War conventions,” 
as the engagement of other states of the Warsaw Pact aimed to veil the actual 
intensity of Moscow’s engagement. This “low-key strategy,” in which Soviet 
4 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
5 | Choueri, 2000, 192.
6 | Halliday even states that as early as 1980 the bloc confrontation as the dominant 
conflict was supplanted by a regional contention, the Iraq-Iran War, Halliday, 2005, 100.
7 | Until the states of the Warsaw Pact finally agreed on the basic principles of coordination 
for military relations with the Global South, in: Protokoll 11. Sitzung Komitee der 
Verteidigungsminister TS des Warschauer Vertrages vom 4 bis 7.12 1978, Ost-Berlin, in: 
BArch DVW 1/71035, 318-357; Protokoll 12. Sitzung Komitee der Verteidigungsminister des 
Warschauer Vertrages vom 2 bis 6.12 1979, Warschau, in: BArch DVW 1/71036, sine pagina.
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engagement was sometimes mediated through secondary actors, such as the 
ČSSR or the GDR, was applied in cases of significant military support and conflict 
intervention in the region in Soviet interest. Moscow hoped to be able to deny its 
active involvement if necessary so as to minimize the impact of its on action on 
the superpower relations.8
When Moscow’s good relations with Egypt successively deteriorated in the 
early 1970s, the Kremlin began to shift its attention to other allies, old and new, to 
uphold its power status in the region. During this period of consolidation in the 
Middle East, Moscow also began to expand its footholds, such as Aden, mostly 
through the advancement of the revolutionary nationalist movements. However, 
this policy of Marxist-Leninist expansionism in the “Global South” in the end 
clearly exceeded Moscow’s economic abilities: When the Soviet star in the Middle 
East was on the wane after the mid-1980s, its allies were among the poorest and 
most isolated in the region. As a consequence, the Kremlin’s interests transformed 
from long-term involvement to “more immediate benefits”9 – such as the use of 
military, naval, or political bases at the most important strategic locations.
In Yemen, still one of the poorest countries today, Moscow had made an 
extraordinary long-term commitment, hoping for a reliable and stable ally that 
could serve as one of the major Soviet bases in the Middle East. The Kremlin’s 
strategy in South Yemen can be subsumed under its wider policies in the Middle 
East the Global South in general, as it rather simply aimed at expansion of 
influence, if possible at a cost to the Western powers. Politically, Moscow’s strategy 
mainly relied on ideological arguments, for the large part the support of “liberation 
movements” against the “imperialist West,” combined with financial and military 
incentives, either directly or mediated through local henchmen.10 Even though the 
support policy of the “liberation movements” and the communist parties became 
less aggressive and obvious, Moscow did never fully discard the option until the 
late 1980s.11 The neighboring conservative states in the region were well aware of 
this role of South Yemen as the original “troublemaker” and a possible duplicate 
of the Soviet system.
Among all of the Soviet Union’s allies in the Middle East, the Aden-Moscow 
relationship has to be considered a special one. This relationship has long been 
neglected by analysts or relativized in comparison to Soviet ties with Cairo or 
8 | Chubin, Adelphi Paper No.157, 1980, in: The Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies (Ed.), 302.
9 | Yodfat, 1983, 115.
10 | The support of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) and its 
cause to remove “the monarchies in the Persian Gulf” is one of the major examples of joint 
foreign policy projects between Moscow and Aden. Chubin, 1980, in: The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (Ed.), 301.
11 | As the participation of the Saudi Communist Party in the leftist Party Conference in 
Cyprus of 1985 had shown, in: Cigar, 1985, 784.
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Bagdad. However, Soviet presence in Egypt never reached an extent comparable 
to that in South Yemen, in what Cigar calls a “qualitative difference”: The PDRY’s 
“socio-political system was […] remolded on a Marxist-Leninist pattern.”12 In addition 
to that, Halliday argues, “[d]espite the undoubted divergences between Moscow and 
Aden, and the enduring nationalism of the South Yemenis, there had not been the 
kind of break that had occurred in […] Egypt and Iraq.”13 All in all, South Yemen 
has to be considered “the closest [and most loyal] of [the Kremlin”s] Arab allies.”14 
Even though there never was agreement on all fields between Aden and Moscow, 
the common ideological basis and growing dependence on Soviet support and 
safekeeping without doubt had created a basic congruence of interests.
Commentators at the time described South Yemen an “ideological model,” an 
“ideological victory”15 for the USSR – a view shared by Moscow. The external view 
of these witnesses comes close to what can be concluded today, but misses the 
actual conditions just as often: This perception simply elevates the Soviet-South 
Yemeni relations beyond their actual significance and exaggerates with regard 
to Soviet engagement. In 1985 Norman Cigar, an Officer of US Department of 
Defense, summarizes: “The Soviets have sought to establish their presence in as 
many sectors as possible.”16 However, and especially in the beginning, Moscow 
rather focused on those sectors which immediately benefited its policy in the 
region. Then, its policy was combined with the GDR’s activities: Moscow advanced 
to become Aden’s primary “source of political and socio-economic guidance,” 
while East Berlin served as Aden’s “role model” of a socialist state led by a Soviet-
style vanguard party.17
Current research on Soviet foreign policy, as well as its goals, reasons, and 
even the intensity of engagement, remains a mere approximation due to lack of 
archival access to this day. South Yemen, a country where the GDR intensified its 
activity on behalf of the Kremlin, is a case study in which at least some features 
of Moscow’s regional policy during this time are revealed through both secondary 
literature and the archival material. Halliday, not only one of the few researchers 
who occupied themselves with South Yemen and its foreign relations, but also 
the only one who also devoted extensive interest to the USSR’s presence in the 
country, advocates for the relevance of the Aden case for the Soviet Union’s Middle 
East policy. And rightly so. Despite the lack of any extra-territorial status, and 
even though the USSR officially never maintained the number of forces in the 
PDRY as they did in Egypt and Somalia,18 Moscow enjoyed full access to South 
12 | Cigar, 1985, 793.
13 | Halliday, 1990, 217.
14 | Ibid. 1990, 178; also see: Brehony, 2013, 81; Cigar, 1985, 775.
15 | Cigar, 1985, 782.
16 | Cigar, 1985, 777.
17 | On the GDR’s “model character” for the developing countries, also see: Howell, 1994, 328.
18 | Halliday, 1990, 204.
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Yemen’s military facilities and Aden advanced to “the port most frequently visited 
by the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean.”19 South Yemen provided the USSR with a 
military base and all necessary privileges in all but name.
All in all, Halliday considers the “alliance with the USSR […] the most important 
component of the PDRY’s foreign policy”20 and emphasizes the political benefits 
and dependencies of both sides:21 On the one hand, South Yemen clearly played 
the dependent part. The Soviet Union promoted itself as South Yemen’s external 
security guarantor in the region. The survival of the radical NF/YSP regime hinged 
on this Soviet guarantee, just as the SED regime in East-Berlin did. This clear 
commitment by Aden to the Eastern Bloc only added to the radical state’s isolation 
in the region. At times, Aden even opted against the consensus of the other Arab 
states in support of the Eastern Bloc.22 On the other hand, small, isolated, and 
unimportant Aden had emerged as Moscow’s only Marxist-Leninist “model state” 
in the Middle East. No wonder the Kremlin was ready to go to great lengths to 
secure “socialism on three continents,” even after the shock of the “1986 crisis,” 
and to keep its incarnated model and symbol of Marxist-Leninist expansion alive 
and healthy.
2.  ADvOCACY FOR AN E AST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY IN ITS OWN 
RIGhT
For the GDR, the scope of action for its foreign policy was considerably small, 
as East Germany had to maneuver between three restricting determinants: the 
Soviet Union, West Germany, and the demands from within the GDR. But to 
simply consider the GDR’s policy in the Middle East as a “residuum of Bonn’s 
action or non-action”23 does not do justice to international relations at the time. 
A comprehensive assessment of East German foreign policy cannot rely on a 
restricted view that defines East Berlin’s policy as a mere reaction to Bonn alone. 
Rather, one has to acknowledge the fact that – despite Bonn’s early internal 
and external political strength – both Germanys had to maneuver within the 
determinants of the Cold War. Even though Bonn was able to acquire an actual 
degree of sovereignty toward the Western allied forces, the FRG was no fully 
sovereign state either before German reunification in 1990. Thus, the argument 
19 | Cigar, 1985, 781.
20 | On the intensifying relationship between Moscow and Aden, See: Halliday, 1990, 178; 
Dresch, 2000, 134.
21 | Similar to other analysts of the time like Cigar, 1985.
22 | E.g., the formal recognition of the Afghan regime opposed the common Arab position.
23 | Wippel, 1996, 27.
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that no East German foreign policy existed due to its restricted sovereignty alone 
does not hold.
Beyond West Germany, the Soviet Union – the GDR’s midwife and the guarantor 
of its existence – always remained the major determinant of East German foreign 
policy. However, within the staked out field of international action, the GDR 
incrementally established itself as an international actor. Regardless of its lack of 
full sovereignty and thus its limited autonomy in the international sphere, East 
Berlin had to act on its own accord. At a certain point Moscow was neither willing 
nor able to watch and guide each and every step of the GDR. Rather, the Kremlin 
was sure that the SED would act in anticipatory obedience and embrace Soviet 
interests as part of its own foreign policy. East Germany had to become active itself. 
In the beginning, this meant copying Soviet policies as far as possible. However, 
the GDR had to realize that it had very different prerequisites in resources and the 
GDR’s national interests, or at least its foreign policy priorities, were not even close 
to being identical to the Soviet agenda.
Due to the modest tools at its disposal, East Germany began to create its own 
foreign policy strategies to further its national interests. East Germany indeed 
developed several strategies for the Global South in general and the Middle East 
in particular, which together can be considered a “Middle East Policy.” While 
East Berlin rather passively followed Moscow’s orders during the first phase of 
its foreign policy, it was already beginning to frame bilateral relations where 
possible. After international recognition of the GDR, Moscow gave assignments 
rather than orders and left the details to East Berlin. In the 1980s, the Kremlin, 
due to its own emerging weakness, even tolerated single-handed decisions and 
strategies like Honecker’s aloofness toward the new PDRY regime after the “1986 
crisis.” Toward Bonn, the GDR tried to react proactively to any blank spots of West 
German international engagement, with South Yemen being the prime example. 
Thus, the GDR’s policy in the Middle East may be characterized as a restricted 
“fill-in policy” between the two determinants, Bonn and Moscow. This has to be 
considered more than a “residuum of Bonn’s actions” though. It was a framed 
foreign policy based on specific strategies to pursue the interests of the state. All 
three of the determinants mentioned above more or less could turn into either a 
guarantor for or threat to the existence of East Germany as a separate state under 
SED leadership. Thus, East Berlin did not simply move within the given limits, 
but consciously worked with them. East Berlin’s engagement in the Middle East in 
general and in South Yemen in particular clearly show that the SED developed 
several strategies aiming to first ensure the survival of the GDR as the SED’s state 
and second to secure its acceptance as an international actor by expanding East 
Germany’s international position.
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3. ThE GDR IN SOuTh YEMEN: A PhASE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY
Moscow’s official reading of politics in the Middle East had dominated the GDR’s 
foreign policy approach throughout the state’s existence.24 Not surprisingly, the 
Kremlin’s high times of engagement in the region from the 1970s to the early 
1980s coincide with the GDR’s most active phase in the Middle East and its 
engagement in South Yemen. However, in the very beginning it had been East 
Germany’s initiative THAT promoted the connection to the future leaders in Aden. 
Just as in other countries of the developing world, this was part of the GDR’s “low-
profile strategy” to achieve international recognition through the intensification 
of contacts “from below the governmental level.” The major target countries of the 
GDR’s early policies were often led by strong leftist liberation movements, which 
were considered promising candidates for “socialist development,” especially in 
the Middle East.
3.1 Toward Diplomatic Relations: The First Phase of Engagement
In 1965, a “fundamental resolution” on the support of the African and Arab 
people in their struggle for liberation with “non-civilian materials” was 
presented.25 After South Yemen’s declaration of independence in 1967, Aden still 
was merely one piece in this East German foreign policy puzzle, but this was 
to change soon enough. In the following years, the political measures taken by 
East Berlin to further its goal of recognition in South Yemen laid the foundation 
for cooperation. During this first phase of East German engagement, lasting 
until 1970, East Berlin was able to build upon personal contacts, leading to 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between East Berlin and Aden in 
1969. When the GDR and South Yemen jointly developed a new South Yemeni 
constitution in 1970, East Germany was able to squeeze “a foot in the door” to 
get involved in a variety of other policy fields. After delegating its first advisory 
group to South Yemen to support the draft of a new constitution, East German 
consultancy became the catalyst for future cooperation. These relations of 
cooperation, which grew in the early days of South Yemeni state-formation, 
emerged as the basis of trust for East Germany’s policy of socialist state- and 
nation-building in the years to follow. From then on, East German engagement 
intensified continuously until the caesura of 1986.
24 | For fur ther elaboration on these concepts see Chapter 8. The GDR and the “Arab 
World”: A Small State’s “Fill-In Policy.”
25 | Otto Winzer and Willy Stoph, May 28 1965, in: BArch, DC 20/13001, Bl.28-33. Also 
see: Storckmann, 2012, 108; Politbürositzung January 10 1967, Annex 5, in: BArch SAPMO, 
DY 30/J IV 2/2/1093.
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3.2 Policy Change toward State-Building: The Second Phase of 
Engagement
Until the early 1970s, the dominant motivation of East Germany’s foreign 
policy had been securing international recognition as an equal member of the 
international society of states. South Yemen is one of the earliest examples where 
this goal was achieved. As a consequence, the SED was able to leave behind its 
“policy of recognition” and to introduce a new comprehensive bilateral policy 
toward South Yemen: With Soviet blessing and at South Yemen’s request, the 
GDR developed a policy of socialist state- and nation-building. Whether East 
Germany believed itself to be able to introduce its own version of Soviet “system 
export” at the time is certainly debatable. Nonetheless, this is exactly what East 
German engagement was to become in scope and intensity: A supportive state- 
and nation-building policy close to neo-colonialist aspirations. Thus, one may also 
question whether the GDR truly wanted to serve South Yemeni needs better than 
Moscow. But South Yemenis apparently tended to see it that way, preferring the 
small GDR as a role model to the overpowering Soviet Union, as it was more 
comparable to its own size.26 Also, East Berlin had invested more and earlier in 
its bilateral relations with Aden than Moscow, so when the Soviet Union induced 
a policy change in the region in the mid-1970s, the Kremlin was able to use the 
GDR’s good relations with the Aden regime for its own purposes: Over the next 
decade there clearly existed a “division of labour” between the superpower and its 
“first officer of foreign policy.” While East Berlin promoted inner stability of state 
and society and aimed to secure the rule of the YSP and its “progressive regime” 
on the inside, Moscow provided for military training and equipment to guarantee 
security for the future Socialist state on the outside.
During the second phase of East German foreign policy from 1970 to 1978, 
the “Phase of Expansion,” the GDR diversified its engagement and continuously 
increased the intensity from “involvement” to “intervention” until the end of 
the third phase. Through consultancy, East Germany ensured its influence on 
a wide range of policy fields of the young state: Education, the media, economy, 
agriculture, even foreign policy and finally the establishment of a jurisdiction and 
security apparatus, including security policy and South Yemen’s secret service, 
KfS. The latter played a central role in East Germany’s policy of socialist state-
and nation-building. In Aden, East Berlin cooperated closely with the security 
services of the USSR, and later on the ČSSR, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, 
and Hungary,27 but the MfS of the GDR considered itself the “the most important 
partner” of the PDRY’s KfS.28  From 1970 onwards, the East German Security 
26 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.
27 | Zu den Beziehungen des MfS der VDRJ mit dem MfS der DDR und mit Sicherheitsorganen 
anderer Länder, in: BStU MfS Abt. X Nr. 234, Part 1 of 2, 105.
28 | Ibid.,102.
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Service MfS continuously expanded its engagement and advisory presence in 
South Yemen, even reaching into other policy fields such as legislation and legal 
affairs in general.
The GDR’s high level of engagement during this time in almost all social and 
political fields was furthered by two dynamics that appear to contradict on first 
glance. On the one hand, the PDRY had publicly aligned itself with the Eastern 
Bloc, while the US and Bonn for the time being had given up any aspirations 
in South Yemen. In addition to that, the Kremlin not only acquiesced to East 
Berlin’s concrete engagement in South Yemen, but even integrated it into its own, 
more active policy in the region in the mid-1970s.29 On the other hand, the GDR 
had to cope with other competitors from outside the Eastern Bloc who sought 
Aden’s attention and trust and thus this smallest sphere of influence: Western 
experts, UN envoys, and representatives of the World Bank and the IMF. This 
was one of the major reasons why East Berlin would continually work on South 
Yemen’s behalf, such as by presenting itself as the “honest broker” as opposed to 
the representatives of the Western world: Within GDR diplomacy, but also among 
the Yemeni public, it was the GDR’s declared goal to ward off these “advances of 
imperialism.”
3.3 Founding of the Vanguard Part y and Consolidation: The Third 
Phase of Engagement
For Moscow and its East German henchman, the most pressing topic in the 
PDRY’s domestic politics during the 1970s was the establishment of a Soviet-
style vanguard party. Thus, the founding of the Yemeni Socialist Party in 1978 
turned out to be the catalyst event that further intensified the commitment of the 
Eastern Bloc. This event also initiated the third phase of East German activities, 
the “Phase of Continuity and Consolidation.” Moscow clearly had aimed for 
the establishment of this vanguard party and kept entertaining a high level of 
engagement. Furthermore, Moscow added technical assistance to its two major 
fields of activities, military and ideology. The Kremlin’s policy was complemented 
by the highly diversified East German engagement: East Berlin continued its 
involvement in the crucial civil fields of law, governance, economy, education, and 
the media and significantly intensified cooperation with the security apparatus. 
Nonetheless, it was also time for Soviet and East German engagement to yield 
concrete results. Evaluation of the performance of the KfS, for example, indicated 
that the secret service so far had not produced much valuable information. Also, 
the majority of state institutions were not working efficiently, and despite the early 
successes in installing “democratic centralism” as the major structural principle, 
29 | Letter Scharfenberg and Grünheid, Ministry of Planning, January 1 1974, in: PA AA, 
MfAA, 166276, 79.
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socialist state- and nation-building was far from being accomplished.30 Personal 
political conflicts and internal social obstacles seemed to prevent profound 
improvements and the PDRY’s regime was searching for the reasons for failure 
outside its borders rather than within. Moscow and East Berlin had invested a lot to 
create a secure foothold and a dependent ally in the region that would follow their 
guidance. But as the events of 1986 were about to demonstrate, these investments 
were not to obtain much success.
3.4 Aden’s Crisis and East Berlin’s Cold Shoulder: The Final Phase of 
Engagement
In January 1986, the GDR’s cooperation and steady intensification of relations 
with South Yemen were brought to an abrupt end. The internal coup among the 
leadership of the YSP caused the removal of the principle political actors – the 
leaders and “heroes” of the revolution – from their posts. Both external actors, the 
Soviet Union and the GDR, had to accept the unpredictability of the PDRY, but 
drew quite different conclusions. Moscow, on the one hand, picked up right where 
its engagement had been interrupted by the “1986 crisis,” explicitly tightening its 
grip on its outpost at the Bab al-Mandab and clearly aiming to further increase 
control over what was left of the PDRY. The GDR, on the other hand, fully 
terminated its civil activities. Long-term personal friendships had nourished the 
relations between the GDR and the PDRY, which had yielded advantages such 
as unofficial channels of communication. These personal relationships were 
particularly important to the GDR’s ties with the PDRY, as foreign-policy-making 
of the 1980s was mostly focused on the person of Honecker, who rejected any 
rapprochement with the new regime right away. The stable base of relations 
disappeared and left a diplomatic-political vacuum that the rigid political system 
of the GDR prevented from being filled again in the few years the two states had 
left. Especially due to Honecker’s irrational foreign policy, which followed his 
personal preferences rather than the GDR’s national interest, this fourth and last 
phase from 1986 to 1990 simply was too short for relations to recover.
30 | Operative Einschätzung des GMS “Leonhardt“ – Vorg.-Nr.XV 3481/82, August 28 
1986, HV A/III/AG/018, in: BStU MfS AGMS Nr. 10208-88, 67; Interview with Hans Bauer 
June 20 2011.
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4. SOuTh YEMEN AS ThE EXCEPTIONAL CASE AND AN APPROXIMATION 
TO ThE “IDEAL TYPE” OF EAST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
“For the GDR, South Yemen was all about erecting a bastion of socialism. 
Regardless of its size, there was the hope that [the model of] South Yemen 
would radiate into the Arab world.”31
(Fritz Balke, East German diplomat assigned to the policies toward both 
Yemens in the Section Near and Middle East of the MfAA in the 1980s)
The GDR’s activities in South Yemen were by no means the rule but were rather 
the exception of East German foreign policy in the Global South. But due to the 
intensity and diversity of engagement, this study concludes that this exceptional 
case can also serve as a theoretical “ideal type,”32 a model case that laid beyond 
West German restrictions and within a scope of action approved by the Soviet 
Union. This leads to the major hypotheses of this study: In the sense of a paradox,33 
the case of South Yemen may not only be the “exception of the rule,” but also a 
model pointing towards the possible “ideal type” of the “general,” a “utopia” of 
East German foreign policy towards the Global South.
Following Kierkegaard’s notion of the general, it may be concluded that this 
exception carries a meaning beyond its own, as the exception defines the normal 
situation as well as itself.34 Only in relation to the “normal condition” we may detect 
the deviation, the “exceptional case.” When reconsidering the “normal condition” 
of East German foreign policy, two factors, or determinants, create the lion’s share 
of what is considered the scope of action of foreign policy for the GDR: The Soviet 
Union and the “other” Germany, the Federal Republic in the West. Both major 
determinants of the GDR’s international activities manifested in different ways 
than they usually did for East German foreign policy: First, South Yemen is one 
of the few cases where West Germany and West German presence did not play 
an immediate role in determining the GDR’s foreign policy beyond the general 
question of international diplomatic recognition of East Berlin. Thus Bonn did 
not have a direct impact on the GDR’s activities on the ground and was absent as 
one of the major determinants of East German foreign policy. Secondly, Moscow 
31 | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.
32 | Weber, 2002, 10.
33 | This paradox may be resolved as a ”dialectic.” “Das reinere dialektische besteht darin, 
daß von einem Prädicat eine Verstandesbestimmung aufgezeigt wird, wie sie an ihr selbst 
ebenso sehr das Entgegengesetzte ihrer selbst ist, sie sich also in sich aufhebt,” Hegel, 1961, 
214. On the benefits and limits of the concept of “dialectic” in modern thought in general 
and the social sciences in particular, especially with regard to the differences between the 
“three-step” of Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis” and the so-called “Hegelian Dialectic” and its 
misinterpretations, see: Burch, 2004; Mueller, 1958; Popper, 2009 (1963), 180ff.
34 | Kierkegaard, in: Schmitt, 2005 (1922), 15.
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apparently had assigned East Germany to get involved with South Yemen in the 
1960s, even though the Soviet Union did not develop a special interest in South 
Yemen until the mid-1970s. By the time Moscow aimed at establishing Aden as 
its new unofficial military base in the region, East Berlin was a well-acquainted 
and respected ally of the radical South Yemeni regime. Within the granted room 
of maneuver, Moscow had left East Berlin to its own devices for almost a decade, 
during which the GDR had developed a self-confidence different from its typical 
dwarfed self-perception. In this, South Yemen, without doubt, was the “exception 
to the rule” of East German international performance.
However, this “exceptional condition” may not only be considered the exception 
from the norm. The “exceptional case” of GDR foreign policy in South Yemen may 
also be considered a model case pointing the way towards a Weberian “ideal type,”35 
a “utopian” idea of East German foreign policy. With his “Idealtypus,” Weber first 
of all introduced an instrument to analyze singular cases, but at the same time it 
expands the view of the analyst towards the general phenomenon, formed by the 
sum of singular cases. By “generating [one or several] ‘ideal types’ from limited 
empirical material [one may] compare further empirical material with it”36 and 
draw conclusions from the similarities and differences between material and ideal 
type. So this “utopia,” though it never existed in reality, may be derived from the 
singular case of East German foreign policy as it was planned and implemented 
in the PDRY:  Aden was one of many possible foreign policy futures that were 
realized nowhere else.
How does the “exceptional case” of East German foreign policy, the case of South 
Yemen, point toward an “ideal type” then? On the one hand, the two major 
determinants of East German foreign policy allowed for foreign policy activities 
and self-direction well beyond the regular East German scope of action: The 
Soviet Union assigned East Berlin to actively engage in the stabilization of the 
new state in south Arabia as well as its regime, while the Federal Republic of 
Germany was conspicuously absent from Aden. Bonn’s foreign policy simply had 
no immediate impact on East German activities in South Yemen. On the other 
hand, South Yemen more than welcomed East German help as a fellow “small 
country,”37 and thus accommodated East-Berlin’s intended engagement in any 
35 | On the ideal type see: Weber 2002, 10; Swedberg, 2005, 119; According to Weber, 
limited empirical material is analyzed to generate this ideal type, by an “einseitige 
Steigerung eines oder einiger Gesichtspunkte und durch Zusammenschluss einer Fülle 
von dif fusen und diskreten, hier mehr, dort weniger, stellenweise gar nicht, vorhandenen 
Einzelerscheinungen, die sich zu jenen einseitig herausgehobenen Gesichtspunkten 
fügen, zu einem in sich einheitlichen Gedankenbilde,” in: Weber, Max, Die “Objektivität” 
sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, in: Weber, 1991, 73. 
36 | Pohlig, 2013, 304.
37 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.
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imaginable way. Clearly, East Germany’s diversified activities made the difference 
for Soviet engagement, such as in Iraq or Syria. In Bagdad and Damascus, East 
Germany also served as an immediate supporter of Soviet military and technical 
engagement, as well as the security apparatus. However, activities never achieved 
a comparable level of intensity or diversity, not in the realm of security, and 
especially not in the civil sphere: Due to lack of willingness of the host states, in 
this case Iraq and Syria, no policy could be implemented that approached the level 
of engagement of the socialist state- and nation-building policy in Aden.
In conclusion, conditions in South Yemen were as close to “ideal conditions”38 
for East German foreign policy making as they could ever be under the rules 
of the Cold War: An exceptional room for East German maneuver allowed for a 
high intensity of engagement. South Yemen advanced not only as one of the few 
East German focal countries, but also achieved one of the highest levels of East 
German foreign policy engagement outside the Eastern Bloc.39  Thus Aden is one 
of the few, if not the only case, where the GDR was able to design and apply an at 
least partly self-directed comprehensive foreign policy. Based on this observation, 
one may consider the policy designed for South Yemen a model policy, a kind 
of blueprint suggesting a theoretical “ideal type” of East German foreign policy 
toward states of the Global South. In other words: If East Germany had had the 
autonomy, scope of action, and the resources to do so, its foreign policy towards 
other countries in the Global South could have looked pretty much the same way 
as it did in Aden – if the host state cooperated.
38 | “Ideal conditions” in this context means the most positive conditions imaginable. The 
meaning of “ideal” in the term “ideal conditions” does not correspond with Weber’s idea of 
the “ideal type” as a theoretical notion in any respect. 
39 | Apart from Cuba and Nicaragua, other intense engagement usually was focused on 
certain phases and did not increase continuously from the mid-1960s as it did in South 
Yemen.
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CHAPTER 17. Moscow, East Berlin and the 
“Hawks of Hadramawt”:1 
Nation-Building or Neo-Colonialism in Southern Yemen?
“The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which 
is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the 
outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality 
its economic system and thus its political policy is directed 
from the outside. […] The result of neo-colonialism is that 
foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for 
the development of the less developed parts of the world.”2
kwAme NkrumAh, 1965
1. hOW TO E XPLORE ThE “LIMITS OF FOREIGN POLICY”
Based on Kwame Nkrumah’s monograph “Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of 
Imperialism,” the notion of “neo-colonialism”3 has been used to describe the 
perpetuation of relations of dependence between post-colonial states and their 
former colonizers, as well as external powers that replaced the former colonizer.4 
And while according to Nkrumah, “neo-colonialism” is considered to be an 
immediate consequence of colonialism and imperialism, recent research based on 
discourse analysis5 expanded the meaning of the term. Here, the concept has also 
been applied in studies concerned with newly emerging relations of dominance 
between external powers and formerly colonized states, as well as newly forming 
or reforming states in the sense of state- and nation-building, such as Iraq or 
1 | Title changed for spelling consistency. Alfree, The Hawks of Hadramaut, 1967.
2 | Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, 1965, ixf f.
3 | Definition “Neo-Colonialism,” in: Stanton/Ramsamy/Seybolt/Elliott, 2012, 332-334 
and Young, 2001, Chapter 4.
4 | Nkrumah, 1965, x.
5 | Holzscheiter, 2014; Tor fing, 2005.
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Afghanistan,6 often under the umbrella of “humanitarian intervention”7 and 
the “responsibility to protect” (RtP).8 What all of these interpretations of “neo-
colonialism” have in common is an outright critical stance towards external 
engagement in domestic politics of another state, while some would recognize the 
external actors’ intention as a qualifying factor and others wouldn’t.
Nkrumah’s approach, however, has not only been selected for the reflection 
on the limits of foreign policy due to its reception and eventual transformation, 
but because of its direct connection to Marxist-Leninist ideology that is discussed 
later on in this chapter. All of the approaches inspired by Nkrumah in the end 
question the basis of international action in the current world system of nation 
states: A state’s national “sovereignty” and how to interpret it. As introduced in 
Part A of this analysis, this study approaches “sovereignty” in nominalist terms to 
be able to differentiate between internal and external state sovereignty.9 Internal 
sovereignty is defined by Francis Harry Hinsley’s interpretation of sovereignty, 
that is, the “final and absolute authority in the political community” where “no 
final and absolute authority exists elsewhere”10 in the respective territory.11 External 
sovereignty, on the other hand, is regularly defined in legal terms and based on 
the sovereign equality of states in the international state system and the non-
intervention clause in Chapter 1, Article II(7) of the UN Charter.12 According to 
this principle of “non-intervention,” every sovereign state has the right “to conduct 
its affairs without outside interference.”13 This ties in with the major criterion used 
to distinguish between coercive intervention and “humanitarian intervention” 
before the introduction of RtP: Any intervention had to be justified by consent of 
the host state.14
6 | See e.g. Welch, 2008. For a critique on “Humanitarian Intervention” see, e.g. Nardin, 
Humanitarian Imperialism, 2006 answering Tesón, 2006.
7 | For a wider discussion on the topic of “humanitarian intervention” as a justification 
for military and other inter ference in domestic affairs, see: Welsh, 2004; Wheeler, 2000.
8 | On the origins of the RtP see: Walzer, 1977. Major document that introduced the RtP to 
be discussed as a new norm in international law: Report of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001.
9 | The argument follows Georg Jellinek, 1900.
10 | Hinsley, 1986 (1966), 26.
11 | Hinsley’s definition rests on the essentialist understanding of sovereignty as it had 
been introduced by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. For a discussion of Bodin’s and Hobbes’ 
understanding of “sovereignty” see: Schmitt, 1922, 33. Furthermore, Hinsley includes Max 
Weber‘s definition of the state as the agent claiming and owning the “monopoly of the 
legitimate use of [physical] violence within a cer tain territory,” Weber, 2004 (1919), 310f.
12 | UN Charter of October 24th 1945. 
13 | “Case Concerning the Military and Paramilit. Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States of America),” Sep. Opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh President, 1986.
14 | On the question of consent in military intervention see e.g. Lieblich, 2011.
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Now, one may transfer this divide used for “rightful military intervention” to non-
military intervention in domestic affairs: “Consent of the host state” may serve 
as a criterion to judge whether the GDR’s foreign policy in South Yemen, and 
actually any other foreign policy as well, transgressed the “limits of foreign policy,” 
in the sense of “imposition” or “neo-colonialism.” In more concrete terms,  this 
distinction is occupied with the question of whether it is only the external actors’ 
interests that determine their engagement or if the “neo-colonized” or “host” 
state actually demanded or needed this intervention. East German engagement 
in South Yemen is reconsidered with a focus on the motives for this engagement, 
that is, its foreign policy intent. In so doing, this analysis explicitly differentiated 
between intensity and intention of action, as opposed to Prados’ approach,15 and 
includes an assessment of possible South Yemeni agency, the “receiving side” of 
this foreign policy.
As shown above, the notion of “neo-colonialism” as it is applied in current 
debates also encompasses the more problematic side of external support for state- 
and nation-building, and thus is considered extremely useful to interpreting 
the GDR’s foreign policy of socialist state- and nation-building in the PDRY in 
normative terms. In addition to that, the notion of neo-colonialism developed by 
Nkrumah is based on Lenin’s “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism”16 
and thus on the socialist ideal of international relations, socialism’s own standard 
of comparison, so to speak. As a consequence, “neo-colonialism” might turn out 
to be an intriguing basis for normative judgment.
2. ThE GDR’S POLICY OF SOCIALIST STATE- AND NATION-
BuILDING: MOTIvES AND STR ATEGIES
“We, [the MfAA working group on the 1986 crisis] already concluded at that 
time that our support [for Aden] with the constitution and everything else had 
merely been superimposed on South Yemen. But this was not only because we 
wanted it. [The South Yemenis] wanted it themselves, the party wanted it.”17
(Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GDR Heinz-Dieter Winter in 2012)
The first question to be answered is about the possible motives of the GDR, that is, 
its foreign policy intent, separating these motives from any considerations about 
the intensity of the GDR’s engagement. While the first phase in South Yemen 
was clearly focused on the full diplomatic recognition by the Aden regime, the 
following engagement was part of East Germany’s attempt to further strengthen 
its international status. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1969, 
15 | Prados, 2005.
16 | Lenin, 1963 (1917).
17 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
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South Yemen became one of the few countries of intense East German involvement 
following its “strategy of focus.” One of the highest levels of East German foreign 
policy engagement outside the Eastern Bloc was accomplished in Aden.
2.1 The Determinism of Socialist State-Building
From that time onward, East Berlin emphasized assistance with the 
establishment of a functional state apparatus in the sense of state-building, 
while following its own socialist state model. Apart from constitutional law 
and administration, this also included the promotion of the armed forces in 
general, as well as the establishment of a state security apparatus to support 
and secure the rule of the Yemeni counterpart of the GDR’s SED, the YSP. 
East Berlin also intended to promote the integration of society in the sense of 
its own “homogenization of society” and the creation of the “new human.” 
In this regard, East German foreign policy activities focused on the “third 
sphere” of foreign policy making outside party and state: Cooperation between 
East German society actors and the Yemeni population, such as the media and 
friendship societies, but especially the field of education. Last but not least, 
in the case of socialist nation-building in South Yemen, the “integration of 
society” necessarily was supported by the communication and acceptance of 
an integrative ideology.18
All in all, the GDR’s particular interpretation of Marxism-Leninism offered 
both the motivation and the goal for this “superimposed”19 developmental policy. 
As the SED shared this ideology with a majority of political actors of the YSP,20 
“ideology” not only served as the basis for building trust between South Yemen 
and East Germany, but also served as the point of departure for Soviet and East 
German political. Especially during the 1970s, East Germany was considered 
the young South Yemen’s role model, as Aden’s functionaries never ceased to 
emphasize.21 Due to the GDR’s activities during Phase I and II of its foreign 
policy in Aden, South Yemen’s years of state-building offer numerous examples 
of the GDR’s long-term influence in almost any political field. Apart from the 
determined and intensive creation of South Yemen’s security apparatus, the 
biggest impact was on the genesis of the PDRY’s constitution and legal system, 
which from the very beginning followed a noticeable path-dependency of East 
German development.  The justification behind East Germany’s nation-building 
policy first of all was an ideological one: In the socialist version of state- and 
18 | East-Berlin for example was highly influential in this respect on the training of NF/YSP 
Party cadres in the GDR and the PDRY.
19 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.
20 | Meaning after Salmin was removed from office in 1978.
21 | Stenografische Niederschrif t der Beratung mit der Delegation der NLF Südjemen am 
2.11.1970 im Hause des ZKs, in: BArch SAPMO/DY 30/11407.
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nation-building, all three elements of nation-building intertwine and double-
back on each other in such a way that the ideology’s logic appears as an inevitable 
outcome, defying any critical scrutiny.
2.2 A New Perspective on Nature and Interests of East German 
Activities in the Global South
The majority of analyses occupied with the GDR’s policies in “developing countries” 
focus on the economy and the military as the major “fields of engagement.” This 
study explicitly included a differentiation of the “fields of engagement” in its 
analysis, which leads to fundamentally different conclusions on the nature of 
East German activities and interests in the Global South: Despite the sometimes 
considerable substantial financial and material support provided to the economy 
and the military in Aden, it was other fields in which the GDR’s involvement had 
been the most intense. This involvement also developed a considerably higher 
impact on the receiving country: Administration and state institutions, legal 
affairs and the media, and above all education. Thus, modest military support and 
economic aid were merely used as a means to an end: To strengthen the bonds with 
the supposedly socialist or socialist-friendly regimes of the host countries and to 
stabilize their position. At the end of the day, the SED aimed for the policy fields 
most relevant for state- and nation-building to have an impact on the regimes with 
“socialist orientation” – to guide them towards the East German interpretation of 
the “planned development of socialism.”22
Socialist state-building had been one of the major strategies of Soviet 
engagement in Eastern Europe to multiply its political system led by a vanguard 
party of “the new type.” Thus, East Germany’s foreign policy in South Yemen can 
be interpreted as a copy of the Soviet approach toward the GDR itself: The creation 
of a proxy state by providing the plans and the means necessary to establish a 
socialist state very much like its own. However, by applying this comprehensive 
policy approach, the GDR also felt competent enough to mimic Soviet foreign 
policy toward its so-called satellite states and even toward Eastern Germany of 
the 1940s and 1950s on a lower scale of intensity, though no less ideologically 
dedicated. However, East Berlin had clearly aimed not just to reproduce the Soviet 
model, but the East German interpretation of it. East Berlin tried to transfer its 
own experiences of the socialist path of development to South Yemen. In the 
process, the GDR applied a rigid, intrusive foreign policy to further its national 
interest, while at least some of its foreign policy actors clearly believed in a “higher 
purpose” of their engagement in South Yemen in the sense of “solidarity” and 
22 | Schroeder, 1999, 119ff; Schroeder, 2013, 110ff.
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“socialist internationalism,”23 presenting a socialist version of Kipling’s “The 
White Man’s Burden.”24
The GDR’s “policy of socialist state-building” has to be considered an “imperial 
variant of external nation-building” that demonstrated the temptation “to create 
one’s counterpart in one’s own image.”25 This reveals that the GDR’s attitude toward 
the Global South was based on the assumptions of “modernization theory”:26 The 
“underdeveloped” states of the “Third World” should and could “catch up” with 
the states of the developed world by imitating their process of development.27 As a 
mélange of rational national interest and ideology, Walzer would summarize the 
GDR’s intentions in Aden as “mixed motives” of the intervening state.28 Armed 
with the belief of bringing “socialism” to an underdeveloped country, South 
Yemen above all served East German national interests. Examples like the PDRY 
were meant to fulfill the SED’s hunger for international prestige: Publications of 
the time presented the GDR as a progressive, industrialized nation state, granting 
generous support and assistance to build a “Socialist Civilization” in a developing 
country.29 Without doubt, East German intentions in South Yemen had a “neo-
colonial” tinge to them and thus transgressed the boundaries of foreign policy 
acceptable under international law.
3. ThE IMPACT OF SOCIALIST NATION-BuILDING ON SOuTh YEMEN 
AND ITS SOCIET Y: A TRuLY MARXIST STATE IN ThE ARAB WORLD?
“[M]aking the socialist revolution means transforming existing relations.”30
The NLF in Mukhalla before the British Pullout in 1967
The main questions that now needs to be answered to reach a normative conclusion 
on East German policy are whether the YSP regime was able to react to East German 
and Soviet engagement and direct it in its own interest, and whether the socialist 
approach in the end was embraced by Yemeni society or not. The actual impact of an 
external “policy of state-building” may be rather difficult to assess. In case of South 
Yemen, and with the benefit of hindsight, the analyst can, for example, ask for the 
23 | Kl. Polit. Wörterbuch, 1973, Außenpolitik, in: 86; Also see: Scholtyseck, 2003, 36.
24 | Kipling, 1899.
25 | Hippler, 2005, 177.
26 | On “modernization theory” see: Badie/Berg-Schlosser/Morlino, 2012, 1609-1613.
27 | On the emergence of “Developmentalism” and “Modernization Theory” as part of US 
Foreign Policy due to the perceived threat of Communism during the Cold War see: Baber, 
2001;  For a critique on “Developmental Theory” see for example: Berberoglu, 1992.
28 | Walzer, 1977, 101ff.
29 | See e.g.: Gambke/Jacob/Mätzig, 1974 and Schußter, 1987.
30 | Dresch quotes the Mukalla NLF before the British pullout, in: Dresch, 2000, 120.
A Spectre is Haunting Arabia – How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen
389
reasons why the policy failed in the end. The following subsection seeks the reasons 
for the PDRY’s failure as a state to approach the questions outlined above.
Yemeni Traditions Trump “Socialist Revolution”
The outcome of South Yemen’s process of nation-building can be connected to 
the notion of collective identities’ degree of responsiveness to change: While 
the success and failure of establishing stable state institutions has been a major 
focus of analysis in studies on the emergence of states,31 the other two elements 
regularly receive less attention. This shortcoming could be remedied by including 
the degree of “responsiveness” of collective identities as an additional explanation 
for success or failure of the state-and nation-building process. This hypothesis of 
the correlation between social change and the character of collective identities was 
merely introduced and interpreted very briefly, due to the framework of this study, 
but was included nonetheless as it without doubt supports the argument for the 
failure of the YSP regime to impose its ideology on the Yemeni population.
In the process of nation-building, ideology often, though not always, turns 
out to be the most influential source of social power, contributing to the process 
in three major ways: First, by legitimizing political measures taken; second, by 
mobilizing support for the new system and its implications; and third, to facilitate 
the “integration of society.” The claim made here is that the fulfillment of the last 
two “functions” of ideology in the nation-building process ultimately depends on 
the characteristics of the collective identities exposed to this ideology. Ideology 
can support the formation of a national consciousness and construct national 
identity if, and only if, the prevailing identities are receptive to this ideology. 
Ideally, this consciousness will facilitate the integration of society by increasing 
political participation in the political sphere in scope and intensity and allow the 
mobilization of political action – from below or above.
In the mid-1980s, SED officials claimed that the YSP had “little impact on 
the population and [the party’s] efforts to expand its basis in society remain 
insufficient.”32  The Soviet Union and GDR had identified “tribalism” as the major 
obstacle to socialist nation-building by the NF/YSP-regime.33 But while the newly 
emerging state could only rely on weak state structures, this fact cannot not be 
equated with a lack of social or political structures. Yemen is an example of the 
31 | Hippler describes three inter twined elements as the preconditions for successful 
nation building: Effective and stable state institutions, the integration of society, and an 
attractive ideology, Hippler, 2003.
32 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP […] Ali 
Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 150.
33 | In 1982, a Soviet research mission even began “compiling a tribal and ethnographic 
map of the Hadramaut and Socotra” which potentially could provide extensive knowledge 
on the power distribution among the tribes, in: Cigar, 1985, 779 and October 14th, Daily 
South-Yemeni newspaper, April 9 1984.
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most complex social relationships, which have grown and stabilized over hundreds 
of years. During the “Socialist revolution” in Aden, these traditional social 
structures and identities turned out to be extremely sound and rigid:34 Despite 
the implementation of radical measures to abolish tribalism and tradition as early 
as the late 1960s, traditional social structures clearly withstood the policies of the 
YSP regime. Even within the lower ranks of the YSP, people first and foremost 
followed the local and tribal leaders according to the established patronage system, 
pretty similar to the socio-politico conditions in other Arab states of the time.35
But while the Marxist-Leninist ideology and its values had proven to be alien to 
the South Yemeni people and their social reality, even the radical political leaders had 
a hard time  escaping their collective identities. Even though the figureheads of the 
NF propagated the dissolution of tribal affiliations, they mostly drew their political 
power from their tribal ties. 36  These affiliations explain why it was mostly “tribeless” 
Ismail from the north who advocated convincingly for a profound change of society 
towards socialism. But even the chief ideologue Ismail appears to have recognized the 
lack of coherence between his ideological aspirations, the imposed political system, 
and the actual society on the ground: One of his final decisions was to abolish the 
enumeration of the provinces and give them back their traditional names in March 
1980.37 Ideological principles apparently had never reached the degree of entrenchment 
within the population that was needed for a social transformation of socialist 
connotation in South Yemen. In addition to that, the fundamental encroachments 
into peoples’ everyday lives driven by the YSP regime not only caused displeasure, but 
also outright rejection of the political system. Just as in the GDR before 1961, there was 
a “constant stream of people leaving, mainly the best-educated and most talented.”38
In this study, nation-building has been identified as a policy that can be pursued 
from the inside and from the outside, in which the latter can “make nation-
building easier or harder.” Hippler concludes that even though some developments 
can be initiated or promoted from the outside, others “are very difficult or even 
impossible to furnish from [there],”39 especially ideology. This is where one may 
find an explanation for the failure of the YSP and its Marxist state in the end: Even 
though the regime may have invited socialist state- and nation-building, most of 
the effort came from outside Yemen’s society. The YSP regime was only a very 
34 | Na’ana, Hamida, 1988, in: Dresch, 2000, 120.
35 | Brehony, 2013, 36.
36 | “The tribal chiefs had gone, but were in fact replaced by the NF officials from the 
tribe,” in: Brehony, 2013, 70.
37 | BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/6365 (8 March 1980), in: Brehony, 2013, 
121.
38 | Brehony, 2013, 59.
39 | Hippler, 2005, 9.
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small part of South Yemen’s “inside” and clearly had not been able to rally the 
support of the majority of the Yemeni population.
4. SOuTh YEMEN: SuBjECT OR OBjECT OF FOREIGN POLICY?
“Our relations are not merely multifaceted. They are characterized by completeness, 
by their “totality.” Do you understand what I mean? They are all-embracing.”40
Valery Sukhin, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official 
on Soviet-South Yemeni relations in 1984
“[I consider the Yemenis] a very proud people who were fully convinced of their 
own importance. […] We felt the independence of the South Yemenis at all times 
– which they understandably wanted to maintain.”41
(Hans Bauer, consultant and MfS resident of the GDR to the PDRY)
Halliday argues that both superpowers refrained from direct involvement in the 
Middle East, though both got involved in proxy conflicts.42 Taking into consideration 
the results of the “levels of engagement approach,” this judgment has to be questioned 
– at least for the Soviet Union. In South Yemen Moscow’s actions constantly hovered 
between the levels of “involvement” and active “intervention.” The intention behind 
these actions furthermore must be reconsidered in the light of this study with regard 
to the GDR’s involvement in the PDRY: With the GDR as vicarious agent, the Kremlin 
apparently aimed to “impose” its own political system on South Yemen. Hence, one 
may see the Soviet Union’s ultimate goal in Aden as the inclusion of the PDRY in its 
sphere of influence – and thus clearly to exceed the limits of foreign policy.
However, the Arab countries may not be considered helpless with no agency at all 
during the Cold War, as Halliday rightly summarizes:
“[T]he elites of Turkey, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia were not simply tools of 
Washington, any more than were the radical leaderships of Egypt, Syria, Libya, 
Iraq or the PDRY agents of Moscow.”43
Halliday’s statement can be expanded by concluding that the bipolar structure of the 
Cold War enabled rather than restricted actors of the Global South in general and of 
the Middle East in particular: Between 1946 and 1990, the “developing world” was 
able claim a certain power in the international sphere, by either using the permanent 
40 | Al-Thawra, September 22 1984, quoted in: Cigar, 1985, 781.
41 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.
42 | Halliday, 2005, 125.
43 | Halliday, 2005, 128.
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competition between East and West to strike the best bargain for themselves, or, as 
in the case of radical South Yemen, to opt for the “alternative” in the international 
system.44 As a consequence, one has to take into consideration South Yemen’s actual 
interests and behavior towards Moscow and East Germany to be able to conclude first 
on Aden’s agency in the relationship, and second to be able to unmask the double-
moral standard of East German foreign policy engagement.
Security, that is securing its existence as a state, was the foremost priority of the newly 
independent South Yemeni state after the British withdrawal in 1967. Naturally, 
this led to a certain paranoia towards any foreign interference and a possible return 
of “imperial” powers. This mindset may serve as an explanation for Aden’s initial 
rejection of Western support, the leadership’s extremist political position, and the 
resulting close relationship with Moscow and East Berlin, who readily offered material 
support and consultancy. As opposed to other post-colonial states, however, the 
colonial power hadn’t left behind a fully functional administrative apparatus in South 
Yemen. Due to Britain’s focused interest in the harbor, “administrative resources”45 in 
1967 were restricted to Aden and its vicinity, and thus the bigger part of South Yemeni 
territory was not fully integrated into the state apparatus in the sense of a “modern 
nation state.”46 As a consequence, the Aden regime was confronted with the task of 
building a new state almost from scratch. Even though British administration was 
expanded over the South Yemeni territory successfully, functioning state organs and 
institutions, above all police and military forces, had to be established. For this effort, 
the impoverished country needed financial and technical assistance, and above all, 
due to the lack of education in leadership and population, know-how and training.
In retrospect, the PDRY not only consented to Soviet engagement, and especially 
the East German policy of socialist state- and nation-building, but explicitly 
demanded this kind of support, based on the ideological approach offered by 
Moscow and East Berlin. This analysis repeatedly revealed the South Yemeni 
belief in Lenin’s three inseparable elements,47 as references to all three of them 
can be found in the Party Program of the YSP of 1978.48 Without doubt, this 
ideology served as a comprehensive and cohesive blueprint for nation-building 
in South Yemen, and Moscow provided the assistance it considered necessary for 
its implementation. The GDR advanced as the most active and influential Soviet 
ally in this undertaking. This included the integration of South Yemen in a wider 
44 | See for example, Howell, 1994.
45 | On the role of “imported” administration for “post-colonial states” see: Giddens, 1983, 272.
46 | Giddens, 1983, 255; Also: Weber‘s def. of the state as the agent claiming and owning the 
“monopoly of the legitimate use of [physical] violence,” in: Weber, 2009 (1919), sine pagina.
47 | Schroeder, 2013, 716.
48 | JSP – Avantgarde des jemenitischen Volkes. Auszüge aus dem Programm der JSP (I) 
und (II), in: horizont No.50/51 1978, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.27368, 9.
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community of states, that is the Eastern Bloc and its allies, clearly an upside of 
Aden’s close ties to Moscow for the otherwise isolated radical regime of South 
Yemen. Cigar even speaks of “a sense of acceptance” and the “reassurance [for 
the PDRY regime] that it [was] on the right path.”49 Thus, apart from rational 
considerations of security and economic development, Soviet acknowledgment 
also meant moral confirmation and support for the young Yemeni regime.
On first glance, the Aden regime appears as the weaker part of this unbalanced 
relationship to Moscow and East Berlin. East German reports and minutes from 
meetings even describe PDRY functionaries as naïve and heady, ignorant of time 
frames and the political and economic capabilities of South Yemen.50 However, 
the “1986 crisis” somewhat showed that neither Moscow nor East Berlin had 
full access to all spheres of politics and communication in South Yemen, not to 
mention control of the YSP and its cadres. On top of that, South Yemeni actors 
without doubt were able to develop a certain political self-confidence.51 Supposedly 
small political gestures during the years that followed the founding of the YSP 
hint at the Yemenis’ intention to emancipate themselves from Soviet and East 
German “guidance” and their policy of active nation-building: In 1983, the KfS 
awarded the “Medal of Friendship” to Mielke and the “Medal of Loyalty” to OibE 
“Marquardt,”52 claiming political agency for themselves with this act. And only a 
few years later, a delegation of the GDR’s Ministry of the Interior reports that the 
PDRY wished for a change in terminology for the next Protocol on Cooperation 
[between the security apparatuses]. Instead of consultants, the GDR was supposed 
to send “delegates” which clearly indicated that the YSP regime strived for more 
autonomy and independence.53
Taking into consideration the mounting drive toward more agency within the 
relationship between Aden, Moscow and East Berlin, as well as the impact of the 
“1986 crisis” on this relationship, the most decisive phase of East German presence 
was, without doubt, the 1970s: East Berlin’s policy of socialist state-building was in 
full swing and the intensification of engagement worked toward the manipulation 
49 | Cigar, 1985, 786.
50 | Brief Scharfenberg an Willerding, July 25 1973, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1555/76, 52; Also 
see: Brehony, 2013, 81.
51 | Like the South Yemeni “VO,” the liaison officer of the KfS in the GDR; German: 
Verbindungsoffizier, VO, in: Bericht über die erste Zusammenkunft des neueingesetzten VO 
des KfS der VDR Jemen beim MfS, Mohammed Abdo Mohammed, August 21 1986, in: BStU 
MfS, Abt. X Nr.234 Teil 1 von 2, 262-265.
52 | Brief Botschaft der VDRJ in Berlin, January 19 1983, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 
von 2 438. “Marquardt“ is Major-General Jänicke, ibid. 441/2.
53 | Bericht über die Reise einer Delegation des MdI in die VDRJ, January 1986, in: BStU 
MfS HA VII 7954, 62.
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of the “internal affairs or foreign policy activities.”54 In correspondence with Soviet 
involvement, one may even speak of a drift towards “imposition,” as the continuous 
existence of South Yemen as a state of “socialist orientation” depended largely on 
Moscow’s protection. Clearly, this foreign policy aimed at changing the conditions 
in South Yemen in East German and Soviet interest. On the other hand, any policy 
steps taken by the two foreign powers happened with the explicit consent of the 
Yemeni regime. East German and Soviet intensive activities would not have been 
possible if not for the willingness of the South Yemeni political elite, that is, from 
the “power actors” on the inside.
The Aden regime’s decisions at times clearly were not fully autonomous: 
A relationship of dependency had emerged with Moscow as an economic55 and 
military guarantor of survival. A survival which was contested by its neighbors 
and the major actors of the region. Both Moscow and East Berlin pursued a 
policy based on an attitude one may easily describe as “neo-colonial,” based on 
material and ideological superiority with regard to the Marxist-Leninist ideal of 
development. However, the attitude of merely one side of a relationship does not 
define the ultimate character of it. Even though the GDR first of all served its 
own interests when fulfilling South Yemen’s requests, the Aden regime presented 
itself as a proactive player with clear motives. East German archival sources and 
contemporary witnesses agree that most of the time it was the South Yemenis who 
initiated further cooperation and sought for concrete support from East Berlin. 
Also, the PDRY apparently tried to use the GDR to feel less pressured by Moscow 
and to diversify its dependencies, and succeeded in doing so. 
Socialism had come as an “alien arrival [to South Yemen], tied up for a time, then 
passed on.”56 What can be witnessed today in Yemen’s South, a movement with 
an appetite for separation based on a separate Yemeni identity, clearly is not the 
re-emergence of a Marxist-Leninist state of Soviet and East German making, but 
rather the memories and mentalities of a very Yemeni interpretation. 
“Yemen is a happy country,
the people die standing tall:
they will not cower, will not surrender
their identity.”57
(Mansur Rajih, “The Fatherland”, 1958)
54 | Prados, 2005, 4.
55 | In December 1989, Aden’s debt to Moscow was estimated at about 4 billion, Al-
Ashmali, in: Brehony, 2013, 169.
56 | Mackintosh-Smith, 1997, 171.
57 | Rajih, Mansur, The Fatherland, 1958. Born in northern Yemen in 1958, Rajih was 
imprisoned for murder from 1983–1998. Amnesty International condemned trial and sentence 
as politically motivated.
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